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Let the games begin

Here we are. The Strait of Hormuz is the new “war game.” In just a few days, the world has begun to tremble, even more than it already was.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important maritime passages in the global economic system. Located between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, it connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and, via the Arabian Sea, with the Indian Ocean. Its geographical position makes it a real “bottleneck” for global energy trade, as most oil and liquefied natural gas exports from the Middle East must pass through this narrow maritime corridor. For this reason, the Strait of Hormuz is not only economically important, but also strategically and geopolitically significant, constituting one of the most sensitive points for global energy security.

Geographically, the strait has a minimum width of about 33 kilometers, while the navigation lanes used by commercial ships are much narrower, organized according to a maritime traffic system with two corridors of about three kilometers each, separated by a safety zone. This configuration makes maritime traffic particularly vulnerable to disruptions, accidents, or military tensions. For this very reason, the control and security of the Strait of Hormuz are considered a strategic priority for many states and international organizations.

From a geo-economic perspective, the strait is a key hub for the global trade in hydrocarbons. According to leading international energy analyses, around one-fifth of the oil consumed globally passes through this passage. Every day, between 20 and 21 million barrels of oil and petroleum products pass through the strait, accounting for around 20% of global consumption. In addition to crude oil, a significant share of the global trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through this route, especially that exported from Qatar, one of the world’s leading producers of LNG. It is estimated that around 25-30% of the global trade in liquefied natural gas passes through the Strait of Hormuz.

The main commodities passing through this passage are therefore crude oil, refined products, and liquefied natural gas. However, in addition to energy resources, the strait is also crossed by container ships, bulk carriers, and tankers carrying other types of cargo, such as chemicals, metals, industrial raw materials, and consumer goods destined for Asian, European, and North American markets. The presence of large commercial ports in the Persian Gulf, such as those located in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, further contributes to the intensity of trade flows through the strait.

The main players involved in the geopolitical dynamics of the Strait of Hormuz are primarily the coastal states, particularly Iran and Oman, which directly border the strait and share territorial control over it. Iran, in particular, exerts a strong strategic influence on the region, thanks in part to its military presence along the coast and on the islands near the strait. From a political and military standpoint, Tehran has repeatedly declared, in situations of international tension, the possibility of restricting or blocking maritime traffic in the strait as a means of geopolitical pressure.

Alongside the states directly bordering the strait, other key players are the major oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These states depend heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for the export of their energy resources to major international markets. Consequently, the stability and safety of navigation in the strait are considered essential for their economies and for the balance of global energy markets.

A leading role is also played by the major international powers, particularly the United States, which maintains a significant military presence in the Persian Gulf region. The US Navy, through its Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain, conducts patrol and maritime security operations to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait. Other powers, such as the United Kingdom and France, also periodically participate in naval surveillance and security missions in the region. In recent years, China has also shown a growing strategic interest in the stability of Middle Eastern energy routes, given its heavy dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf.

From a legal and diplomatic point of view, navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is governed by various international rules and agreements. The main regulatory framework is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982. This convention establishes the principle of “right of transit” in straits used for international navigation, guaranteeing civilian and military vessels the possibility of passing through these passages without unjustified interference from coastal states. However, Iran has not formally ratified UNCLOS and has repeatedly expressed restrictive interpretations of the right of transit, arguing for the need to regulate the passage of foreign warships in its territorial waters.

In addition to the international legal framework, there are also several multilateral initiatives and maritime security missions aimed at ensuring the stability of the strait. These include the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), an international coalition created in 2019 with the aim of protecting commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Several countries are participating in this initiative, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other regional partners.

Another important element is infrastructure investment aimed at reducing dependence on the strait. Some Gulf countries have developed alternative pipelines that allow oil to be exported without passing through Hormuz. Significant examples include the pipeline connecting Saudi Arabia’s oil fields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, and the pipeline connecting Abu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. However, the capacity of these alternative infrastructures remains limited compared to the total volume of energy exports from the region.

It is therefore a crucial hub of the world’s economic geography and one of the most sensitive points in the global energy system, whose security and stability can shift the financial balance of entire regions of the world.

Geopolitical perspectives

Now that the strategic and geo-economic value of the strait is clear, let’s try to think about the disaster that is unfolding and, above all, who benefits from it. Who, indeed, is the question. At first glance, this operation fits consistently into the plan to dissolve Europe with its political and financial powers.

In fact, it is the eurozone that is suffering the hardest blow, in a dramatic way. The possibility that logistics, transport, and even industrial production will suffer a sharp slowdown is a well-founded fear and, unfortunately, a very real one. In fact, it is already happening. But this is consistent, we repeat, with the intention to destroy the European architecture. This is a mission that Trump has declared and that also suits Putin’s Russia, and not only that: none of the other countries like the old European power order, especially those that have suffered decades or centuries of European colonialism. And, to be honest, they do not like America either, with its return to imperialism, heir to that of Europe, but everything must be dealt with in its own time, and now is the time for the collapse of the old continent.

Now, given its function as a central hub for global energy trade, any significant change in freedom of navigation in the strait would have immediate effects not only on energy markets but also on the geopolitical balance between the major world powers. From a strategic analysis perspective, at least three distinct scenarios can be hypothesized: the total closure of the strait to naval traffic, a selective closure aimed at favoring certain trading partners, and a prolonged militarization of the area.

The first scenario involves the total closure of the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Such an event, even if temporary, would have extremely significant consequences for the global economy. Since approximately 20% of the oil consumed worldwide passes through this passage, its interruption would immediately cause a severe shock to energy supply, the prelude to which we are already seeing in part at this very moment. The prices of oil and liquefied natural gas would rise rapidly on international markets, with knock-on effects on inflation, industrial production, and financial stability. In short, chaos. And chaos is always useful to someone, because it allows them to do things that cannot be done in times of peace and order. Is that clear?

A total blockade of Hormuz would put everyone in crisis to the point of having to take remedial action. A short war would involve a very strong show of force by the US and Israel (even atomic weapons would be considered), and would allow the conflict to be resolved quickly, effectively crushing Iran in a violent war, perhaps with the support of other European countries and those in the Gulf. To do this, the conditions must be extremely sophisticated, with a complex game of blackmail and power leverage that leaves no other choice for all participants. America would have to find, or violently demand, exceptional decision-making authority and military operational capability, while also resolving the moral dilemma. In practice, Iran would have to be placed in a position where it could be accused of being the absolute evil and responsible for all the consequences of the blockade. The information war and the speed of action in a multi-domain context would play a central role here.

For Europe, the consequences would be particularly significant. Although in recent years the European Union has partially diversified its energy sources, especially after the energy crisis linked to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a significant share of oil and gas imports continues to come from the Middle East. The closure of the strait would lead to a drastic reduction in supplies from countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. This would put severe pressure on European energy markets, forcing member states to increase imports from other areas such as the United States, West Africa, or the North Sea, at significantly higher costs.

The impact on Asia would be even greater, as many Asian economies are more dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, India, and especially China import a significant portion of their energy needs via routes through the Strait of Hormuz. A total closure of the passage could therefore slow down economic growth across the entire Asian region, causing instability in financial markets and potentially triggering emergency policies to secure energy supplies. However, let’s not make the mistake of thinking that China and other Far Eastern countries will allow this to happen without reacting…

The second scenario envisages a selective closure of the strait, limited to ships bound for or coming from Europe, with preferential treatment for Asian trade routes, particularly those bound for China and Russia. Although complex from an operational and legal point of view, this scenario could emerge in a context of strong geopolitical polarization, characterized by the formation of opposing economic blocs.

In such a situation, some Gulf producer countries could decide to favor their Asian partners, who are already the main buyers of Middle Eastern oil. China, for example, has become the world’s leading oil importer over the past two decades and has developed increasingly close economic relations with several countries in the region. A selective closure of the strait could therefore further strengthen the energy link between the Persian Gulf and East Asia.

For Europe, the consequences would be particularly problematic, as it would be excluded from one of the world’s main energy routes. This could accelerate the process of reorganizing energy supply chains, increasing European dependence on alternative suppliers such as the United States, Norway, or African countries. At the same time, such a scenario would strengthen the geopolitical weight of Asia, and China in particular, in the global energy system.

Furthermore, selective discrimination in maritime traffic could call into question some fundamental principles of international maritime law, increasing the risk of diplomatic and military tensions. The European Union and its allies could respond with economic pressure, naval protection missions, or diplomatic initiatives aimed at restoring freedom of navigation.

However, it is true that this second scenario would cause the war to be prolonged and reshaped. Diplomacy would play a greater role here, seeking ways in and out of Tehran. Iran would have a very interesting card to play. The theater of operations would be remodeled, probably transforming the Gulf into a “special” area, with temporary and atypical management, in which the players would confront each other at different times or through alliances, without completely freeing the area from conflict. Medium- and long-term timescales, with which to manually redefine the global balance of power. It is (perhaps) a less bloody scenario.

Finally, the third scenario concerns the prolonged militarization of the Strait of Hormuz for a period exceeding 100 days. In this case, maritime traffic would not necessarily be interrupted, but it would be subject to a high level of military control, with the constant presence of naval fleets, surveillance systems, and potential incidents between the armed forces of different countries.

Long-term militarization would have a significant impact on the costs of maritime trade. Shipping companies and maritime insurers would significantly increase risk premiums for ships passing through the area, making the transport of goods and energy resources more expensive. This increase in logistics costs would inevitably be reflected in the final prices of raw materials and industrial products in a much more significant way than is already the case.

From a geopolitical perspective, a prolonged military presence could transform the Strait of Hormuz into a veritable zone of strategic confrontation between major powers. The United States, European powers, China, and potentially other emerging powers could strengthen their naval presence in the region to protect trade routes and their energy interests. This would increase the risk of military incidents or unintended escalation.

At the same time, prolonged militarization could further encourage the development of alternative routes and infrastructure, such as land pipelines or new sea routes through other regions. However, such solutions would require very high investments and long implementation times, making it difficult to completely replace the strategic role of the Strait of Hormuz in the short term.

Once again, the question returns to the initial one: who benefits? The world is changing very quickly.

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This is part 2 of a two-part analysis. Please read part 1 here.

President Putin sent a gracious message to Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, personally congratulating him on his election as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Words do (italics mine) matter:

“At a time when Iran is confronting armed aggression, your efforts in this high position will undoubtedly require great courage and dedication. I am confident that you will honourably continue your father’s work and unite the Iranian people in the face of an immense ordeal.”

After stressing foreign “aggression” and continuity of government, Putin reiterated the strategic partnership in no uncertain terms:

“For my part, I would like to reaffirm our unwavering support for Tehran and solidarity with our Iranian friends. Russia has been and will remain a reliable partner for the Islamic Republic.”

Cue to a desperate President Trump, or neo-Caligula, placing a call to Putin, essentialy to ask him to intervene as a mediator to convince Iran into accepting a ceasefire. What he heard instead was a polite enumeration of unpleasant facts regarding the war of choice launched by the Epstein Syndicate on Iran.

Trump is throwing his favorite envoy Steve Witkoff under the bus, alongside puny Jared Kushner and the push up clown posing as Secretary of Forever Wars, as the ones who forced him to bomb Iran. It’s Witkoff who claimed after the phone call that Russia stated it’s not transfering intel data to Iran, as confirmed, he said, by presidential assistant for international affairs Yuri Ushakov.

Nonsense. Ushakov never said such a thing. Russians at the highest political level do not comment on military matters linked to their strategic partnerships with both Iran and China.

Now for the facts.

Russian intel, Iranian execution, and no military treaty

It’s no secret that Moscow has shared what can be defined as industrial amounts of intel – and combat data – gathered in Ukraine with Tehran. A great deal of the advanced jamming tech and satellite intel leading to the serial destruction of THAAD radars, Patriot radars, and every other ultra-heavy fixed radar installations comes from both Russia and China.

Even if footage of Russian S-400 and Krasukha systems successfully intercepting American missiles has not been released, and probably it won’t be, the fact is Russian technicians are helping Iranian crews fine-tune the trajectories of missiles and drones during flight.

So there is a sophisticated, practical interplay in effect between Chinese and Russian high-resolution orbital imagery and targeting assistance, and swarms of cheap, $20,000 drones.

Russia provided Iran with the super-charged, upgraded and battle-tested Geran-3 and Geran-5 drones. These are the facto Russian Shaheds: lethal, inexpensive cruise missiles, equipped with anti-jamming via their Komet antenna, and able to reach 600 km/h. They are now all over the battlefield.

Now for the extremely savoury part.

Slightly over a week before the Epstein Syndicate decapitation strike on Tehran on February 28, Russian intel sent to the IRGC the fully developed US strike plan – complete with target matrices, launch platforms, timing sequences.

So the IRGC knew exactly what to expect.

Six weeks before that, in December last year, Moscow signed a 500 million euros weapons deal with Iran, including the delivery of 500 Verba MANPADS launchers and 2,500 advanced 9M336 missiles.

Essentially, Russia is providing Iran with intel and air defense. And China provides anti-ship missiles and real-time satellite surveillance.

The beauty of it all is there’s no formal trilateral alliance in play. And no military treaty. It’s all embedded in their interlocking strategic partnerships.

Considering all of the above, it’s no wonder the puzzled Epstein Syndicate is blaming Russia and China intel for certified hits such as the satellite communications station part of the communications and cyber defense unit of the Israeli military near Beer Sheeba.

And we’re not even talking about the next, inevitable Russian move: installing the extremely powerful S-500 Prometheus air defense system in Iran.

How to capture market share without breaking a sweat

The Russia-Iran strategic partnership – even if does not include a military treaty – works in several interlocked levels.

On the energy front. Moscow, under Putin’s orders, is now evaluating what may eventually become a definitive pre-emptive halt of remaining exports to the EU, so they may be redirected to Asia at ever-climbing prices.

The EU after all is phasing Russian gas out: short-term contracts will be banned starting late April; full LNG ban by the end of the year; and ban on pipeline gas by 2027.

So a lot of LNG is already being directed to China, India, Thailand and Philippines. As in Follow The Money: LNG tankers diverted mid-voyage from European ports to Asia, offering higher spot prices.

Every day that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed – and it will remain closed – Russia captures extra market share, anywhere, at a premium, without breaking a sweat.

Secretary of Iranian Security Council Ali Larijani made it crystal clear in several languages, including Russian: when it comes to Hormuz, there are “open opportunities for everyone”, as in partnership with allies Russia and China; and it’s “a dead-end for warmongers”, as in the Epstein Syndicate and other hostile entities.

Russia certainly does not need the Strait of Hormuz open. Still, it received a nod and a wink from Larijani acknowledging their partnership.

The Epstein Syndicate war on Iran is becoming immensely profitable for the Russian state budget – something not seen since early 2022 price hikes. With the Strait of Hormuz closed and Qatar LNG completely out of the picture, Russian energy is the only game in town: no more a sanctioned commodity. Talk about the war on Iran weaponizing Russian oil and gas.

What will India learn from its double betrayal

India, by contrast, is a case that could break any psychoanalytic cabinet. New Delhi is chairing BRICS in 2026. It’s one of BRICS founders, and Iran is a full BRICS member. Every BRICS original member condemned the Epstein Syndicate war on Iran: Brazil, Russia, China, South Africa. India waited three days to basically say that Iran and the US should talk, “nicely”.

While Prime Minister Modi was signing defense deals with that death cult in West Asia – 40% of its weapons exports go to India – a fellow BRICS member was being bombed with some of these very same weapons.

Modi in effect was in Israel gushing about “motherland” (India) and “fatherland” (Israel) only 48 hours before the death cult in West Asia and the wider Epstein Syndicate launched their decapitation strike on Tehran.

For all practical purposes, the Modi gang privileged weapons deals – and Trump’s tariff relief – over international law.

And it gets even filthier.

India could not even issue a pro-forma statement condemning the American torpedo attack on Iranian warship Iris Dena on international waters – after the Indian Navy hosted Iris Dena in a military exercise. All BRICS founding members condemned it. Not India.

The controversy is still rolling: India may have even given the coordinates of the – unarmed and invited – Iris Dena to the Americans. And now Sri Lanka, under American pressure, refuses to hand over the dead bodies to Iran.

It will take time to evaluate how deep India’s betrayal blew BRICS apart. As it stands, BRICS are in a coma.

Perhaps there may be something auspicious coming out of it. And that’s thanks to unbounded Iranian finesse.

Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, had a phone call with Abbas Araghchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran.

Aragchi played it like a consumate gentleman. He did not lecture India, or exploded in rage – American-style. He was restrained, as in letting India know that Iran is fully aware New Delhi is in a very tight spot, and that Tehran interprets this strategic ambiguity as relatively useful, and not hostile.

In practical terms, Iran is virtually India’s neighbor: Iran’s southern Makran coast is right across the Arabian Sea from India’s western shore. Kandla Port in Gujarat to Chabahar in Sistan-Balochistan is just 550 nautical miles. Talk about a maritime corridor, which for centuries was a Maritime Silk Road between two civilizational states.

And now it’s all back, as part of the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), which links 3 BRICS: Russia, Iran and India, the theme of my ‘Golden Corridor’ documentary shot last year in Iran.

Moreover, Iran is the nearest major source of oil and LNG for India.

Russia is teaching India its own lesson. New Delhi will have to pay dearly for it – as in no more energy discounts, even if Moscow is ready to potentially raise India’s share of Russian crude imports to up to 40%, as confirmed by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.

New Delhi may be out of the picture in terms of understanding the enormous stakes of the Epstein Syndicate war on Iran.

Moscow-Beijing though, are on a whole new level. They are investing on the optimal outcome: a war that the Empire of Chaos cannot win, and at a price it cannot afford to pay.

The stage is set. Russia briefed Iran on what was coming; Russia-China provide crucial intel and 24/7 satellite surveillance; and Decentralized Mosaic does the heavy lifting. The Exceptionalist strike “plan” was deeply compromised from the start.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Andiamo al sodo: il BRICS è in uno stato di profonda crisi. È stato compromesso, almeno temporaneamente, dall’India, che ospiterà il vertice del BRICS alla fine di quest’anno. Si tratta di un tempismo davvero inopportuno.

L’India ha tradito, in sequenza, sia la Russia che l’Iran, membri a pieno titolo del BRICS. Sigillando la sua alleanza con il Sindacato Epstein, Nuova Delhi ha dimostrato, senza ombra di dubbio, non solo di essere inaffidabile: oltre a ciò, tutta la sua retorica altisonante di “guidare il Sud del mondo” è crollata, definitivamente.

Il BRICS dovrà essere completamente rinnovato: anche il Gran Maestro Sergey Lavrov dovrà giungere a questa inevitabile conclusione. Il triangolo originale di Primakov, “RIC”, muore ancora una volta. Anche se l’India non verrà espulsa dal BRICS – potrebbe essere sospesa – ‘RIC’ dovrà necessariamente essere tradotto come Russia-Iran-Cina, o anche “RIIC” (Russia-Iran-Indonesia-Cina).

Per quanto riguarda la nostra posizione sulla Grande Scacchiera, il Prof. Michael Hudson sintetizza: “La grande finzione abilitante è svanita. L’America non sta proteggendo il mondo dagli attacchi di Russia, Cina e Iran. Il suo obiettivo a lungo termine di controllare il commercio mondiale del petrolio richiede il terrorismo continuo e la guerra permanente in Medio Oriente”.

Qualunque cosa accada in futuro, il terrorismo in corso in tutta l’Asia occidentale rimarrà – come nel caso dell’Epstein Syndicate, per perversa impotenza e rabbia pura, scatenando una pioggia nera sulla popolazione civile di Teheran perché gli iraniani si sono rifiutati di accettare un cambio di regime.

Inoltre, il nocciolo della questione almeno fino alla metà del secolo è più chiaro che mai. O prevarrà il sistema eccezionalista del caos internazionale, oppure sarà sostituito dall’uguaglianza guidata dal Sud del mondo, con la Cina che guida da dietro.

Questa è un’analisi in due parti sull’interazione chiave dei BRICS in relazione alla guerra contro l’Iran. Qui ci concentriamo sulla Cina. Successivamente ci concentreremo sulla Russia e sull’India.

Non sparate! Sono di proprietà cinese!

Le speculazioni del MICIMATT (complesso militare-industriale-congressuale-intelligence-media-accademico-think tank) sulle informazioni dei servizi segreti statunitensi che “suggeriscono” che la Cina si stia preparando ad aiutare l’Iran sono, ancora una volta, la prova di come la sofisticatezza cinese eluda totalmente le “analisi” insignificanti provenienti dalla Barbaria.

Innanzitutto: l’energia. La Cina e l’Iran hanno stipulato un accordo venticinquennale del valore di 400 miliardi di dollari, reciprocamente vantaggioso, che essenzialmente interconnette gli investimenti nell’energia e nelle infrastrutture.

A tutti gli effetti, lo Stretto di Hormuz è bloccato a causa del ritiro delle assicurazioni occidentali in preda al panico. Non perché Teheran lo abbia bloccato.

La Cina riceve il 90% delle esportazioni totali di petrolio greggio iraniano, che rappresentano il 12% delle importazioni totali cinesi. Il punto chiave è che la Cina ha ancora accesso alle esportazioni iraniane, così come a quelle saudite, emiratine, kuwaitiane, qatariote e irachene: questo perché la partnership strategica Teheran-Pechino è solida, il che significa che le petroliere dirette in Cina possono attraversare lo Stretto di Hormuz in entrambe le direzioni.

Pechino e Teheran hanno negoziato un passaggio sicuro bilaterale, operativo dallo scorso venerdì, in quello che a tutti gli effetti è un corridoio marittimo cruciale chiuso a livello multilaterale. Non c’è da stupirsi che sempre più petroliere stiano ora inviando sui loro transponder le parole magiche “di proprietà cinese” (il corsivo è mio). È il loro passaporto diplomatico navale.

Traduzione: si tratta di un cambiamento epocale, la fine dell’egemonia talassocratica dell’Impero del Caos.

La “libertà di navigazione” in alcuni corridoi di connettività marittima selezionati ora significa “un accordo con la Cina”. Di proprietà cinese, sì, ma non europea, giapponese o sudcoreana.

Ciò che Teheran ottiene, in abbondanza, è l’aiuto high-tech cinese per la guerra contro il Sindacato Epstein.

E questo è iniziato ancora prima della guerra.

La nave cinese Liaowang-1, un SIGINT (signals intelligence) di nuova generazione e nave di tracciamento spaziale, da settimane naviga vicino alla costa dell’Oman, fornendo all’Iran informazioni elettromagnetiche in tempo reale sui movimenti navali e aerei del Sindacato Epstein.

Questo spiega in larga misura la precisione millimetrica della maggior parte degli attacchi iraniani.

La Liaowang-1, scortata dai cacciatorpediniere Type 055 e Type 052D, trasporta almeno cinque cupole radar e antenne ad alto guadagno, in grado di tracciare con precisione almeno 1.200 bersagli aerei e missilistici contemporaneamente utilizzando algoritmi di rete neurale profonda. La portata dei suoi sensori è di circa 6.000 chilometri.

Il vantaggio è che questi sensori possono tracciare allo stesso modo un satellite cinese o una portaerei americana.

Traduzione: la Cina sta aiutando il suo partner strategico senza sparare un solo colpo, semplicemente navigando con una piattaforma di sorveglianza che elabora reti neurali in acque internazionali.

Quindi sì: la Cina sta registrando la guerra, in diretta, 24 ore su 24, 7 giorni su 7.

A complemento della Liaowang-1, oltre 300 satelliti Jilin-1 registrano letteralmente tutto, costituendo un enorme database ISR dell’Impero del Caos in azione.

Non ci sarà alcuna conferma ufficiale né da Teheran né da Pechino. Tuttavia, le informazioni reali cinesi, trasmesse su Beidou, sono state certamente cruciali per Teheran per distruggere completamente l’infrastruttura della 5^a flotta statunitense in Bahrein, un centro radar, di intelligence e database completo e la spina dorsale dell’egemonia statunitense in Asia occidentale.

Questo capitolo della guerra, affrontato proprio all’inizio, rivela come Teheran abbia colpito al cuore quando si è trattato di distruggere il gioco di potere progettato dall’impero per controllare i punti strategici e il transito di energia, negando così l’accesso alla Cina.

Per quanto possa sembrare sorprendente, ciò a cui stiamo assistendo in tempo reale è l’Iran che nega all’Impero del Caos l’accesso a punti nevralgici marittimi, porti e corridoi di collegamento navale. Per il momento si tratta del Golfo Persico e dello Stretto di Hormuz. Presto, con l’aiuto degli Houthi yemeniti, potrebbe aggiungersi anche Bab-al-Mandeb.

Questo è un cambiamento epocale che avvantaggia non solo la Cina, ma anche la Russia, che ha bisogno di mantenere aperte le sue rotte marittime di esportazione.

Se avete denaro, andate in Oriente

Ora seguiamo il denaro. La Cina detiene 760 miliardi di dollari in titoli del Tesoro statunitense. Pechino ha ordinato a tutto il suo sistema bancario di vendere i propri titoli come se non ci fosse un domani e, contemporaneamente, di accumulare oro.

La Cina e l’Iran già commerciano in yuan. D’ora in poi, il laboratorio BRICS che sperimenta sistemi di pagamento alternativi deve raggiungere la velocità di fuga. Ciò comporta la sperimentazione di tutti i meccanismi, dal BRICS Pay all’Unità.

Poi c’è l’esodo di denaro in arrivo. Arabia Saudita, Emirati Arabi Uniti, Qatar e Kuwait stanno già “rivedendo” ogni accordo, dubbio o meno, che hanno stipulato con Washington. Collettivamente, controllano non meno di 2.000 miliardi di dollari di investimenti statunitensi: titoli del Tesoro, partecipazioni tecnologiche nella Silicon Valley, immobili, ecc.

Un’ondata di denaro sta iniziando a invadere l’Asia orientale. La destinazione preferita, allo stato attuale, è la Thailandia, non Hong Kong. Ma anche Hong Kong sarà coinvolta e, ancora una volta, questo porterà enormi profitti alla Cina, poiché Hong Kong è uno dei nodi chiave della Greater Bay Area, insieme a Shenzhen e Guangzhou.

Le riserve strategiche e commerciali di greggio della Cina sono sufficienti per un massimo di quattro mesi. Oltre a ciò, è possibile aumentare le importazioni di greggio e gas naturale, via mare e tramite oleodotti, dalla Russia, dal Kazakistan e dal Myanmar.

Pertanto, una combinazione di riserve strategiche sufficienti, diverse fonti di approvvigionamento e “il passaggio dalla domanda di petrolio a quella di elettricità” qualificano ancora una volta la resilienza cinese. Il blocco di Hormuz potrebbe compromettere l’Occidente, ma non la Cina.

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La defensa mosaica descentralizada de Irán —denominación oficial— se modifica constantemente: esa es la estrategia a largo plazo del IRGC, consistente en una muerte por mil cortes diseñada para desangrar al Imperio del Caos.

Recorramos los canales interconectados que impregnan el pantano inconstitucional, imposible de ganar y estratégicamente catastrófico construido por el Imperio del Caos.

La resiliencia mosaica y la estrategia a largo plazo de Irán; la tentación de ese espantoso culto a la muerte en Asia Occidental de pasarse a la energía nuclear; el inminente e inexorable infierno de los interceptores; el implacable impulso de China por deshacerse del antiguo orden (acumulando oro, deshaciéndose de dólares); el progreso de los BRICS en la creación de un sistema financiero paralelo; el colapso de los vasallos estadounidenses en varias latitudes: todo ello está acelerando un reinicio radical del sistema.

Y luego está Vladimir Putin, que, de forma casual, casi como una idea de último momento, anuncia que, después de todo, puede que no haya gas ruso para vender a la UE:

Quizás tenga más sentido que dejemos de suministrar gas a la UE y nos traslademos a esos nuevos mercados, y nos establezcamos allí (…) Una vez más, quiero subrayar: no hay ningún motivo político en esto. Pero si de todos modos van a cerrarles el mercado en uno o dos meses, quizá sea mejor marcharse ahora y centrarse en países que sean socios fiables. Dicho esto, no es una decisión. Solo estoy pensando en voz alta. Pediré al Gobierno que lo estudie junto con nuestras empresas.

El lamentable canciller Bratwurst pidió permiso al neocalígulo para que Alemania comprara petróleo ruso. Lo consiguió. Pero puede que no haya nada que comprar.

Se trata de una guerra energética, y la UE, una vez más, ni siquiera reúne los requisitos para ser un mendigo sin hogar. Sin gas de Qatar, sin petróleo y gas rusos. Ahora vuelvan a su guerra eterna obsesionada con la OTAN.

El bombardeo del oleoducto del CCG-petrodólar

Inmediatamente después del ataque decapitador del sábado pasado contra el líder supremo ayatolá Jamenei, Irán pasó a un mando y control descentralizados y a células con un plan de sucesión de cuatro niveles, lanzando incesantes salvas de misiles más antiguos y lentos y drones sacrificables para consumir baterías Patriot y sistemas THAAD a escala industrial. Con esa medida, Irán cambió las reglas del juego ya en el primer día de la guerra.

Cualquiera con un coeficiente intelectual superior a la temperatura ambiente sabe que utilizar tres Patriots —con un coste combinado de 9,6 millones de dólares— para defenderse de un solo misil balístico iraní sacrificable es completamente insostenible.

Por lo tanto, no es de extrañar que solo hicieran falta cuatro días de la guerra del sindicato Epstein contra Irán para que el sistema financiero mundial se volviera completamente loco. Se evaporaron 3,2 billones de dólares en cuestión de cuatro días, y la cifra sigue aumentando.

El estrecho de Ormuz está cerrado a todos los efectos prácticos, excepto para los buques rusos y chinos. Al menos el 20 % de las necesidades mundiales de petróleo no se están moviendo a ninguna parte. Toda la producción de GNL de Qatar está fuera de servicio, sin perspectivas de reanudación. El segundo yacimiento petrolífero más grande de Irak ha sido cerrado.

Y aun así, el volátil neocalígulo vocifera que su guerra, que se suponía que solo duraría un fin de semana, puede prolongarse durante cinco semanas, y otros payasos industriales y militares del Pentágono hablan de que se prolongará hasta septiembre.

Al fijar como objetivos legítimos los intereses estadounidenses en todo el Consejo de Cooperación para los Estados Árabes del Golfo (CCG), y no solo las bases militares, Irán ha puesto una bomba de relojería. Se trata de un ataque directo al petrodólar (para deleite silencioso de Pekín).

Sin duda, Teherán calculó que la reacción en cadena sería instantánea, hasta llegar al pánico como preludio de una nueva Gran Depresión generalizada.

La falta de petróleo, sumada a la inexistencia de una defensa significativa del CCG contra los misiles y drones iraníes, significa el fin de los torrentes de dinero falso de Wall Street.

Al fin y al cabo, la burbuja de la inteligencia artificial se financia con las “inversiones” del CCG. El nuevo bombardeo de Pipeineistán no es del tipo Nord Stream: es el bombardeo del oleoducto del petrodólar del CCG.

Todo esto está sucediendo en un tiempo récord, a medida que se perfecciona el mosaico descentralizado de Irán. Por ejemplo, una serie de misiles antibuque letales, que aún no se han utilizado, están coordinados por el IRGC, la marina, el ejército y las fuerzas aeroespaciales. Lo mismo ocurre con los drones.

Aunque los ataques con misiles balísticos no mantengan el ritmo inicial vertiginoso, son más que suficientes para seguir golpeando sin cesar las bases militares estadounidenses (cuyas defensas aéreas ya están en gran parte agotadas); sumir al culto de la muerte en Asia Occidental y al CCG en un infierno económico total; y aterrorizar hasta la muerte a todos los rincones de los “mercados globales”.

Y a pesar de todas las bravuconerías de Washington por parte del untuoso y payaso secretario de las guerras eternas, docenas de fortalezas militares subterráneas iraníes cargadas con decenas de miles de misiles y equipos siguen siendo invisibles e intocables.

Arruinar el modelo de negocio del Imperio del Caos

Esta es una guerra desesperada para salvar el petrodólar. Una potencia energética como Irán que comercia fuera del petrodólar es el anatema definitivo, especialmente porque el proceso va acompañado de la iniciativa de los BRICS para establecer sistemas de pago independientes.

La inmensa fragilidad estructural del CCG —los vecinos de Irán— los convierte en una presa ideal. Al fin y al cabo, todo su modelo de negocio se basa en el petrodólar a cambio de la ‘protección’ mafiosa de Estados Unidos, que se ha desvanecido en la arena en los cuatro primeros días de la guerra.

Es el momento de que la máquina de guerra asimétrica de Irán arruine el modelo de negocio del Imperio del Caos en tiempo real.

La prueba definitiva es la implosión del sueño bling bling de Dubái, mucho más que la devastación impuesta a los intereses relacionados con la Quinta Flota de Estados Unidos en Bahréin e incluso un misil balístico que destruyó el radar de matriz en fase AN/FPS-132, valorado en 1100 millones de dólares, en la base aérea de Al Udeid, en Qatar.

La ruptura coordinada y en curso del CCG, ya inevitable, significa en última instancia el fin del reciclaje del petrodólar, lo que abre el juego al petroyuan o al comercio de energía en una cesta de monedas de los BRICS.

“Jaque mate” proviene del persa “Shah Mat”, que significa “el rey está indefenso”. Bueno, es posible que el emperador neocalígulo no sepa que está desnudo, porque es incapaz de jugar al ajedrez. Pero está lo suficientemente asustado como para empezar a buscar desesperadamente una salida.

El corredor aéreo Astracán-Teherán

Ahora veamos el papel de Rusia. La atención debe centrarse en el corredor aéreo Astracán-Teherán, repleto de vuelos secretos de carga. El aeródromo militar de Chkalovsk, cerca de Astracán, es el centro logístico clave del corredor: cargamentos como el Il-76MD, el An-124 y el Tu-0204-300C van y vienen cubiertos con un material especial que reduce la visibilidad del radar y los oculta de los sistemas de rastreo civiles.

Su carga llega al aeropuerto de Mehrabad en Teherán (no es de extrañar que fuera bombardeado por Israel), Pyam y Shahid Behesthi en Isfahán. También se aplica la logística multimodal, ya que parte de la carga se entrega a través del Caspio.

Todo está coordinado por la 988.ª Brigada Logística Militar de Astracán. El contenido de la carga incluye componentes para sistemas de defensa aérea, módulos de guía por radar, sistemas hidráulicos para lanzamisiles y módulos de radar de detección de largo alcance.

Además, en virtud de un protocolo secreto, Rusia está suministrando a Irán tecnología de guerra electrónica de última generación, incluida una versión de exportación del Krasukha-4IR, capaz de interferir los sistemas de radar de los drones estadounidenses.

A esto hay que añadir que Irán pronto desplegará baterías S-400 completas, lo que le permitirá controlar hasta el 70 % del espacio aéreo iraní.

Cómo la tensión económico-política se volverá insoportable

Y ahora pasemos al papel de Turquía.

Hace solo dos meses, el MIT (servicio de inteligencia turco) advirtió directamente al IRGC de que combatientes kurdos estaban intentando cruzar de Irak a Irán.

Piénsese en ello: un miembro de pleno derecho de la OTAN que transmite información operativa urgente al IRGC justo cuando el sindicato Epstein se preparaba para la guerra.

Hay al menos 15 millones de kurdos viviendo en Irán. Lo último que quiere Ankara es que los kurdos se empoderen en Irán. A pesar de todas las insaciables maniobras del sultán Erdogan, sabe que no puede enfrentarse frontalmente a Teherán.

Necesita equilibrar una gran variedad de intereses que mezclan la OTAN, el corredor energético con Rusia, pero también el corredor energético hacia Occidente a través del oleoducto BTC, y el papel de ancla occidental del Corredor Medio hacia China.

Por eso, el supuesto misil balístico iraní que apuntaba a Turquía y que fue derribado por la OTAN no fue gran cosa: los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores Fidan (Turquía) y Aragchi (Irán) lo discutieron como adultos.

Existe una impenetrable niebla de guerra al respecto: el misil podría haber sido enviado para inutilizar la terminal petrolera del BTC y los posteriores drones lanzados sobre Georgia estaban diseñados para inutilizar el punto más débil del BTC.

Nada de esto está confirmado, y será imposible confirmarlo. También podría haber sido una operación de bandera falsa, aunque Teherán pueda estar muy interesado en cortar el 30 % del suministro de petróleo de Israel.

El BTC seguirá en funcionamiento, ya que atraviesa Georgia transportando crudo azerí a través del Cáucaso hasta la costa mediterránea turca. Bombardear el BTC encajaría en la estrategia iraní de cortar todos los corredores energéticos que alimentan al sindicato Epstein y sus acólitos a través del Golfo, el Cáucaso y hasta el Mediterráneo.

A lo largo del BTC, otras medidas lógicas de Irán serían atacar el oleoducto este-oeste de Arabia Saudí (que evita Ormuz); las plataformas de carga marítimas de Irak en aguas territoriales iraníes, que manejan 3,5 millones de barriles al día; y el centro de procesamiento de Abqaiq, que maneja la mayor parte del crudo saudí antes de que llegue a las terminales de exportación.

Si Irán, bajo una presión extrema, se ve obligado a atacar todo lo anterior, no hay ninguna reserva estratégica de petróleo en el planeta capaz de cubrir el déficit.

En esta infernal interconexión de corredores energéticos, rutas marítimas, cadenas de suministro globales, seguridad marítima y precios del petróleo fuera de control, solo los payasos del Pentágono pueden querer prolongar la guerra hasta septiembre. Asia, Europa y todos los importadores de energía del tablero de ajedrez ejercerán la máxima presión para lograr cualquier medida de distensión.

Sin embargo, la estrategia asimétrica de Irán sigue siendo inquebrantable: expandir la guerra horizontalmente y alargar al máximo el plazo para que la presión económica y política sea insoportable.

Traducción: esto no es una maniobra rápida para cambiar el régimen por parte de un grupo de psicópatas. Se trata de una guerra de desgaste estructurada. Y el guion se ha escrito en Teherán.

Traducción: Observatorio de trabajador@s en lucha

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The recent statement by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian asserting that Iran does not intend to attack neighboring countries generated widespread misinterpretations in several analytical circles. Many observers assumed the message was directed at the Gulf monarchies. However, such an interpretation makes little sense considering that American attacks against Iran are being launched from Sunni countries in the region. Moreover, Iran continues to frequently strike targets in those states.

A closer reading of the statement indicates that the message had a specific recipient: Azerbaijan. Pezeshkian’s remarks appear to have been primarily an attempt at de-escalation amid the possibility of a new front opening in the current war.

The tension began after the crash of a supposed Iranian drone at an airport in Azerbaijan. Authorities in Baku classified the episode as a possible hostile attack and responded with harsh rhetoric, including promises of the use of force. Military movements along the border were reported, suggesting that the incident could escalate into a direct confrontation.

Tehran immediately denied any involvement in the episode. Such a denial alone would not necessarily be enough to dispel suspicion. Nevertheless, several factors make the hypothesis of a deliberate Iranian attack unlikely. First, if the objective had been to strike Israeli or American strategic assets located on Azerbaijani territory, Iran would hardly have chosen such a limited and ineffective action as a simple drone incident that caused no significant damage.

Furthermore, Baku’s own reaction raises questions. Interstate conflicts are rarely triggered by isolated drone incidents, especially when there are no casualties or meaningful destruction. The speed and intensity of the response suggest that the episode may have been interpreted within an already tense political context, in which some actors might have been seeking a pretext for escalation.

Another relevant element concerns Iran’s demographic composition. A significant portion of the country’s population consists of ethnic Azeris, which creates an additional layer of sensitivity in bilateral relations. An open conflict with Azerbaijan could generate internal tensions and undesirable identity-based mobilizations within Iran itself. Historically, for this reason, Tehran has adopted a cautious posture toward Baku, avoiding direct confrontations whenever possible.

Given this context, alternative hypotheses have emerged to explain the incident. One possibility is a false-flag operation conducted by actors interested in dragging Azerbaijan into the current conflict between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Another possibility involves the use of electronic warfare capabilities to divert Iranian drones launched toward other directions and cause them to fall on Azerbaijani territory, thereby creating an artificially politicized incident.

Regardless of the origin of the episode, the decisive factor for understanding the crisis lies in Azerbaijan’s geopolitical alliances. In recent years, Baku has developed significant strategic cooperation with Israel, particularly in the fields of energy, defense and intelligence. However, this rapprochement creates tensions with another key Azerbaijani partner: Turkey. Ankara has traditionally regarded Baku as a natural ally based on ethnic, linguistic, and historical affinities between Turks and Azeris. The slogan “one nation, two states” symbolized this partnership for many years.

However, the regional scenario changed significantly after the fall of the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, an event that altered the strategic balance in the Middle East. With the weakening of the former geopolitical buffer zone represented by the Syrian state, competing expansionist projects began interacting more directly. On one side stands Turkey’s regional strategy, often described as neo-Ottomanism; on the other, the expansion of Zionist influence under the project commonly referred to as “Greater Israel.”

In this context, Turkey increasingly perceives Israel as a potential existential rival. The emergence of possible anti-Turkish military alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean – such as cooperation between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus – as well as Israeli involvement in the Horn of Africa, including the recognition of Somaliland, are clear signs of growing hostility between Tel Aviv and Ankara. For this reason, despite its many disagreements with Iran, Turkey currently sees Tehran’s role in the conflict as indirectly beneficial, since it contributes to weakening Israel and improving Turkish strategic security.

Within this framework, Turkey does not want its “brother nation” in the South Caucasus to attack Iran, as such a move would undermine Ankara’s broader strategic posture toward Israel. By threatening Iran, Baku risks ignoring its closest ethnic ally in favor of its partnership with Israel – something many Turkish observers view as unacceptable. Among Turkish nationalist circles – including Turkists, Turanists, neo-Ottomanists, and even Islamist circles – the possibility of Azerbaijan acting militarily against Iran under Israeli influence is widely interpreted as a move contrary to the interests of the broader Turkic world.

Thus, the current crisis reveals a complex web of rivalries and alliances. A direct confrontation between Iran and Azerbaijan would have profound consequences not only for the South Caucasus but also for the strategic balance involving Turkey, Israel, and other regional powers. It would also carry serious risks of internal instability within Iran due to its large ethnic Azeri population.

In this sense, Pezeshkian’s statement can be understood as an attempt to prevent a limited incident from evolving into a broader conflict. Whether this effort at de-escalation will be sufficient remains uncertain. What seems clear, however, is that a war between Iran and Azerbaijan would hardly benefit any regional actor other than those interested in deepening divisions and rivalries across the Eurasian space – namely Israel and the United States.

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“Our success will continue to hinge on America’s military power and the credibility of our assurances to our allies and partners in the Middle East.”

These were the words spoken in December 2013 by the Secretary of Defense of the Obama administration, Chuck Hagel, to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. That reinforced the historical guarantees given by Washington to its puppets, reaffirming the deceptive propaganda that the United States is the guardian of global security.

Promises like that are made by every administration, whether Democrat or Republican. Twelve years later, Donald Trump would reinforce that mantra again, addressing Qatar specifically: “The United States shall regard any armed attack on the territory (…) of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States.” According to Trump, the United States would respond to attacks against Qatar with “all lawful and appropriate measures,” “including militarily.”

Israel had just bombed Doha, targeting Hamas leaders. The entire speech by the president of the United States was completely hollow: the Patriot systems acquired for 10 billion dollars in the 2012 agreement, together with a new acquisition of Patriot and NASAMS systems for more than 2 billion dollars in 2019, did not intercept the Israeli bombardment. And the United States did not consider that attack a “threat to the peace and security of the United States” — on the contrary, they turned a blind eye to it.

Qatar hosts the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Air Force and the British Royal Air Force at Al-Udeid Air Base, built with more than 8 billion dollars invested by the Qatari government. None of this has protected the Qatari people. Iran’s retaliation for the U.S.–Israel aggression revealed that the base itself (the largest U.S. military installation in the Middle East) is a fragile target: it was struck by a missile on the 3rd, which likely damaged or destroyed the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar, one of the most important sensors in the U.S. missile defense system, valued at about $1.1 billion. Satellite images suggest significant damage to the equipment, which could compromise the ability to detect ballistic missiles at long distances.

In 2017, Saudi Arabia spent $110 billion on U.S. military equipment in an agreement that foresees spending more than $350 billion by next year — including Patriot and THAAD systems. Apparently, this enormous expenditure is not guaranteeing fully secure protection. Despite important interceptions in the current war, the U.S. government instructed part of its personnel to flee Saudi Arabia to protect themselves — which reveals that even the United States does not trust the defensive capability it sells to others. In fact, in the early hours of the 3rd, two drones struck the U.S. embassy in Riyadh and, two days earlier, U.S. soldiers were also targeted.

Since 1990, Gulf countries have spent nearly $500 billion purchasing weapons and protection systems from the United States, according to data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database and reports from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The construction and maintenance of defense infrastructure by the United States is almost entirely financed by the host countries. All of this is being blown apart by the legitimate Iranian retaliation.

The ineffectiveness of the protection provided by the United States had already been demonstrated in last year’s war, but also by the launches from Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis toward Israel, which shattered the myth surrounding the Iron Dome. In a certain sense, the success of many of those attacks represented a humiliation for the all-powerful American arms industry. The several MQ-9 Reaper drones shot down by the Yemenis represented losses amounting to $200 million — the drones used by the Houthis to shoot down the American aircraft cost an insignificant fraction to produce.

The ineffectiveness of American protection also reveals the extremely low quality of the products of its military complex. This complex is dominated by a small handful of monopolies such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon which, without competitors and with clients subservient to the American government, see no need to make the maximum effort to produce weapons and systems of unsurpassable quality. Finally, corruption runs rampant in this field, and inferior peoples such as those of the Gulf do not deserve to consume products of the same quality as those destined for America — apparently their regimes are willing to pay dearly for anything.

Iran, with all its experience of more than four decades dealing with aggression, has known how to use these vulnerabilities very well. Leaders at the highest levels of the Iranian state publicly insist that peace in the Middle East is impossible while U.S. bases remain operational in the region. Saeed Khatibzadeh, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, stated, “We have no option but to put an end to the existence of American presence in the Persian Gulf area.” These appeals are certainly circulating in neighboring countries — both among the general population and within the armed and political forces.

The Persian nation is not only attacking military installations but also strategic targets that affect the nerve center of the Gulf countries’ economies: the energy industry — in retaliation for the bombings of its own oil infrastructure by the United States and Israel. These Iranian attacks place even greater pressure on the puppet regimes of imperialism to do something to stop their masters. The obvious solution would be to prevent the use of their territory for aggression against Iran, which would necessarily imply closing the military bases.

Although all these countries are dictatorships that repress any dissent, as the suffering of the civilian population increases, popular discontent may become uncontrollable. Their rulers know this and are already racking their brains to find a safe way out of this potentially explosive situation.

Will the peoples of these countries swallow all the lying propaganda that their regimes — fed by the lie industry of the United States and Israel — try to tell them, that Iran is the aggressor and responsible for the attacks? But why do the United States build missile launch bases so close to residential neighborhoods? Clearly, just like the Israelis, this is not a “moral” and “ethical” army: those people exist to serve as human shields for American soldiers. The logic of protection is inverted: it is not U.S. anti-aircraft systems that serve to protect the Saudi, Emirati or Qatari people — it is these second-class citizens who must die to protect the occupying forces.

Moreover, U.S. military bases frequently house soldiers responsible for crimes against local populations. This became explicit during the Iraq War. For example, the rape of a 14-year-old girl named Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi, followed by her murder and the killing of her family after soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division invaded her house in Mahmudiya in 2004. Or the rapes documented over years during the invasion of Iraq, together with the practice of sexual exploitation and prostitution carried out in areas near American military installations such as Balad Air Base, used by the 4th Infantry Division.

On the 1st, U.S. Marines killed at least nine protesters who attempted to storm the American consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, in protest against the criminal aggression against Iran that had already massacred about 150 girls in an Iranian school the previous day. This is what imperialist presence in the countries of the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America serves for: to rape, murder and use the natives themselves as human shields, not to protect them.

How long will it take before they rise up against this true military occupation? Probably not long.

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Join up the dots and you come to the same conclusion. America and Israel are the biggest losers in the Iran war. But not Trump.

A recent poll in the U.S. concluded that Donald Trump tells the truth only about 3 percent of the time during his public announcements at press conferences. Perhaps it was his stint at being a celebrity on TV that taught him how gullible people in America are when fed the most fanciful, moronic lies a leading figure can tell, through the American media. Of course, it’s also about the journalists as well, and if there’s one thing that the Trump administrations have taught us, it is how poor the general level of journalism is in America these days. American journalists are not afraid to ask difficult questions or disbelieve what they are told. They simply don’t know how to do this in the first place.

Covering the Iran war, it is breathtaking, some of the brazen lies he tells while being questioned by journalists who are complicit in his dirty work. The mere idea that Iran, for example, acquired a Tomahawk missile and used it to kill its own schoolgirls is beyond absurd. How could journalists not question such a reply when it is so clear that Trump is lying through his teeth?

Because of this lying, we can see how Trump works, though. Unlike other U.S. presidents who have some shame and discomfort in lying to the press, Trump suffers no such handicap and so can take on bolder, more daring ventures on the global stage. In this environment, there is no respect for international law or even due process within the political framework of how Congress works. Trump hasn’t worked out how to defeat Iran, but he has all the contingent narratives to lay out afterwards to explain why everything that goes wrong is not his fault. We see that he is already preparing himself for the day of judgement by the press pack in the coming days and weeks by telling them that it was Jared Kushner, Marco Rubio and Steve Witkoff who told him to hit Iran.

The direction towards these three is revealing. Of course, we have learned the simple rule of Trump when it comes to decisions. When things go well, everything was his decision; when things go badly, blame others.

And so, the blaming of these three is a clear example and acknowledgement by Trump that the Iran war was a failure. The U.S. didn’t bring about regime change nor seek any military concessions from its government. In fact, it’s really hard to establish one minor point where you could say that the Americans chalked up any kind of victory, given the high energy prices around the world and the Straits of Hormuz still closed to oil tankers. Despite the U.S. being a net exporter of oil, the crisis is raising pump prices back home, and so it is Trump’s support base of blue-collar workers who are, once again, paying the price for his failed policies.

This last point about the Straits of Hormuz is worth taking stock of when we examine Trump’s lies, which just get increasingly fatuous by the day. It’s like we’re dealing with a child in power who has lost sense of any of the realities around him. One of Trump’s claims which he repeats over and over again is that the U.S. navy has completely destroyed its Iranian counterpart, and that all ships have been sunk. And yet there is no video evidence at all to support this, official or even just phone footage from even one U.S. sailor’s phone. Could this be another massive Trump lie, given that he is struggling to prove to the American people or the press that the operation has been a success? Very convenient that all Iranian vessels happen to have been sunk. Perhaps the truth sunk and the Iranian vessels are still operational. The saddest thing is that not one American “journalist” is even able at a press conference, or even in their copy, to ask the most obvious question about this claim, which is: “If there is no Iranian navy, then why are the Straits of Hormuz still closed to ships passing through?”

Or is it that the Iranian navy has been destroyed, but Iran’s control of the shipping and its threat against America’s aircraft carriers is so strong and prevalent that the U.S. navy doesn’t have the capability to break the siege?

Trump is busy building up a case to make him look less culpable in the whole war, which in itself is a massive admission that it has all gone horribly wrong. These indicators are subtle and sometimes are not easy to spot, like his recent comment that GCC countries helped the U.S. bomb Iran. So the mighty U.S. navy, air force and army did not come up to scratch and had to rely on regional partners? The president needs some help here with his messaging, as he is clearly trying to spread the blame and reduce his own importance, perhaps as a ploy to not only protect himself from impeachment but from facing international criminal courts.

The lie that GCC countries bombed Iran is even more laughable than the one about Iran bombing its own schoolgirls, but with no real journalists around who are even able to ask the most obvious questions, he’ll be able to get away with it, despite the odd dichotomy of logic shooting himself in the foot. The truth about the so-called Iran War is that almost nothing we see on our TV screens is anywhere near the truth. Sometimes it is simply omission, as in the case of the real level of destruction in Israel, which is not being reported due to a shameful agreement struck between U.S. networks and Israel to block the truth and only show bombs which have hit civilian targets rather than military ones. The biggest lie possibly concerns the reasons behind it, although blithering buffoons like Lindsey Graham can hardly keep the lid on it. Money. Do even Trump’s more vociferous supporters doubt for one moment that he hasn’t made billions out of it by manipulating markets?

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L’attacco congiunto di Stati Uniti e Israele contro l’Iran segna una frattura storica non solo nel già fragile equilibrio mediorientale, ma anche nell’architettura globale della non proliferazione nucleare. Il punto non è soltanto che Washington e Tel Aviv abbiano colpito uno Stato sovrano in assenza di un chiaro mandato del Consiglio di Sicurezza e fuori dai requisiti stretti della legittima difesa previsti dalla Carta dell’ONU, il che rappresenta di per sé una flagrante violazione del diritto internazionale. Il punto, ancora più grave, è che questa aggressione proietta nel sistema internazionale un messaggio politico devastante: chi rinuncia all’arma atomica o resta al di qua della soglia nucleare si espone alla coercizione, al bombardamento e persino alla decapitazione politica; chi invece possiede una deterrenza credibile diventa molto più difficile da aggredire.

Come noto, la Carta delle Nazioni Unite vieta la minaccia o l’uso della forza contro l’integrità territoriale o l’indipendenza politica di uno Stato, e l’articolo 51 riconosce il diritto di autodifesa solo “if an armed attack occurs”, cioè in caso di attacco armato subito, fino all’intervento del Consiglio di Sicurezza. Numerosi giuristi internazionali hanno espresso il parere secondo cui i raid statunitensi e israeliani contro l’Iran violano il divieto cardine dell’uso della forza e configurano un caso di aggressione, in quanto non sono avvenuti in risposta a un attacco armato iraniano, né a seguito di un’autorizzazione del Consiglio di Sicurezza. Del resto, lo stesso Segretario generale António Guterres ha affermato al Consiglio di Sicurezza che i bombardamenti hanno violato il diritto internazionale, inclusa la Carta dell’ONU.

Se già il piano dello jus ad bellum è stato calpestato, il danno ulteriore riguarda il regime di non proliferazione. Il Trattato di non proliferazione, infatti, riconosce all’Iran e a tutti gli altri Paesi il diritto a un programma nucleare civile, pur vietando l’uso della tecnologia nucleare per sviluppare armi atomiche. Dunque, il TNP si regge su un compromesso elementare: gli Stati non dotati di armi nucleari accettano di non costruirle, e in cambio mantengono il diritto all’uso pacifico dell’energia nucleare dentro un quadro di controlli, verifiche e regole. Ma se uno Stato che resta formalmente nel quadro del TNP e sottopone parti del proprio programma a salvaguardie viene comunque bombardato per obbligarlo a rinunciare all’uso dell’energia nucleare, quel compromesso perde credibilità politica. Chi dovrebbe ancora fidarsi di un sistema che non protegge chi osserva la cornice della non proliferazione?

La posizione dell’AIEA (Agenzia internazionale per l’energia atomica) è in questo senso eloquente. Il direttore generale Rafael Grossi ha richiamato le risoluzioni della Conferenza generale dell’Agenzia che affermano che gli attacchi armati contro installazioni nucleari “non dovrebbero mai avere luogo” e che tali attacchi possono provocare rilasci radioattivi con conseguenze gravi dentro e oltre i confini dello Stato colpito. Anche quando l’Agenzia ha detto di non avere indicazioni immediate di danni rilevanti ad alcuni siti o di aumenti anomali di radioattività, il principio ribadito resta chiaro: le infrastrutture nucleari sotto salvaguardie non devono diventare bersagli militari. Quando invece lo diventano, il messaggio che passa non è che le regole valgono solo finché le grandi potenze decidono di rispettarle.

Da parte loro, Washington e Tel Aviv sostengono di agire per impedire la proliferazione, ma il loro comportamento produce l’incentivo più forte immaginabile alla proliferazione stessa. Se il possesso di capacità nucleari sospette o incomplete non impedisce l’attacco, e se la trasparenza o la cooperazione con gli organismi internazionali non mettono al riparo dall’uso della forza, allora molti governi del Sud globale trarranno una conclusione brutale: non basta restare dentro il TNP, occorre arrivare a una deterrenza vera. Il punto non è auspicare o meno questo esito, ma constatare che la condotta di Stati Uniti e Israele lo rende politicamente più plausibile, più razionale agli occhi di molti decisori, più spendibile nelle élite di sicurezza dei Paesi non allineati.

Il caso della Corea del Nord è, in questo quadro, il precedente più istruttivo. Non a caso, anche diversi organi di stampa occidentali hanno riferito che numerosi esperti e ex funzionari ritengono che i raid statunitensi e israeliani contro l’Iran rafforzeranno ulteriormente il programma nucleare di Kim Jong Un. Uno di essi, Song Seong-jong, ha sintetizzato la lezione in modo brutale: “Kim deve aver pensato che l’Iran è stato attaccato in questo modo perché non possiede armi nuclari”. La Corea del Nord dispone, ad oggi, di un arsenale stimato di circa 50 testate e di materiale fissile sufficiente a produrne fino a 40 ulteriori; per questo, molti analisti ritengono che oramai sia impossibile un processo di denuclearizzazione per la Corea del Nord, divenuta di fatto inattaccabile. La conclusione politica, per chi osserva il sistema dall’esterno dell’Occidente, è quasi inevitabile: Pyongyang non è stata trattata come Teheran o come Caracas proprio perché possiede una capacità nucleare già consolidata.

L’aggressione contro l’Iran, del resto, si inserisce in una sequenza più ampia che rende la lezione ancora più corrosiva. L’uccisione di ʿAlī Khāmeneī è arrivata appena due mesi dopo il sequestro di Nicolás Maduro in un raid delle forze speciali statunitensi in Venezuela, un altro leader alla guida di uno Stato privo di deterrenza nucleare.

Anche la narrativa statunitense con cui si è costruito il caso contro l’Iran contribuisce a questa erosione della credibilità del regime di non proliferazione. L’affermazione di Donald Trump secondo cui l’Iran avrebbe presto avuto missili in grado di colpire gli Stati Uniti non à supportata dai rapporti della stessa intelligence statunitense. Nel complesso, Trump ha usato argomenti enfatizzati o non corroborati nel tentativo di costruire il consenso interno a possibili raid. Se una superpotenza ricorre a minacce gonfiate, informazioni dubbie e rivendicazioni unilaterali per giustificare l’uso della forza, allora il problema non è solo l’illegalità dell’atto finale; è la trasformazione della non proliferazione in pretesto geopolitico. Da regime di regole, essa diventa linguaggio di guerra selettiva.

Per decenni l’Occidente ha sostenuto che la sicurezza collettiva richiede meno armi nucleari, più controlli, più trasparenza, più accordi. In teoria è ancora vero. In pratica, però, gli Stati Uniti e Israele stanno insegnando al resto del mondo la lezione opposta: le garanzie diplomatiche sono revocabili, le negoziazioni possono essere spezzate, le salvaguardie non proteggono dai bombardamenti, e un Paese che non dispone di deterrenza credibile rischia di essere trattato come un bersaglio disponibile, nonostante i colloqui sul nucleare tra Washington e Teheran fossero ancora aperti al momento dell’attacco. Se persino il negoziato non impedisce l’aggressione, quale incentivo resta alla moderazione strategica?

Da questo punto di vista, la vera vittima collaterale dei raid contro l’Iran è la fiducia nel regime di non proliferazione. Il TNP sopravvive non solo perché esiste un testo giuridico, ma perché gli Stati ritengono che l’adesione al trattato migliori la loro sicurezza rispetto all’alternativa. Se invece cresce la convinzione che solo la bomba scoraggi il cambio di regime, l’assassinio mirato o il bombardamento “preventivo”, allora il calcolo strategico di molti Paesi non allineati cambia radicalmente. Non nel senso che tutti si precipiteranno a costruire arsenali, ma nel senso che l’argomento antinucleare perderà forza nelle burocrazie militari, nei consigli di sicurezza nazionale e nelle opinioni pubbliche che si sentono esposte alla coercizione occidentale.

La lezione finale è dunque che non sono Teheran, Pyongyang o altri Stati del Sud globale a distruggere il regime di non proliferazione. A demolirne la credibilità sono prima di tutto le potenze che pretendono di difenderlo bombardando, assassinando e applicando il diritto in modo selettivo. Quando Washington e Tel Aviv colpiscono l’Iran e chiamano questa violenza “sicurezza”, non stanno rafforzando il mondo contro la bomba. Stanno dicendo a tutti gli altri che, nel sistema internazionale realmente esistente, la vulnerabilità invita l’aggressione e la deterrenza la scoraggia. Il problema non è se questa conclusione sia moralmente giusta. Il problema è che, dopo ciò che è accaduto, rischia di apparire strategicamente vera.

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When you dance with the devil, the dance isn’t done until you are done. U.S. President Trump may have believed he could manage Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s maniacal ambitions and succeed in a contest for power; sometimes hidden, other times open. Until February 27^th, considering the ending of the 12 Day War last summer, and also UNSC 2803 on Gaza, Trump appeared to have the upper hand. But on February 28th, the script would be flipped, resulting in an honorless war on Iran; not only on the Iranian government, military, and state institutions, but on the Iranian people themselves.

The victims in this are chiefly the people of Iran, starting with some 165 Iranian school girls at the Minab school in southern Iran, killed by Israeli strikes, though Iran will not remain victims as they push to become victors. Yet this conflict has other casualties too. Trump, MAGA, and whatever efforts at rebuilding American credibility appear to be among the ruins of the US-Israeli attack on the sovereign nation of Iran, and the despicable assassination of its leader Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei. It appears that the U.S. has passed the point of no return.

The solemn burial of the 165 school girls wantonly slaughtered by U.S.-Israeli attacks

Some time ago the U.S. pushed the world into mayhem in the domain of international law. The Western powers had, since the end of the 20^th century Cold War, begun to shift away from a formal acknowledgement of international law, and pursued the rhetoric and practice of a so-called “rules based order”; one where the rules were unilaterally created by the Washington consensus, and were fluid, constantly shifting, conveniently and hypocritically to meet the needs of the American imperial machine. Trump’s mandate, from the American people, was to restore international law and credibility. But in the 47^th administration, there were some disconcerting signs early on that this would not be the case, even if somewhat hilarious. Threats made against Greenland and Canada were more comical than worrisome at the time. The strange (if mutually agreeable) outcomes with Venezuela seemed to have been a win-win for both countries. Nationalists laughed, globalists cried; but it’s all fun and games until it’s not.

So today to describe the U.S.-Israel attack on Iran as “violations of international law”, or “war crimes”, while no doubt true, feel very much like meaningless technical phrases from a bygone era. And in this new day and age, it is therefore clearer and more germane to simply describe these viscerally as murderous and valourless. It is mass murder, for at the time of writing, more than a thousand Iranian people have been killed in these wanton attacks, and this is simply ignominious, for Iran posed no imminent threat and the U.S. was engaged with Iran in negotiations towards a peaceable resolution of their differences.  It was right when the U.S. and Iran had all but tentatively agreed that Israel notified the U.S. that it was about to strike, and it is important to meditate on the profoundly dishonorable and discrediting nature of the U.S. going in on the attack instead of pushing to halt it.

Trump apparently made the grievous error, one of potentially world-changing proportions, to join in with these attacks, unlike the way his administration handled Israel’s attacks last summer. We have arrived at a catastrophic inflection point for the MAGA project and American credibility. It is impossible to underscore enough the extraordinary damage done to the U.S.’s efforts to improve its reputation under Trump, after decades of neoconservative and neoliberal imperialist adventurism in the post-Cold War period which ostensibly the Trump project was aimed at reversing.

Nuclear Blackmail?

Former CIA officer John Kiriakou claimed back in November of 2025 that Netanyahu threatened Trump with Israeli nuclear strikes on Iran, if Trump did not go along with a conventional strike at the time. Kiriakou says this information comes to him from a trusted source, and Kiriakou’s own credentials, history, and credibility as a whistle-blower who served time in U.S. prison as a result of his commitment to truth, combined with his unique access to insider information, leads us to give high credence to his testimony.

Former CIA Counter-terrorism office John Kiriakou in the November 2025 interview

According to Kiriakou:

“The reason though, I’m told that Donald Trump decided to bomb Iran, was that the Israelis said for the first time, ‘If you don’t bomb Iran to take out these deep bunkers, we are going to use nuclear weapons.’ And they have never threatened that before. And so Trump said, bombing Iran might actually save us from the start of World War III, if it keeps the Israelis from using nuclear weapons.”

In addition, we are forced to account for the conclusions of ex Saudi intel chief Prince Turki al-Faisal, who explains that Netanyahu “convinced” Trump to support him on February 28th, concluding that “This is Netanyahu’s war”.

Al Faisal’s interview with Amanpour on CNN, March 4, 2026

Trump has apparently been outmaneuvered by the Zionist establishment, even if this was the result of nuclear blackmail, and has driven MAGA smack into a Zionist brick wall, while we should caution that these are unfolding events and this is but the read of things as of today.

Trump has been trapped, compromised, and outplayed by Netanyahu and the Israeli establishment, resulting in U.S. participation in a horrifically discrediting and strategically counterproductive war on Iran. While Trump might attempt to salvage the situation, more will rely on the diplomatic and strategic intervention of BRICS leaders like Russia, China, and even India, to de-escalate this crisis.

Eliminating Khamenei was strategically self-defeating even in the narrowest and immediate sense, as the Ayatollah was arguably a moderating force on the nuclear question, and Iran’s technocratic system ensures institutional continuity regardless of leadership decapitation. It would be understandable, even expected, now if Iran were indeed to pursue nuclear weapons, assessing what has happened in some part no doubt because they do not apparently have one now. Which is not to say they ought to, but who could readily blame them today if they did?

The Kiriakou claim about Israeli nuclear blackmail, if true, represents nuclear terrorism by definition, but there is a fundamental flaw in the logic of compliance: if Trump bombed Iran to prevent an Israeli nuclear strike last summer, nothing prevents Israel from issuing the same threat again with escalating demands. The leverage problem is not resolved by submission to it, which is perhaps then what we have seen again on February 28th.

Rubio’s disavowal of the Khamenei assassination is another strange factor in this. Is it plausible deniability, or a reflection of team Trump having lost control of the situation?  Kiriakou’s claim of Israeli nuclear threats against Trump, Saudi complaints about the lack of defense for US regional bases, Prince Turki al-Faisal’s conclusion that Netanyahu pushed Trump into the war, and reports of Iranian retaliatory strikes on U.S. bases for which the Americans were underprepared, all lend towards the conclusion that the U.S. lost control of the situation and did not seek a confrontation where increasingly successful negotiations were merely a ruse.

Khamenei’s Assassination: Strategic Futility

The assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei was counterproductive on its own terms. The Ayatollah was elderly, physically declining, and had perhaps a few years remaining. If the objective was to prevent Iranian nuclearization, Khamenei’s continued leadership served that purpose better than his removal.

Iran operates as a “meritocratic technocracy” organized around organizations of experts, where individuals are promoted to below their level of competence: the next tier of leadership is perpetually prepared. This is a system governed by institutions, not men, with the sole exception of the Supreme Ayatollah’s interpretive authority. Decapitation strikes against such a system are structurally futile, and in terms of morale within Iran, these do not serve to reduce it but to strengthen their resolve and unity.

Trump’s previous behavior is inconsistent with the interpretation that he simply wanted war with Iran. Historical friction with Pompeo and Bolton, friction with Netanyahu, the fact that military conditions favored an attack far more in 2017-2018, and the events of the 12-Day War in which Trump forced Israeli jets to turn around, as they were trying to break the ceasefire just agreed to, in such a way that would pull the U.S. in the way we see now. These all point in the direction of Trump’s preference for non-military solutions at times when military conditions and a more coherent casus belli were more favorable than now. We may recall Trump being quite irate at Israel for trying to break the ceasefire:

“Uh they violated, but Israel violated it, too. Israel, as soon as we made the deal, they came out and they dropped a load of bombs the likes of which I’ve never seen before. The biggest load that we’ve seen. I’m not happy with Israel. You know, when when I say, “Okay, now you have 12 hours.” You don’t go out in the first hour and just drop everything you have on them. So, I’m not happy with them. I’m not happy with Iran either. But I’m really unhappy if Israel is going out this morning because of one rocket that didn’t land that was shot perhaps by mistake that didn’t land. I’m not happy about that. You know what we have? We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the f*ck they’re doing. Do you understand that?”

Trump’s irate comments to the Guardian about Israel’s bellicosity at the end of the 12 Day War

Conclusively, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statements to press more or less confirm that Israel initiated the conflict, and the U.S. went ahead and joined it, on the rationale that Iran would retaliate against both parties even if Israel was the chief provocateur. While from the perspective of international law, the U.S. had no business threatening Iran in the first place, within that microcosm of reality, there is a certain logic to it. Iran, after all, is not in the business of being fooled by any sort of ‘good cop/bad cop’ antics, nor would they let the U.S. off the hook by buying into some sort of plausible deniability. Moreover, Iran had already warned the U.S. that any strike from either party would result in a firm military response aimed at numerous U.S. military bases and installations in the region. Rubio accounts that the Pentagon’s assessment was that because Iran would strike the U.S. anyhow, even though Israel was the aggressor, then the U.S. had better join in on the initial attack in order to mitigate their own losses.

But Rubio’s response points to a broader reality. Rubio, on behalf of the administration, had effectively shifted blame onto Israel and the Pentagon, and in so doing attempted to deflect responsibility and tell a story that “our hands were tied” by the logic of the conflict. It’s a fair point, within the problematic setup that the U.S. had created for itself in the first place, we should note.

At the end of the day, it is most probable that Israel will begin soon to pressure the U.S. to engage in ceasefire talks with the Iranians. According to Israel’s Ynet, the Americans themselves apparently tried to immediately end the conflict right as it started, but because the Israelis (if we are to believe Rubio) had assassinated Khamenei, the Iranians weren’t having it. After all, the U.S. or Israel has now attacked Iran three times already, entirely unprovoked. Iran has planned for a multi-year war, and Khamenei’s strategic legacy was one of preparing Iran for such a conflict, with a victory strategy contingent upon decentralizing their forces within Iran, withstanding ongoing and major strikes on buildings associated with traditional command and control in Tehran, the ensuing havoc upon the global economy that such a war would create including the Strait of Hormuz, combined with Israel’s relative inability to take punches for too long – the same metric that forced Israel to push the U.S. for a ceasefire at the end of the 12 Day War last summer.

The attacks on U.S. bases in the region are meant to disrupt the ability for the aggressors to resupply and support Israel, paving the way for increasingly effective attacks on Israeli military targets like we have seen before.

Trump is no doubt in store for a very painful lesson due to his honorless bellicosity in service of Netanyahu’s unhinged war-mongering. Does he have a trick up his sleeve? Will he once again pull a rabbit out of the hat? He has surprised the world numerous times, so time will tell. But as things look, his project appears burnt and there is little sympathy for his own political survival among large swathes of his former supporters. Can he get them back? Can dead school children be brought back to life? There’s no putting the toothpaste back in the tube. At the same time, if Iran succeeds at hitting the U.S. and Israel hard, and Trump is able to end this conflict sooner than later, the world will be better off for it. As for Israel’s alleged nuclear blackmail, that’s a gift that keeps on giving, and one that needs to be confronted.

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A little clarity for everyone

Pakistan has attacked Afghanistan. American aircraft carriers have broken toilets. The embassies of twelve states are calling on their citizens and diplomatic staff to leave Iran. How are all these events connected? Let’s take a strategic and geopolitical look.

The situation after January’s “Operation 13 Days,” in which Western intelligence services plotted and attempted yet another regime change in the Islamic Republic of Iran through the old method of organized protests, was one of encirclement of Iran by U.S. armed forces, concurrent with negotiations between the American and Iranian governments. The whole world cried out against the U.S., which, with its usual gangster-like arrogance, put Iran under pressure, creating no small number of problems.

But what if the perspective were broader than that?

From a strategic point of view, both military and diplomatic, what we have seen is this: the U.S. and Iran open diplomatic talks; the U.S. surrounds them with its military force. If we stick to a technical analysis, this gesture has meant putting up a wall of military defense between Iran and… Israel.

That’s right: Israel is the country that is trying to provoke an escalation in the Middle East, pressuring the U.S. for authorization and military support to attack Iran. Without the U.S., Israel would risk ending up like a squashed fly, making a lot of noise and disturbing everyone, but it wouldn’t take much to wipe it out. This link is essential. If we admit this possibility, which, I repeat, makes strategic sense, we realize that there is an attempt at collaboration between the U.S. and Iran to redraw the maps of the Middle East. And this makes sense and is indispensable for reducing the power of the Zionist entity, reshaping Arab influences, and agreeing on zones of influence. An absurd idea? We will see in six or seven months.

If we look more closely, we realize that it is Israel itself that has tried to detonate the conflict, creating various enmities and breaking points. A method already known on the international scene. And this is where the Pakistan issue comes in.

When plumbers are lacking

If we broaden our view, we see that Israel has meanwhile tried to run for cover and has rushed to find some new allies. The first was India. The country led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi is thirsty for military technology, particularly nuclear technology, and with the agreement signed with Netanyahu, it will have access to Israeli and American technology. This choice is consistent with both the political stance of the current Indian leadership and the concrete needs of the world’s most populous country.

In order to be a power, it must have access to a range of technologies that will allow it to remain at the top of the competition, technologies that it cannot obtain from China, its long-standing rival. Israel is well aware of this, which is why it has stepped in and tried to fragment the rapprochement that had been achieved thanks to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which had managed to bring the RIC (Russia-India-China), the three great superpowers, to the table, reaching a historic agreement on cooperation and healing the animosities of the past.

And how does Israel go against China as well, trying to create a zone of negotiation with the U.S., which cannot stand China? It inserts itself into Pakistan, which has excellent relations with China and is also a rival of India. Two possible victories in one fell swoop. But perhaps even more than that.

The detonation of a conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in fact, does what the U.S. did not want to do: set the region on fire, but in the East, not in the West. In this way, Iran finds itself indirectly involved, since the well-known tensions with the Balochistan region, between Pakistan and Iran, and also the political relations that have stabilized positively with the new Afghan leadership, are now being called into question and become the subject of a series of problems to be resolved.

This choice is still a Plan B, but it makes sense. By setting the region ablaze, Israel is aiming for a change in the balance of power in the medium term, not immediately. The only way to escalate the situation is to involve the U.S. in the Pakistan-Afghanistan affair, perhaps by offering the Washington government the opportunity to return to Kabul. What is certain is that the USS Ford, with 35 hydraulic engineers on board, did not suffer a ‘random’ failure of its toilets: the tampering with one of the largest warships in the world (and other ships as well) is a simple but effective way of telling Israel that no, they have no intention of engaging in a war in the Middle East right now to satisfy the follies of the genocidal Netanyahu.

Then there is the other player that is being called into the field, Russia, which has kept its distance for the moment, leaving the U.S. to deal with Iran. Russia has already made a significant retreat from the region with the loss of exclusive access to the Caucasus, due to the century-old agreement between the U.S., Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Russia, which mediated the transition in Afghanistan with incredible foresight, could now be called upon, precisely by Israel, to have its say. In this way, Israel also aims to disrupt the hard work of rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia, which objectively constitutes a major barrier to Zionist ambitions, but this could also become an opportunity for Russia and the U.S. to disqualify Israel from the game. How? By allowing at least part of this escalation to come to light, revealing the Israeli mind behind it all, in order to completely delegitimize Israeli authority and its influence in the world.

It is not yet entirely clear who is pushing whom in this strange conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, nor how things will end between Iran and the U.S… what is certain is that the situation is heating up and could become very, very dangerous if Israel is not stopped in time.