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Let the games begin

Here we are. The Strait of Hormuz is the new “war game.” In just a few days, the world has begun to tremble, even more than it already was.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important maritime passages in the global economic system. Located between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, it connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and, via the Arabian Sea, with the Indian Ocean. Its geographical position makes it a real “bottleneck” for global energy trade, as most oil and liquefied natural gas exports from the Middle East must pass through this narrow maritime corridor. For this reason, the Strait of Hormuz is not only economically important, but also strategically and geopolitically significant, constituting one of the most sensitive points for global energy security.

Geographically, the strait has a minimum width of about 33 kilometers, while the navigation lanes used by commercial ships are much narrower, organized according to a maritime traffic system with two corridors of about three kilometers each, separated by a safety zone. This configuration makes maritime traffic particularly vulnerable to disruptions, accidents, or military tensions. For this very reason, the control and security of the Strait of Hormuz are considered a strategic priority for many states and international organizations.

From a geo-economic perspective, the strait is a key hub for the global trade in hydrocarbons. According to leading international energy analyses, around one-fifth of the oil consumed globally passes through this passage. Every day, between 20 and 21 million barrels of oil and petroleum products pass through the strait, accounting for around 20% of global consumption. In addition to crude oil, a significant share of the global trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through this route, especially that exported from Qatar, one of the world’s leading producers of LNG. It is estimated that around 25-30% of the global trade in liquefied natural gas passes through the Strait of Hormuz.

The main commodities passing through this passage are therefore crude oil, refined products, and liquefied natural gas. However, in addition to energy resources, the strait is also crossed by container ships, bulk carriers, and tankers carrying other types of cargo, such as chemicals, metals, industrial raw materials, and consumer goods destined for Asian, European, and North American markets. The presence of large commercial ports in the Persian Gulf, such as those located in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, further contributes to the intensity of trade flows through the strait.

The main players involved in the geopolitical dynamics of the Strait of Hormuz are primarily the coastal states, particularly Iran and Oman, which directly border the strait and share territorial control over it. Iran, in particular, exerts a strong strategic influence on the region, thanks in part to its military presence along the coast and on the islands near the strait. From a political and military standpoint, Tehran has repeatedly declared, in situations of international tension, the possibility of restricting or blocking maritime traffic in the strait as a means of geopolitical pressure.

Alongside the states directly bordering the strait, other key players are the major oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These states depend heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for the export of their energy resources to major international markets. Consequently, the stability and safety of navigation in the strait are considered essential for their economies and for the balance of global energy markets.

A leading role is also played by the major international powers, particularly the United States, which maintains a significant military presence in the Persian Gulf region. The US Navy, through its Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain, conducts patrol and maritime security operations to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait. Other powers, such as the United Kingdom and France, also periodically participate in naval surveillance and security missions in the region. In recent years, China has also shown a growing strategic interest in the stability of Middle Eastern energy routes, given its heavy dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf.

From a legal and diplomatic point of view, navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is governed by various international rules and agreements. The main regulatory framework is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982. This convention establishes the principle of “right of transit” in straits used for international navigation, guaranteeing civilian and military vessels the possibility of passing through these passages without unjustified interference from coastal states. However, Iran has not formally ratified UNCLOS and has repeatedly expressed restrictive interpretations of the right of transit, arguing for the need to regulate the passage of foreign warships in its territorial waters.

In addition to the international legal framework, there are also several multilateral initiatives and maritime security missions aimed at ensuring the stability of the strait. These include the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), an international coalition created in 2019 with the aim of protecting commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Several countries are participating in this initiative, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other regional partners.

Another important element is infrastructure investment aimed at reducing dependence on the strait. Some Gulf countries have developed alternative pipelines that allow oil to be exported without passing through Hormuz. Significant examples include the pipeline connecting Saudi Arabia’s oil fields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, and the pipeline connecting Abu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. However, the capacity of these alternative infrastructures remains limited compared to the total volume of energy exports from the region.

It is therefore a crucial hub of the world’s economic geography and one of the most sensitive points in the global energy system, whose security and stability can shift the financial balance of entire regions of the world.

Geopolitical perspectives

Now that the strategic and geo-economic value of the strait is clear, let’s try to think about the disaster that is unfolding and, above all, who benefits from it. Who, indeed, is the question. At first glance, this operation fits consistently into the plan to dissolve Europe with its political and financial powers.

In fact, it is the eurozone that is suffering the hardest blow, in a dramatic way. The possibility that logistics, transport, and even industrial production will suffer a sharp slowdown is a well-founded fear and, unfortunately, a very real one. In fact, it is already happening. But this is consistent, we repeat, with the intention to destroy the European architecture. This is a mission that Trump has declared and that also suits Putin’s Russia, and not only that: none of the other countries like the old European power order, especially those that have suffered decades or centuries of European colonialism. And, to be honest, they do not like America either, with its return to imperialism, heir to that of Europe, but everything must be dealt with in its own time, and now is the time for the collapse of the old continent.

Now, given its function as a central hub for global energy trade, any significant change in freedom of navigation in the strait would have immediate effects not only on energy markets but also on the geopolitical balance between the major world powers. From a strategic analysis perspective, at least three distinct scenarios can be hypothesized: the total closure of the strait to naval traffic, a selective closure aimed at favoring certain trading partners, and a prolonged militarization of the area.

The first scenario involves the total closure of the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Such an event, even if temporary, would have extremely significant consequences for the global economy. Since approximately 20% of the oil consumed worldwide passes through this passage, its interruption would immediately cause a severe shock to energy supply, the prelude to which we are already seeing in part at this very moment. The prices of oil and liquefied natural gas would rise rapidly on international markets, with knock-on effects on inflation, industrial production, and financial stability. In short, chaos. And chaos is always useful to someone, because it allows them to do things that cannot be done in times of peace and order. Is that clear?

A total blockade of Hormuz would put everyone in crisis to the point of having to take remedial action. A short war would involve a very strong show of force by the US and Israel (even atomic weapons would be considered), and would allow the conflict to be resolved quickly, effectively crushing Iran in a violent war, perhaps with the support of other European countries and those in the Gulf. To do this, the conditions must be extremely sophisticated, with a complex game of blackmail and power leverage that leaves no other choice for all participants. America would have to find, or violently demand, exceptional decision-making authority and military operational capability, while also resolving the moral dilemma. In practice, Iran would have to be placed in a position where it could be accused of being the absolute evil and responsible for all the consequences of the blockade. The information war and the speed of action in a multi-domain context would play a central role here.

For Europe, the consequences would be particularly significant. Although in recent years the European Union has partially diversified its energy sources, especially after the energy crisis linked to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a significant share of oil and gas imports continues to come from the Middle East. The closure of the strait would lead to a drastic reduction in supplies from countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. This would put severe pressure on European energy markets, forcing member states to increase imports from other areas such as the United States, West Africa, or the North Sea, at significantly higher costs.

The impact on Asia would be even greater, as many Asian economies are more dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, India, and especially China import a significant portion of their energy needs via routes through the Strait of Hormuz. A total closure of the passage could therefore slow down economic growth across the entire Asian region, causing instability in financial markets and potentially triggering emergency policies to secure energy supplies. However, let’s not make the mistake of thinking that China and other Far Eastern countries will allow this to happen without reacting…

The second scenario envisages a selective closure of the strait, limited to ships bound for or coming from Europe, with preferential treatment for Asian trade routes, particularly those bound for China and Russia. Although complex from an operational and legal point of view, this scenario could emerge in a context of strong geopolitical polarization, characterized by the formation of opposing economic blocs.

In such a situation, some Gulf producer countries could decide to favor their Asian partners, who are already the main buyers of Middle Eastern oil. China, for example, has become the world’s leading oil importer over the past two decades and has developed increasingly close economic relations with several countries in the region. A selective closure of the strait could therefore further strengthen the energy link between the Persian Gulf and East Asia.

For Europe, the consequences would be particularly problematic, as it would be excluded from one of the world’s main energy routes. This could accelerate the process of reorganizing energy supply chains, increasing European dependence on alternative suppliers such as the United States, Norway, or African countries. At the same time, such a scenario would strengthen the geopolitical weight of Asia, and China in particular, in the global energy system.

Furthermore, selective discrimination in maritime traffic could call into question some fundamental principles of international maritime law, increasing the risk of diplomatic and military tensions. The European Union and its allies could respond with economic pressure, naval protection missions, or diplomatic initiatives aimed at restoring freedom of navigation.

However, it is true that this second scenario would cause the war to be prolonged and reshaped. Diplomacy would play a greater role here, seeking ways in and out of Tehran. Iran would have a very interesting card to play. The theater of operations would be remodeled, probably transforming the Gulf into a “special” area, with temporary and atypical management, in which the players would confront each other at different times or through alliances, without completely freeing the area from conflict. Medium- and long-term timescales, with which to manually redefine the global balance of power. It is (perhaps) a less bloody scenario.

Finally, the third scenario concerns the prolonged militarization of the Strait of Hormuz for a period exceeding 100 days. In this case, maritime traffic would not necessarily be interrupted, but it would be subject to a high level of military control, with the constant presence of naval fleets, surveillance systems, and potential incidents between the armed forces of different countries.

Long-term militarization would have a significant impact on the costs of maritime trade. Shipping companies and maritime insurers would significantly increase risk premiums for ships passing through the area, making the transport of goods and energy resources more expensive. This increase in logistics costs would inevitably be reflected in the final prices of raw materials and industrial products in a much more significant way than is already the case.

From a geopolitical perspective, a prolonged military presence could transform the Strait of Hormuz into a veritable zone of strategic confrontation between major powers. The United States, European powers, China, and potentially other emerging powers could strengthen their naval presence in the region to protect trade routes and their energy interests. This would increase the risk of military incidents or unintended escalation.

At the same time, prolonged militarization could further encourage the development of alternative routes and infrastructure, such as land pipelines or new sea routes through other regions. However, such solutions would require very high investments and long implementation times, making it difficult to completely replace the strategic role of the Strait of Hormuz in the short term.

Once again, the question returns to the initial one: who benefits? The world is changing very quickly.

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“Our success will continue to hinge on America’s military power and the credibility of our assurances to our allies and partners in the Middle East.”

These were the words spoken in December 2013 by the Secretary of Defense of the Obama administration, Chuck Hagel, to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. That reinforced the historical guarantees given by Washington to its puppets, reaffirming the deceptive propaganda that the United States is the guardian of global security.

Promises like that are made by every administration, whether Democrat or Republican. Twelve years later, Donald Trump would reinforce that mantra again, addressing Qatar specifically: “The United States shall regard any armed attack on the territory (…) of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States.” According to Trump, the United States would respond to attacks against Qatar with “all lawful and appropriate measures,” “including militarily.”

Israel had just bombed Doha, targeting Hamas leaders. The entire speech by the president of the United States was completely hollow: the Patriot systems acquired for 10 billion dollars in the 2012 agreement, together with a new acquisition of Patriot and NASAMS systems for more than 2 billion dollars in 2019, did not intercept the Israeli bombardment. And the United States did not consider that attack a “threat to the peace and security of the United States” — on the contrary, they turned a blind eye to it.

Qatar hosts the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Air Force and the British Royal Air Force at Al-Udeid Air Base, built with more than 8 billion dollars invested by the Qatari government. None of this has protected the Qatari people. Iran’s retaliation for the U.S.–Israel aggression revealed that the base itself (the largest U.S. military installation in the Middle East) is a fragile target: it was struck by a missile on the 3rd, which likely damaged or destroyed the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar, one of the most important sensors in the U.S. missile defense system, valued at about $1.1 billion. Satellite images suggest significant damage to the equipment, which could compromise the ability to detect ballistic missiles at long distances.

In 2017, Saudi Arabia spent $110 billion on U.S. military equipment in an agreement that foresees spending more than $350 billion by next year — including Patriot and THAAD systems. Apparently, this enormous expenditure is not guaranteeing fully secure protection. Despite important interceptions in the current war, the U.S. government instructed part of its personnel to flee Saudi Arabia to protect themselves — which reveals that even the United States does not trust the defensive capability it sells to others. In fact, in the early hours of the 3rd, two drones struck the U.S. embassy in Riyadh and, two days earlier, U.S. soldiers were also targeted.

Since 1990, Gulf countries have spent nearly $500 billion purchasing weapons and protection systems from the United States, according to data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database and reports from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The construction and maintenance of defense infrastructure by the United States is almost entirely financed by the host countries. All of this is being blown apart by the legitimate Iranian retaliation.

The ineffectiveness of the protection provided by the United States had already been demonstrated in last year’s war, but also by the launches from Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis toward Israel, which shattered the myth surrounding the Iron Dome. In a certain sense, the success of many of those attacks represented a humiliation for the all-powerful American arms industry. The several MQ-9 Reaper drones shot down by the Yemenis represented losses amounting to $200 million — the drones used by the Houthis to shoot down the American aircraft cost an insignificant fraction to produce.

The ineffectiveness of American protection also reveals the extremely low quality of the products of its military complex. This complex is dominated by a small handful of monopolies such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon which, without competitors and with clients subservient to the American government, see no need to make the maximum effort to produce weapons and systems of unsurpassable quality. Finally, corruption runs rampant in this field, and inferior peoples such as those of the Gulf do not deserve to consume products of the same quality as those destined for America — apparently their regimes are willing to pay dearly for anything.

Iran, with all its experience of more than four decades dealing with aggression, has known how to use these vulnerabilities very well. Leaders at the highest levels of the Iranian state publicly insist that peace in the Middle East is impossible while U.S. bases remain operational in the region. Saeed Khatibzadeh, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, stated, “We have no option but to put an end to the existence of American presence in the Persian Gulf area.” These appeals are certainly circulating in neighboring countries — both among the general population and within the armed and political forces.

The Persian nation is not only attacking military installations but also strategic targets that affect the nerve center of the Gulf countries’ economies: the energy industry — in retaliation for the bombings of its own oil infrastructure by the United States and Israel. These Iranian attacks place even greater pressure on the puppet regimes of imperialism to do something to stop their masters. The obvious solution would be to prevent the use of their territory for aggression against Iran, which would necessarily imply closing the military bases.

Although all these countries are dictatorships that repress any dissent, as the suffering of the civilian population increases, popular discontent may become uncontrollable. Their rulers know this and are already racking their brains to find a safe way out of this potentially explosive situation.

Will the peoples of these countries swallow all the lying propaganda that their regimes — fed by the lie industry of the United States and Israel — try to tell them, that Iran is the aggressor and responsible for the attacks? But why do the United States build missile launch bases so close to residential neighborhoods? Clearly, just like the Israelis, this is not a “moral” and “ethical” army: those people exist to serve as human shields for American soldiers. The logic of protection is inverted: it is not U.S. anti-aircraft systems that serve to protect the Saudi, Emirati or Qatari people — it is these second-class citizens who must die to protect the occupying forces.

Moreover, U.S. military bases frequently house soldiers responsible for crimes against local populations. This became explicit during the Iraq War. For example, the rape of a 14-year-old girl named Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi, followed by her murder and the killing of her family after soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division invaded her house in Mahmudiya in 2004. Or the rapes documented over years during the invasion of Iraq, together with the practice of sexual exploitation and prostitution carried out in areas near American military installations such as Balad Air Base, used by the 4th Infantry Division.

On the 1st, U.S. Marines killed at least nine protesters who attempted to storm the American consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, in protest against the criminal aggression against Iran that had already massacred about 150 girls in an Iranian school the previous day. This is what imperialist presence in the countries of the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America serves for: to rape, murder and use the natives themselves as human shields, not to protect them.

How long will it take before they rise up against this true military occupation? Probably not long.

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“Nuestro éxito seguirá dependiendo del poder militar de Estados Unidos y de la credibilidad de nuestras garantías a nuestros aliados y socios en Oriente Medio.”

Estas fueron las palabras pronunciadas en diciembre de 2013 por el secretario de Defensa del gobierno de Obama, Chuck Hagel, a los países del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo. Aquello reforzaba las garantías históricas dadas por Washington a sus marionetas, reafirmando la propaganda engañosa de que Estados Unidos es el guardián de la seguridad global.

Promesas como esa son hechas por cada administración, sea demócrata o republicana. Doce años después, Donald Trump volvería a reforzar ese mantra, dirigiéndose específicamente a Qatar: “Los Estados Unidos considerarán cualquier ataque armado contra el territorio (…) de Qatar como una amenaza a la paz y la seguridad de los Estados Unidos.” Según Trump, Estados Unidos respondería a los ataques contra Qatar con “todas las medidas legales y apropiadas”, “incluyendo militarmente”.

Israel acababa de bombardear Doha, apuntando contra dirigentes de Hamas. Todo el discurso del presidente de Estados Unidos era absolutamente vacío: los sistemas Patriot adquiridos por 10 mil millones de dólares en el acuerdo de 2012, sumados a una nueva adquisición de Patriot y NASAMS por más de 2 mil millones de dólares en 2019, no interceptaron el bombardeo israelí. Y Washington no consideró aquel ataque como una “ amenaza a la paz y la seguridad de los Estados Unidos  ” — por el contrario, cerró los ojos ante él.

Qatar alberga el Comando Central de Estados Unidos, la Fuerza Aérea de Estados Unidos y la Real Fuerza Aérea británica en la base aérea de Al-Udeid, construida con más de 8 mil millones de dólares empleados por el gobierno de Qatar. Nada de eso ha protegido al pueblo catarí. Las represalias de Irán a la agresión de Estados Unidos-Israel revelaron que la propia base (la mayor instalación militar de Estados Unidos en Oriente Medio) es un objetivo frágil: fue alcanzada por un misil el día 3, que probablemente dañó o destruyó el radar de alerta temprana AN/FPS-132, uno de los sensores más importantes de la defensa antimisiles de Estados Unidos, valorado en alrededor de 1,1 mil millones de dólares. Imágenes de satélite sugieren daños significativos en el equipo, lo que podría comprometer la capacidad de detección de misiles balísticos a largas distancias.

En 2017, Arabia Saudita gastó 110 mil millones de dólares en material bélico de Estados Unidos, en un acuerdo que prevé gastar nuevos 350 mil millones de dólares hasta el próximo año — esto incluye los sistemas Patriot y THAAD. Aparentemente, ese gasto exagerado no está garantizando una protección totalmente segura. A pesar de importantes interceptaciones en la guerra actual, el gobierno estadounidense orientó a parte de sus funcionarios a huir de Arabia Saudita para protegerse — lo que revela que ni los propios Estados Unidos confían en la capacidad de defensa que venden a los demás. De hecho, en la madrugada del día 3, dos drones alcanzaron la embajada estadounidense en Riad y, dos días antes, soldados estadounidenses también fueron atacados.

Desde 1990, los países del Golfo han desembolsado casi 500 mil millones de dólares en la compra de armamento y sistemas de protección de Estados Unidos, según datos de la Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), de la base de datos del Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) y de informes del Congressional Research Service (CRS). La construcción y mantenimiento de la infraestructura de defensa por Estados Unidos es financiada casi completamente por los países anfitriones. Todo esto está saltando por los aires gracias a la legítima represalia iraní.

La ineficacia de la protección dada por Estados Unidos ya se había demostrado en la guerra del año pasado, pero también por los disparos de Hamas, Hezbollah y los hutíes hacia Israel, que derribaron el mito alrededor del Domo de Hierro. En cierto sentido, el éxito de muchos de esos ataques representó una humillación para la todopoderosa industria bélica estadounidense. Los varios drones MQ-9 Reaper derribados por los yemeníes significaron pérdidas por un monto de 200 millones de dólares — los drones utilizados por los hutíes para abatir las aeronaves estadounidenses costaron una fracción insignificante para ser producidos.

La ineficacia de la protección estadounidense también revela la bajísima calidad de los productos de su complejo militar. Este está dominado por un pequeño puñado de monopolios como Lockheed Martin y Raytheon que, sin competidores y con clientes subservientes al gobierno estadounidense, no ven la necesidad de esforzarse al máximo para producir armamentos y sistemas de calidad insuperable. Finalmente, la corrupción corre libre en esta área, y pueblos inferiores como los del Golfo no merecen consumir productos de la misma calidad que los destinados a América — aparentemente, sus regímenes están dispuestos a pagar caro por cualquier cosa.

Irán, con toda su experiencia de más de cuatro décadas lidiando con agresiones, ha sabido utilizar muy bien esas vulnerabilidades. Dirigentes del más alto nivel del Estado iraní insisten públicamente en que no es posible que haya paz en Oriente Medio mientras las bases de Estados Unidos estén en funcionamiento en la región. Saeed Khatibzadeh, el viceministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Irán, declaró: “No tenemos otra opción que poner fin a la presencia estadounidense en la zona del Golfo Pérsico”. Estos llamados ciertamente están circulando en los países vecinos — tanto entre la población común como en las fuerzas armadas y políticas.

La nación persa no está atacando solo instalaciones militares, sino también objetivos estratégicos que afectan el punto neurálgico de la economía de los países del Golfo: la industria energética — en represalia por los bombardeos de Estados Unidos e Israel contra su propia infraestructura petrolera. Estos ataques iraníes presionan con una fuerza aún mayor a los regímenes títeres del imperialismo para que hagan algo para detener a sus amos. La solución obvia sería impedir la utilización de su territorio para agresiones contra Irán, lo que implicaría necesariamente el cierre de las bases militares.

Aunque todos estos países sean dictaduras que reprimen cualquier disidencia, a medida que aumenta el sufrimiento de la población civil, el descontento popular puede volverse incontrolable. Sus gobernantes lo saben y ya están rompiéndose la cabeza para encontrar una salida segura para esta situación potencialmente explosiva.

¿Acaso los pueblos de estos países se tragarán toda la propaganda mentirosa que sus regímenes — alimentados por la industria de mentiras de Estados Unidos e Israel — intentan contarles, de que Irán es el agresor y el responsable de los ataques? Pero ¿por qué Estados Unidos construye bases de lanzamiento de misiles tan cerca de barrios residenciales? Está claro que, al igual que los israelíes, no se trata de un ejército “moral” y “ético”: esas personas existen para ser escudos humanos de los soldados estadounidenses. La lógica de protección se invierte: no son los sistemas antiaéreos de Estados Unidos los que sirven para proteger al pueblo saudí, emiratí o catarí, son esos ciudadanos de segunda clase los que deben morir para proteger a las fuerzas ocupantes.

Además, las bases militares de Estados Unidos frecuentemente albergan soldados responsables de crímenes contra las poblaciones locales. Esto quedó explícito durante la Guerra de Irak. Por ejemplo, la violación de una niña de 14 años llamada Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi, seguida de su asesinato y el de sus familiares después de que soldados de la 101.ª División Aerotransportada invadieran su casa en Mahmudiya, en 2004. O las violaciones documentadas durante años durante la invasión de Irak, sumadas a la práctica de explotación sexual y prostitución realizada en áreas cercanas a instalaciones militares estadounidenses, como la Base aérea de Balad, utilizada por la 4ª División de Infantería.

El día 1°, marines estadounidenses mataron al menos a nueve manifestantes que intentaron invadir el consulado estadounidense en Karachi, en Pakistán, en protesta contra la agresión criminal contra Irán que ya había masacrado a cerca de 150 niñas en una escuela iraní el día anterior. Para eso sirve la presencia imperialista en los países de Oriente Medio, Asia Central, África y América Latina: violar, asesinar y usar a los propios nativos como escudos humanos, no para protegerlos.

¿Hasta cuándo se levantarán contra esta verdadera ocupación militar? Probablemente, eso no tardará en suceder.

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First let me explain the meaning of the X message and photo that appears above… the cancellation of the training exercise is a key indicator that the Pentagon is going to deploy the some, if not all, of the 82nd Airborne Division to the Persian Gulf. 

Final destination unknown. You may recall an article I wrote on February 18 when I reported that a CENTCOM exercise scripting conference, which was scheduled to begin on Sunday, 22 February 2026, had been abruptly cancelled. Six days later the war started.

The imminent deployment of the 82nd does not mean they are going into battle in the next couple of days. I expect it will be at least two weeks before they reach their base camp. However, this does mean that Trump and Hegseth were not just making an idle comment when they mentioned putting boots on the ground.

Despite the Trump administration’s efforts to downplay US casualties after seven days of war in the Persian Gulf, clues are appearing on the internet that indicate the US has suffered more combat losses than reported. The first clue is this Xhitter (pronounced SHITTER) from Stars and Stripes.

K-Town refers to Kaiserslautern, a US Army base in Germany, which is located 13 miles east of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. So what? Well, on March 4, 2026 the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) in Germany—the largest US Department of Defense hospital outside the United States and the primary overseas trauma/evacuation hub for injured service members from Europe, the Middle East, and Africa—sent out a memo announcing the temporary suspension of its labor and delivery services “until further notice.” The memo did not explicitly define the “primary objective,” but LRMC’s core role is treating combat- and training-related injuries. It also is the main medical evacuation point for wounded troops from ongoing operations.

A knowledgeable friend who supervised DOD’s Wounded Warrior Program during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars and worked with personnel at the LRMC, learned today that there is a flood of casualties arriving at the hospital. The numbers are so large that the hospital could no longer continue to spend resources on birthing babies.

Then this picture popped up on Telegram a little bit ago:

It is not a stretch to conclude that Iran’s attacks on the US bases in the Persian Gulf produced more than a few casualties. DOD/DOW is working hard to keep this information from the public. Most Americans do not support the unprovoked war… This is likely to fuel more opposition.

Original article:  ronpaulinstitute.org

Segue nostro Telegram.

Da un certo punto di vista, l’Iran ha chiaramente “vinto”. Trump voleva essere celebrato con una splendida ‘vittoria’ in stile reality show. L’attacco di domenica ai tre siti nucleari è stato infatti proclamato a gran voce da Trump e Hegseth come tale: hanno affermato di aver “distrutto” il programma di arricchimento nucleare dell’Iran. “Completamente distrutto”, insistono.

Solo che… non è così: l’attacco ha causato forse qualche danno superficiale. E sembra che sia stato coordinato in anticipo con l’Iran tramite intermediari per essere un’azione “una tantum”. Questo è un modello abituale di Trump (coordinamento preventivo). È stato così in Siria, nello Yemen e persino con l’assassinio di Qasem Soleimani da parte di Trump, il tutto con l’intento di regalare a Trump una rapida “vittoria” mediatica.

Il cosiddetto “cessate il fuoco” che ha rapidamente seguito gli attacchi statunitensi, sebbene non senza qualche intoppo, è stata una “cessazione delle ostilità” messa insieme in fretta e furia (e non un cessate il fuoco, poiché non sono stati concordati termini). Si è trattato di una “soluzione provvisoria”. Ciò significa che l’impasse negoziale tra l’Iran e Witkoff rimane irrisolta.

La Guida Suprema ha enunciato con forza la posizione dell’Iran: “Nessuna resa”; l’arricchimento dell’uranio prosegue; gli Stati Uniti devono lasciare la regione e non immischiarsi negli affari iraniani.

Quindi, dal lato positivo dell’analisi costi-benefici, l’Iran ha probabilmente abbastanza centrifughe e 450 kg di uranio altamente arricchito e nessuno (tranne l’Iran) sa ora dove sia nascosto il deposito. L’Iran riprenderà la lavorazione. Un secondo vantaggio per l’Iran è che l’AIEA e il suo direttore generale Grossi sono stati così egregiamente sovversivi nei confronti della sovranità iraniana che l’Agenzia molto probabilmente sarà espulsa dall’Iran. L’Agenzia ha fallito nella sua responsabilità fondamentale di salvaguardare i siti in cui era presente uranio arricchito.

I servizi segreti statunitensi ed europei perderanno così i loro “occhi” sul terreno, oltre a rinunciare alla raccolta di dati tramite l’intelligenza artificiale dell’AIEA (da cui probabilmente dipendeva in larga misura l’identificazione degli obiettivi da parte di Israele).

Dal punto di vista dei costi, sul piano militare l’Iran ha ovviamente subito danni materiali, ma mantiene la sua potenza missilistica. La narrativa statunitense-israeliana secondo cui i cieli iraniani sarebbero “aperti” agli aerei israeliani è l’ennesimo inganno architettato per sostenere la “narrazione vincente”:

Come Simplicius osserva: “Non rimane alcuna prova che aerei israeliani (o americani, per quella materia) abbiano mai sorvolato in modo significativo l’Iran in qualsiasi momento. Le affermazioni di ”superiorità aerea totale” sono prive di fondamento. [Le riprese] fino all’ultimo giorno mostrano che Israele ha continuato a fare affidamento sui suoi pesanti UCAV [grandi droni di sorveglianza e attacco] per colpire obiettivi terrestri iraniani”.

Inoltre, sono stati registrati serbatoi di carburante provenienti da aerei israeliani che sono stati ritrovati sulle coste settentrionali del Mar Caspio, il che suggerisce piuttosto che l’aviazione israeliana abbia lanciato missili a lunga gittata dal nord (cioè dallo spazio aereo dell’Azerbaigian).

Salendo di livello nell’analisi costi-benefici, è necessario passare al quadro più ampio: la distruzione del programma nucleare era un pretesto, ma non l’obiettivo principale. Gli stessi israeliani affermano che la decisione di attaccare lo Stato iraniano è stata presa lo scorso settembre/ottobre (2024). Il piano intricato, costoso e sofisticato di Israele (decapitazione, omicidi mirati, attacchi informatici e infiltrazione di cellule di sabotaggio equipaggiate con droni) che si è svolto durante l’attacco a sorpresa del 13 giugno era incentrato su un obiettivo immediato: l’implosione dello Stato iraniano, aprendo la strada al caos e al “cambio di regime”.

Trump credeva nell’illusione israeliana che l’Iran fosse sull’orlo di un collasso imminente? Molto probabilmente sì. Credeva alla versione israeliana (secondo quanto riferito, inventata dal programma Mosaic dell’AIEA) secondo cui l’Iran stava accelerando “verso l’arma nucleare”? È possibile che Trump sia stato ingannato – o, più probabilmente, fosse una preda consenziente – dalla narrativa costruita da Israele e dagli Stati Uniti filoisraeliani.

Poiché la questione ucraina si è rivelata più intrattabile di quanto Trump si aspettasse, la promessa israeliana di un “Iran pronto a implodere, in stile siriano” – una trasformazione ‘epica’ verso un “Nuovo Medio Oriente” – deve essere stata abbastanza allettante da spingere Trump a spazzare via bruscamente l’affermazione di Tulsi Gabbard secondo cui l’Iran non possiede armi nucleari.

Quindi, la risposta militare iraniana e la massiccia mobilitazione popolare attorno alla bandiera sono state una “grande vittoria” per l’Iran? Beh, è certamente una “vittoria” sui venditori ambulanti del “regime change”; ma forse la ‘vittoria’ va precisata? Non è una “vittoria definitiva”. L’Iran non può permettersi di abbassare la guardia.

La “resa incondizionata dell’Iran” è, ovviamente, fuori discussione. Ma il punto è che l’establishment israeliano, la lobby pro-israeliana negli Stati Uniti (e forse anche Trump) continuerà a credere che l’unico modo per garantire che l’Iran non si avvicini mai allo status di potenza nucleare non sia attraverso ispezioni e monitoraggi invasivi, ma proprio attraverso un “cambio di regime” e l’insediamento di un fantoccio puramente occidentale a Teheran.

La “lunga guerra” per sovvertire l’Iran, indebolire la Russia, i BRICS e la Cina è in sospeso. Non è finita. L’Iran non può permettersi di rilassarsi o di trascurare le sue difese. La posta in gioco è il tentativo degli Stati Uniti di controllare il Medio Oriente e il suo petrolio come sostegno alla supremazia del dollaro.

Il professor Hudson osserva che “Trump si aspettava che i paesi avrebbero risposto al suo caos tariffario raggiungendo un accordo per non commerciare con la Cina e, di fatto, accettando sanzioni commerciali e finanziarie contro la Cina, la Russia e l’Iran”. Chiaramente, sia la Russia che la Cina comprendono la posta in gioco geo-finanziaria che circonda un Iran che non si arrende. E capiscono anche come un cambio di regime renderebbe vulnerabile il fianco meridionale della Russia, come potrebbe far crollare i corridoi commerciali dei BRICS e essere utilizzato come un cuneo per separare la Russia dalla Cina.

In parole povere: la lunga guerra degli Stati Uniti probabilmente riprenderà in una nuova forma. L’Iran è sopravvissuto a questa fase acuta del confronto. Israele e gli Stati Uniti hanno scommesso tutto su una rivolta del popolo iraniano. Ma non è successo: la società iraniana si è unita di fronte all’aggressione. E l’umore è più forte, più risoluto.

Tuttavia, l’Iran “vincerà” ancora di più se le autorità sapranno cogliere l’euforia di una società unita per infondere nuova energia alla rivoluzione iraniana. L’euforia non durerà per sempre, se non si agirà. È un’opportunità paradossale e inaspettata offerta alla Repubblica.

Israele, al contrario, dopo aver lanciato la sua “guerra psicologica” per rovesciare lo Stato iraniano, si è rapidamente trovato in una situazione in cui il suo nemico non si è arreso, ma ha risposto. Israele si è trovato bersaglio di attacchi di ritorsione su larga scala. La situazione è diventata rapidamente critica, sia dal punto di vista economico che dell’esaurimento delle difese aeree, come dimostrano le disperate richieste di aiuto di Netanyahu agli Stati Uniti.

Passando al più ampio livello geopolitico dei costi e dei benefici, la posizione di Israele (a livello regionale) di essere inattaccabile quando unito al potere americano ha subito un duro colpo: “Pensateci in questo modo: tra dieci o vent’anni, cosa verrà ricordato… [l’attacco decapitante e le uccisioni mirate di scienziati]… o il fatto che le città israeliane sono state bruciate per la prima volta, che Israele non è riuscito a neutralizzare il programma nucleare iraniano e ha fallito in tutti gli altri obiettivi importanti che si era prefissato, compreso il cambio di regime?

“Il fatto è che Israele ha subito un’umiliazione storica che ha distrutto il suo mito”. I paesi del Golfo avranno qualche difficoltà a digerire il significato più ampio di questo evento simbolico.

E sebbene l’elettorato di Trump sembri soddisfatto che l’America abbia partecipato in modo minimo alla guerra – e apparentemente sia felice di vivere avvolto in un miasma di esagerata autocompiacimento – ci sono prove significative che la fazione MAGA della coalizione di Trump stia contemporaneamente giungendo alla conclusione che il presidente degli Stati Uniti stia diventando sempre più parte del sistema dello Stato profondo che ha criticato con tanto ardore.

Ci sono state due questioni chiave nelle ultime elezioni presidenziali statunitensi: l’immigrazione e la fine delle “guerre infinite”. Trump, oggi, nonostante i messaggi altamente confusi e contraddittori, è chiaro sul fatto che una guerra infinita non è fuori discussione: “Se l’Iran costruirà nuovamente impianti nucleari, allora in quello scenario gli Stati Uniti colpiranno [di nuovo]”, ha avvertito Trump.

Questo, insieme ai post sempre più bizzarri scritti da Trump, sembra aver radicalizzato la base populista contro Trump su questo tema.

Per il resto del mondo, i recenti post di Trump sono inquietanti. Forse funzionano per alcuni americani, ma non altrove. Ciò significa che Mosca, Pechino o Teheran hanno più difficoltà a prendere sul serio messaggi così irregolari. Altrettanto preoccupante, tuttavia, è quanto il Team Trump si sia dimostrato distante dalla realtà geopolitica in una serie di casi nella sua valutazione della situazione. In molte capitali del mondo lampeggiano luci gialle.