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Let the games begin

Here we are. The Strait of Hormuz is the new “war game.” In just a few days, the world has begun to tremble, even more than it already was.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important maritime passages in the global economic system. Located between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, it connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and, via the Arabian Sea, with the Indian Ocean. Its geographical position makes it a real “bottleneck” for global energy trade, as most oil and liquefied natural gas exports from the Middle East must pass through this narrow maritime corridor. For this reason, the Strait of Hormuz is not only economically important, but also strategically and geopolitically significant, constituting one of the most sensitive points for global energy security.

Geographically, the strait has a minimum width of about 33 kilometers, while the navigation lanes used by commercial ships are much narrower, organized according to a maritime traffic system with two corridors of about three kilometers each, separated by a safety zone. This configuration makes maritime traffic particularly vulnerable to disruptions, accidents, or military tensions. For this very reason, the control and security of the Strait of Hormuz are considered a strategic priority for many states and international organizations.

From a geo-economic perspective, the strait is a key hub for the global trade in hydrocarbons. According to leading international energy analyses, around one-fifth of the oil consumed globally passes through this passage. Every day, between 20 and 21 million barrels of oil and petroleum products pass through the strait, accounting for around 20% of global consumption. In addition to crude oil, a significant share of the global trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through this route, especially that exported from Qatar, one of the world’s leading producers of LNG. It is estimated that around 25-30% of the global trade in liquefied natural gas passes through the Strait of Hormuz.

The main commodities passing through this passage are therefore crude oil, refined products, and liquefied natural gas. However, in addition to energy resources, the strait is also crossed by container ships, bulk carriers, and tankers carrying other types of cargo, such as chemicals, metals, industrial raw materials, and consumer goods destined for Asian, European, and North American markets. The presence of large commercial ports in the Persian Gulf, such as those located in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, further contributes to the intensity of trade flows through the strait.

The main players involved in the geopolitical dynamics of the Strait of Hormuz are primarily the coastal states, particularly Iran and Oman, which directly border the strait and share territorial control over it. Iran, in particular, exerts a strong strategic influence on the region, thanks in part to its military presence along the coast and on the islands near the strait. From a political and military standpoint, Tehran has repeatedly declared, in situations of international tension, the possibility of restricting or blocking maritime traffic in the strait as a means of geopolitical pressure.

Alongside the states directly bordering the strait, other key players are the major oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These states depend heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for the export of their energy resources to major international markets. Consequently, the stability and safety of navigation in the strait are considered essential for their economies and for the balance of global energy markets.

A leading role is also played by the major international powers, particularly the United States, which maintains a significant military presence in the Persian Gulf region. The US Navy, through its Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain, conducts patrol and maritime security operations to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait. Other powers, such as the United Kingdom and France, also periodically participate in naval surveillance and security missions in the region. In recent years, China has also shown a growing strategic interest in the stability of Middle Eastern energy routes, given its heavy dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf.

From a legal and diplomatic point of view, navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is governed by various international rules and agreements. The main regulatory framework is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982. This convention establishes the principle of “right of transit” in straits used for international navigation, guaranteeing civilian and military vessels the possibility of passing through these passages without unjustified interference from coastal states. However, Iran has not formally ratified UNCLOS and has repeatedly expressed restrictive interpretations of the right of transit, arguing for the need to regulate the passage of foreign warships in its territorial waters.

In addition to the international legal framework, there are also several multilateral initiatives and maritime security missions aimed at ensuring the stability of the strait. These include the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), an international coalition created in 2019 with the aim of protecting commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Several countries are participating in this initiative, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other regional partners.

Another important element is infrastructure investment aimed at reducing dependence on the strait. Some Gulf countries have developed alternative pipelines that allow oil to be exported without passing through Hormuz. Significant examples include the pipeline connecting Saudi Arabia’s oil fields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, and the pipeline connecting Abu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. However, the capacity of these alternative infrastructures remains limited compared to the total volume of energy exports from the region.

It is therefore a crucial hub of the world’s economic geography and one of the most sensitive points in the global energy system, whose security and stability can shift the financial balance of entire regions of the world.

Geopolitical perspectives

Now that the strategic and geo-economic value of the strait is clear, let’s try to think about the disaster that is unfolding and, above all, who benefits from it. Who, indeed, is the question. At first glance, this operation fits consistently into the plan to dissolve Europe with its political and financial powers.

In fact, it is the eurozone that is suffering the hardest blow, in a dramatic way. The possibility that logistics, transport, and even industrial production will suffer a sharp slowdown is a well-founded fear and, unfortunately, a very real one. In fact, it is already happening. But this is consistent, we repeat, with the intention to destroy the European architecture. This is a mission that Trump has declared and that also suits Putin’s Russia, and not only that: none of the other countries like the old European power order, especially those that have suffered decades or centuries of European colonialism. And, to be honest, they do not like America either, with its return to imperialism, heir to that of Europe, but everything must be dealt with in its own time, and now is the time for the collapse of the old continent.

Now, given its function as a central hub for global energy trade, any significant change in freedom of navigation in the strait would have immediate effects not only on energy markets but also on the geopolitical balance between the major world powers. From a strategic analysis perspective, at least three distinct scenarios can be hypothesized: the total closure of the strait to naval traffic, a selective closure aimed at favoring certain trading partners, and a prolonged militarization of the area.

The first scenario involves the total closure of the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Such an event, even if temporary, would have extremely significant consequences for the global economy. Since approximately 20% of the oil consumed worldwide passes through this passage, its interruption would immediately cause a severe shock to energy supply, the prelude to which we are already seeing in part at this very moment. The prices of oil and liquefied natural gas would rise rapidly on international markets, with knock-on effects on inflation, industrial production, and financial stability. In short, chaos. And chaos is always useful to someone, because it allows them to do things that cannot be done in times of peace and order. Is that clear?

A total blockade of Hormuz would put everyone in crisis to the point of having to take remedial action. A short war would involve a very strong show of force by the US and Israel (even atomic weapons would be considered), and would allow the conflict to be resolved quickly, effectively crushing Iran in a violent war, perhaps with the support of other European countries and those in the Gulf. To do this, the conditions must be extremely sophisticated, with a complex game of blackmail and power leverage that leaves no other choice for all participants. America would have to find, or violently demand, exceptional decision-making authority and military operational capability, while also resolving the moral dilemma. In practice, Iran would have to be placed in a position where it could be accused of being the absolute evil and responsible for all the consequences of the blockade. The information war and the speed of action in a multi-domain context would play a central role here.

For Europe, the consequences would be particularly significant. Although in recent years the European Union has partially diversified its energy sources, especially after the energy crisis linked to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a significant share of oil and gas imports continues to come from the Middle East. The closure of the strait would lead to a drastic reduction in supplies from countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. This would put severe pressure on European energy markets, forcing member states to increase imports from other areas such as the United States, West Africa, or the North Sea, at significantly higher costs.

The impact on Asia would be even greater, as many Asian economies are more dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, India, and especially China import a significant portion of their energy needs via routes through the Strait of Hormuz. A total closure of the passage could therefore slow down economic growth across the entire Asian region, causing instability in financial markets and potentially triggering emergency policies to secure energy supplies. However, let’s not make the mistake of thinking that China and other Far Eastern countries will allow this to happen without reacting…

The second scenario envisages a selective closure of the strait, limited to ships bound for or coming from Europe, with preferential treatment for Asian trade routes, particularly those bound for China and Russia. Although complex from an operational and legal point of view, this scenario could emerge in a context of strong geopolitical polarization, characterized by the formation of opposing economic blocs.

In such a situation, some Gulf producer countries could decide to favor their Asian partners, who are already the main buyers of Middle Eastern oil. China, for example, has become the world’s leading oil importer over the past two decades and has developed increasingly close economic relations with several countries in the region. A selective closure of the strait could therefore further strengthen the energy link between the Persian Gulf and East Asia.

For Europe, the consequences would be particularly problematic, as it would be excluded from one of the world’s main energy routes. This could accelerate the process of reorganizing energy supply chains, increasing European dependence on alternative suppliers such as the United States, Norway, or African countries. At the same time, such a scenario would strengthen the geopolitical weight of Asia, and China in particular, in the global energy system.

Furthermore, selective discrimination in maritime traffic could call into question some fundamental principles of international maritime law, increasing the risk of diplomatic and military tensions. The European Union and its allies could respond with economic pressure, naval protection missions, or diplomatic initiatives aimed at restoring freedom of navigation.

However, it is true that this second scenario would cause the war to be prolonged and reshaped. Diplomacy would play a greater role here, seeking ways in and out of Tehran. Iran would have a very interesting card to play. The theater of operations would be remodeled, probably transforming the Gulf into a “special” area, with temporary and atypical management, in which the players would confront each other at different times or through alliances, without completely freeing the area from conflict. Medium- and long-term timescales, with which to manually redefine the global balance of power. It is (perhaps) a less bloody scenario.

Finally, the third scenario concerns the prolonged militarization of the Strait of Hormuz for a period exceeding 100 days. In this case, maritime traffic would not necessarily be interrupted, but it would be subject to a high level of military control, with the constant presence of naval fleets, surveillance systems, and potential incidents between the armed forces of different countries.

Long-term militarization would have a significant impact on the costs of maritime trade. Shipping companies and maritime insurers would significantly increase risk premiums for ships passing through the area, making the transport of goods and energy resources more expensive. This increase in logistics costs would inevitably be reflected in the final prices of raw materials and industrial products in a much more significant way than is already the case.

From a geopolitical perspective, a prolonged military presence could transform the Strait of Hormuz into a veritable zone of strategic confrontation between major powers. The United States, European powers, China, and potentially other emerging powers could strengthen their naval presence in the region to protect trade routes and their energy interests. This would increase the risk of military incidents or unintended escalation.

At the same time, prolonged militarization could further encourage the development of alternative routes and infrastructure, such as land pipelines or new sea routes through other regions. However, such solutions would require very high investments and long implementation times, making it difficult to completely replace the strategic role of the Strait of Hormuz in the short term.

Once again, the question returns to the initial one: who benefits? The world is changing very quickly.

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This is part 2 of a two-part analysis. Please read part 1 here.

President Putin sent a gracious message to Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, personally congratulating him on his election as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Words do (italics mine) matter:

“At a time when Iran is confronting armed aggression, your efforts in this high position will undoubtedly require great courage and dedication. I am confident that you will honourably continue your father’s work and unite the Iranian people in the face of an immense ordeal.”

After stressing foreign “aggression” and continuity of government, Putin reiterated the strategic partnership in no uncertain terms:

“For my part, I would like to reaffirm our unwavering support for Tehran and solidarity with our Iranian friends. Russia has been and will remain a reliable partner for the Islamic Republic.”

Cue to a desperate President Trump, or neo-Caligula, placing a call to Putin, essentialy to ask him to intervene as a mediator to convince Iran into accepting a ceasefire. What he heard instead was a polite enumeration of unpleasant facts regarding the war of choice launched by the Epstein Syndicate on Iran.

Trump is throwing his favorite envoy Steve Witkoff under the bus, alongside puny Jared Kushner and the push up clown posing as Secretary of Forever Wars, as the ones who forced him to bomb Iran. It’s Witkoff who claimed after the phone call that Russia stated it’s not transfering intel data to Iran, as confirmed, he said, by presidential assistant for international affairs Yuri Ushakov.

Nonsense. Ushakov never said such a thing. Russians at the highest political level do not comment on military matters linked to their strategic partnerships with both Iran and China.

Now for the facts.

Russian intel, Iranian execution, and no military treaty

It’s no secret that Moscow has shared what can be defined as industrial amounts of intel – and combat data – gathered in Ukraine with Tehran. A great deal of the advanced jamming tech and satellite intel leading to the serial destruction of THAAD radars, Patriot radars, and every other ultra-heavy fixed radar installations comes from both Russia and China.

Even if footage of Russian S-400 and Krasukha systems successfully intercepting American missiles has not been released, and probably it won’t be, the fact is Russian technicians are helping Iranian crews fine-tune the trajectories of missiles and drones during flight.

So there is a sophisticated, practical interplay in effect between Chinese and Russian high-resolution orbital imagery and targeting assistance, and swarms of cheap, $20,000 drones.

Russia provided Iran with the super-charged, upgraded and battle-tested Geran-3 and Geran-5 drones. These are the facto Russian Shaheds: lethal, inexpensive cruise missiles, equipped with anti-jamming via their Komet antenna, and able to reach 600 km/h. They are now all over the battlefield.

Now for the extremely savoury part.

Slightly over a week before the Epstein Syndicate decapitation strike on Tehran on February 28, Russian intel sent to the IRGC the fully developed US strike plan – complete with target matrices, launch platforms, timing sequences.

So the IRGC knew exactly what to expect.

Six weeks before that, in December last year, Moscow signed a 500 million euros weapons deal with Iran, including the delivery of 500 Verba MANPADS launchers and 2,500 advanced 9M336 missiles.

Essentially, Russia is providing Iran with intel and air defense. And China provides anti-ship missiles and real-time satellite surveillance.

The beauty of it all is there’s no formal trilateral alliance in play. And no military treaty. It’s all embedded in their interlocking strategic partnerships.

Considering all of the above, it’s no wonder the puzzled Epstein Syndicate is blaming Russia and China intel for certified hits such as the satellite communications station part of the communications and cyber defense unit of the Israeli military near Beer Sheeba.

And we’re not even talking about the next, inevitable Russian move: installing the extremely powerful S-500 Prometheus air defense system in Iran.

How to capture market share without breaking a sweat

The Russia-Iran strategic partnership – even if does not include a military treaty – works in several interlocked levels.

On the energy front. Moscow, under Putin’s orders, is now evaluating what may eventually become a definitive pre-emptive halt of remaining exports to the EU, so they may be redirected to Asia at ever-climbing prices.

The EU after all is phasing Russian gas out: short-term contracts will be banned starting late April; full LNG ban by the end of the year; and ban on pipeline gas by 2027.

So a lot of LNG is already being directed to China, India, Thailand and Philippines. As in Follow The Money: LNG tankers diverted mid-voyage from European ports to Asia, offering higher spot prices.

Every day that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed – and it will remain closed – Russia captures extra market share, anywhere, at a premium, without breaking a sweat.

Secretary of Iranian Security Council Ali Larijani made it crystal clear in several languages, including Russian: when it comes to Hormuz, there are “open opportunities for everyone”, as in partnership with allies Russia and China; and it’s “a dead-end for warmongers”, as in the Epstein Syndicate and other hostile entities.

Russia certainly does not need the Strait of Hormuz open. Still, it received a nod and a wink from Larijani acknowledging their partnership.

The Epstein Syndicate war on Iran is becoming immensely profitable for the Russian state budget – something not seen since early 2022 price hikes. With the Strait of Hormuz closed and Qatar LNG completely out of the picture, Russian energy is the only game in town: no more a sanctioned commodity. Talk about the war on Iran weaponizing Russian oil and gas.

What will India learn from its double betrayal

India, by contrast, is a case that could break any psychoanalytic cabinet. New Delhi is chairing BRICS in 2026. It’s one of BRICS founders, and Iran is a full BRICS member. Every BRICS original member condemned the Epstein Syndicate war on Iran: Brazil, Russia, China, South Africa. India waited three days to basically say that Iran and the US should talk, “nicely”.

While Prime Minister Modi was signing defense deals with that death cult in West Asia – 40% of its weapons exports go to India – a fellow BRICS member was being bombed with some of these very same weapons.

Modi in effect was in Israel gushing about “motherland” (India) and “fatherland” (Israel) only 48 hours before the death cult in West Asia and the wider Epstein Syndicate launched their decapitation strike on Tehran.

For all practical purposes, the Modi gang privileged weapons deals – and Trump’s tariff relief – over international law.

And it gets even filthier.

India could not even issue a pro-forma statement condemning the American torpedo attack on Iranian warship Iris Dena on international waters – after the Indian Navy hosted Iris Dena in a military exercise. All BRICS founding members condemned it. Not India.

The controversy is still rolling: India may have even given the coordinates of the – unarmed and invited – Iris Dena to the Americans. And now Sri Lanka, under American pressure, refuses to hand over the dead bodies to Iran.

It will take time to evaluate how deep India’s betrayal blew BRICS apart. As it stands, BRICS are in a coma.

Perhaps there may be something auspicious coming out of it. And that’s thanks to unbounded Iranian finesse.

Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, had a phone call with Abbas Araghchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran.

Aragchi played it like a consumate gentleman. He did not lecture India, or exploded in rage – American-style. He was restrained, as in letting India know that Iran is fully aware New Delhi is in a very tight spot, and that Tehran interprets this strategic ambiguity as relatively useful, and not hostile.

In practical terms, Iran is virtually India’s neighbor: Iran’s southern Makran coast is right across the Arabian Sea from India’s western shore. Kandla Port in Gujarat to Chabahar in Sistan-Balochistan is just 550 nautical miles. Talk about a maritime corridor, which for centuries was a Maritime Silk Road between two civilizational states.

And now it’s all back, as part of the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), which links 3 BRICS: Russia, Iran and India, the theme of my ‘Golden Corridor’ documentary shot last year in Iran.

Moreover, Iran is the nearest major source of oil and LNG for India.

Russia is teaching India its own lesson. New Delhi will have to pay dearly for it – as in no more energy discounts, even if Moscow is ready to potentially raise India’s share of Russian crude imports to up to 40%, as confirmed by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.

New Delhi may be out of the picture in terms of understanding the enormous stakes of the Epstein Syndicate war on Iran.

Moscow-Beijing though, are on a whole new level. They are investing on the optimal outcome: a war that the Empire of Chaos cannot win, and at a price it cannot afford to pay.

The stage is set. Russia briefed Iran on what was coming; Russia-China provide crucial intel and 24/7 satellite surveillance; and Decentralized Mosaic does the heavy lifting. The Exceptionalist strike “plan” was deeply compromised from the start.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Andiamo al sodo: il BRICS è in uno stato di profonda crisi. È stato compromesso, almeno temporaneamente, dall’India, che ospiterà il vertice del BRICS alla fine di quest’anno. Si tratta di un tempismo davvero inopportuno.

L’India ha tradito, in sequenza, sia la Russia che l’Iran, membri a pieno titolo del BRICS. Sigillando la sua alleanza con il Sindacato Epstein, Nuova Delhi ha dimostrato, senza ombra di dubbio, non solo di essere inaffidabile: oltre a ciò, tutta la sua retorica altisonante di “guidare il Sud del mondo” è crollata, definitivamente.

Il BRICS dovrà essere completamente rinnovato: anche il Gran Maestro Sergey Lavrov dovrà giungere a questa inevitabile conclusione. Il triangolo originale di Primakov, “RIC”, muore ancora una volta. Anche se l’India non verrà espulsa dal BRICS – potrebbe essere sospesa – ‘RIC’ dovrà necessariamente essere tradotto come Russia-Iran-Cina, o anche “RIIC” (Russia-Iran-Indonesia-Cina).

Per quanto riguarda la nostra posizione sulla Grande Scacchiera, il Prof. Michael Hudson sintetizza: “La grande finzione abilitante è svanita. L’America non sta proteggendo il mondo dagli attacchi di Russia, Cina e Iran. Il suo obiettivo a lungo termine di controllare il commercio mondiale del petrolio richiede il terrorismo continuo e la guerra permanente in Medio Oriente”.

Qualunque cosa accada in futuro, il terrorismo in corso in tutta l’Asia occidentale rimarrà – come nel caso dell’Epstein Syndicate, per perversa impotenza e rabbia pura, scatenando una pioggia nera sulla popolazione civile di Teheran perché gli iraniani si sono rifiutati di accettare un cambio di regime.

Inoltre, il nocciolo della questione almeno fino alla metà del secolo è più chiaro che mai. O prevarrà il sistema eccezionalista del caos internazionale, oppure sarà sostituito dall’uguaglianza guidata dal Sud del mondo, con la Cina che guida da dietro.

Questa è un’analisi in due parti sull’interazione chiave dei BRICS in relazione alla guerra contro l’Iran. Qui ci concentriamo sulla Cina. Successivamente ci concentreremo sulla Russia e sull’India.

Non sparate! Sono di proprietà cinese!

Le speculazioni del MICIMATT (complesso militare-industriale-congressuale-intelligence-media-accademico-think tank) sulle informazioni dei servizi segreti statunitensi che “suggeriscono” che la Cina si stia preparando ad aiutare l’Iran sono, ancora una volta, la prova di come la sofisticatezza cinese eluda totalmente le “analisi” insignificanti provenienti dalla Barbaria.

Innanzitutto: l’energia. La Cina e l’Iran hanno stipulato un accordo venticinquennale del valore di 400 miliardi di dollari, reciprocamente vantaggioso, che essenzialmente interconnette gli investimenti nell’energia e nelle infrastrutture.

A tutti gli effetti, lo Stretto di Hormuz è bloccato a causa del ritiro delle assicurazioni occidentali in preda al panico. Non perché Teheran lo abbia bloccato.

La Cina riceve il 90% delle esportazioni totali di petrolio greggio iraniano, che rappresentano il 12% delle importazioni totali cinesi. Il punto chiave è che la Cina ha ancora accesso alle esportazioni iraniane, così come a quelle saudite, emiratine, kuwaitiane, qatariote e irachene: questo perché la partnership strategica Teheran-Pechino è solida, il che significa che le petroliere dirette in Cina possono attraversare lo Stretto di Hormuz in entrambe le direzioni.

Pechino e Teheran hanno negoziato un passaggio sicuro bilaterale, operativo dallo scorso venerdì, in quello che a tutti gli effetti è un corridoio marittimo cruciale chiuso a livello multilaterale. Non c’è da stupirsi che sempre più petroliere stiano ora inviando sui loro transponder le parole magiche “di proprietà cinese” (il corsivo è mio). È il loro passaporto diplomatico navale.

Traduzione: si tratta di un cambiamento epocale, la fine dell’egemonia talassocratica dell’Impero del Caos.

La “libertà di navigazione” in alcuni corridoi di connettività marittima selezionati ora significa “un accordo con la Cina”. Di proprietà cinese, sì, ma non europea, giapponese o sudcoreana.

Ciò che Teheran ottiene, in abbondanza, è l’aiuto high-tech cinese per la guerra contro il Sindacato Epstein.

E questo è iniziato ancora prima della guerra.

La nave cinese Liaowang-1, un SIGINT (signals intelligence) di nuova generazione e nave di tracciamento spaziale, da settimane naviga vicino alla costa dell’Oman, fornendo all’Iran informazioni elettromagnetiche in tempo reale sui movimenti navali e aerei del Sindacato Epstein.

Questo spiega in larga misura la precisione millimetrica della maggior parte degli attacchi iraniani.

La Liaowang-1, scortata dai cacciatorpediniere Type 055 e Type 052D, trasporta almeno cinque cupole radar e antenne ad alto guadagno, in grado di tracciare con precisione almeno 1.200 bersagli aerei e missilistici contemporaneamente utilizzando algoritmi di rete neurale profonda. La portata dei suoi sensori è di circa 6.000 chilometri.

Il vantaggio è che questi sensori possono tracciare allo stesso modo un satellite cinese o una portaerei americana.

Traduzione: la Cina sta aiutando il suo partner strategico senza sparare un solo colpo, semplicemente navigando con una piattaforma di sorveglianza che elabora reti neurali in acque internazionali.

Quindi sì: la Cina sta registrando la guerra, in diretta, 24 ore su 24, 7 giorni su 7.

A complemento della Liaowang-1, oltre 300 satelliti Jilin-1 registrano letteralmente tutto, costituendo un enorme database ISR dell’Impero del Caos in azione.

Non ci sarà alcuna conferma ufficiale né da Teheran né da Pechino. Tuttavia, le informazioni reali cinesi, trasmesse su Beidou, sono state certamente cruciali per Teheran per distruggere completamente l’infrastruttura della 5^a flotta statunitense in Bahrein, un centro radar, di intelligence e database completo e la spina dorsale dell’egemonia statunitense in Asia occidentale.

Questo capitolo della guerra, affrontato proprio all’inizio, rivela come Teheran abbia colpito al cuore quando si è trattato di distruggere il gioco di potere progettato dall’impero per controllare i punti strategici e il transito di energia, negando così l’accesso alla Cina.

Per quanto possa sembrare sorprendente, ciò a cui stiamo assistendo in tempo reale è l’Iran che nega all’Impero del Caos l’accesso a punti nevralgici marittimi, porti e corridoi di collegamento navale. Per il momento si tratta del Golfo Persico e dello Stretto di Hormuz. Presto, con l’aiuto degli Houthi yemeniti, potrebbe aggiungersi anche Bab-al-Mandeb.

Questo è un cambiamento epocale che avvantaggia non solo la Cina, ma anche la Russia, che ha bisogno di mantenere aperte le sue rotte marittime di esportazione.

Se avete denaro, andate in Oriente

Ora seguiamo il denaro. La Cina detiene 760 miliardi di dollari in titoli del Tesoro statunitense. Pechino ha ordinato a tutto il suo sistema bancario di vendere i propri titoli come se non ci fosse un domani e, contemporaneamente, di accumulare oro.

La Cina e l’Iran già commerciano in yuan. D’ora in poi, il laboratorio BRICS che sperimenta sistemi di pagamento alternativi deve raggiungere la velocità di fuga. Ciò comporta la sperimentazione di tutti i meccanismi, dal BRICS Pay all’Unità.

Poi c’è l’esodo di denaro in arrivo. Arabia Saudita, Emirati Arabi Uniti, Qatar e Kuwait stanno già “rivedendo” ogni accordo, dubbio o meno, che hanno stipulato con Washington. Collettivamente, controllano non meno di 2.000 miliardi di dollari di investimenti statunitensi: titoli del Tesoro, partecipazioni tecnologiche nella Silicon Valley, immobili, ecc.

Un’ondata di denaro sta iniziando a invadere l’Asia orientale. La destinazione preferita, allo stato attuale, è la Thailandia, non Hong Kong. Ma anche Hong Kong sarà coinvolta e, ancora una volta, questo porterà enormi profitti alla Cina, poiché Hong Kong è uno dei nodi chiave della Greater Bay Area, insieme a Shenzhen e Guangzhou.

Le riserve strategiche e commerciali di greggio della Cina sono sufficienti per un massimo di quattro mesi. Oltre a ciò, è possibile aumentare le importazioni di greggio e gas naturale, via mare e tramite oleodotti, dalla Russia, dal Kazakistan e dal Myanmar.

Pertanto, una combinazione di riserve strategiche sufficienti, diverse fonti di approvvigionamento e “il passaggio dalla domanda di petrolio a quella di elettricità” qualificano ancora una volta la resilienza cinese. Il blocco di Hormuz potrebbe compromettere l’Occidente, ma non la Cina.

Segue nostro Telegram.

L’Europa primo importatore di armi al mondo

Il 9 marzo 2026 lo Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ha pubblicato il suo rapporto annuale sui trasferimenti di armi convenzionali. Il dato principale è inequivocabile: l’Europa è diventata la prima regione importatrice di armi al mondo, superando per la prima volta dagli anni Sessanta sia l’Asia-Oceania sia il Medio Oriente. Le importazioni europee di sistemi d’arma maggiori sono più che triplicate (+210%) nel periodo 2021-2025 rispetto al quinquennio precedente, passando dal 12% al 33% del totale globale.

Il volume complessivo dei trasferimenti internazionali di armi è cresciuto del 9,2% tra i due periodi — il maggiore aumento dal 2011-2015 — e questo incremento è quasi interamente trainato dall’Europa. Come ha dichiarato Mathew George, direttore del programma SIPRI sui trasferimenti di armi: “L’aumento brusco dei flussi di armi verso gli Stati europei ha spinto i trasferimenti globali in crescita di quasi il 10%. Le consegne all’Ucraina dal 2022 sono il fattore più evidente, ma la maggior parte degli altri Stati europei ha iniziato a importare significativamente più armi per rafforzare le proprie capacità militari contro una crescente minaccia percepita dalla Russia.”

Chi compra. L’Ucraina è il primo importatore mondiale in assoluto, con il 9,7% delle importazioni globali (rispetto allo 0,1% del quinquennio precedente). Seguono in Europa la Polonia e il Regno Unito. I tre Paesi insieme assorbono quasi la metà delle importazioni europee. Ma il fenomeno è diffuso: le importazioni dei 29 Paesi NATO europei sono cresciute del 143% nel periodo.

Il caso della Polonia è emblematico. Le importazioni polacche sono aumentate dell’852% — quasi nove volte — rispetto al 2016-2020. Varsavia è il primo importatore NATO in Europa, con il 17% del totale delle importazioni NATO europee e il 3,6% di quelle mondiali. La quasi totalità delle forniture proviene da fuori Europa: il 47% dalla Corea del Sud e il 44% dagli Stati Uniti. La Polonia sta costruendo quello che dichiara essere il più grande esercito di terra d’Europa, equipaggiandosi quasi esclusivamente con armi americane e sudcoreane.

Chi vende. Gli Stati Uniti hanno ulteriormente consolidato il proprio dominio come fornitori di armi, passando dal 36% al 42% del mercato globale delle esportazioni. In termini assoluti, le esportazioni americane sono cresciute del 27%. Il dato strategicamente più rilevante è questo: per la prima volta in due decenni, la quota maggiore delle esportazioni americane è andata all’Europa (38%) anziché al Medio Oriente (33%). Le esportazioni USA verso l’Europa sono aumentate del 217%. Il 48% di tutte le importazioni europee proviene dagli Stati Uniti — soprattutto aerei da combattimento e sistemi di difesa aerea a lungo raggio.

La Francia è il secondo esportatore mondiale con il 9,8% del mercato, in crescita di oltre un quinto. L’80% delle esportazioni francesi va però fuori dall’Europa — soprattutto a India, Egitto e Grecia. La Germania è salita al quarto posto globale, superando la Cina, con il 5,7% del mercato — anche grazie alle forniture all’Ucraina.

466 F-35 ordinati dall’Europa. Un numero riassume la dipendenza europea dagli Stati Uniti meglio di qualunque analisi: alla fine del 2025, dodici Paesi europei avevano 466 caccia F-35 di Lockheed Martin ordinati o preselezionati per l’ordine. A questi si aggiungono almeno 78 ordini israeliani di sistemi missilistici di difesa aerea e 66 ordini tedeschi per analoghi sistemi. L’Europa sta investendo massicciamente in armi — ma le sta comprando in America.

Il paradosso: comprare armi da chi ti destabilizza

Il rapporto SIPRI fotografa un paradosso che nessun commentatore mainstream osa nominare. L’Europa sta triplicando le importazioni di armi perché percepisce una crescente minaccia dalla Russia e una crescente incertezza sull’impegno americano a difendere i propri alleati. Lo dice testualmente il rapporto: “Le percezioni di minaccia riguardo alla Russia, amplificate dalle incertezze sull’impegno degli USA a difendere i propri alleati europei, hanno alimentato la domanda di armi tra gli Stati membri NATO.”

Tradotto: l’Europa compra armi americane perché non si fida più degli americani. La stessa America di Donald Trump che ha abbandonato l’Ucraina, minacciato di invadere la Groenlandia (territorio di un alleato NATO), attaccato verbalmente Spagna e Regno Unito nel mezzo della guerra contro l’Iran, e ha dichiarato apertamente che le esportazioni di armi sono uno strumento di politica estera — come esplicita la nuova America First Arms Transfer Strategy.

L’Europa sta comprando sicurezza dallo stesso Paese che produce la sua insicurezza. E ogni caccia F-35 acquistato, ogni sistema Patriot installato, ogni miliardo speso al Pentagono è un miliardo che non va all’industria europea della difesa — quella stessa industria che Bruxelles dice di voler rafforzare con programmi come il SAFE (Security Action for Europe), dotato di 150 miliardi di euro in prestiti agevolati per acquisti intra-UE.

Ma i numeri parlano chiaro: nonostante la retorica dell’autonomia strategica, il 48% delle armi europee viene ancora dagli USA. L’Europa non è una potenza che si riarma per difendersi: è un cliente che si riarma per comprare protezione. Pedina, non giocatore.

Bunker nucleari a ruba fra i funzionari USA

Mentre l’Europa compra armi per prepararsi alla guerra, chi la guerra l’ha lanciata si prepara a sopravviverle. Secondo un’inchiesta del Telegraph ripresa da ZeroHedge, almeno due membri senior del gabinetto Trump hanno acquistato bunker anti-nucleari privati dall’inizio del conflitto con l’Iran.

Ron Hubbard, proprietario della Atlas Survival Shelters — azienda texana specializzata in rifugi sotterranei — ha dichiarato di essere stato “inondato di chiamate” dall’inizio delle operazioni militari, con un aumento delle richieste di dieci volte rispetto alla media. Ha rivelato che due membri del gabinetto Trump sono tra i nuovi clienti: “Uno di loro mi ha mandato un messaggio ieri, chiedendomi: ‘Quando sarà pronto il mio bunker?'”

I rifugi in questione non sono cantine rinforzate. Sono strutture in acciaio temprato con porte blindate anti-esplosione, sistemi di purificazione dell’aria, e dotazioni di lusso — cinema, piscine, poligoni di tiro — progettate per resistere ad attacchi con droni o testate convenzionali. I prezzi partono da 20.000 dollari per i modelli base e arrivano a diversi milioni per i compound più sofisticati.

Lo stesso Hubbard è però brutalmente onesto sui limiti: “Nessun bunker al mondo è progettato per resistere a una bomba bunker-buster americana. Se gli americani ti vogliono morto, sei morto.” L’ironia è tragica: i membri del governo che hanno ordinato il bombardamento dell’Iran si comprano rifugi perché sanno che le ritorsioni sono inevitabili.

L’azienda ha aperto un nuovo ufficio a Dubai — dove le richieste sono esplose dopo che i missili iraniani hanno colpito la città. “Pensavano di non vedere mai cadere bombe. Adesso che le bombe cadono, vorranno tutti un rifugio. È un dato di fatto.” Atlas Survival Shelters fatturava in media 2 milioni di dollari al mese nel 2026; per il prossimo mese prevede ricavi di 50 milioni. Il business della paura nucleare è il più fiorente dell’economia di guerra.

Tra i clienti precedenti dell’azienda figurano nomi come Mark Zuckerberg e Andrew Tate. Le élite globali si preparano al peggio. Non perché siano paranoiche — ma perché conoscono le conseguenze di ciò che hanno messo in moto.

Due facce della stessa medaglia

I due fenomeni — l’Europa che si riarma e i funzionari USA che comprano bunker — non sono notizie separate. Sono le due facce della stessa medaglia, e quella medaglia si chiama economia di guerra permanente.

Da un lato, l’industria bellica americana raccoglie i dividendi della paura: il 42% del mercato globale delle armi, 466 F-35 ordinati dall’Europa, esportazioni in crescita del 217% verso il Vecchio Continente. BlackRock — il più grande gestore patrimoniale del pianeta — detiene miliardi in Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman ed Elbit Systems. Ogni bomba sganciata sull’Iran è un ordine di riacquisto. Ogni sistema Patriot installato in Europa è un contratto pluriennale di manutenzione e munizioni.

Dall’altro, chi siede ai tavoli dove si decide la guerra sa perfettamente che le conseguenze sono incontrollabili. Lo Stretto di Hormuz — attraverso cui transita il 20% del petrolio mondiale — è di fatto chiuso dal 28 febbraio. Il Brent ha superato i 120 dollari. Il Qatar ha dichiarato la force majeure sui contratti di gas. L’Iran ha colpito Dubai, basi americane, territorio israeliano. I missili balistici iraniani hanno dimostrato di poter raggiungere obiettivi che si credevano al sicuro.

E chi ha innescato tutto questo? Gli stessi che ora comprano bunker. Non è cinismo: è la logica interna del sistema. La guerra genera profitti per chi la finanzia, terrore per chi la subisce, e rifugi sotterranei per chi la ordina. Il circuito è perfetto.

L’Europa paga il conto

L’Europa si trova intrappolata in una spirale autodistruttiva. Spende per riarmarsi contro una minaccia russa reale ma strumentalmente amplificata, comprando armi dal Paese che destabilizza il suo fianco orientale e il suo approvvigionamento energetico. L’Europa riceve tra il 12 e il 14% del proprio GNL dal Qatar attraverso Hormuz — forniture ora interrotte. La dipendenza dal gas americano cresce, e con essa la subordinazione politica.

Il programma europeo SAFE da 150 miliardi dovrebbe incentivare acquisti intra-UE, ma i grandi fornitori europei — Francia, Germania, Italia — continuano a esportare la maggior parte delle proprie armi fuori dal continente. La Francia vende l’80% fuori Europa. L’UE ha un volume di esportazioni pari al 28% del mercato globale — quattro volte la Russia, cinque volte la Cina — ma non riesce a equipaggiare sé stessa. Come ha osservato il generale Hodges: “La relazione transatlantica esiste ancora, ma non è più la stessa e probabilmente non lo sarà mai più.”

Lo SIPRI stesso nota che la “nuova strategia America First per i trasferimenti di armi” dell’amministrazione Trump rende esplicito ciò che era sempre stato implicito: le esportazioni di armi americane sono uno strumento di controllo politico, non di solidarietà tra alleati. Ogni F-35 venduto all’Europa è un vincolo di dipendenza tecnologica, logistica e strategica che durerà decenni.

La guerra è il prodotto

Il rapporto SIPRI esce il 9 marzo 2026 — dieci giorni dopo l’inizio delle operazioni militari USA-Israele contro l’Iran. I dati coprono il periodo 2021-2025, quindi non includono ancora l’impatto dell’attuale conflitto. Ma come ha dichiarato il ricercatore SIPRI Pieter Wezeman, gli Stati del Medio Oriente avevano già piazzato ordini significativi prima dell’escalation — e il conflitto in corso spingerà ulteriormente la domanda, “soprattutto di sistemi anti-missile e di difesa aerea.”

La spesa globale per la difesa ha raggiunto i 2.700 miliardi di dollari nel 2024 — un aumento del 9,4% in termini reali, il più alto dalla fine della Guerra Fredda. Il commercio di armi è tornato ai volumi del 1989, l’ultimo anno della Guerra Fredda. Non è un caso: stiamo vivendo l’inizio di una nuova Guerra Fredda, ma questa volta con bombe vere che cadono su Teheran, Dubai e le petroliere nel Golfo Persico.

La domanda che il rapporto SIPRI non pone — ma che noi poniamo — è: chi beneficia di questo ciclo? L’Europa, che spende sempre di più e si sente sempre meno sicura? I cittadini americani, i cui funzionari comprano bunker mentre spendono le loro tasse in bombe? O i gestori di fondi, le lobby del complesso militare-industriale, i donatori che finanziano le campagne e dettano le guerre?

La guerra è il prodotto. Il caos è la materia prima. L’Europa compra armi, l’America compra bunker, e chi siede al tavolo dove si decidono i conflitti conta i profitti.

Lo scacco matto è in corso. Ma chi lo sta dando a chi?

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The proverb “revenge is a dish best served cold” traces to French (“La vengeance se mange froide”), appearing in English literature by the 19th century. Most Americans do not know the French orign of the proverb… 

It entered popular culture thanks to Star Trek. In Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (1982), Khan Noonien Singh delivers the line during a tense video call with Admiral Kirk:

Ah, Kirk, my old friend… do you know the Klingon proverb? ‘Revenge is a dish best served cold.’ And it is very cold…

As the war against Iran continues to escalate, Russia finds itself in a powerful position to deal with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which has kowtowed to the United States and allowed the US to dominate militarily the Persian Gulf on behalf of Israel, and India, which has taken advantage of their long friendship with Russia to engage in a disgustingly abject act of sycophancy with Israel at the expense of fellow BRICS member Iran. Russia has delivered a firm diplomatic message to both.

During an Ambassadorial Roundtable in Moscow on March 5, 2026, Sergei Lavrov addressed the Ambassadors from the GCC countries, who had come to Moscow seeking Putin’s intervention in shutting down Iran’s military operations in retaliation for the sneak attack by Israel and the United States. The event was supposed to focus on the Ukrainian crisis, digital threats, and international information security, but Lavrov devoted significant time to the escalating Middle East conflict, particularly the US-Israeli military strikes on Iran and Iran’s retaliatory actions affecting Gulf states.

The GCC ambassadors reportedly urged Russia to pressure Iran to de-escalate and halt its missile/drone strikes on or over their territories (e.g., targeting US/Israeli-linked sites). Lavrov responded critically and pointedly rejected a one-sided approach. Lavrov shut them down in an extraordinary display of tough love. I’ve posted the video of his remarks below.

Lavrov began by expressing condolences for civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure in Persian Gulf countries caused by the ongoing conflict. But he immediately challenged the GCC’s selective criticism… He asked whether they had condemned the “US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran” or specific incidents like the reported killing of 170 schoolgirls in Minab by US/Israeli actions). Ouch!

He continued by highlighting their hypocrisy in pushing for pressure only on Iran while not equally condemning the initiators (US and Israel), noting that accepting such a request would imply acceptance of the original aggression.

Lavrov asserted that the ongoing US and Israeli operations were aimed at driving a wedge between Iran and its Arab neighbors (GCC states), noting that these actions were an attempt to sabotage recent positive normalization trends (e.g., Saudi-Iran rapprochement, UAE/Iran engagement).

He advocated for a unified, balanced international response: an immediate cessation of all hostilities (not just Iranian ones), political/diplomatic settlement, and safeguarding legitimate security interests of all Persian Gulf states.

He reminded the Ambassadors that Russia has long promoted a Concept of Collective Security in the Persian Gulf (for over 20 years) and expressed appreciation for GCC efforts in this regard (e.g., trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi). He concluded by calling on the GCC and others to add their voices to calls for de-escalation and against selective UN resolutions (e.g., any Bahrain-proposed draft condemning only Iran). Without issuing a direct threat, Lavrov was putting the GCC on notice that Russia expected them to hold Israel and the United States accountable for the economic disaster that is confronting the GCC.

Then there is India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent trip to Israel was ill-timed, coming three days before Israel and the US attacked Iran. Although India is one of the founders of BRICS, he made a big show of elevating the India-Israel relationship from a “strategic partnership” to a “Special Strategic Partnership for Peace, Innovation, and Prosperity.” Modi signed 16 agreements and announcement of 11 joint initiatives in areas like defense (joint development/production with tech transfer), critical/emerging technologies (led by national security advisors), cyber security (Indo-Israel Cyber Centre of Excellence in India), agriculture, water management, labor mobility (facilitating over 50,000 Indian workers in Israel over five years), culture, education, and more.

Modi, along with Netanyahu, announced the advancement of free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations (first round concluded, next in May; Modi stated a deal would be finalized “soon”). He also reaffirmed India’s strong defense and counter-terrorism cooperation with Israel, including potential transfers like Iron Dome technology. Talk about bad timing. Modi’s obsequious behavior in Israel was a direct insult to the other members of BRICS… Advocating warm relations with a country guilty of genocide has not been well-received by other BRICS members.

The attack by Israel and the United States on Iran, a member of BRICS, has created a potentially catastrophic economic problem of Modi and India. India imports the vast majority of its crude oil needs (around 85-88% of total consumption), as domestic production is limited. India’s total crude oil imports average roughly 5 million barrels per day (bpd) in recent data (early 2026 figures). The Persian Gulf countries (primarily Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Qatar; sometimes broadly including other Middle East suppliers) are a major source, especially via the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of these flows pass. Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz has created an emergency situation for India.

The war against Iran has given Russia tremendous leverage over India. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, in remarks made on March 6, 2026, emphasized that Russia would not disclose specific quantitative data on oil exports to India, citing “too many ill-wishers” and security concerns. This came in response to reports of potential large deliveries (e.g., up to 22 million barrels in a week) amid India’s supply crunch. Peskov also noted the Iran war has significantly boosted demand for Russian energy resources, positioning Russia as a “reliable supplier” of oil and gas.

Russia, instead of leaving India to sleep in the bed it made with Israel, highlighted its readiness to support India, but at a cost. For instance, earlier in March (around March 4), sources indicated Russia was prepared to divert oil cargoes (e.g., ~9.5 million barrels near Indian waters) and potentially raise India’s share of Russian crude imports to up to 40%. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak mentioned receiving “signals of renewed interest” from India in larger volumes due to the crisis.

Amid the surge in demand for Russia’s Urals crude, Russia hit India with a firm, but diplomatic, reminder of the cost of betraying a friend. Prior to the attack on Iran, Russia sold oil to India with deep discounts ($10-13 below Brent pre-conflict). While promising to help India compensate for its loss of Persian Gulf oil, Russia inoformed Modi that India would have to pay a premium of $4-5 over Brent for March/April deliveries. This reflects market forces rather than explicit “assurances” of continued discounts; some reports frame it as Russia treating it more as “business” without prior friendship-based concessions.

I am speculating here, but I think Modi is going to reconsider the agreements he made with Israel… Especially if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed for six months or more. What do you think?

Original article:  sonar21.com

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Let’s cut to the chase: BRICS is in deep coma. Blown up, at least temporarily, by India – which happens to host the BRICS summit later this year. Talk about horrendous timing.

India has betrayed, sequentially, both full BRICS members Russia and Iran. By sealing its alignment with the Epstein Syndicate, New Delhi has proved, without the shadow of a doubt, not only that it’s untrustworthy: more than that, its whole lofty rhetoric of “leading the Global South” has collapsed – for good.

BRICS will have to be completely revamped: even Grandmaster Sergey Lavrov will have to reach this inescapable conclusion. The original Primakov triangle, “RIC”, once again dies another day. Even if India is not expelled from BRICS – it could be suspended – “RIC” will necessarily have to be translated as Russia-Iran-China, or even “RIIC” (Russia-Iran-Indonesia-China).

When it comes to where we stand on the Grand Chessboard, Prof. Michael Hudson synthesizes it: “The great enabling fiction is gone. America is not protecting the world from attack by Russia, China and Iran. Its long-term aim of controlling the world oil trade requires ongoing terrorism and permanent war in the Middle East.”

Whatever happens next, ongoing terrorism across West Asia will remain – as in the Epstein Syndicate, out of pervert impotence and sheer rage, unleashing a Black Rain over the civilian (italics mine) population of Tehran because Iranians refused to go for regime change.

Moreover, the heart of the matter until at least the mid-century is more crystal clear than ever. Either the Exceptionalist system of international chaos prevails. Or it will be replaced by Global South-driven equality, with China leading from behind. 

This is a two-part analysis on key BRICS interplay related to the war on Iran. Here we focus on China. Next we will focus on Russia and India.

Don’t shoot! I’m Chinese owned!

Clueless MICIMATT (military-industrial-congressional-intelligence-media-academia-think tank complex) speculation about US intel “suggesting” China is preparing to help Iran is, once again, evidence of how Chinese sophistication total evades the puny “analyses” emanating from Barbaria.

First of all: energy. China and Iran follow a $400 billion, mutually beneficial 25-year agreement that essentially interlocks energy and infrastructure investment.

For all practical purposes, the Strait of Hormuz is blocked because of panicky Western insurance withdrawal. Not because Tehran blocked it.

China receives 90% of total Iran crude oil exports; that represents 12% of total Chinese imports. The key point is that China still has access to Iranian exports as well as Saudi, Emirati, Kuwaiti, Qatari and Iraqi exports: that’s because the strategic partnership Tehran-Beijing is iron-clad, meaning that Chinese-bound tankers can cross the Strait of Hormuz back and forth.

Beijing-Tehran negotiated a bilateral safe passage, operational since last Friday, in what for all practical purposes is a multilaterally-closed crucial maritime corridor. It’s no wonder that more and more tankers are now texting on their transponders the magic words Chinese Owned (italics mine). That’s their naval diplomatic passport.

Translation – and that’s a mega-game-changer: the end of the thalassocratic hegemony of the Empire of Chaos.

“Freedom of navigation” in selected maritime connectivity corridors now means “a deal with China”. Chinese owned, OK; but not European, Japanese or even South Korean.

What Tehran gets, in spades,is high-tech Chinese help for the war with the Epstein Syndicate. And that started even before the war.

The Chinese intel gathering Liaowang-1, a next generation SIGINT (signals intelligence) and space tracking vessel, for weeks has been navigating near the coast of Oman, providing Iran with real-time electromagnetic intel on the Epstein Syndicate’s naval and aerial movements.

That accounts to an enormous degree for the pinpoint accuracy of most Iranian strikes.

The Liaowang-1, escorted by Type 055 and Type 052D destroyers, carries at least five radar domes and high-gain antennas, accurately tracking at least 1,200 air and missile targets simultaneously using deep neural network algorithms. The range of its sensors is roughly 6,000 kilometers.

The beauty is that those sensors can equally track a Chinese satellite or an American carrier.

Translation: China is helping its strategic partner without firing a single shot, just by sailing a neural network processing surveillance platform in international waters.

So yes: China is recording the war, live, 24/7.

Complementing the Liaowang-1, over 300 Jilin-1 satellites record literally everything, constituting a massive ISR database of the Empire of Chaos in action.

There won’t be any official confirmation either from Tehran or Beijing. But Chinese real-life intel, relayed on Beidou, was certainly crucial for Tehran to totally destroy the US 5^th Fleet infrastructure in Bahrain – a comprehensive radar, intel and database center and the backbone of US hegemony in West Asia.

This chapter of the war, tackled right at the beginning, reveals how Tehran went to the jugular when it comes to smashing the imperially designed power play of controlling strategic chokepoints and energy transit, thus denying Chinese access to them.

As stunning as it sounds, what we are watching, in real time, is Iran denying key maritime chokepoints, ports and naval connectivity corridors to the Empire of Chaos. For the moment, that’s Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Soon it may be, with the help of the Yemeni Houthis, also the Bab-al-Mandeb.

Now that’s a max game-changer profiting not only China but also Russia – which needs to keep its maritime export routes open.

Got money, go East

Now let’s follow the money. China holds $760 billion in US Treasury bonds. Beijing has ordered its whole banking system to sell their Treasures like there’s no tomorrow, and simultaneously hoard gold.

China and Iran already trade in yuan. From now on, the BRICS lab experimenting with alternative payment systems must reach escape velocity. That involves all mechanisms being tested – from BRICS Pay to The Unit.

Then there’s the incoming money exodus. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Kuwait are already “reviewing” every deal – dodgy or otherwise – they have struck with Washington. Collectively, they control no less than $2 trillion in US investments: Treasury bonds, Silicon Valley tech stakes, real estate, the works.

A tsunami of cash is beginning to invade East Asia. The favorite destination, as it stands, is Thailand – not Hong Kong. That will come – and once again, it will immensely profit China as Hong Kong is one of the key nodes of the Greater Bay Area, alongside Shenzhen and Guangzhou.

China’s strategic and commercial crude reserves  are enough for up to 4 months. Apart from that, imports of crude and natural gas can be increased, by sea and by pipelines, from Russia, Kazakhstan and Myanmar.

So a mix of enough strategic reserves; several supply sources; and “demand-side shift from oil to electricity” qualify once again as Chinese resilience. The blockade of Hormuz may break the West. But it won’t break China.

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Recent statements suggest the U.S. has more control over India’s energy policy than have been previously acknowledged, reports Betwa Sharma.

The United States has “allowed” Indian refiners to purchase Russian oil for the next 30 days amid concerns over energy shortages because of the war in Iran.

It is expected New Delhi will also “ramp up purchases of U.S. oil,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a post on X on Friday.

Bessent said that the decision was made to “enable oil to keep flowing into the global market” and that it will not “provide significant benefit to the Russian government as it only authorises transitions involving oil already stranded at sea.”

The U.S. is letting India buy Russian oil: it is hard to believe the headline that has been flashing everywhere.

India has always taken pride in strategic autonomy, so the idea that the U.S. is effectively not only approving but also announcing India’s energy purchases to the world is not only a sign of how frayed that autonomy is under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, but also a little humiliating.

It is also not true.

India’s imports of Russian crude continued to decline in early 2026, yet Russia remained the country’s largest supplier. In January, India imported 1.215 million barrels per day (bpd), down roughly 12 percent from December, followed by 1.04 million bpd in February.

And yet to Fox News, Bessent said,

“The Indians have been very good actors. We had asked them to stop buying sanctioned Russian oil this fall. They did. They were going to substitute with US oil. But to ease the temporary gap in oil around the world, we have given them permission to accept Russian oil. We may unsanction other Russian oil.”

It is remarkable, then, that India has remained largely silent as the U.S. repeatedly claims that  India has stopped buying Russian oil, even though Russia continues to be India’s top supplier despite the downturn.

Under Pressure

In the process of keeping Washington happy and avoiding trade tariffs as high as 50 percent, India has significantly diluted relationships with countries like Russia and Iran, partners with whom it shares far older and deeper ties than the U.S., and who have rarely behaved like fair-weather friends or resorted to threats and coercion.

The U.S. strikes on Iran and wider conflict in the Middle East and the Gulf put India in a tough spot.

On the one hand, the Modi government has to continue to avoid upsetting the U.S. by appearing less dependent on Russian oil.

On the other hand, with the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly half of India’s crude oil imports pass, New Delhi may have few alternatives but to rely more on shipments from Russia.

The Strait of Hormuz and the Musandam Peninsula on December 6, 2018. (MODIS Land Rapid Response Team, NASA GSFC / Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain)

In 2025, under U.S. pressure, the Modi government scaled back oil imports from Russia.

By December 2025, Indian imports of Russian oil had fallen to their lowest level in two years. At the same time, OPEC’s share of India’s crude imports rose slightly to 50 percent, up from 49 percent the previous year, while Russia’s share dropped to 33.3 percent from 36 percent in 2024.

New Delhi has been framing all this as simply diversifying its supply sources.

It is also yet to clarify whether U.S. President Trump’s claim that Modi had agreed to stop importing Russian oil as part of the U.S.-India trade deal was true or not.

After India signed the deal last month, which critics and political opponents say heavily favours the U.S. and is especially detrimental to Indian farmers, Washington rescinded the 50 percent tariffs on Indian imports, including the 25 percent levy to deter it from buying Russian oil, and slashed them to 18 percent.

However, recent developments complicate the economic rationale for India to side with the U.S. and distance itself from old partners like Russia and Iran, and to make concessions such as limiting purchases of Russian energy.

Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Trump’s tariff policy introduced by Trump, which had threatened steep duties on several trading partners.

That decision potentially removes a major source of leverage the U.S. had over India.

At present, the Trump administration has imposed a temporary universal tariff of roughly 15 percent under a different law that applies across countries.

At 15 percent, Indian exporters are paying less than the negotiated 18 percent rate, but the tariffs last only 150 days unless the U.S. Congress approves them.

If the situation holds, New Delhi may see little reason to rush into a trade deal with Washington that demands painful concessions and the abandonment of old partners.

Wrong Side of History

Even in the unfolding confrontation involving Iran, the U.S., and Israel, New Delhi appears to have moved much closer to the Western position.

While building relations with Israel and the United States, India carefully maintained ties with Iran. But all that changed last year when, under pressure from the U.S., it withdrew from Chabahar, the Iranian port that India had developed over a decade to access Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan.

India hasn’t formally joined any U.S.-Israel bloc, but its actions make its leanings clear.

India admits it gave Iranian ship coordinates to the U.S., which sank it with a torpedo.

Modi’s recent visit to Israel was warm and effusive, filled with praise for Israel, yet it made no mention of the atrocities in Gaza, despite India being home to the world’s third-largest Muslim population and historically maintaining strong sympathies for Palestine.

Prime Minister Modi’s departure from Israel for New Delhi on February 26, 2026. (Prime Minister’s office / Government of India / Public Domain)

Despite a significant Shia community, for whom Iran’s Ayatollahs hold spiritual and religious importance, and despite deep cultural, linguistic, and historical ties, New Delhi has largely remained quiet on the U.S.?Israel strikes on Iran, sticking mainly to calls for restraint and diplomacy.

At home, the government has also cracked down on protests and social media posts supporting Iran or criticising Israel, a pattern that echoes the suppression of voices critical of Israel during the Gaza conflict.

The Mystery of the Russian Oil

Announcing the U.S.-India trade deal on his Truth Social platform in February, Trump said that Modi had “agreed to stop buying Russian oil, and to buy much more from the United States and, potentially, Venezuela.”

Modi’s own post on the deal only thanked Trump for the reduced tariff of 18 percent, with no mention of stopping purchases of oil from Russia.

With the Prime Minister and his ministers staying silent and Russia insisting it has no knowledge of any such deal, the big question remains: did India really make this massive concession, flipping decades of strategic autonomy on its head?

Bessent’s claim that India needed a 30-day waiver from the U.S. to purchase Russian oil during the ongoing crisis lends more weight to it.

The Indian government is again silent on Bessent’s claim that it needs Washington’s permission to buy oil from Russia. The Opposition has slammed Modi for the US’s “blackmail” and “condescension”. Modi’s own party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is hailing it as a success of “India’s strategic oil diplomacy”.

Clear acknowledgement could make Modi look small before his adoring, loyal right-wing base, who see him as a leader who has restored India’s global standing since he and the BJP first came to power in 2014 and went on to win two more national elections.

With a pliant media, Modi can usually maintain his strongman, popular image, laughing and hugging leaders of the most powerful countries and negotiating as an equal.

But the story becomes harder to control when the other side is Trump, who has never been known for diplomatic restraint, and in his second term, he has been even blunter, announcing things on social media — starting with his claim that he stopped the four–day–long India–Pakistan conflict in May 2025.

Even though the comment clearly annoyed New Delhi, not least because it made India look like a smaller power being schooled by a bigger one, Trump has continued to say it.

These humiliations have become routine, such as Trump claiming Modi had supplicantly asked him, “Sir, may I see you, please?,” and yet India rarely reacts publicly anymore.

The silence is partly because India can’t afford to upset the U.S., and partly because, as many other world leaders who’ve faced Trump’s verbal antics have learned, there’s often little point in responding at all.

Original article:  consortiumnews.com

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Cambiai il vento

Negli ultimi mesi, la nuova Siria post-Assad ha cercato di ridefinire il proprio posizionamento regionale puntando con decisione sul dossier energetico come leva di riapertura diplomatica e stabilizzazione interna.

Dopo anni di isolamento politico e collasso infrastrutturale, Damasco ha avviato una strategia orientata ad ampliare le cooperazioni nel settore del gas e dell’elettricità, presentando l’energia come terreno pragmatico di dialogo con i paesi arabi confinanti. In questo quadro, gli accordi con Giordania ed Egitto non rappresentano soltanto intese tecniche per aumentare i volumi di fornitura, ma costituiscono anche strumenti attraverso cui la leadership siriana tenta di reinserirsi nelle reti economiche regionali, alleggerire la pressione interna e ricostruire gradualmente margini di manovra politica.

Il 26 gennaio è stato firmato un accordo tra la Syrian Petroleum Company e la Jordanian National Electricity Company con l’obiettivo di garantire circa 141 milioni di piedi cubi al giorno (4 milioni di metri cubi) di gas naturale, trasportati attraverso il territorio giordano, per sostenere il sistema elettrico siriano. L’intesa è stata sottoscritta alla presenza del ministro siriano dell’Energia Mohammad al-Bashir e del suo omologo giordano Saleh al-Kharabsheh.

Secondo il ministro siriano, l’accordo rappresenta un passo rilevante negli sforzi governativi volti a rafforzare l’approvvigionamento di combustibile necessario al settore elettrico e a migliorare l’affidabilità della rete, specialmente dopo le difficoltà accumulate negli ultimi anni. Dal canto suo, il ministro giordano ha sottolineato che la fornitura contribuisce alla stabilità del comparto elettrico siriano, precisando che il pompaggio è iniziato il 1° gennaio con volumi oscillanti tra 30 e 90 milioni di piedi cubi al giorno.

Dopo oltre un decennio di guerra, sanzioni internazionali e deterioramento delle infrastrutture, le centrali siriane operano molto al di sotto della loro capacità nominale. I blackout prolungati scandiscono la quotidianità delle famiglie, paralizzano attività commerciali e industriali e mettono sotto pressione ospedali e servizi essenziali. In questo contesto, ogni incremento delle forniture energetiche viene presentato come un sollievo immediato più che come una scelta geopolitica.

Tuttavia, fin dall’avvio dei flussi, è emersa una questione cruciale: qual è la reale origine del gas che arriva in Siria?

Le dichiarazioni ufficiali parlano di cooperazione araba e stabilizzazione regionale, ma evitano di specificare con precisione la provenienza primaria del combustibile. Si tratta di gas egiziano? È produzione interna giordana? Oppure è gas israeliano che attraversa intermediari arabi prima di alimentare le turbine siriane?

Gli accordi firmati a gennaio tra Siria, Giordania ed Egitto definiscono quantità, tempistiche e modalità operative, ma non chiariscono esplicitamente l’origine molecolare del gas. Nel Mediterraneo orientale, dove le infrastrutture energetiche sono fortemente interconnesse, l’origine non è un elemento semplice né politicamente neutrale.

Fonti regionali indicano che il gas in arrivo non può essere considerato egiziano in senso stretto, ossia derivante esclusivamente da giacimenti situati in territorio egiziano. Le operazioni si basano su una nave galleggiante di stoccaggio e rigassificazione noleggiata dalla parte egiziana nel porto di Aqaba, in Giordania, suggerendo che il ruolo del Cairo sia prevalentemente logistico e infrastrutturale.

Secondo dati ufficiali giordani, l’ultimo carico di gas naturale liquefatto giunto nel regno è arrivato nel novembre 2025 dagli Stati Uniti. Tale fornitura, però, sarebbe stata sufficiente per meno di un mese di esportazioni verso la Siria ai livelli annunciati, alimentando dubbi sulla sostenibilità di un approvvigionamento completamente alternativo alle fonti israeliane.

Parallelamente all’intesa con la Giordania, Damasco ha raggiunto un accordo con l’Egitto per ricevere circa 60 milioni di piedi cubi al giorno di gas in cambio della concessione del transito di gas ed elettricità destinati al Libano attraverso il territorio siriano. In questo schema, la Siria non è soltanto beneficiaria, ma anche anello intermedio di una catena energetica regionale più ampia.

Il ministero egiziano del Petrolio ha annunciato la firma di memorandum d’intesa volti a regolare le forniture e a soddisfare le esigenze del settore petrolifero siriano, presentando l’accordo come un passaggio tecnico. Secondo indiscrezioni riportate dalla stampa internazionale, l’intesa sarebbe collegata ai meccanismi di sostegno energetico al Libano, e il gas destinato alla Siria funzionerebbe come compensazione per i diritti di transito concessi. Il trasporto avviene tramite l’Arab Gas Pipeline, progetto approvato nel 2000 e lungo circa 1.200 chilometri, che collega Egitto, Giordania, Siria e Libano. Prima del 2011, questo gasdotto trasportava direttamente gas egiziano verso le centrali siriane. Oggi, però, l’architettura delle forniture regionali è profondamente mutata. L’Egitto riceve infatti circa un miliardo di piedi cubi al giorno tramite il collegamento con Israele, oltre a ulteriori volumi attraverso le interconnessioni con la Giordania. Nel dicembre 2025, il primo ministro israeliano Benjamin Netanyahu ha annunciato un nuovo accordo con l’Egitto del valore di circa 35 miliardi di dollari, descritto come il più grande nella storia energetica israeliana. La società NewMed Energy, partner nel giacimento Leviathan, ha indicato che l’intesa prevede forniture aggiuntive fino al 2040. Anche la Giordania importa gas israeliano sulla base di un accordo firmato nel 2016 ed entrato in vigore nel 2020, con una durata di 15 anni e un valore stimato intorno ai 10 miliardi di dollari. Di conseguenza, sia l’Egitto sia la Giordania dipendono in misura significativa dalle importazioni israeliane per alimentare i rispettivi sistemi energetici. Entrambi hanno concluso accordi di fornitura con la Siria, ma nessuno dei due ha chiarito pubblicamente l’origine finale del gas destinato alle centrali siriane.

La struttura delle reti rende inoltre complessa qualsiasi distinzione netta. La Giordania non è un grande produttore di gas: la produzione interna è limitata rispetto alla domanda, in particolare nel settore elettrico. Il terminale di GNL ad Aqaba consente l’importazione di carichi dal mercato globale, ma tali volumi svolgono un ruolo complementare. Il gas israeliano costituisce una componente fondamentale della stabilità energetica del regno. La Siria, che prima del 2011 produceva oltre un miliardo di piedi cubi al giorno, oggi genera solo una frazione di quel volume. L’approvvigionamento esterno rappresenta quindi una necessità urgente.

Un dubbio ancora irrisolto

Resta però il nodo politico: non esiste un accordo di pace o un processo di normalizzazione ufficiale tra Siria e Israele, ma esiste il fatto concreto che il governo israeliano ha promosso, sostenuto e sponsorizzato le milizie dei tagliagole di Al Jolani, ora presidente della “nuova Siria democratica”. Se il gas israeliano fosse effettivamente incorporato nei flussi attuali, arriverebbe in Siria in assenza di una cornice diplomatica dichiarata. Il paradosso è evidente: mentre parte del territorio siriano rimane sotto occupazione israeliana, la possibilità che energia di origine israeliana alimenti le centrali siriane assume un significato simbolico che va oltre la dimensione economica.

Al tempo stesso, la leadership siriana si trova davanti a una realtà stringente: la crisi elettrica incide direttamente sulla stabilità sociale e sulla capacità di ricostruzione economica. I blackout prolungati ostacolano la ripresa industriale, aggravano le condizioni di vita e alimentano il malcontento. L’energia diventa, pertanto, uno strumento di sopravvivenza nazionale e di legittimazione politica.

La domanda rimane aperta: la Siria sta ricevendo gas arabo o sta consumando energia israeliana reindirizzata attraverso reti arabe? Fino a quando i contratti non saranno resi pubblici con maggiore trasparenza e le catene di fornitura chiarite nei dettagli, la risposta resterà immersa in una struttura regionale che tende a sfumare l’origine pur garantendo la continuità dei flussi. E ciò potrebbe anche diventare uno strumento di ricatto per i Paesi limitrofi, in un secondo momento, giacché questo progetto è stato benedetto dalle Potenze occidentali.

Nel Mediterraneo orientale, il gas non è soltanto una merce energetica ma è un elemento di influenza, dipendenza e riallineamento geopolitico, inserito in equilibri delicati che la nuova Siria post-Assad cerca oggi di navigare attraverso una politica di cooperazione energetica ampliata e pragmaticamente orientata alla stabilizzazione. E chissà cosa verrà dopo.

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LNG shipping rates have gone from $40,000 to $300,000 per day — a 650% vertical climb in less than a week — and the men who ordered the strikes that caused this are still strutting around the Oval Office talking about “strength.” 

That is not strength. That is the economics of catastrophe unfolding in real time, and it will reach every kitchen table from Tokyo to Turin before anyone in the beltway finishes reading the intelligence brief they probably won’t bother to read anyway.

The Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day transit, representing north of 20% of global seaborne oil trade — has effectively ceased to function as a commercial corridor, and what’s doing the closing is less about Iranian missiles, and more the insurance market, the invisible hand of capital that everyone in Washington claims to worship suddenly delivering its honest verdict on Operation Epstein Epic Fury. Major commercial operators, oil companies and insurers have effectively withdrawn from the corridor, creating a de facto closure comparable in character to the Red Sea disruption — but with far larger volumes at stake. The market has spoken. The war lobby apparently has not listened.

Qatar declared force majeure on gas exports, and sources say it may take at least a month to return to normal production volumes — meaning global gas markets will experience shortages for weeks even in the unlikely scenario the conflict ends today. Read that sentence again slowly. Even if it stopped right now. Even if every bomb stopped falling this afternoon and every missile went cold, the damage is already baked in, the supply chain already severed, the cryogenic infrastructure already in shutdown sequence — because the cryogenic nature of LNG requires specialised storage maintaining temperatures of approximately -160°C, making it impossible to simply store excess production in temporary facilities, and once disruptions occur, restarting operations requires weeks of careful, sequential rehabilitation to avoid thermal shock to the entire system.

Qatar supplies 20 percent of the world’s LNG — and if that’s off the table, countries must scramble for what remains. Japan scrambles. South Korea scrambles. Taiwan scrambles. India, which sources nearly half of its LNG intake from Qatari supply under long-term contracts , scrambles. These are not abstract geopolitical actors — these are the factories that make your semiconductors, the power grids that keep hospitals running, the fertiliser supply chains that feed a billion people, and every one of them is now competing in a spot market that has been stripped of a fifth of its supply overnight. This is what cascading systemic failure looks like before it hits the news cycle.

Dutch TTF futures, Europe’s benchmark gas contract — rose 35% on Tuesday alone, with prices on the week running roughly 76% higher, while the Japan-Korea Marker benchmark reached a one-year high. Europe, still carrying the scar tissue of 2022 when Russia’s war on Ukraine sent the continent into an energy convulsion it spent hundreds of billions surviving, is now staring down a second shock — this one detonated by an ally that drew the target circles, pulled the trigger, and handed Europe the wreckage as a fait accompli — no consultation, no warning, no framework for what follows, just the bill. The shutdown also affects downstream products including urea, polymers, methanol and aluminium , meaning the price destruction moves through industrial supply chains like a slow haemorrhage through every sector that uses energy as an input — which is every sector.

Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd and CMA CGM have all suspended operations through the Strait of Hormuz, rerouting vessels around the southern tip of Africa — adding weeks to transit times and driving costs across the entire container shipping ecosystem. The global just-in-time economy was already running thin margins after Covid, and now it absorbs voyages six weeks longer with insurance premiums at the ceiling and no clear date when any of it normalises. Every delay is a price. The Bangladeshi textile worker whose factory loses power this month didn’t vote for this war. The Filipino seafarer rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope for the third time this year didn’t either. The cost transfers downward with perfect precision — away from the people who made the decision, toward everyone who had no part in it and no protection from it.

Because what is happening is not a regional energy disruption — it is the deliberate removal of approximately one quarter of the world’s seaborne energy supply from the global market, not by accident, not by miscalculation in the margins, but as the direct and foreseeable consequence of a war of choice waged on behalf of a government in Tel Aviv that has now pulled Washington into a confrontation with consequences that will metastasise across every economy on the planet that cannot print its own reserve currency. Countries heavily reliant on imported energy with limited fiscal space — Japan, India, South Africa, Turkey, Hungary, Malaysia — are the most exposed to the shock, while the architects of this disaster enjoy the insulation of domestic shale production and the privilege of pricing oil in their own currency. The Global South will pay the highest price for a war it never voted for, never wanted, and was never once consulted about.

The Covid pandemic cost the world approximately $13 trillion and this will be orders of magnitude worse to a level of economic suicide that would make Darwin roll in his grave. There is no exit ramp here, only the compounding arithmetic of a war of choice whose costs will be distributed with ruthless precision to everyone who had no say in the choosing. It will arrive not as a headline but as a bill — a gas bill in Rotterdam, a power cut in Karachi, a factory closure in Busan, that no emergency fund will fully reach in time. Billions of people across Asia, Africa, and the Global South are now the unconsulted collateral of a war fought for reasons they were never given a vote on and objectives they were never shown. They will survive it, most of them. They will rebuild, and they will remember — with a clarity that no Pentagon briefing, no State Department white paper, and no carefully worded presidential statement will ever extinguish — exactly who decided, and exactly who paid. But the invoice for betrayal will come due and that will dwarf the economic one.

Original article:  islanderreports.substack.com

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The wind has changed

In recent months, the new post-Assad Syria has sought to redefine its regional positioning by focusing decisively on the energy dossier as a lever for diplomatic reopening and internal stabilization.

After years of political isolation and infrastructural collapse, Damascus has launched a strategy aimed at expanding cooperation in the gas and electricity sectors, presenting energy as a pragmatic area for dialogue with neighboring Arab countries. In this context, the agreements with Jordan and Egypt are not only technical arrangements to increase supply volumes, but also tools through which the Syrian leadership is attempting to reintegrate itself into regional economic networks, ease internal pressure, and gradually rebuild its political room for maneuver.

On January 26, an agreement was signed between the Syrian Petroleum Company and the Jordanian National Electricity Company with the aim of guaranteeing approximately 141 million cubic feet per day (4 million cubic meters) of natural gas, transported through Jordanian territory, to support the Syrian electricity system. The agreement was signed in the presence of Syrian Energy Minister Mohammad al-Bashir and his Jordanian counterpart Saleh al-Kharabsheh.

According to the Syrian minister, the agreement represents a significant step in the government’s efforts to strengthen the fuel supply needed for the electricity sector and improve the reliability of the grid, especially after the difficulties accumulated in recent years. For his part, the Jordanian minister stressed that the supply contributes to the stability of the Syrian electricity sector, specifying that pumping began on January 1 with volumes ranging between 30 and 90 million cubic feet per day.

After more than a decade of war, international sanctions, and deteriorating infrastructure, Syrian power plants are operating well below their nominal capacity. Prolonged blackouts punctuate the daily lives of families, paralyze commercial and industrial activities, and put pressure on hospitals and essential services. In this context, any increase in energy supplies is presented as immediate relief rather than a geopolitical choice.

However, since the start of the flows, a crucial question has emerged: what is the real origin of the gas arriving in Syria?

Official statements speak of Arab cooperation and regional stabilization, but avoid specifying precisely where the fuel comes from. Is it Egyptian gas? Is it produced domestically in Jordan? Or is it Israeli gas that passes through Arab intermediaries before feeding Syrian turbines?

The agreements signed in January between Syria, Jordan, and Egypt define quantities, timelines, and operating procedures, but do not explicitly clarify the molecular origin of the gas. In the eastern Mediterranean, where energy infrastructures are highly interconnected, origin is neither a simple nor a politically neutral issue.

Regional sources indicate that the incoming gas cannot be considered Egyptian in the strict sense, i.e., derived exclusively from fields located in Egyptian territory. Operations are based on a floating storage and regasification vessel chartered by the Egyptian side in the port of Aqaba, Jordan, suggesting that Cairo’s role is primarily logistical and infrastructural.

According to official Jordanian data, the last shipment of liquefied natural gas to arrive in the kingdom came in November 2025 from the United States. However, this supply would have been sufficient for less than a month of exports to Syria at the announced levels, fueling doubts about the sustainability of a completely alternative supply to Israeli sources.

In parallel with the agreement with Jordan, Damascus has reached an agreement with Egypt to receive approximately 60 million cubic feet of gas per day in exchange for granting transit of gas and electricity destined for Lebanon through Syrian territory. In this scheme, Syria is not only a beneficiary but also an intermediate link in a broader regional energy chain.

The Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum announced the signing of memoranda of understanding aimed at regulating supplies and meeting the needs of the Syrian oil sector, presenting the agreement as a technical step. According to rumors reported in the international press, the agreement is linked to energy support mechanisms for Lebanon, and the gas destined for Syria would serve as compensation for the transit rights granted. Transportation is via the Arab Gas Pipeline, a project approved in 2000 and approximately 1,200 kilometers long, connecting Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Before 2011, this pipeline transported Egyptian gas directly to Syrian power plants. Today, however, the architecture of regional supplies has changed profoundly. Egypt receives about one billion cubic feet per day through its connection with Israel, as well as additional volumes through interconnections with Jordan. In December 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a new agreement with Egypt worth about $35 billion, described as the largest in Israeli energy history. NewMed Energy, a partner in the Leviathan field, has indicated that the agreement provides for additional supplies until 2040. Jordan also imports Israeli gas under an agreement signed in 2016 and entered into force in 2020, with a duration of 15 years and an estimated value of around $10 billion. As a result, both Egypt and Jordan depend significantly on Israeli imports to fuel their respective energy systems. Both have concluded supply agreements with Syria, but neither has publicly clarified the final origin of the gas destined for Syrian power plants.

The structure of the networks also makes any clear distinction difficult. Jordan is not a major gas producer: domestic production is limited compared to demand, particularly in the electricity sector. The LNG terminal in Aqaba allows imports from the global market, but these volumes play a complementary role. Israeli gas is a key component of the kingdom’s energy stability. Syria, which before 2011 produced over a billion cubic feet per day, now generates only a fraction of that volume. External supply is therefore an urgent necessity.

An unresolved question

However, the political knot remains: there is no peace agreement or official normalization process between Syria and Israel, but there is the concrete fact that the Israeli government has promoted, supported, and sponsored the cutthroat militias of Al Jolani, now president of the “new democratic Syria.” If Israeli gas were actually incorporated into current flows, it would arrive in Syria in the absence of a declared diplomatic framework. The paradox is clear: while part of Syrian territory remains under Israeli occupation, the possibility of Israeli energy powering Syrian power plants takes on a symbolic meaning that goes beyond the economic dimension.

At the same time, the Syrian leadership is faced with a pressing reality: the electricity crisis directly affects social stability and the capacity for economic reconstruction. Prolonged blackouts hinder industrial recovery, worsen living conditions, and fuel discontent. Energy thus becomes a tool for national survival and political legitimacy.

The question remains open: is Syria receiving Arab gas or consuming Israeli energy redirected through Arab networks? Until contracts are made public with greater transparency and supply chains are clarified in detail, the answer will remain shrouded in a regional structure that tends to obscure the origin while ensuring the continuity of flows. This could also become a tool for blackmailing neighboring countries at a later stage, as this project has been blessed by the Western powers.

In the eastern Mediterranean, gas is not only an energy commodity but also an element of influence, dependence, and geopolitical realignment, embedded in delicate balances that the new post-Assad Syria is now trying to navigate through a policy of expanded energy cooperation pragmatically oriented towards stabilization. And who knows what will come next.