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Let’s end the year in style

When a prime minister advises his staff to rest because the coming year will be much more difficult, it is neither black humor nor fatigue. It is a moment of sincerity, the kind that only emerges when internal projections no longer support the public narrative.

Giorgia Meloni was not addressing the electorate. She was addressing the machinery of the state itself, the administrative core charged with implementing decisions whose effects can no longer be hidden. Her observation was not about a normal increase in workload. She was talking about constraints, about limits being reached, about a Europe that has moved from crisis response to a phase of controlled contraction, fully aware that 2026 is the year when deferred costs will eventually converge.

What has leaked out is what European ruling circles have already understood: the Western strategy in Ukraine has run up against material limits. Not with Russian messages, not with disinformation, not with populist dissent, but with steel, ammunition, energy, manpower, and time. Once these realities assert themselves, political legitimacy begins to erode.

The EU cannot sustain this war economically. Europe can strike poses of readiness. It cannot manufacture war.

After years of high-intensity conflict, both the US and Europe are rediscovering a long-forgotten truth: wars of this nature cannot be sustained with speeches, sanctions, or the abandonment of diplomacy. They require bullets, missiles, trained personnel, maintenance cycles, and industrial production that consistently exceeds battlefield losses. None of this exists, not in sufficient quantities, and it is not feasible in the timeframe preached in Brussels.

Russia is producing artillery ammunition in quantities that Western officials now openly admit exceed NATO’s total production. Its industrial base has shifted to near-continuous wartime production, with centralized procurement, streamlined logistics, and state-led manufacturing, without even total mobilization. Estimates place Russian production at several million artillery shells per year, already delivered, not just projected.

Europe, meanwhile, spent 2025 congratulating itself on targets it is structurally incapable of achieving. The EU’s stated commitment of two million shells per year depends on facilities, contracts, and labor that will not be available by the decisive period of the war, if ever. Even if achieved, the figure would still be less than Russian production. The US, despite emergency expansion, expects about one million shells per year once full ramp-up is complete, and only if that happens. Even on paper, combined Western production struggles to match what Russia is already producing in practice. The imbalance is clear.

This is not just a deficit, but a misalignment of timing. Russia is producing now. Europe is planning for the future. And time is the only factor immune to sanctions.

Washington, in fact, cannot indefinitely compensate for Europe’s eroded capacity because it faces its own industrial difficulties. Patriot interceptor production remains in the order of a few hundred per year, while demand simultaneously concerns Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and the replenishment of US stocks: an imbalance that, as Pentagon officials admit, cannot be resolved quickly. Shipbuilding tells a similar story: submarines and surface ships are years behind schedule due to labor shortages, aging infrastructure, and skyrocketing costs, pushing significant expansion toward 2030. The assumption that America can indefinitely support Europe is no longer in line with reality. This is a systemic Western problem.

Unfounded war rhetoric

European leaders talk about a “state of war” as if it were a rhetorical position, but in reality, it is an industrial condition that Europe does not meet.

New artillery lines take years to reach stable production. Air defense interceptors are produced in long, batch-based cycles, not in sudden spikes. Even basic components such as explosives remain a critical issue, with plants that closed decades ago only now reopening and some not expected to reach full capacity until the late 2020s. This timeline is in itself an admission.

Europe’s weakness is not intellectual, but institutional: huge sums have been authorized, but procurement inertia, fragmented contracts, and a depleted supplier base have meant that deliveries are years behind schedule. France, often described as Europe’s most capable arms manufacturer, is capable of building advanced systems, but only in limited quantities, counted in dozens, while a war of attrition requires thousands. EU ammunition initiatives have expanded capacity on paper, while the front has exhausted ammunition in a matter of weeks.

These are not ideological shortcomings, but administrative and industrial failures, which are exacerbated in stressful situations. It is yet another example of the failure of European Community policy, so much so that the structural contrast is stark. Western industry has been optimized for shareholder returns and peacetime efficiency, while Russian industry has been reoriented to withstand pressure. NATO announces aid packages. Russia counts deliveries. You can already guess what the outcome of this situation will be, right?

This industrial reality explains why the debate on asset freezing was so important and why it failed. Europe did not pursue the seizure of Russian sovereign assets out of legal ingenuity or moral determination, but because it needed time: time to avoid admitting that the war was unsustainable in Western industrial terms, time to replace production with financial maneuvers.

When the effort to confiscate some €210 billion in Russian assets failed on December 20, blocked by legal risks, market repercussions, and opposition led by Belgium, with Italy, Malta, Slovakia, and Hungary opposing total confiscation, the Brussels technocracy settled for a reduced alternative: a €90 billion loan to Ukraine for 2026-27, with interest payments of around €3 billion per year. This further mortgages Europe’s future. This is not a strategy, but emergency triage. A collapsing political hospital. Pure panic.

Narrative, crisis, disaster

The deeper reality is that Ukraine is no longer primarily a military dilemma, it is a question of solvency. Washington recognizes this, because it cannot absorb the reputational discomfort, but they cannot take on unlimited responsibility forever. A way out is being explored, discreetly, inconsistently, and shrouded in rhetorical cover.

Europe cannot admit the same necessity, because it has ultimately adopted ‘Putin’s version’, i.e. it has framed the war as existential, civilising, moral – but do you remember when European politicians enjoyed calling Putin crazy for talking about a clash of civilisations?

Compromise has become appeasement, negotiation surrender. In doing so, Europe has eliminated its own escape routes. Well done, ladies and gentlemen!

On the narrative front, greetings to all. The aggressive enforcement of the EU’s Digital Services Act has less to do with security than with containment: building an information perimeter around a consensus that cannot survive open scrutiny. Translated: censorship as a solution. The truth of the matter must not be made known, and those who try to do so must be suppressed in an exemplary manner. This also explains why regulatory pressure now extends beyond European borders, generating transatlantic friction over freedom of expression and jurisdiction. Confident systems welcome debate. Fragile ones suppress it. In this case, censorship is not ideology, but a form of insurance.

The information crisis, rest assured, will very soon become… a social crisis ready to detonate into domestic conflict.

And the crisis is also one of resources and energy. We are witnessing the securitization of decline, whereby obligations are postponed while the productive base needed to sustain them continues to shrink. It’s a cat chasing its tail. Here too, you know how it will end, don’t you?

Europe has not only sanctioned Russia. It has sanctioned itself. European industry will continue to pay energy prices well above those of its competitors in the United States or Russia throughout 2026. Take a trip around Europe, read the headlines in local newspapers, look at people’s faces: the fabric of small and medium-sized enterprises, the true beating heart of entire EU countries, is quietly disappearing. And this is logically reflected in large companies too. This is why Europe cannot increase its production of ammunition and why rearmament remains an aspiration rather than a concrete operation.

Energy, we said. Low-cost energy was not a convenience, it was essential. If it is eliminated through self-inflicted damage, the entire structure is emptied. Even the most ambitious plans preached for years, such as the IMEC corridor, are still a mirage. There is a stampede towards Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to try to scrape together a few kilowatts. A ridiculous attempt to save what is now tragically unsalvageable.

China, observing all this, represents the other half of Europe’s strategic nightmare. It controls the world’s deepest manufacturing base without having entered into a position of war. Russia does not need China’s full capacity, only its strategic depth in reserve. Europe has neither.

A frightening 2026

2026 therefore looks set to be a terrible year, I’m sorry to say. The European elites find themselves losing control on three fronts at once. On finance, because the budget will be bitter and the money for the insane support to Kiev will no longer be the same. On narrative, because the question citizens will ask themselves will be ‘what was the point of all this?’. On the cohesion of the Alliance, both NATO and the EU, because Washington’s disengagement will force a review of the balance of power on the European continent to the point of no return and, perhaps, a break between the two sides divided by the ocean.

Panic, again. Not a sudden defeat, but the slow erosion of legitimacy as reality creeps in through gas that costs as much as gold, closed plants, empty stockpiles, obsolete rifles, and a future that is turning away.

This is not just a difficult situation for Europe, but a matter of civilization. A system incapable of producing, supplying, speaking honestly, or retreating without collapsing in credibility has reached its limit. When leaders begin to prepare their institutions for worse years, they are not anticipating inconveniences, but recognizing structural failure.

Empires proclaim victory loudly. Declining systems quietly lower expectations or, in this case, momentarily say the quiet part out loud. But the truth is that nothing is the same as before, and it is obvious.

For most Europeans, the reckoning will not come as an abstract debate about strategy or supply chains, but as a simple realization: this was never a war they consented to. It did not defend their homes, their prosperity, or their future. And so, again, how do you think it will end?

An ideological war has been fought in the name of imperial ambition and financed through declining living standards, industrial decline, and the prospects of their children. In the name of big pro-European capital, of the privileged few with robes, stars, and crowns.

For months, even years, it was said that “there was no alternative” and that this was the only course of action. And now?

Europeans are tired. They want peace, stability, and the quiet dignity of prosperity: affordable energy, a functioning industry, and a future unencumbered by conflicts they NEVER chose and, above all, they do not want the decline of millennia-old civilizations.

And when this awareness has taken hold, when the fear has faded and the spell has been broken, the question Europeans will ask themselves will not be technical or ideological. It will be existential. And all existential questions lead to radical choices, even terrible ones.

May this dramatic fear keep the mad leaders of this Europe awake at night.

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A.I. is fast expanding as a plague all along the internet spectrum. That’s quite predictable, considering the Big Tech model for A.I. is techno-feudalism, relying on profit and mind/social control, and not on sharing/expanding knowledge and creating better conditions for a well-informed citizenry.

A.I. in many aspects is the antithesis of civitas. Prior to the A.I. boom, several layers of the internet had already been distorted into a series of minefields across a large-than-life sewer. A.I. – as controlled by Big Tech – in many aspects had already revealed itself as a fraud. Now it’s a weapon.

There are several channels on YouTube manipulated by A.I., stealing the image and voice by some of us, independent political analysts. A not-extensive list includes as targets John Mearsheimer, Larry Johnson, Richard Wolff, Glenn Diesen, Yanis Varoufakis, economist Paulo Nogueira Batista and myself.

It’s not an accident that all of us are independent geopolitical and geoeconomic analysts, mostly know each other personally, and are guests in roughly the same podcasts.

In my own case, there are channels in English, Portuguese and even Spanish: I rarely do podcasts in Spanish, so even the voice is fake. In English, usually the voice is approximately cloned. In Portuguese it comes with an accent I don’t have. In several cases, audience numbers are huge. Essentially, these come from bots.

In all cases, as far as we, the targets are concerned, all these channels are fake. I repeat: all these channels are fake. They may at least in some cases be set up by “fans” – certainly with an eye for profit via monetization.

Or the whole scam may be part of something way more sinister: a strategy bent of loss of credibility. As in an operation by the usual suspects to sow confusion amongst the – large – audience of several independent thinkers.

It’s not an accident that quite a few viewers are already deeply puzzled. Cue to the most common question: “Is this really you, or A.I.?”  Many apparently have denounced these fake channels, but YouTube, so far, has done absolutely nothing about them. The algos keep suggesting these channels to large audiences.

The only realistic way to fight the scam is to file a complaint with YouTube. But that, in practice, is pretty useless. YouTube management seems to be more interested in occasionally erasing “inconvenient” channels displaying critical thinking and analysis.

Cracking the code of the scam

Quantum Bird, a physics and HPC (High Performance Computing) expert, formerly with the CERN in Geneva, has cracked the code of the scam:

“The proliferation of agents of deep learning digital neural networks capable of emulating writing, voice and video of human beings was inevitable, and their impact on scientific research, production of knowledge and art in general has a negative potential that has not been yet fully analyzed.”

He adds: “While writers and academics are detailing the springing up of texts attributed to them, and replicating to a certain extent their style and opinions, the latest fad is the blooming of whole channels on YouTube, and other notorious Big Tech platforms, that offer videos of popular content producers, communicating in their native language or other languages. In several cases, the quality of this synthesized material is sufficiently high not to allow immediate identification by an average viewer. In the context of the political analysis community, the impact is obvious: historic revisionism, erosion of reputations and distortion of news and analysis.”

And here Quantum Bird lays out the tech clincher:

“The synthetization of this type of content requires the availability of abundant samples and massive computational capacity, way beyond the reach of domestic users. While the popularity of the YouTube victims guarantees the first condition, the second one suggests the activity of large-scale state or corporate actors, since advanced deep learning models must be developed and trained by processing a huge quantity, in terms of “disk space”, of audio and video. The monetization of the content does not cover the costs of this operation. Ironically, it’s the availability and the excess exposure of voice and video online that allows this type of attack.”

Here we go. Welcome to A.I. turning the net into an infernal machine bent on erasing meaning, culture and History – and sowing deep intellectual confusion. Exactly like Techno-Feudalism wants it.

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Boston, many years ago…

Cryptocurrencies are now an integral part of the daily lives of billions of people around the world. The West as a whole is even “stockpiling” them as a reserve for the global market in the event of a collapse of Western currencies. But who would ever think that Epstein had anything to do with the infamous Bitcoin?

Information that has emerged from emails, court documents, and journalistic investigations indicates that Jeffrey Epstein had indirect but real links to the Bitcoin ecosystem in its early stages, mainly through donations to MIT in Boston and contacts with developers, investors, and political figures. However, there is no evidence that he directly influenced the code or technical decisions of Bitcoin Core, but his network of relationships touched on some key financing and networking hubs in the cryptocurrency world.

Joichi Ito, director of MIT’s Media Lab, resigned in September 2022 after The New Yorker published an investigation into his alleged maneuvers to conceal financial contributions from pedophile Jeffrey Epstein. Although Ito led one of MIT’s most influential labs, his role and legacy within the cryptocurrency community have remained largely overlooked.

Ito was the founder of MIT’s Digital Currency Initiative (DCI), a project that contributed decisively to the survival of Bitcoin at one of its most critical moments in 2015. That year, when the Bitcoin Foundation—a nonprofit organization dedicated to the development of the cryptocurrency—was facing serious funding difficulties, the DCI welcomed key Bitcoin Core developers such as Gavin Andresen, Cory Fields, and Wladimir van der Laan, offering them full-time positions.

Subsequently, other DCI members left the initiative to work on Facebook’s Libra, while some prominent contributors started their own cryptocurrencies. Associate Professor Christian Catalini, principal investigator of the MIT Digital Currencies Research Study, is now chief economist at Calibra, Facebook’s digital wallet; similarly, Professor Silvio Micali founded Algorand, a digital currency based on a consensus mechanism founded on a kind of lottery.

Ito’s departure from MIT immediately raised questions about both the DCI’s past funding and its future prospects because, given the links between the Media Lab and Epstein, it is legitimate to ask what a convicted sex offender had to do with the development of cryptocurrencies.

Beyond the resignation—which Boston University has not commented on—it seems appropriate to also reconsider Ito’s positions on cryptocurrencies, especially in light of the revelations about the Epstein case. His criticism of entrepreneurs in the sector reflects not only abuses in the fundraising mechanisms of the blockchain industry, but also his own contradictions.

In a video published in September 2017, in which he talks with Neha Narula, director of the DCI, Ito addresses the issues of open source development and initial coin offerings, i.e., cryptocurrency fundraising campaigns. After Narula observes that many open source developers work more out of passion than for profit, expressing surprise at the billions of dollars raised through crypto crowdfunding, Ito intervenes, pointing out that money tends to corrupt. He also states that the underlying problem with cryptocurrencies lies in their structural link to money, which pushes people to pursue paths where work can be quickly turned into profit, a temptation that is difficult to avoid, especially when family responsibilities come into play.

It is easy to imagine how this view may also have influenced Ito’s personal justifications for accepting funds from Epstein. In another passage, reflecting on abuses related to crypto crowdfunding, he notes that many initiatives are born in a problematic way.

The fact remains, however, that while accepting funding from Epstein, Ito also provided the DCI with a critical and cautious approach to cryptocurrencies. In his public speeches and editorial contributions, he repeatedly warned against excessive investment in blockchain and the risks of putting profit before all other considerations.

In an editorial published in Wired in February 2018, Ito wrote that contemporary ICOs were fueled by a gold rush mentality, were launched irresponsibly, and ended up harming individuals and the ecosystem of developers and organizations, pointing out that adequate legal, technical, and regulatory tools were still lacking and that many were taking advantage of this.

When, at the height of the 2017 bubble, a cryptocurrency called IOTA received enthusiastic coverage from MIT Technology Review, Ito critically analyzed its claims, debunking its claims. What is disappointing is that, while identifying abuses and exaggerations in the world of cryptocurrencies, Ito does not seem to have applied the same critical rigor to his own behavior.

But why crypto?

Why was Epstein interested in cryptocurrencies? We must try to answer this question. Yes, it is clear from his dealings with ICO and MIT that he had some interest, otherwise financing projects of this type would have been nothing more than a losing investment.

Let us therefore consider a few elements.

First, let’s assume that the theory of bitcoin as a project created by the NSA is at least possible. A senior US DIA official spoke to me at length about this several months ago. In the world of American alternative information and OSINT, it is a much-discussed topic.

The theory stems from the fact that in 1996, the NSA published a study entitled “How to make a mint” on the topic of “electronic cash” and standardized SHA-256, the hash algorithm used in Bitcoin, which is the basis of mining. The authors of the publication are all cryptographers from the American intelligence agency. The Bitcoin white paper was only published in 2008, twelve years later. The 1996 paper introduced new concepts of cryptography, such as public key cryptography, hidden signatures, and digital anonymity mechanisms, but did not yet mention a decentralized system. It was not until 2008 that the concept of decentralized proof-of-work consensus and the so-called blockchain were introduced.

You may rightly say that this information alone is not enough. However, Edward Snowden accused the NSA of monitoring Bitcoin-related traffic and tracking it in depth, at least since 2013. Metadata, network traffic, exchanges, everything was perfectly tracked, even though cryptocurrencies were said to be “secure” and “hidden.” This forced enthusiasts to recognize that the crypto system, particularly Bitcoin as the first and most widespread currency, is not so secure after all. All transactions are verifiable, not by name but by addresses and amounts, forever; addresses can be linked to a person’s on-chain financial history; there are even companies, such as Chainalysis or Elliptic, that offer mapping and distribution services for sensitive data.

It is a masterpiece of digital surveillance because… it does not seem like surveillance, as it is public, almost anyone can do it, and, it is said, there is no room with a big red button that causes the entire system to shut down. Yes, it’s a pity that this method of dispersion – a classic used to obscure the truth about certain information in the world of intelligence – does not say that “it is not true that the NSA created Bitcoin,” but only says that the key to opening the chest containing the truth has been thrown into the ocean, and now anyone who wants to understand something has to take a long swim. On the other hand, the transparency of the blockchain is a design compromise: it guarantees security and verifiability, but makes it possible, in retrospect, to reconstruct movements if they can be linked to real identities, and authorities and companies have learned to exploit this transparency for investigative and compliance purposes, without the need for Bitcoin to be created as an “espionage project.”

So, to recap: if you are a boss of political and sexual blackmail and want to help develop a payment system that perfectly tracks every single bit, do as Epstein did.

This is Manhattan, Brock

The released emails reveal that Epstein had hosted Mr. Brock Pierce, one of the earliest investors in Bitcoin, and former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers at his home in Manhattan. The discussion focused on the potential of Bitcoin, although Summers expressed concern about the risks to his reputation if the price fell.

Pierce apparently introduced himself to Summers as “the most active investor in Bitcoin,” and the conversation focused on the opportunities and reputational risks associated with price volatility, while Epstein acted as a facilitator, connecting the nascent crypto ecosystem with members of the traditional financial elite. These meetings, which took place after Epstein’s 2008 conviction, suggest that his interest in Bitcoin was not just theoretical, but part of a strategy of networking and positioning himself in a sector perceived as emerging.

After all, if you strike a deal with a former Treasury Secretary, you can be sure you’ve received excellent financial investment advice, right? When you plan to blackmail very important men and women from around the world, you have to ask the best experts or, at least, those who hold the keys to the control room in the palaces of those who really rule.

Another figure then appears who is sure to cause a stir: Steve Bannon. The former White House strategist and influential figure on the American right was contacted by Epstein for some investment advice on cryptocurrencies. The questions focused in particular on the taxation of cryptocurrencies, how to receive, spend, and distribute tokens, and compliance with rules on donations and political financing, a sign that Epstein was also interested in the regulatory and tax implications of digital assets. After all, once you’ve invested $850,000, it’s legitimate to wonder whether it was well spent or not, right?

Sources report that Bannon did not limit himself to a generic response, but put him in touch with experts from the Federal Election Commission and professionals in the crypto sector, further expanding Epstein’s network in the world of digital currencies. This episode confirms that, years after his first donations to MIT, Epstein continued to seek to position himself with regard to cryptocurrencies, assessing both their financial potential and their legal and political consequences.

And yet another unexpected step forward: Amazon. A further piece of the puzzle comes from an analysis of Epstein’s book purchases on Amazon, which emerged in leaks of his emails and related reports. The documents indicate that in 2017 he purchased several books on Bitcoin, Ethereum, blockchain technology, and, more generally, finance and trading, confirming a systematic and not episodic interest in the sector.

The reconstructions cite these purchases as part of a broader personal development strategy that Epstein pursued while attempting to rebuild his network after the scandals, focusing on new digital financial instruments. Some online summaries refer generically to “cryptocurrency” payments linked to these books, but the public materials mainly mention the nature of the texts and the thematic interest; In any case, the overall picture suggests Epstein’s intellectual and operational involvement with Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies was much broader than was known until the recent publication of emails and government documents.

So, Epstein was genuinely interested in the entire cryptocurrency ecosystem, from their design and development to investing in and using them. An excellent system not for covering up his own activities but, if anything, for tracking the misdeeds of others, perhaps under his own guidance, perhaps in the very scheme of blackmail and extortion that he had created. Another piece in the next chapter of our Epstein Saga will help us better understand this strategic choice that comes from intelligence.

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No one would dare claim that nature is fair, and this becomes quite clear when we assess the distribution of natural resources across the planet’s surface and compare it with national borders. Some resources are more or less evenly distributed among nations, while others are more concentrated in specific points on the globe. A very few resources are hyper-concentrated in one or two countries and virtually absent from the rest of the planet.

Such is the case of so-called “rare earths”—a generic name more correctly referred to as “rare earth metals”—a set of 17 heavy metals whose utility has been growing for the high-tech industry, especially those linked to the Fourth Industrial Revolution. They are applicable to sectors ranging from smartphones and wind turbines to the precision systems of contemporary missile technology, not forgetting electric vehicle motors.

Well, the world, as far as is known, contains 92 million metric tons of rare earth metals. Of these, approximately 47% are in China (which is also responsible for about 60-70% of mineral production and, more crucially, over 85% of global refining and processing) and roughly 23% are in Brazil. India follows far behind with 7% of the reserves.

The United States, in turn, possesses only 1% of the rare earth elements.

The problem is obvious when one realizes that the U.S. tries to remain at the forefront of contemporary technological development and, for that reason, has been in absolute dependence on China for rare earth imports. This reality of dependence in such a strategic sector is clearly not to Donald Trump’s liking.

Thus, despite Trump’s recent visit to China serving to ease tensions between the countries and secure the supply of rare earths, freeing itself from Chinese dependence remains a strategic objective of the highest order for the White House. This is confirmed by the approach to the “Chinese question” in the U.S. National Security Strategy document, which places competition with China among the primary American objectives.

The search for alternative sources of rare earths, therefore, constitutes a priority.

And by the very logic of this natural resource’s distribution… that’s where Brazil comes in, the second country in terms of rare earth quantity.

First, the quantity of reserves does not necessarily correlate with the production (i.e., the refining) of these elements from the rare earths. Brazil, for example, despite possessing 23% of the rare earths, accounts for only 1% of production. In other words, Brazil has an as-yet underutilized potential in this sector.

Faced with this reality, the question arises: why, then, doesn’t Brazil begin to refine and use its own rare earth metals, considering their strategic character?

For decades, Brazil has been categorized in intermediate groups such as “developing countries,” “future powers,” etc., but its socioeconomic situation has evolved little in the last 20 years. Wouldn’t this be a strategic advantage capable of leveraging Brazil’s development and reindustrialization?

My sources in the financial sector say, however, that it is unlikely any change in the Brazilian government’s posture will happen on this issue of rare earths. And for very simple reasons: refining rare earths is complex, requires high investment and great energy expenditure. Generally, any significant investment in this area will take approximately 12-15 years to show any results.

This actually places Brazil in a situation of international fragility. It is the possessor of wealth that it currently lacks the conditions to exploit—and this in a context where a major, relatively nearby power needs these very natural resources.

But it would be amateurish to deduce from this any possible U.S. pretension to invade or attack Brazil. The reality is that Washington simply doesn’t need to do anything of the sort.

The recent agreement between Lula and Trump was portrayed in the international media as a defeat for Bolsonaro, which is true, but it would be premature to speak of a “victory” for Lula. Because the details of the negotiations between the two countries to this day have not been disclosed, and well-founded rumors say that Brazil would have agreed to facilitate U.S. access to Brazilian rare earths.

This access, however, is to some extent already verifiable.

The Trump administration, through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), invested US$465 million in the mining company Serra Verde, the only commercial-scale rare earths producer outside Asia. Despite operating in Brazil, the company is controlled by the U.S. fund Denham Capital, and its CEO met with high-ranking U.S. government officials before tariffs were imposed against Brazil.

In parallel, Serra Verde is also seeking resources from Brazilian institutions such as BNDES and Finep to expand its production and innovation. Another beneficiary of the DFC is the mining company Aclara, which received US$5 million to explore rare earths in Aparecida de Goiânia. Controlled by the Peruvian Hochschild group—a family empire with a history of mining in Latin America—Aclara aims to explore heavy rare earths essential for high-tech magnets.

No one should be surprised by the possibility of Brazil yielding so easily to the U.S. The Brazilian elite is notoriously cosmopolitan and Westernized, and ideologically adheres to the values of “liberal democracy” and “human rights,” nurturing a deep distrust of countries like Russia and China. Far from the stereotypical image fed abroad of Lula, the Brazilian President has expressed on several occasions a greater sense of closeness to the European Union compared to non-aligned or counter-hegemonic countries.

Naturally, the major concern is that current and future U.S. investments in exploiting Brazilian rare earths will not result in any development and will not go beyond the most predatory extractivism. Comparatively, in this case, a joint venture agreement with the Chinese could be more beneficial, given their greater willingness for technology transfer.

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A solution is needed

While European institutions discuss deadlines, constraints, and political dogmas, Budapest is taking action by signing concrete contracts. Hungary’s energy security cannot continue to be the subject of provocation, discord, and mockery from the West as a whole, which is why the Orban government has decided to take action.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has announced that he has concluded a major agreement for the supply of natural gas from Azerbaijan for the next two years. This operation goes far beyond the commercial plan, taking on a clear political significance and placing itself in open friction with recent European Union directives, which are strongly contested by the Hungarian government.

According to diplomatic sources, Hungary will receive a total of 800 million cubic meters of gas. The agreement was formalized following a meeting between Rovshan Najaf, president of the Azerbaijani state energy company SOCAR, and Károly Mátrai, CEO of the Hungarian energy group MVM.

The agreement, which will come into effect on January 1, 2026, consolidates what is defined as “strategic energy cooperation.” For a landlocked country such as Hungary, diversifying gas pipeline supplies is not an option but an essential condition for economic and productive stability.

The agreement stipulates that SOCAR will be the supplier and MVM ONEnergy the buyer of 800 million cubic meters, with a duration of two years starting January 1, 2026.

The time factor is obviously crucial. While Hungary is strengthening its ties with Baku, on December 3, the European Union decided to completely eliminate Russian gas imports by 2027, providing for a gradual and mandatory reduction for both liquefied natural gas and gas transported via pipeline.

The Hungarian government’s response was immediate. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Minister Szijjártó announced their intention to appeal to the European Court of Justice. The justification given is pragmatic: for Budapest, implementing and applying these decisions is simply unfeasible. Without supplies from the East, the national economy would risk collapse. In this context, Hungary and Slovakia continue to stand out from the rest of the EU, maintaining energy relations with Moscow for one simple reason: physical geography imposes constraints that politics cannot erase by decree.

Here emerges the more technical – and in some ways paradoxical – dimension of the affair, emblematic of the ambiguities of the European energy transition. It is legitimate to ask whether the gas destined for Hungary comes exclusively from the Caspian fields.

The game of roles in the market

Surviving energetically is becoming a risky game in Europe. Hungary’s choice, however risky it may seem, is decisive for national and regional stability.

Clearly, this is a geo-economic ploy. In the energy market, it is well known that molecules do not bear indications of origin; Azerbaijan has limited extraction capacity and growing domestic demand; in order to fulfill its export commitments to Europe, Baku has often compensated by purchasing Russian gas for its own domestic needs, thus freeing up volumes for Western export.

From an economic and logistical point of view, the mechanism is that of a swap: Azerbaijan purchases gas from Gazprom for domestic consumption, while exporting gas formally labeled as “Azerbaijani” to Europe.

The end result is clear: energy flows continue and financial resources circulate. Hungary guarantees security of supply, Azerbaijan benefits from revenue and geopolitical prestige, while Brussels can continue to support the narrative of politically acceptable gas. An exercise in administrative “hypocrisy” which, however, ensures heating and continuity of production. If we want to read it from a Keynesian perspective, what matters is maintaining aggregate demand and industrial capacity; the nominal origin of the gas is irrelevant to the real economy.

The impact will be mainly stabilizing. The availability of 800 million cubic meters under contractual terms set for two years reduces exposure to spot market volatility, which is set to increase as 2027 approaches. For households and businesses, this means greater cost predictability, a decisive factor in a context of persistent inflation.

It is unlikely that Brussels will directly block a bilateral agreement with Azerbaijan, which the European bloc itself considers a strategic partner in reducing dependence on Moscow. Disputes could only arise if the Russian origin of the flows were proven, but physically tracing the origin of gas in an integrated network is extremely complex. Hungary is ready to exploit every legal loophole to protect its energy independence.

This raises a question: can Azerbaijani gas completely replace Russian gas? The answer is no. Although significant, the expected volume does not cover Hungary’s entire demand, which amounts to several billion cubic meters per year. The agreement represents a form of diversification and a safety net, not a definitive solution. Structural dependence on eastern flows remains, which is why the Orbán government considers a total abandonment of Russian gas by 2027 without serious economic consequences to be unrealistic: both the infrastructure and the necessary alternative volumes are lacking.

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In the contemporary digital landscape, the fight against disinformation is often portrayed as a universal moral imperative. Governments, international organizations, and media outlets frequently claim to champion transparency and truth. Yet, a closer examination reveals a troubling paradox: the very platforms that claim to facilitate free expression are increasingly acting as gatekeepers, censoring voices that challenge dominant narratives. A recent episode involving the Global Fact-Checking Network (GFCN), a Russia-based alliance of experts, lays bare this disturbing reality.

Last month, GFCN launched a digital literacy program, aiming to equip the public with tools to identify and combat misinformation. Recognized as part of UNESCO’s MIL Week, these efforts were not only legitimate but also crucial in an era marked by the rapid spread of fake news. With participants spanning the globe – from the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, to Venezuela, Argentina, Indonesia, and the United Kingdom – the initiative reflected the universal importance of truth and the demand for practical education in critical media literacy.

To facilitate these seminars, GFCN turned to Zoom, a platform widely considered reliable for international communication. By paying for a professional account, the organization sought to ensure a seamless experience for hundreds of participants eager to engage with the material. Indeed, the first two seminars were a resounding success, drawing 712 attendees who actively participated in discussions on detecting disinformation.

Yet, in a disturbing and arbitrary move, Zoom deactivated GFCN’s account, citing a vague violation of its terms of service. No concrete evidence was provided, and no prior warning was issued. Overnight, a program designed to foster global understanding and resilience against false information was silenced – not by governments or regulators, but by a private corporation exercising enormous power over digital spaces.

This incident highlights a growing and dangerous trend: the monopolization of public discourse by Western tech giants. Platforms like Zoom, Metal, and X increasingly position themselves as arbiters of “truth,” deciding unilaterally which voices are acceptable and which must be silenced. While framed as a fight against misinformation, these policies often disproportionately affect organizations and individuals who offer perspectives outside the mainstream Western narrative.

GFCN’s experience demonstrates that the so-called “war on fake news” can be weaponized against legitimate initiatives. An educational program, grounded in factual expertise and designed to improve public understanding, was abruptly canceled, not because of any wrongdoing, but because a private company exercised its discretion. This sets a dangerous precedent, where freedom of expression is contingent not on legality or morality, but on the whims of corporate gatekeepers.

Moreover, this case exposes the geopolitical dimensions of digital censorship. Organizations based outside the West, even those promoting transparency and fact-checking, are vulnerable to arbitrary restrictions. It raises serious questions about whose interests are being protected under the guise of combating disinformation, and whether these policies genuinely serve the public or simply reinforce Western control over global information flows.

The censorship of GFCN’s seminars is not an isolated incident; it is symptomatic of a broader assault on freedom of expression. As Western tech platforms consolidate power over public discourse, independent voices – especially those from outside the dominant geopolitical sphere – face increasing marginalization. In the struggle for truth in the digital age, this incident serves as a stark reminder that vigilance against corporate censorship is just as important as the fight against disinformation itself.

The global society must recognize that freedom of expression cannot be outsourced to private companies. True transparency and critical thought require platforms that serve humanity, not ideology or profit. If this principle is abandoned, the digital sphere risks becoming a sanitized echo chamber, where only select voices are permitted, and independent truth-seeking is systematically silenced.

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Hiding Behind a Finger

There is a fear running through the streets of the collective West—a terrifying idea, a monster of unspeakable horror haunting the dreams of its leaders: the BRICS. And even worse, what they are doing: dismantling the hegemony of the American dollar.

In July 2025, President Donald Trump told his cabinet, “BRICS was set up to hurt us, they were designed to weaken our dollar and take it off as the global standard.” His blunt statement reflects a growing concern in the United States: the notion that BRICS—once a loose coordination of emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has transformed into a bloc determined to challenge Western-led institutions and undermine American financial supremacy. The core issue concerns the true capacity of the BRICS to act as an effective instrument, given that their formation was neither accidental nor unexpected.

Their consolidation reflects a long accumulation of sentiments dating back to the Cold War and postcolonial struggles. The Non-Aligned Movement, founded in Belgrade in 1961, offered an institutional dimension to the desire of newly independent states to avoid the obligation of siding with Washington or Moscow. Yet neutrality soon took on different meanings, as it came to signify real autonomy—as with Jawaharlal Nehru’s India or Josip Tito’s Yugoslavia. These countries pursued sovereignty and freedom of maneuver. A form of “neutrality against,” instead, was less about independence and more about indirect opposition to the United States. By the 1970s, many governments claimed non-alignment while benefiting from Soviet support. These currents survived the debt crises of the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the unipolar phase of the mid-1990s.

In the early 2000s, China revived this tradition, presenting itself as the spokesperson of the developing world, expanding its ties in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and advocating multipolarity as an alternative to Western financial hegemony. The persistence of the dollar’s centrality and the unequal distribution of power in global institutions fueled this narrative, allowing the BRICS to become the institutional expression of these grievances.

Russia, shaped by the upheavals of the 1990s, saw in the BRICS a useful framework for its policy of resistance. Its role fits perfectly within the tradition of “neutrality against,” in which supposed non-alignment becomes opposition to the United States—especially after the U.S. sanctions of 2014 and 2022.

The creation of the New Development Bank in 2014, the expansion of bilateral currency swap agreements, and the gradual promotion of yuan-denominated trade serve as tools aimed at reducing the dollar’s weight, even while presenting the project as reformist rather than revolutionary.

Brazil has adopted a more flexible stance. Its diplomacy continues to practice a “neutrality for,” seeking room for advantage in the international system without breaking ties with the United States or the European Union.

India, among the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, remains anchored to the value of strategic autonomy. Its rivalry with China, heightened by clashes in Ladakh in 2020, limits its willingness to accept structures that expand Beijing’s influence, even as it continues to invest in the BRICS framework.

The BRICS financial agenda—promoting non-dollar trade, diversifying reserves, and building parallel institutions—turns the traditional sentiment of non-alignment into a concrete threat to American interests. Since the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944, the primacy of the dollar has formed the foundation of U.S. global power. The BRICS lack the cohesion needed to dethrone the dollar entirely, but they can provide political cover and an institutional framework for “neutrality against.” In doing so, they undermine the legitimacy of the dollar and of the U.S.-dominated international order.

All this terrifies the West, whose financial dominance rests on the dollar as a “universal currency”—slowly but effectively dismantled by the BRICS and the Global South. America, for its part, hides behind a finger so small that the Hudson Institute has felt compelled to dedicate an entire paper to the problem, pondering what “effective” strategies might counter the BRICS and their deleterious intention to ruin Washington’s monetary toy.

The BRICS Financial Agenda

According to the paper, Washington’s global economic power relies above all on the centrality of the dollar and the dominance of the SWIFT system (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication)—the secure messaging network connecting banks worldwide. SWIFT allows the United States to monitor financial flows and facilitate sanctions, anti-money-laundering measures, and counter-terrorism financing operations. This transparency distinguishes the dollar-based system from older, informal networks.

The BRICS, by contrast, seek to build channels that are difficult to monitor from the outside, in a manner similar to—brace yourselves—the methods used by terrorist cells through hawala, the ancient value-transfer system born in South Asia in the 8th century. Hawala functioned through trust-based networks without centralized records or oversight, leaving few traces. Like hawala, the group promotes local-currency regulations and alternative payment systems. The difference is that, whereas hawala relies on informal networks, the BRICS aim for official coordination among major economies to build solid alternatives to dominant reserve currencies. And for the U.S., this is a brutal low blow—one taken very poorly.

American control over the dollar and SWIFT is the core of its financial strategy. In the past, those seeking to evade U.S. oversight turned to informal methods that remained marginal and could not compete with the dollar’s liquidity and reliability. The BRICS New Development Bank, China’s CIPS system, and the growth of currency swap agreements are coordinated attempts to create alternatives to dollar payments—shifting the challenge from the margins to the center of global finance. BRICS members still depend on dollar liquidity, but each summit strengthens the credibility of alternatives, while de-dollarization moves from aspiration to policy.

Washington’s ability to revoke SWIFT access—as it did against Iran in 2012 and Russia in 2022—is one of its economic weapons, but it has proven almost entirely ineffective, demonstrating through currency collapses that alternatives to the dollar-based system exist and even function. States rejecting dollar hegemony are labeled “hostile” and deserving of punishment. Financial sovereignty is not tolerated in Washington’s clubs.

The group has advanced several possible tools for replacing the dollar:

1. National alternative currencies.

Some members—above all China—seek to expand the use of their currencies in trade. Beijing uses bilateral swap agreements and the CIPS system—its SWIFT alternative—to enlarge the yuan’s area of use. After intensified Western sanctions against Russia, Moscow and Beijing have settled growing shares of bilateral trade in yuan and rubles, while India has experimented with rupee-denominated trades.

2. Barter and clearing mechanisms.

Some BRICS members already use such tools. India and Russia have conducted exchanges in rupees and rubles, and Iran has long relied on barter agreements to cope with shortages of hard currency. These systems can support economies hit by sanctions or financial difficulties, though they are difficult to balance or scale—especially in multilateral contexts—while still weakening the dollar’s grip on the market.

3. Digital currencies.

The most innovative scenario concerns payment systems based on cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies—especially stablecoins—already operate as a sort of parallel banking system in fragile or heavily sanctioned states, such as Venezuela or Iran. Pegged to the dollar, stablecoins like USDT and USDC offer a store of value and enable fast, low-cost international transfers. Yet their relationship with American power is ambiguous: on the one hand, they compete with U.S. financial institutions; on the other, they reinforce the dollar’s influence by expanding its digital presence. A coordinated BRICS initiative would instead aim to break entirely from the dollar. China has experimented with the digital yuan, while Russia has adopted pro-crypto policies. The BRICS Pay project—aimed at managing cross-border transactions in local currencies—is still in its infancy.

Protecting the Gulf to Preserve Monetary Power

The BRICS have identified the Gulf as a key battleground for challenging the monetary supremacy that has underpinned American influence since the 1970s. The U.S., as is well known, built a true imperial system through the petrodollar—making the dollar the currency for oil transactions. But something is inexorably changing.

China leads the partnership strategy by encouraging Gulf oil producers to denominate part of their sales in yuan. At the same time, Huawei’s role in shaping regional technological standards could foster the creation of alternative payment circuits and data networks to bypass Western supervision. Beijing has also encouraged the sovereign wealth funds of Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Doha to invest in yuan-denominated platforms, digital currencies, and blockchain-based trading systems.

Russia and Iran contribute as well: Moscow conducts energy, military, and financial transactions with Tehran using rubles and rials, reducing exposure to U.S. sanctions. Iran, for its part, keeps its economy afloat through barter, gold transfers, and crypto networks that circumvent traditional banking channels. These parallel systems demonstrate to potential BRICS partners that trade can continue outside the dollar’s orbit—even under heavy U.S. pressure. The goal is, in every case, to reduce the Gulf’s dependence on the dollar and limit the reach of American sanctions, presenting these moves as simple “rebalancing” against Western economic coercion.

The United Arab Emirates, a key U.S. security ally and a major financial hub, joined the group in 2023. The decision does not signal a break with Washington but reflects Abu Dhabi’s assessment that the BRICS offer concrete advantages at low cost. A similar logic drives Saudi Arabia: not yet a formal member, Riyadh has attended summits, discussed selling oil in yuan, and launched investment initiatives with China. These openings by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi reinforce the bloc’s legitimacy and show that joining the BRICS is compatible with maintaining traditional security ties with the United States. This makes it harder for Washington to portray the group as marginal or inherently anti-Western; by attracting Gulf allies into their orbit, China and Russia undermine the central narrative of the American financial order.

Empty Recommendations

American policymakers have begun to recognize the risk posed by parallel financial institutions. President Trump’s signing of the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for US Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act laid the groundwork for control mechanisms aimed at curbing the use of stablecoins to evade sanctions, but the reality is that such limitations apply only within U.S. jurisdiction—while most cryptocurrencies lie outside the American legal sphere.

Domestic regulation will not suffice for the U.S. to extend dominance over these new monetary forms. The pace of financial innovation is too fast, and the BRICS’ incentives to pursue monetary sovereignty are too strong for them to abandon their search for digital and political alternatives. To preserve the dollar’s status—and thus the United States’ ability to exercise global financial oversight—Washington will need to adopt a combination of economic, regulatory, and diplomatic measures. Otherwise, it will soon be time to say: “Bye bye, Mr. Dollar!”

From the American perspective, any financial institution choosing to operate within a compensation system designed to bypass SWIFT should lose access to both SWIFT and dollar transactions. For banks, the choice would be obvious: losing access to the U.S. system—which handles the majority of global transactions—would be far more costly than gaining entry to a BRICS-promoted alternative network.

Washington has already made efforts to remind states interested in joining the BRICS of the costs of supporting a project aimed at weakening the United States, using threats, retaliation, and tariffs. For American leadership, current members should be discouraged from participating in Russian, Chinese, or Iranian efforts to erode the dollar’s role. But the “most powerful currency in the world” is now a distant memory, and none of the partners wants to risk missing the opportunity of a future beyond American hegemony. For it is clear: everyone is growing tired of this arrogance.

The dollar, ladies and gentlemen, is now inexorably heading off the playing field. For the U.S., defending its centrality means preserving America’s ability to monitor international transactions and impose measures at will under the guise of “humanitarian operations.” If Washington does not act decisively to defend SWIFT, regulate stablecoins, exert diplomatic pressure, and reinforce the legitimacy of American financial supervision, the BRICS will continue to shape an alternative, antagonistic monetary order—presenting themselves as champions of non-alignment and multipolarity.

A happy end of the dollar, buddy!

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The second Trump administration is trying to be the government of tariffs. A more erudite Trumpist might argue that the early stages of United States history are intertwined with the history of tariffs; after all, the U.S. South was run by farmers who favored free trade, while the North defended tariffs to protect its nascent industry from English competition. Since the U.S. became a superpower because of the North and not because of the South, it’s clear that the Lochner era (which preceded the 1929 crisis) and Reagan’s neoliberal deregulation, conceived in partnership with Thatcher, are deviations from the path that led the U.S. to success. However, liberal propaganda, greatly aided by anti-communism, managed to portray free trade as essential to the very identity of the U.S.

Therefore, it is worth reflecting on the words of the economist Friedrich List (1789 – 1846), one of the greatest defenders of the “American system” or “national system of political economy,” which administered tariffs to protect the domestic economy: “I would admonish the people of these U. S. who rely on the celebrated system of Smith, to take care not to die of a beau ideal. Indeed, sir, it would sound almost like sarcasm, if in after ages an historian should commemorate the decline of this country in the following terms: ‘They were a great people, they were in every respect in the way to become the first people on earth, but they became weak and died – trusting in the infallibility of two books imported into the country; one from Scotland [Adam Smith], the other from France [Jean-Baptiste Say]; books, the general failure of which was shortly afterwards acknowledged by every individual.’ ” (Outlines of American Political Economy, Letter 1)

First of all, what is striking in the 21st century is someone calling free trade, or economic liberalism, a utopia. This is due to the fact that economic liberalism is presented to the public as the ironclad laws of science that must be applied, under penalty of serious consequences. This strategy is nothing new: when Chesterton was alive, he already complained about this expedient. Both Malthusianism and social Darwinism present their tragic public policies as necessary. Of these two, social Darwinism has an inseparable relationship with economic liberalism.

Nevertheless, reading List, we note that Adam Smith and other defenders of free trade envision a world without wars, in which no one has to fear running out of supplies due to political issues. For example: in 1827, just 51 years after independence, American congressmen who were followers of Adam Smith “asserted quite seriously that it would be better to import gunpowder from England, if it could be bought cheaper there than manufactured here. I wonder why they did not propose to burn our men of war, because it would be better economy, to hire, in time of war, ships and sailors in England.” (Letter 2). War is the least of it. Proponents of free trade envision a world in which there are no economic wars.

Next, we must consider that scientism, utopianism, and political liberalism go hand in hand. Let’s see: with political liberalism, it is understood that faith is a subjective truth that should remain outside the public sphere. Nevertheless, common ground is necessary for citizens of different faiths to be able to live in society. Science appears in place of religion as the bearer of objective and universal knowledge. Thus, it is evident that science, by becoming the seat of so much power, ends up being instrumentalized and corrupted. Scientism is born, the belief in the capacity of science to determine all political and social issues.

Historically, scientism, utopianism, and secularism (which is an indispensable component of political liberalism) have gone hand in hand: there are precedents of Saint-Simonism, positivism, socialism, and communism. Thus, it makes perfect sense that a country that adheres to political liberalism ends up falling into scientism. The difference between liberal scientism and other forms of scientism is that in liberalism, the figure of the planner is not highlighted. Instead, there is a spontaneous harmony that only the liberal imbued with the scientific spirit can grasp, so that their criticisms are directed against those who interfere with the so-called natural order (imposing trade barriers, for example). While historical followers of scientism tend to be interventionists, clamoring for a technician to bring order to the chaos, liberal followers od scientism are anti-interventionists and argue that the things is always in perfect order until someone interferes.

Now, if science constitutes the common denominator in a political regime, it is of fundamental importance to create a public fund for science that prevents it from being co-opted by private agents. In List’s work, we do not find this concern: on the contrary, he follows the American philosophy, already present in the Constitution, according to which Congress should protect the intellectual property of inventors. For List, this protection causes inventions to spread through industry, instead of being lost with the death of the inventor. This may be true, but the absence of a public knowledge policy has led to the privatization of knowledge, and the doctrine of free trade, which he criticized so much, has become practically an indisputable scientific truth.

The fact that Trump reinstated the tariffs and transformed them into yet another instrument of the liberal world’s sheriff, without regard for the needs of the domestic economy, shows how the U.S. has failed to protect its intellectual heritage.

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Latest estimates show that the Trump family has racked up some $3.4 billion dollars in profits since the real estate developer first entered the White House in 2017. But why do so many Americans seem unfazed about this brazen conflict of interest at the highest levels?

Politicians cashing in on their lofty positions is certainly nothing new, although that does not make it right. Even Democrats were crying foul back in 2000 when their darling Hillary Rodham Clinton began her Senate career by peddling a memoir of her years as first lady for a near-record advance of about $8 million. The deal raised eyebrows on both sides of the political aisle. It’s never a good look when a legislator accepts a hefty, unearned sum of money in what may be interpreted as a means of currying favor in the political process.

However, debates over poorly timed, million-dollar book deals and speaking tours pale in comparison with today’s dizzying billion-dollar deals that have emerged from the Trump White House.

While serving as POTUS, Trump has maintained control, like a modern-day mafioso, over The Trump Organization, Inc., which owns and develops hotels, resorts, and golf courses in various countries, while the daily operation of these vast enterprises has been relegated to his family. Trump’s business empire has really started to take off in his second term with a publicly traded social media company, a multi-billion-dollar cryptocurrency venture, golf resorts, among other international interests (In the first half of 2025, the Trump Organization’s income soared 17-fold to $864 million from $51 million a year earlier, according to Reuters calculations).

Meanwhile, Trump has turned the White House and its sacred symbolism into something like a money-generating Disneyland, complete with its own coinage and merch. He’s the first president to manage a private online shop that directs consumers’ money straight into his wallet – around $28 million has been accumulated from the sale of MAGA hats, sneakers, picture books and the “God Bless the USA” Bible.

Trump has made a personal profit of more than $1.8bn in the past year, according to the Center for American Progress think-tank, which reports that most of the money came from launching his own crypto ventures while severely deregulating the industry. There was a $2 billion investment by a United Arab Emirates state-owned enterprise in the Binance crypto exchange using the Trump family’s stablecoin asset. In another investment move, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and President Donald Trump’s son Eric held a groundbreaking ceremony in May for a $1.5 billion luxury residential development with three 18-hole golf courses outside Hanoi, the Vietnamese capital. The announcement came as Vietnam was trying to avoid harsh tariffs threatened by the Trump White House.

Meanwhile, a $2 billion investment from Saudi Arabia poured into Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner’s firm, Affinity Partners, while Emirati and Qatari investors contributed billions more, as recently as last year (Kushner denies that there is any conflict of interest in the business venture). A cherry on the top of the Middle East bonanza came by way of a luxury jet presented to the president by the emir of Qatar, which Trump has said will be donated to his presidential library after he leaves office.

Then there’s Mar-a-Lago, Trump’s private kingdom where he regularly gets to play king. Once a $100,000 club, Trump began substantially raising the membership payment after the 2016 election. Today, the honor of rubbing shoulders and whispering deals with the movers and shakers of the world will cost you a cool $1 million per year. It has been estimated that the Florida oasis alone has generated no less than $125 million in additional annual profits directly tied to Trump’s political rise. Other sources of profit include gifts, law suits and income from a $40m Amazon documentary about the first lady, Melania Trump.

There are several reasons Trump’s presidential profiteering is greatly different from previous presidencies. In the past, presidential candidates voluntarily released their tax returns prior to and while serving in the Oval Office. This gave the public a peek into their wealth and clearly demonstrated how their net worth transformed after they departed office. Trump scandalously has refused to release his tax returns, leaving the public clueless over his finances.

A US president earns an annual salary of $400,000 while in office. This is on top of being able to live for free in the White House, and having a separate budget for other presidential necessities, like traveling and entertaining. At the same time, presidents have routinely separated themselves from their private business concerns once they’ve been elected to public office. Trump the itinerant businessman stands out as the grand exemption.

The obscene political profiteering from the Trump White House is changing the public perception of the highest office in the land. No longer a dutiful public servant, the present occupant is an avaricious businessman, laser-focused on enriching himself and his family at the expense of the country and its reputation. Such a thing should be totally unacceptable, yet sadly most Americans have become too cynical of their political process to even care anymore.

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New navigation routes

Starting in 2050, the Central Arctic Ocean will gradually become navigable for increasingly longer periods, opening up the real possibility of using the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) as a seasonal trade route. This development will mark a fundamental transition: the TSR will no longer be just a theoretical hypothesis, but will begin to take shape as an effectively viable route, albeit still subject to significant technical and environmental limitations.

The continuous thinning of the Arctic ice pack will in fact make it possible to cross the CAO for a few weeks during the summer, particularly in September, when the ice reaches its annual minimum. However, even at this stage, navigation will remain dependent on weather conditions, satellite assistance to locate residual ice floes, and the availability of icebreakers for support. The TSR will therefore not replace traditional routes, but will become an alternative and complementary corridor, suitable for certain types of traffic and more specialized market segments.

The transpolar route connects the Barents Sea to the Bering Sea, passing directly over the geographic North Pole, and offers significant theoretical advantages. In terms of distance, it reduces the route between Northern Europe and East Asia by about 30–40% compared to the Suez route. However, these benefits can only be fully exploited when navigability conditions are more stable — a goal that still seems far off in the decade 2050–2059.

Commercial traffic along the TSR is expected to initially consist mainly of experimental shipments or demonstration voyages organized by large shipping companies eager to test the potential of their new-generation fleets. These include hybrid or nuclear-powered ships, already under development in Russia and China, designed to operate in Arctic waters without the constant assistance of icebreakers.

Russia, with its experience with Rosatomflot’s nuclear fleet, will maintain its leadership in the sector, while China, with its ‘Polar Silk Road’ strategy, will be the main non-Arctic promoter of regular navigation along the TSR.

The gradual opening of the TSR will take place within a geopolitical framework in which Russia will continue to play a central role, not only because of its geographical position, but also because of its technical and infrastructural control of Arctic routes. By the middle of the century, Moscow will have consolidated a network of research stations, logistics bases, and weather monitoring points along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), thus creating a support system that could potentially be extended to the TSR.

However, managing traffic in the CAO will be more complex, as the TSR is located entirely in international waters. Despite this, Russia will seek to maintain a position of dominance by providing essential services such as satellite surveillance, ice forecasting, technical assistance, and rescue at sea. Moscow is likely to attempt to apply a model similar to that adopted for the NSR to the TSR, with transit fees, notification requirements, and prior authorizations for foreign vessels. However, this approach could meet with opposition from other Arctic countries and non-Arctic maritime powers, which will invoke freedom of navigation in the international waters of the CAO, as provided for in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

A possible institutional compromise could be the creation of an Arctic Navigation Management Council (ANMC), a proposal that has already emerged in some diplomatic circles. This body, composed of Arctic states and major non-Arctic users, would be responsible for setting safety standards, coordinated rescue procedures, and common environmental guidelines. However, its actual implementation will depend on the level of political cooperation achievable in an international context that, in 2050, is likely to remain multipolar and competitive.

From the American point of view, China will continue to promote the Polar Silk Road as an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, emphasizing its potential to reduce the time and cost of Eurasian trade. However, rather than a fully operational logistics project, the Polar Silk Road will represent a strategic and symbolic framework aimed at strengthening China’s presence in the polar regions. China’s participation in the TSR will take the form of scientific and industrial partnerships with Russia and investments in port infrastructure at the route’s terminals—such as Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, or Kirkenes on one side, and Dalian or Shanghai on the other.

China’s commitment will not be limited to maritime transport. Beijing will also invest in oceanographic research and polar meteorology, sectors that are fundamental to the safety of naval operations. It is plausible that China will participate in the creation of a transpolar scientific observation network, sharing meteorological and oceanographic data in an apparently cooperative international consortium, but which in reality will also serve to strategically monitor Arctic traffic and resources.

In the period 2050–2059, the overall volume of traffic along the TSR will remain limited, but the symbolic and technological value of the first regular crossings will be very high. Companies that succeed in operating on this route will reap image benefits and gain a competitive advantage in global logistics innovation. However, the operating costs of Arctic navigation will continue to be higher than traditional routes due to the technical requirements of ships (reinforced hulls, alternative fuels, sophisticated satellite systems) and special insurance against environmental risks.

From an ecological point of view, the opening of the TSR will raise new environmental concerns. The melting of the ice will not eliminate the risks: increased traffic will cause more noise pollution, a greater presence of harmful substances, and a higher risk of collision with marine mammals. Conventionally powered ships, if still in use, will continue to emit black carbon, further accelerating ice melt. In addition, any accidents—such as fuel spills or shipwrecks—would have devastating effects in an environment where rapid response infrastructure is lacking.

To address these risks, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Arctic Council could introduce new safety protocols specific to the TSR, with stricter standards for ship design, monitoring, and traffic management. These rules will form a pillar of the future technical governance of the Arctic Ocean, aimed at balancing economic interests with the necessary protection of the environment.

The geopolitical dimensions of the new route

For the U.S., the emergence and expansion of the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) will take place in a global context in which Arctic routes will become a strategic link in major Eurasian supply chains. East Asia—particularly China and South Korea—will increasingly depend on energy and raw material imports from Russia and Canada, while Europe will seek to diversify its channels of connection with Asia to reduce its dependence on traditional bottlenecks such as Suez and Panama.

In this scenario, the TSR will not only be an economic transit route, but will also take on strong political significance: controlling access to it or influencing its use will mean exercising a new type of strategic power. Competition to establish navigation rules, manage support infrastructure, and define operating rights will reflect the tensions of the emerging multipolar order.

The Arctic, while remaining a sparsely populated region, will gradually become a laboratory for global governance, a place where different models of international cooperation will be tested—on the one hand, forms of regulated multilateralism, and on the other, more nationalistic and assertive approaches.

Starting in the 2060s, the Central Arctic Ocean and the surrounding regions will enter a phase of profound economic and political transformation. Accelerating global warming will prolong the periods when the waters are ice-free, making the Transpolar Sea Route stable as a fully operational seasonal trade route.

This change will mark the transition from still experimental navigation to structured Arctic maritime activity, now fully integrated into global trade and logistics circuits. With the upgrading of port and digital infrastructure in Arctic areas, the CAO will become part of a truly integrated Arctic economic system, encompassing maritime transport, scientific research, mining, and energy production. Ports along the northern coasts of Russia, Norway, Canada, and Greenland will become transit and supply hubs, linked by a dense network of submarine cables, oceanographic sensors, and low-latency satellite platforms for communications and monitoring.

Natural resources—mineral, fish, and potentially energy—will become the main driver of this new economic phase. The depletion or difficulty of accessing traditional deposits in other areas of the planet will make it more convenient to invest in the Arctic, despite the high costs and still difficult environment. Advanced technologies, especially in the field of automation and underwater robotics, will reduce the direct presence of human personnel, increasing efficiency and decreasing the risk of accidents, with a positive impact on operational sustainability. Fishing activities, previously regulated by the CAOFA Agreement, may be resumed in a controlled manner. Fleets will follow dynamic catch quotas, adapted to ecological changes and the new migratory cycles of species that will settle in the Arctic basin due to warming waters. However, these activities will be subject to a strict international control regime, based on satellite tracking systems, digital records, and shared scientific assessments.

Environmental and infrastructural change will redefine the geography of power in the Arctic. Russia will continue to exert a predominant influence thanks to its extensive coastline and technological mastery of the northern routes, but it will have to contend with the growing prominence of other regional and global players. Norway and Canada, supported by alliances with the European Union and the United States, will strengthen their logistical and scientific capabilities, positioning themselves as guarantors of the safety and sustainability of navigation.

At the same time, China will have consolidated its economic presence through the Polar Silk Road network, investing in Arctic ports and digital infrastructure. Beijing will not necessarily act as a territorial power, but as an infrastructural power, capable of exerting influence through the management of logistical connections and information flows. This strategy, based on technological and commercial soft power, could allow it to maintain a stable role even in the absence of military bases or direct sovereign rights in the region.

The United States, for its part, will be driven to increase its naval and scientific presence in the Arctic, considering it a strategic front in the global competition with Russia and China. Its policy will focus on freedom of navigation and the protection of Western companies’ commercial interests, but will also be part of a broader strategy to contain rival powers. The Arctic will thus become a frontier of balance between global powers, where military deterrence and economic cooperation will coexist in constant tension.

A new governance?

Growing economic and scientific activity will make institutional reform of Arctic governance inevitable. The Arctic Council, originally conceived as a forum for intergovernmental cooperation, will have to evolve into a more binding regulatory and decision-making structure, with effective powers of regulation and sanction. It is plausible that by the end of the century a Global Convention for the Arctic Ocean (GCAO) will be established, modeled on the Antarctic Convention but adapted to an economically active context.

This convention would establish a multi-level management regime:

• Sovereign governance, entrusted to Arctic states for their respective EEZs;
• Shared governance, for high seas areas such as the CAO, administered by a dedicated international agency;
• Technical-scientific governance, for environmental monitoring, climate observation, and regulation of fisheries and mineral resources.

In this context, technology—in particular artificial intelligence applied to satellite observation and ocean modeling—will become a fundamental element of legitimacy and power. Those who control data flows, surveillance systems, and automated decision-making platforms will have a decisive advantage in resource management and risk prevention.

By the end of the 21st century, in conclusion, the Arctic could take on a symbolic and political value comparable to that of Antarctica in the previous century: no longer just a remote frontier, but a laboratory for the sustainable management of global resources. The interdependence between science, politics, and technology will make the Arctic a testing ground for new models of international cooperation, capable of reconciling economic competitiveness and environmental protection.

The growing openness of the CAO could even foster the emergence of a shared “Arctic” identity, based on common interests and an ethic of ecological responsibility.

The evolution of the CAO from an inaccessible space to a strategic region of the contemporary world will reflect the transformation of the international order itself: from an era of closed sovereignties and rigid borders to a system of interconnected sovereignties, in which the collective management of global resources becomes not only an ethical imperative but a geopolitical necessity.

We will see how much of what the United States of America predicts will actually come to pass.