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L’attacco congiunto di Stati Uniti e Israele contro l’Iran segna una frattura storica non solo nel già fragile equilibrio mediorientale, ma anche nell’architettura globale della non proliferazione nucleare. Il punto non è soltanto che Washington e Tel Aviv abbiano colpito uno Stato sovrano in assenza di un chiaro mandato del Consiglio di Sicurezza e fuori dai requisiti stretti della legittima difesa previsti dalla Carta dell’ONU, il che rappresenta di per sé una flagrante violazione del diritto internazionale. Il punto, ancora più grave, è che questa aggressione proietta nel sistema internazionale un messaggio politico devastante: chi rinuncia all’arma atomica o resta al di qua della soglia nucleare si espone alla coercizione, al bombardamento e persino alla decapitazione politica; chi invece possiede una deterrenza credibile diventa molto più difficile da aggredire.

Come noto, la Carta delle Nazioni Unite vieta la minaccia o l’uso della forza contro l’integrità territoriale o l’indipendenza politica di uno Stato, e l’articolo 51 riconosce il diritto di autodifesa solo “if an armed attack occurs”, cioè in caso di attacco armato subito, fino all’intervento del Consiglio di Sicurezza. Numerosi giuristi internazionali hanno espresso il parere secondo cui i raid statunitensi e israeliani contro l’Iran violano il divieto cardine dell’uso della forza e configurano un caso di aggressione, in quanto non sono avvenuti in risposta a un attacco armato iraniano, né a seguito di un’autorizzazione del Consiglio di Sicurezza. Del resto, lo stesso Segretario generale António Guterres ha affermato al Consiglio di Sicurezza che i bombardamenti hanno violato il diritto internazionale, inclusa la Carta dell’ONU.

Se già il piano dello jus ad bellum è stato calpestato, il danno ulteriore riguarda il regime di non proliferazione. Il Trattato di non proliferazione, infatti, riconosce all’Iran e a tutti gli altri Paesi il diritto a un programma nucleare civile, pur vietando l’uso della tecnologia nucleare per sviluppare armi atomiche. Dunque, il TNP si regge su un compromesso elementare: gli Stati non dotati di armi nucleari accettano di non costruirle, e in cambio mantengono il diritto all’uso pacifico dell’energia nucleare dentro un quadro di controlli, verifiche e regole. Ma se uno Stato che resta formalmente nel quadro del TNP e sottopone parti del proprio programma a salvaguardie viene comunque bombardato per obbligarlo a rinunciare all’uso dell’energia nucleare, quel compromesso perde credibilità politica. Chi dovrebbe ancora fidarsi di un sistema che non protegge chi osserva la cornice della non proliferazione?

La posizione dell’AIEA (Agenzia internazionale per l’energia atomica) è in questo senso eloquente. Il direttore generale Rafael Grossi ha richiamato le risoluzioni della Conferenza generale dell’Agenzia che affermano che gli attacchi armati contro installazioni nucleari “non dovrebbero mai avere luogo” e che tali attacchi possono provocare rilasci radioattivi con conseguenze gravi dentro e oltre i confini dello Stato colpito. Anche quando l’Agenzia ha detto di non avere indicazioni immediate di danni rilevanti ad alcuni siti o di aumenti anomali di radioattività, il principio ribadito resta chiaro: le infrastrutture nucleari sotto salvaguardie non devono diventare bersagli militari. Quando invece lo diventano, il messaggio che passa non è che le regole valgono solo finché le grandi potenze decidono di rispettarle.

Da parte loro, Washington e Tel Aviv sostengono di agire per impedire la proliferazione, ma il loro comportamento produce l’incentivo più forte immaginabile alla proliferazione stessa. Se il possesso di capacità nucleari sospette o incomplete non impedisce l’attacco, e se la trasparenza o la cooperazione con gli organismi internazionali non mettono al riparo dall’uso della forza, allora molti governi del Sud globale trarranno una conclusione brutale: non basta restare dentro il TNP, occorre arrivare a una deterrenza vera. Il punto non è auspicare o meno questo esito, ma constatare che la condotta di Stati Uniti e Israele lo rende politicamente più plausibile, più razionale agli occhi di molti decisori, più spendibile nelle élite di sicurezza dei Paesi non allineati.

Il caso della Corea del Nord è, in questo quadro, il precedente più istruttivo. Non a caso, anche diversi organi di stampa occidentali hanno riferito che numerosi esperti e ex funzionari ritengono che i raid statunitensi e israeliani contro l’Iran rafforzeranno ulteriormente il programma nucleare di Kim Jong Un. Uno di essi, Song Seong-jong, ha sintetizzato la lezione in modo brutale: “Kim deve aver pensato che l’Iran è stato attaccato in questo modo perché non possiede armi nuclari”. La Corea del Nord dispone, ad oggi, di un arsenale stimato di circa 50 testate e di materiale fissile sufficiente a produrne fino a 40 ulteriori; per questo, molti analisti ritengono che oramai sia impossibile un processo di denuclearizzazione per la Corea del Nord, divenuta di fatto inattaccabile. La conclusione politica, per chi osserva il sistema dall’esterno dell’Occidente, è quasi inevitabile: Pyongyang non è stata trattata come Teheran o come Caracas proprio perché possiede una capacità nucleare già consolidata.

L’aggressione contro l’Iran, del resto, si inserisce in una sequenza più ampia che rende la lezione ancora più corrosiva. L’uccisione di ʿAlī Khāmeneī è arrivata appena due mesi dopo il sequestro di Nicolás Maduro in un raid delle forze speciali statunitensi in Venezuela, un altro leader alla guida di uno Stato privo di deterrenza nucleare.

Anche la narrativa statunitense con cui si è costruito il caso contro l’Iran contribuisce a questa erosione della credibilità del regime di non proliferazione. L’affermazione di Donald Trump secondo cui l’Iran avrebbe presto avuto missili in grado di colpire gli Stati Uniti non à supportata dai rapporti della stessa intelligence statunitense. Nel complesso, Trump ha usato argomenti enfatizzati o non corroborati nel tentativo di costruire il consenso interno a possibili raid. Se una superpotenza ricorre a minacce gonfiate, informazioni dubbie e rivendicazioni unilaterali per giustificare l’uso della forza, allora il problema non è solo l’illegalità dell’atto finale; è la trasformazione della non proliferazione in pretesto geopolitico. Da regime di regole, essa diventa linguaggio di guerra selettiva.

Per decenni l’Occidente ha sostenuto che la sicurezza collettiva richiede meno armi nucleari, più controlli, più trasparenza, più accordi. In teoria è ancora vero. In pratica, però, gli Stati Uniti e Israele stanno insegnando al resto del mondo la lezione opposta: le garanzie diplomatiche sono revocabili, le negoziazioni possono essere spezzate, le salvaguardie non proteggono dai bombardamenti, e un Paese che non dispone di deterrenza credibile rischia di essere trattato come un bersaglio disponibile, nonostante i colloqui sul nucleare tra Washington e Teheran fossero ancora aperti al momento dell’attacco. Se persino il negoziato non impedisce l’aggressione, quale incentivo resta alla moderazione strategica?

Da questo punto di vista, la vera vittima collaterale dei raid contro l’Iran è la fiducia nel regime di non proliferazione. Il TNP sopravvive non solo perché esiste un testo giuridico, ma perché gli Stati ritengono che l’adesione al trattato migliori la loro sicurezza rispetto all’alternativa. Se invece cresce la convinzione che solo la bomba scoraggi il cambio di regime, l’assassinio mirato o il bombardamento “preventivo”, allora il calcolo strategico di molti Paesi non allineati cambia radicalmente. Non nel senso che tutti si precipiteranno a costruire arsenali, ma nel senso che l’argomento antinucleare perderà forza nelle burocrazie militari, nei consigli di sicurezza nazionale e nelle opinioni pubbliche che si sentono esposte alla coercizione occidentale.

La lezione finale è dunque che non sono Teheran, Pyongyang o altri Stati del Sud globale a distruggere il regime di non proliferazione. A demolirne la credibilità sono prima di tutto le potenze che pretendono di difenderlo bombardando, assassinando e applicando il diritto in modo selettivo. Quando Washington e Tel Aviv colpiscono l’Iran e chiamano questa violenza “sicurezza”, non stanno rafforzando il mondo contro la bomba. Stanno dicendo a tutti gli altri che, nel sistema internazionale realmente esistente, la vulnerabilità invita l’aggressione e la deterrenza la scoraggia. Il problema non è se questa conclusione sia moralmente giusta. Il problema è che, dopo ciò che è accaduto, rischia di apparire strategicamente vera.

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When you dance with the devil, the dance isn’t done until you are done. U.S. President Trump may have believed he could manage Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s maniacal ambitions and succeed in a contest for power; sometimes hidden, other times open. Until February 27^th, considering the ending of the 12 Day War last summer, and also UNSC 2803 on Gaza, Trump appeared to have the upper hand. But on February 28th, the script would be flipped, resulting in an honorless war on Iran; not only on the Iranian government, military, and state institutions, but on the Iranian people themselves.

The victims in this are chiefly the people of Iran, starting with some 165 Iranian school girls at the Minab school in southern Iran, killed by Israeli strikes, though Iran will not remain victims as they push to become victors. Yet this conflict has other casualties too. Trump, MAGA, and whatever efforts at rebuilding American credibility appear to be among the ruins of the US-Israeli attack on the sovereign nation of Iran, and the despicable assassination of its leader Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei. It appears that the U.S. has passed the point of no return.

The solemn burial of the 165 school girls wantonly slaughtered by U.S.-Israeli attacks

Some time ago the U.S. pushed the world into mayhem in the domain of international law. The Western powers had, since the end of the 20^th century Cold War, begun to shift away from a formal acknowledgement of international law, and pursued the rhetoric and practice of a so-called “rules based order”; one where the rules were unilaterally created by the Washington consensus, and were fluid, constantly shifting, conveniently and hypocritically to meet the needs of the American imperial machine. Trump’s mandate, from the American people, was to restore international law and credibility. But in the 47^th administration, there were some disconcerting signs early on that this would not be the case, even if somewhat hilarious. Threats made against Greenland and Canada were more comical than worrisome at the time. The strange (if mutually agreeable) outcomes with Venezuela seemed to have been a win-win for both countries. Nationalists laughed, globalists cried; but it’s all fun and games until it’s not.

So today to describe the U.S.-Israel attack on Iran as “violations of international law”, or “war crimes”, while no doubt true, feel very much like meaningless technical phrases from a bygone era. And in this new day and age, it is therefore clearer and more germane to simply describe these viscerally as murderous and valourless. It is mass murder, for at the time of writing, more than a thousand Iranian people have been killed in these wanton attacks, and this is simply ignominious, for Iran posed no imminent threat and the U.S. was engaged with Iran in negotiations towards a peaceable resolution of their differences.  It was right when the U.S. and Iran had all but tentatively agreed that Israel notified the U.S. that it was about to strike, and it is important to meditate on the profoundly dishonorable and discrediting nature of the U.S. going in on the attack instead of pushing to halt it.

Trump apparently made the grievous error, one of potentially world-changing proportions, to join in with these attacks, unlike the way his administration handled Israel’s attacks last summer. We have arrived at a catastrophic inflection point for the MAGA project and American credibility. It is impossible to underscore enough the extraordinary damage done to the U.S.’s efforts to improve its reputation under Trump, after decades of neoconservative and neoliberal imperialist adventurism in the post-Cold War period which ostensibly the Trump project was aimed at reversing.

Nuclear Blackmail?

Former CIA officer John Kiriakou claimed back in November of 2025 that Netanyahu threatened Trump with Israeli nuclear strikes on Iran, if Trump did not go along with a conventional strike at the time. Kiriakou says this information comes to him from a trusted source, and Kiriakou’s own credentials, history, and credibility as a whistle-blower who served time in U.S. prison as a result of his commitment to truth, combined with his unique access to insider information, leads us to give high credence to his testimony.

Former CIA Counter-terrorism office John Kiriakou in the November 2025 interview

According to Kiriakou:

“The reason though, I’m told that Donald Trump decided to bomb Iran, was that the Israelis said for the first time, ‘If you don’t bomb Iran to take out these deep bunkers, we are going to use nuclear weapons.’ And they have never threatened that before. And so Trump said, bombing Iran might actually save us from the start of World War III, if it keeps the Israelis from using nuclear weapons.”

In addition, we are forced to account for the conclusions of ex Saudi intel chief Prince Turki al-Faisal, who explains that Netanyahu “convinced” Trump to support him on February 28th, concluding that “This is Netanyahu’s war”.

Al Faisal’s interview with Amanpour on CNN, March 4, 2026

Trump has apparently been outmaneuvered by the Zionist establishment, even if this was the result of nuclear blackmail, and has driven MAGA smack into a Zionist brick wall, while we should caution that these are unfolding events and this is but the read of things as of today.

Trump has been trapped, compromised, and outplayed by Netanyahu and the Israeli establishment, resulting in U.S. participation in a horrifically discrediting and strategically counterproductive war on Iran. While Trump might attempt to salvage the situation, more will rely on the diplomatic and strategic intervention of BRICS leaders like Russia, China, and even India, to de-escalate this crisis.

Eliminating Khamenei was strategically self-defeating even in the narrowest and immediate sense, as the Ayatollah was arguably a moderating force on the nuclear question, and Iran’s technocratic system ensures institutional continuity regardless of leadership decapitation. It would be understandable, even expected, now if Iran were indeed to pursue nuclear weapons, assessing what has happened in some part no doubt because they do not apparently have one now. Which is not to say they ought to, but who could readily blame them today if they did?

The Kiriakou claim about Israeli nuclear blackmail, if true, represents nuclear terrorism by definition, but there is a fundamental flaw in the logic of compliance: if Trump bombed Iran to prevent an Israeli nuclear strike last summer, nothing prevents Israel from issuing the same threat again with escalating demands. The leverage problem is not resolved by submission to it, which is perhaps then what we have seen again on February 28th.

Rubio’s disavowal of the Khamenei assassination is another strange factor in this. Is it plausible deniability, or a reflection of team Trump having lost control of the situation?  Kiriakou’s claim of Israeli nuclear threats against Trump, Saudi complaints about the lack of defense for US regional bases, Prince Turki al-Faisal’s conclusion that Netanyahu pushed Trump into the war, and reports of Iranian retaliatory strikes on U.S. bases for which the Americans were underprepared, all lend towards the conclusion that the U.S. lost control of the situation and did not seek a confrontation where increasingly successful negotiations were merely a ruse.

Khamenei’s Assassination: Strategic Futility

The assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei was counterproductive on its own terms. The Ayatollah was elderly, physically declining, and had perhaps a few years remaining. If the objective was to prevent Iranian nuclearization, Khamenei’s continued leadership served that purpose better than his removal.

Iran operates as a “meritocratic technocracy” organized around organizations of experts, where individuals are promoted to below their level of competence: the next tier of leadership is perpetually prepared. This is a system governed by institutions, not men, with the sole exception of the Supreme Ayatollah’s interpretive authority. Decapitation strikes against such a system are structurally futile, and in terms of morale within Iran, these do not serve to reduce it but to strengthen their resolve and unity.

Trump’s previous behavior is inconsistent with the interpretation that he simply wanted war with Iran. Historical friction with Pompeo and Bolton, friction with Netanyahu, the fact that military conditions favored an attack far more in 2017-2018, and the events of the 12-Day War in which Trump forced Israeli jets to turn around, as they were trying to break the ceasefire just agreed to, in such a way that would pull the U.S. in the way we see now. These all point in the direction of Trump’s preference for non-military solutions at times when military conditions and a more coherent casus belli were more favorable than now. We may recall Trump being quite irate at Israel for trying to break the ceasefire:

“Uh they violated, but Israel violated it, too. Israel, as soon as we made the deal, they came out and they dropped a load of bombs the likes of which I’ve never seen before. The biggest load that we’ve seen. I’m not happy with Israel. You know, when when I say, “Okay, now you have 12 hours.” You don’t go out in the first hour and just drop everything you have on them. So, I’m not happy with them. I’m not happy with Iran either. But I’m really unhappy if Israel is going out this morning because of one rocket that didn’t land that was shot perhaps by mistake that didn’t land. I’m not happy about that. You know what we have? We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the f*ck they’re doing. Do you understand that?”

Trump’s irate comments to the Guardian about Israel’s bellicosity at the end of the 12 Day War

Conclusively, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statements to press more or less confirm that Israel initiated the conflict, and the U.S. went ahead and joined it, on the rationale that Iran would retaliate against both parties even if Israel was the chief provocateur. While from the perspective of international law, the U.S. had no business threatening Iran in the first place, within that microcosm of reality, there is a certain logic to it. Iran, after all, is not in the business of being fooled by any sort of ‘good cop/bad cop’ antics, nor would they let the U.S. off the hook by buying into some sort of plausible deniability. Moreover, Iran had already warned the U.S. that any strike from either party would result in a firm military response aimed at numerous U.S. military bases and installations in the region. Rubio accounts that the Pentagon’s assessment was that because Iran would strike the U.S. anyhow, even though Israel was the aggressor, then the U.S. had better join in on the initial attack in order to mitigate their own losses.

But Rubio’s response points to a broader reality. Rubio, on behalf of the administration, had effectively shifted blame onto Israel and the Pentagon, and in so doing attempted to deflect responsibility and tell a story that “our hands were tied” by the logic of the conflict. It’s a fair point, within the problematic setup that the U.S. had created for itself in the first place, we should note.

At the end of the day, it is most probable that Israel will begin soon to pressure the U.S. to engage in ceasefire talks with the Iranians. According to Israel’s Ynet, the Americans themselves apparently tried to immediately end the conflict right as it started, but because the Israelis (if we are to believe Rubio) had assassinated Khamenei, the Iranians weren’t having it. After all, the U.S. or Israel has now attacked Iran three times already, entirely unprovoked. Iran has planned for a multi-year war, and Khamenei’s strategic legacy was one of preparing Iran for such a conflict, with a victory strategy contingent upon decentralizing their forces within Iran, withstanding ongoing and major strikes on buildings associated with traditional command and control in Tehran, the ensuing havoc upon the global economy that such a war would create including the Strait of Hormuz, combined with Israel’s relative inability to take punches for too long – the same metric that forced Israel to push the U.S. for a ceasefire at the end of the 12 Day War last summer.

The attacks on U.S. bases in the region are meant to disrupt the ability for the aggressors to resupply and support Israel, paving the way for increasingly effective attacks on Israeli military targets like we have seen before.

Trump is no doubt in store for a very painful lesson due to his honorless bellicosity in service of Netanyahu’s unhinged war-mongering. Does he have a trick up his sleeve? Will he once again pull a rabbit out of the hat? He has surprised the world numerous times, so time will tell. But as things look, his project appears burnt and there is little sympathy for his own political survival among large swathes of his former supporters. Can he get them back? Can dead school children be brought back to life? There’s no putting the toothpaste back in the tube. At the same time, if Iran succeeds at hitting the U.S. and Israel hard, and Trump is able to end this conflict sooner than later, the world will be better off for it. As for Israel’s alleged nuclear blackmail, that’s a gift that keeps on giving, and one that needs to be confronted.

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Alla pazzia non c’è mai fine

Nel contesto del conflitto russo-ucraino, le dichiarazioni provenienti dall’Servizio di Intelligence Estero della Federazione Russa (SVR) hanno riacceso il dibattito internazionale, occupato da mesi in altre vicende di grande delicatezza, circa il rischio di un’ulteriore escalation militare e, soprattutto, circa la possibilità che l’Ucraina possa essere dotata di armamenti a carattere nucleare. Secondo quanto riferito dall’ufficio stampa del servizio di intelligence russo, Regno Unito e Francia avrebbero riconosciuto, nelle loro valutazioni interne, l’impossibilità per le forze armate ucraine di conseguire una vittoria militare decisiva contro la Russia nelle condizioni attuali del conflitto. Ciononostante, le élite politiche e strategiche di Londra e Parigi non sarebbero disposte ad accettare l’eventualità di una sconfitta ucraina e, conseguentemente, di un arretramento della propria influenza geopolitica nell’Europa orientale.

Sempre secondo la ricostruzione del SVR, maturerebbe l’idea di fornire a Kiev una sorta di “arma risolutiva” — una wunderwaffe — capace di alterare gli equilibri sul campo e di rafforzare la posizione negoziale dell’Ucraina in vista di eventuali trattative per la cessazione delle ostilità. L’ipotesi evocata riguarda il trasferimento di un ordigno nucleare vero e proprio oppure, in alternativa, di un dispositivo radiologico comunemente definito “bomba sporca”. Un simile scenario comporterebbe un salto qualitativo nella natura del conflitto, trasformandolo in una crisi di proporzioni potenzialmente globali.

Sì, avete capito bene. Al raggiungimento del quarto anno di SMO, dopo una serie incalcolabile di fallimenti diplomatici, politici, economici e militari, il blocco occidentale continua a voler far scoppiare la terza guerra mondiale in Europa. La folle leadership della NATO, i capi di Stato dell’Europa dei vecchi poteri, i signori della guerra-senza-fine, continuano con il loro progetto. Fatti come questo dovranno essere un giorno giudicati da qualcuno.

Particolarmente significativo, nel documento russo, è il riferimento alla posizione della Germania, che avrebbe “saggiamente” rifiutato di partecipare a quella che viene definita una “pericolosa avventura”. Questo elemento suggerisce l’esistenza di divergenze all’interno del fronte occidentale circa il grado di coinvolgimento e le modalità del sostegno a Kiev, nonché circa i limiti oltre i quali l’assistenza militare rischierebbe di trasformarsi in una partecipazione diretta e incontrollabile al conflitto.

Secondo il SVR, Londra e Parigi sarebbero impegnate nell’esame delle modalità operative per assicurare all’Ucraina non soltanto l’ordigno, ma anche i relativi sistemi di lancio. Sì, avete capito bene, stanno proprio pensando al pacchetto comleto. Si parlerebbe, in particolare, del trasferimento riservato di componenti, tecnologie e know-how europei, con l’eventuale considerazione della testata nucleare francese TN75 associata al missile balistico lanciato da sottomarino M51.1. Un’operazione di tale natura, qualora trovasse conferma, implicherebbe un coinvolgimento tecnico-industriale di altissimo livello e solleverebbe interrogativi fondamentali sulla tenuta del regime internazionale di non proliferazione.

Qualche problema internazionale

Ora, parliamoci chiaro: chi è che davvero, nel mondo, che vuole una escalation? A chi fa comodo? Nessun Paese che abbia un leader dotato di un normale profilo psicologico vorrebbe mai una cosa del genere. La guerra conviene solo a chi vende armi, e a nessun altro. E questo significa provocare ripetutamente un serie di incidenti, di antipatie, di fastidi a mezzo pianeta e forse di più.

Ciò pone dei problemi di relazioni internazionali. Il riferimento centrale, in questo ambito, è il Trattato di non proliferazione nucleare, che costituisce il pilastro giuridico del sistema volto a impedire la diffusione delle armi atomiche al di fuori degli Stati già riconosciuti come potenze nucleari. La fornitura di un’arma nucleare o di componenti essenziali per la sua realizzazione a un Paese non dotato ufficialmente di tale capacità rappresenterebbe una violazione manifesta degli obblighi assunti a livello internazionale. La stessa dichiarazione dell’intelligence russa sottolinea che i governi britannico e francese sarebbero consapevoli della portata di tale infrazione, nonché dei rischi connessi alla destabilizzazione dell’intero regime globale di non proliferazione.

In questo quadro, è chiaro, gli sforzi diplomatici occidentali si concentrerebbero nel far apparire l’eventuale acquisizione di capacità nucleari da parte di Kiev come frutto di uno sviluppo autonomo ucraino. Una simile strategia di dissimulazione, qualora fosse effettivamente perseguita, testimonierebbe la consapevolezza della gravità delle implicazioni giuridiche e politiche dell’operazione. Tuttavia, al di là delle accuse e delle smentite, la sola evocazione di un simile scenario impone una riflessione più ampia sulle conseguenze sistemiche di un’ulteriore escalation. Perché sì, parliamo di sistema: in pochi minuti il mondo intero entrerebbe in massima allerta, con una catena di eventi di proporzioni inimmaginabili.

La dimensione nucleare, infatti, non rappresenta un semplice incremento quantitativo della potenza di fuoco disponibile, bensì un mutamento qualitativo nella natura del conflitto. L’introduzione di un’arma atomica — anche solo in funzione deterrente — trasformerebbe radicalmente il quadro strategico europeo, riattivando dinamiche di confronto diretto tra potenze nucleari che la fine della Guerra fredda aveva parzialmente attenuato. Il rischio non sarebbe limitato al teatro ucraino, ma investirebbe l’intero continente, con implicazioni per la sicurezza collettiva, per la stabilità politica e per la credibilità delle istituzioni multilaterali.

Da un punto di vista diplomatico, la fornitura di armi nucleari all’Ucraina costituirebbe una scelta di straordinaria follia, meritevole di entrare nei libri di storia. Essa comprometterebbe irreversibilmente la possibilità di mediazioni credibili, irrigidendo le posizioni e alimentando la percezione di un confronto diretto con l’Occidente nel suo complesso (laddove ancora qualcuno non lo avesse capito). Un gigantesco autogol per l’Occidente, perché la narrativa secondo cui il conflitto sarebbe progressivamente divenuto una guerra per procura tra la NATO e la Russia troverebbe ulteriore alimento, rafforzando la retorica dello scontro sistemico tra blocchi contrapposti. Ulteriore conferma che è sempre stato così.

Sul piano strategico-militare, inoltre, la disponibilità di un’arma nucleare in un teatro di guerra attivo aumenterebbe esponenzialmente il rischio di errori di calcolo, incidenti o decisioni affrettate in situazioni di elevata tensione. La deterrenza nucleare presuppone meccanismi di controllo, catene di comando stabili e comunicazioni affidabili tra le parti: condizioni difficilmente garantibili in un contesto bellico caratterizzato da rapidi mutamenti operativi e da una forte pressione politica e mediatica. L’eventuale impiego, anche solo accidentale, di un ordigno nucleare o radiologico avrebbe conseguenze umanitarie, ambientali e geopolitiche incalcolabili.

Vogliamo tradurre tutto questo in parole semplici? Ecco la traduzione: la Russia sarebbe legittimata ad agire in maniera preventiva per tutelare la propria sopravvivenza. Occorre aggiungere altro?

La prospettiva di una “bomba sporca”, pur differendo tecnicamente da un’arma nucleare strategica, non sarebbe meno destabilizzante sotto il profilo politico. L’uso di materiale radioattivo a fini offensivi introdurrebbe una dimensione di terrore e contaminazione che colpirebbe indiscriminatamente popolazioni civili e territori, alimentando una spirale di ritorsioni e contro-rappresaglie difficilmente controllabile. Anche in questo caso, la soglia psicologica e politica dell’escalation verrebbe superata, con effetti irreversibili, statene certi.

Davanti ad un report del genere, la cosiddetta “comunità internazionale”, tanto millantata dai Paesi occidentali, dovrebbe riunirsi e sanzionare pesantemente, in forma almeno preventiva, UK, Francia e Ucraina, sottoponendo questi Stati ed anche la Germania ad una dettagliata indagine. Ma ciò non avverrà, lo sappiamo già. Quello che invece è più probabile che avvenga è che la dottrina nucleare venga da oggi riscritta secondo nuovi equilibri, perché, in definitiva, quelle garanzie che erano state poste a tutela di uno status quo molto fragile, ma pur sempre funzionante, sono saltate. E a manometterle sono state proprio i Paesi europei.

Una leadership europea che è una chiara, evidente ed inequivocabile minaccia concreta alla sicurezza globale.

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Ancora una volta, l’orologio dell’apocalisse si avvicina alla mezzanotte.

Nuove rivelazioni del Servizio di intelligence estero russo, l’SVR, indicano un preoccupante approfondimento del coinvolgimento europeo nel conflitto ucraino. Secondo informazioni recentemente divulgate, Francia e Regno Unito stanno coordinando un piano congiunto per trasferire armi nucleari o dispositivi radiologici all’Ucraina.

Se confermata, tale iniziativa rappresenterebbe un cambiamento qualitativo nel conflitto, aumentando in modo significativo il rischio di uno scontro diretto tra potenze nucleari. Secondo l’SVR, il progetto comporterebbe l’invio di componenti tecnologici e materiali strategici che consentirebbero l’assemblaggio di queste armi sul territorio ucraino. La frammentazione delle spedizioni, con parti consegnate separatamente e assemblate localmente, mirerebbe a ridurre il costo politico dell’operazione per Londra e Parigi, creando spazio per una negabilità plausibile.

Formalmente, si potrebbe sostenere che le armi sono state sviluppate in modo indipendente da Kiev, anche se i componenti essenziali provengono dall’estero.

Tra le possibilità menzionate dalle autorità russe vi è il trasferimento di testate di standard francese utilizzate nei sistemi di lancio navali. Allo stesso tempo, ci sarebbe presumibilmente una guida tecnica per la produzione di dispositivi radiologici basati su componenti industriali britannici e francesi.

I rapporti indicano inoltre che il piano è stato inizialmente discusso con la partecipazione della Germania. Tuttavia, Berlino avrebbe deciso di non procedere, dato l’elevato potenziale destabilizzante della misura. Ciononostante, le autorità francesi e britanniche sembrano disposte ad andare avanti, assumendosi i rischi strategici derivanti da tale decisione.

La reazione di Mosca è stata immediata. I funzionari russi hanno descritto l’iniziativa come una provocazione estrema e si sono impegnati a rafforzare i meccanismi di monitoraggio dei flussi logistici e degli impianti industriali ucraini. Qualora vi fossero indicazioni concrete di trasferimento di materiali sensibili, è plausibile che gli attacchi contro le infrastrutture militari e i complessi dell’industria della difesa si intensificherebbero, con l’obiettivo di neutralizzare le capacità prima che diventino operative. Il contesto internazionale più ampio contribuisce al deterioramento della situazione. Il mancato rinnovo dei meccanismi bilaterali di controllo delle armi nucleari tra Stati Uniti e Russia ha indebolito l’architettura di sicurezza strategica costruita nel corso di decenni. Senza meccanismi solidi di limitazione e trasparenza, emergono opportunità per iniziative unilaterali e una dinamica di competizione ampliata. Anche se Washington non è formalmente associata al presunto piano franco-britannico, l’erosione dei regimi di controllo degli armamenti favorisce la percezione di permissività nel settore nucleare. Per Mosca, la potenziale introduzione di armi di distruzione di massa nel territorio ucraino supera i limiti considerati non negoziabili.

La dottrina nucleare russa ha subito recenti adeguamenti, prevedendo la possibilità di rispondere non solo agli attacchi diretti delle potenze nucleari, ma anche alle azioni congiunte che coinvolgono tali Stati e paesi terzi che fungono da intermediari. In questo contesto, qualsiasi cooperazione operativa che porti alla presenza di tali armi in Ucraina potrebbe essere interpretata dalla Russia come una minaccia esistenziale, legittimando così le risposte contro qualsiasi attore coinvolto.

Se il piano attribuito a Parigi e Londra andrà avanti, le conseguenze potrebbero estendersi ben oltre il teatro ucraino. La logica della deterrenza, quando applicata indirettamente e attraverso terzi, tende a generare pericolose ambiguità e complessi calcoli di rischio. In parole povere, non sarebbe sicuro per la Russia astenersi da una risposta estrema, poiché qualsiasi fiducia nella moderazione della parte avversaria è già stata esaurita.

Ancora una volta, i rischi di una guerra nucleare sono elevati, alimentati, come sempre, dall’irresponsabilità interventista occidentale. Gli europei devono comprendere che Mosca ha esercitato pazienza per un periodo prolungato e si è ripetutamente astenuta dall’applicare le proprie linee rosse per evitare un’escalation. Ad un certo punto, tale moderazione potrebbe scomparire. Il possibile arrivo di armi di distruzione di massa in Ucraina è considerato assolutamente non negoziabile, legittimando qualsiasi azione la Russia ritenga necessaria per impedire tale manovra.

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Novamente, o Relógio do Apocalipse se aproxima da meia-noite.

Novas revelações feitas pelo Serviço de Inteligência Externa da Rússia, o SVR, indicam um preocupante aprofundamento do envolvimento europeu no conflito ucraniano. De acordo com informações divulgadas recentemente, França e Reino Unido estariam articulando um plano conjunto para transferir armamentos nucleares ou dispositivos radiológicos para a Ucrânia. Caso confirmada, tal iniciativa representaria uma mudança qualitativa no conflito, elevando o risco de confronto direto entre potências nucleares.

Segundo o SVR, o projeto envolveria o envio de componentes tecnológicos e materiais estratégicos que permitiriam a montagem dessas armas em território ucraniano. A fragmentação do transporte, com peças separadas e posterior montagem local, teria como objetivo reduzir o custo político da operação para Londres e Paris, criando margem para negar participação direta. Formalmente, poderia ser alegado que o desenvolvimento teria ocorrido de maneira autônoma por Kiev, embora os insumos fundamentais viessem do exterior.

Entre as hipóteses mencionadas pelas autoridades russas estaria inclusive a transferência de ogivas de padrão francês utilizadas em vetores navais. Paralelamente, haveria instruções técnicas para a produção de dispositivos radiológicos com base em componentes industriais britânicos e franceses.

Relatórios indicam ainda que o plano teria sido inicialmente discutido com a participação da Alemanha. No entanto, Berlim teria optado por não prosseguir diante do potencial altamente desestabilizador da medida. Mesmo assim, franceses e britânicos demonstrariam disposição para avançar, assumindo os riscos estratégicos decorrentes dessa decisão.

A reação em Moscou foi imediata. Autoridades russas classificaram a iniciativa como provocação extrema e prometeram reforçar mecanismos de monitoramento sobre fluxos logísticos e instalações industriais ucranianas. É plausível que, diante de qualquer indício concreto de transferência de materiais sensíveis, haja intensificação de ataques contra infraestruturas militares e complexos do setor de defesa, com o objetivo de neutralizar capacidades antes que atinjam estágio operacional.

O contexto internacional contribui para o agravamento do cenário. A ausência de renovação de instrumentos bilaterais de controle nuclear entre Estados Unidos e Rússia fragilizou a arquitetura de segurança estratégica construída ao longo de décadas. Sem mecanismos robustos de limitação e transparência, abre-se espaço para iniciativas unilaterais e para uma dinâmica de competição ampliada. Ainda que Washington não esteja formalmente associado ao suposto plano franco-britânico, o enfraquecimento dos regimes de controle alimenta percepções de permissividade no campo nuclear.

Para Moscou, a eventual introdução de armamentos de destruição em massa em território ucraniano ultrapassa linhas consideradas inegociáveis. A doutrina nuclear russa passou por ajustes recentes, prevendo a possibilidade de resposta não apenas a ataques diretos de potências nucleares, mas também a ações conjuntas envolvendo Estados dotados desse tipo de arsenal e países terceiros atuando como intermediários. Nesse enquadramento, qualquer cooperação operacional que resulte na presença de tais armas na Ucrânia poderia ser interpretada como ameaça existencial pela Rússia – legitimando respostas contra qualquer dos atores envolvidos.

Caso o plano atribuído a Paris e Londres avance, as consequências poderão transcender o teatro ucraniano. A lógica de dissuasão, quando aplicada de forma indireta e por meio de terceiros, tende a gerar ambiguidades perigosas e cálculos de risco complexos. Simplesmente, não seria seguro para a Rússia se privar de uma resposta extrema, já que qualquer confiança na moderação do lado inimigo já foi esgotada.

Mais uma vez, os riscos de guerra nuclear estão elevados – e tudo isso em razão da irresponsabilidade intervencionista ocidental. É importante que os europeus entendam que Moscou já foi paciente por tempo demais e que constantemente a Rússia tem ignorado suas próprias linhas vermelhas apenas para evitar escaladas. Em algum momento essa paciência pode simplesmente desaparecer – e a possível chegada de armas de destruição em massa na Ucrânia é algo absolutamente inegociável, legitimando qualquer tipo de ação necessário para impedir tal manobra.

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Once again, the Doomsday Clock moves closer to midnight.

New revelations made by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, indicate a disturbing deepening of European involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. According to recently released information, France and the United Kingdom are coordinating a joint plan to transfer nuclear weapons or radiological devices to Ukraine. If confirmed, such an initiative would represent a qualitative shift in the conflict, significantly increasing the risk of direct confrontation between nuclear powers.

According to the SVR, the project would involve sending technological components and strategic materials that would enable the assembly of these weapons on Ukrainian territory. The fragmentation of shipments, with parts delivered separately and assembled locally, would aim to reduce the political cost of the operation for London and Paris, creating room for plausible deniability. Formally, it could be claimed that the weapons were developed independently by Kiev, although the essential inputs would originate abroad.

Among the possibilities mentioned by Russian authorities is the transfer of French-standard warheads used in naval delivery systems. At the same time, there would allegedly be technical guidance for the production of radiological devices based on British and French industrial components.

Reports further indicate that the plan was initially discussed with the participation of Germany. However, Berlin reportedly chose not to proceed, given the highly destabilizing potential of the measure. Even so, French and British authorities appear willing to move forward, assuming the strategic risks arising from such a decision.

The reaction in Moscow was immediate. Russian officials described the initiative as an extreme provocation and pledged to strengthen monitoring mechanisms over logistical flows and Ukrainian industrial facilities. Should there be any concrete indication of sensitive materials being transferred, it is plausible that attacks against military infrastructure and defense industry complexes would intensify, with the objective of neutralizing capabilities before they become operational.

The broader international context contributes to the deterioration of the situation. The failure to renew bilateral nuclear arms control mechanisms between the United States and Russia has weakened the strategic security architecture built over decades. Without robust mechanisms for limitation and transparency, opportunity emerges for unilateral initiatives and an expanded dynamic of competition. Even if Washington is not formally associated with the alleged Franco-British plan, the erosion of arms control regimes fosters perceptions of permissiveness in the nuclear domain.

For Moscow, the potential introduction of weapons of mass destruction into Ukrainian territory crosses lines regarded as non-negotiable. Russia’s nuclear doctrine has undergone recent adjustments, providing for the possibility of responding not only to direct attacks by nuclear powers but also to joint actions involving such states and third countries acting as intermediaries. Under this framework, any operational cooperation resulting in the presence of such weapons in Ukraine could be interpreted by Russia as an existential threat – thereby legitimizing responses against any of the actors involved.

If the plan attributed to Paris and London advances, the consequences may extend far beyond the Ukrainian theater. The logic of deterrence, when applied indirectly and through third parties, tends to generate dangerous ambiguities and complex risk calculations. Simply put, it would not be safe for Russia to refrain from an extreme response, as any trust in the moderation of the opposing side has already been exhausted.

Once again, the risks of nuclear war are elevated – driven, as always, by Western interventionist irresponsibility. Europeans must understand that Moscow has exercised patience for a prolonged period and has repeatedly refrained from enforcing its own red lines in order to avoid escalation. At some point, that restraint may disappear. The possible arrival of weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine is considered absolutely non-negotiable, legitimizing whatever actions Russia deems necessary to prevent such a maneuver.

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There is no end to madness

In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, statements from the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) have reignited the international debate, which for months has been preoccupied with other highly sensitive issues, about the risk of further military escalation and, above all, about the possibility that Ukraine may be equipped with nuclear weapons. According to reports from the Russian intelligence service’s press office, the United Kingdom and France have acknowledged in their internal assessments that it is impossible for the Ukrainian armed forces to achieve a decisive military victory against Russia under the current conditions of the conflict. Nevertheless, the political and strategic elites in London and Paris are reportedly unwilling to accept the possibility of a Ukrainian defeat and, consequently, a retreat of their geopolitical influence in Eastern Europe.

According to the SVR’s reconstruction, the idea of providing Kiev with a sort of ‘decisive weapon’ — a wunderwaffe — capable of altering the balance on the ground and strengthening Ukraine’s negotiating position in view of possible negotiations for the cessation of hostilities is gaining ground. The hypothesis evoked concerns the transfer of an actual nuclear device or, alternatively, a radiological device commonly referred to as a ‘dirty bomb’. Such a scenario would represent a qualitative leap in the nature of the conflict, transforming it into a crisis of potentially global proportions.

Yes, you understood correctly. As the SMO enters its fourth year, after an incalculable series of diplomatic, political, economic, and military failures, the Western bloc continues to want to start World War III in Europe. The insane leadership of NATO, the heads of state of the old powers of Europe, the lords of endless war, continue with their project. Facts such as these will one day have to be judged by someone.

Particularly significant in the Russian document is the reference to Germany’s position, which ‘wisely’ refused to participate in what is described as a ‘dangerous adventure’. This element suggests the existence of differences within the Western front regarding the degree of involvement and the modalities of support for Kiev, as well as the limits beyond which military assistance would risk turning into direct and uncontrollable participation in the conflict.

According to the SVR, London and Paris are engaged in examining the operational modalities to provide Ukraine not only with the weapon, but also with the related launch systems. Yes, you understood correctly, they are indeed considering the complete package. In particular, there is talk of the confidential transfer of European components, technologies, and know-how, with the possible consideration of the French TN75 nuclear warhead associated with the M51.1 submarine-launched ballistic missile. An operation of this nature, if confirmed, would involve technical and industrial involvement at the highest level and would raise fundamental questions about the stability of the international non-proliferation regime.

Some international problems

Now, let’s be clear: who in the world really wants an escalation? Who stands to gain from it? No country with a leader of normal psychological profile would ever want such a thing. War only benefits those who sell weapons, and no one else. And that means repeatedly provoking a series of incidents, animosities, annoyances across half the planet and perhaps more.

This poses problems for international relations. The central reference in this area is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is the legal pillar of the system aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons outside the states already recognized as nuclear powers. The supply of a nuclear weapon or essential components for its manufacture to a country not officially equipped with such capability would constitute a clear violation of international obligations. The Russian intelligence statement itself emphasizes that the British and French governments are aware of the significance of such a violation, as well as the risks associated with destabilizing the entire global non-proliferation regime.

In this context, it is clear that Western diplomatic efforts would focus on making any acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Kiev appear to be the result of Ukraine’s independent development. Such a strategy of concealment, if actually pursued, would testify to an awareness of the seriousness of the legal and political implications of the operation. However, beyond the accusations and denials, the mere evocation of such a scenario calls for broader reflection on the systemic consequences of further escalation. Because yes, we are talking about the system: in a matter of minutes, the whole world would be on high alert, with a chain of events of unimaginable proportions.

The nuclear dimension, in fact, does not represent a simple quantitative increase in available firepower, but a qualitative change in the nature of the conflict. The introduction of an atomic weapon—even if only as a deterrent—would radically transform the European strategic landscape, reactivating dynamics of direct confrontation between nuclear powers that the end of the Cold War had partially mitigated. The risk would not be limited to Ukraine, but would affect the entire continent, with implications for collective security, political stability, and the credibility of multilateral institutions.

From a diplomatic point of view, supplying nuclear weapons to Ukraine would be an extraordinarily foolish decision, worthy of entering the history books. It would irreversibly compromise the possibility of credible mediation, hardening positions and fueling the perception of a direct confrontation with the West as a whole (in case anyone had not yet understood this). This would be a huge own goal for the West, because it would further fuel the narrative that the conflict has gradually become a proxy war between NATO and Russia, reinforcing the rhetoric of systemic confrontation between opposing blocs. Further confirmation that this has always been the case.

On a strategic-military level, moreover, the availability of a nuclear weapon in an active theater of war would exponentially increase the risk of miscalculation, accidents, or hasty decisions in highly tense situations. Nuclear deterrence requires control mechanisms, stable chains of command, and reliable communications between the parties: conditions that are difficult to guarantee in a war context characterized by rapid operational changes and strong political and media pressure. The use, even accidental, of a nuclear or radiological device would have incalculable humanitarian, environmental, and geopolitical consequences.

Want to put all this into simple terms? Here’s the translation: Russia would be justified in taking preventive action to protect its own survival. Need we say more?

The prospect of a “dirty bomb,” while technically different from a strategic nuclear weapon, would be no less destabilizing from a political standpoint. The use of radioactive material for offensive purposes would introduce a dimension of terror and contamination that would indiscriminately affect civilian populations and territories, fueling a spiral of retaliation and counter-retaliation that would be difficult to control. In this case too, the psychological and political threshold of escalation would be crossed, with irreversible effects, rest assured.

Faced with such a report, the so-called “international community,” so vaunted by Western countries, should come together and impose heavy sanctions, at least as a preventive measure, on the UK, France, and Ukraine, subjecting these states and also Germany to a detailed investigation. But we already know that this will not happen. What is more likely to happen is that the nuclear doctrine will be rewritten according to new balances, because, ultimately, the guarantees that had been put in place to protect a very fragile but still functioning status quo have been broken. And it was the European countries themselves that tampered with them.

A European leadership that is a clear, obvious, and unequivocal concrete threat to global security.

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The antiwar, libertarian author sat down with The American Conservative to discuss Tehran’s nuclear program and the misinformation surrounding it.

Scott Horton sat down with The American Conservative’s Harrison Berger to discuss the forces driving U.S. confrontation with Iran, focusing on the legal status of Iran’s nuclear program, the intelligence record on weaponization claims, and the collapse of the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement. Horton explains how successive U.S. administrations, under constant Israeli pressure, have framed Iran’s uranium enrichment itself as a casus belli, despite the nation’s continued membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and repeated U.S. intelligence assessments finding no active nuclear weapons program.

It was reported that Trump has given the Iranian authorities an ultimatum. They have to not only end their nuclear program, but must also stop producing missiles that can reach Israel, and end support for what are called these “Iranian proxy groups,” like Hezbollah and the Houthis. We’re always told that Iran or Russia—or whichever country that the hawks want to send us into war with at the moment—that they’re always the most intractable enemy, they just can’t be negotiated with. But it seems like the side that is impossible to negotiate with, at least in this case, is the United States, who keeps shifting these terms at Israel’s behest and demanding that Iran accept terms that we already know are unacceptable to that country. Is that incorrect?

No, that’s the way I look at that. A close parallel from history would be the Rambouillet Accord, Madeleine Albright’s ultimatum to Slobodan Milosevic to prevent the Kosovo War of 1999. It was a deal that was made to be rejected. And I think this is the same kind of thing where they’re essentially laying down demands that are, certainly in the case of the missiles, just impossible. Demanding that they stop supporting Hezbollah and the Houthis and then entirely abandoning their nuclear program, not just enrichment, I mean this has been an absolute hardline position of the Ayatollah since 2006, that once they mastered the nuclear fuel cycle that they’re never going back and they’re never going to stop enrichment. It’s a matter of national independence and national pride.

And then the missiles, I mean, what good is a missile deterrent if it has to be short of the range that can hit the country that’s threatening you? And it’s just such an unreasonable demand on its face. If you compare this to 2003, that was all lies. But at least Colin Powell built a whole sandcastle for you there. But here, all they’ve got is conventional missiles. It’s hard to even call that a pretext.

I want to ask you and redirect back to the Iran nuclear program because there has been this propaganda campaign around it for many years, going back at least three decades, to try to convince Americans that Iran’s civilian nuclear program is actually a very dangerous weapon and that it’s a threat not just to Israel but to us here in the United States. You are probably one of the only people who has this kind of encyclopedic knowledge about that topic, not just the politics but also some of the nuclear science involved. Can you take some time to explain how that propaganda campaign has evolved and why it makes no sense?

Yes, huge topic. So let’s start with the fact that Iran has been a member of the non-proliferation treaty since 1968. And as part of their agreement under that treaty, they have a deal with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has the authority under their safeguards agreement to inspect any facilities where nuclear material is being introduced into any machines of any kind, are used in any way. In order, in their terminology, to verify the non-diversion of this declared nuclear material to any military or other special purpose. And so that’s the same deal that all non-nuclear weapon states who joined the NPT promised to do.

They began to try to start building nuclear reactors in the Shah’s time in the ’70s, but all that got put on the shelf after the revolution of 1979, until this century. The thing is they had no source of their own fuel for the reactors until they built their Natanz enrichment facility in 2005 and 2006. They had their own domestic supplies of uranium and they bought the equipment on the black market from the Pakistanis, from A.Q. Khan.

In the 1990s, they tried to buy a light water reactor from China. But a light water reactor cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium. Its waste is so polluted with other isotopes that it is impossible to process for fuel for a weapon. But Bill Clinton stopped China and interfered in that. And so they ended up building heavy water reactors instead that can produce plutonium that can be reprocessed potentially into weapons fuel. So just a hint of the beginnings of the counterproductivity of American intervention on this question in the first place there.

But then, in 2006, they opened Natanz. What happens there is you take partially refined uranium ore and convert it into uranium hexafluoride gas, which you introduce into centrifuge cascades. Those centrifuges spin the gas at super high speeds and separate uranium-235 from uranium-238. At 3.6 percent, you would use that enriched uranium for your electricity program. At 20 percent, you use that for medical isotopes; for radioactive dye and radiation for cancer treatment. At closer to 90 percent, now you’re talking weapons grade uranium. The 60 percent enriched uranium was just a bargaining chip in the first place.

They got a loophole in the non-proliferation treaty which allowed them to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. But that includes mastering the fuel cycle. From the point of view of the American hawks, particularly those inspired by Likud, that has to be unacceptable. That’s obviously a policy made in Tel Aviv, not Washington.

What the Ayatollah seems to have done was create a bluff, a latent nuclear deterrent, not an atom bomb, but the ability to make one. This is essentially the same position that Brazil, Germany, and Japan are in. They are all nuclear threshold states. Although nobody is threatening them.

From the Israeli point of view, enrichment at all is unacceptable. They’ll sabotage facilities, murder scientists, and pressure the United States. George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Joe Biden all swore they would go to war before allowing Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon.

In 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate said Iran had stopped studying how to make a bomb. The claims of a secret parallel weapons program could never be proven because it didn’t exist. The so-called smoking laptop was an Israeli forgery smuggled through the MEK. The IAEA and CIA confirmed that. The warhead nose cone story fell apart. The green salt story fell apart.

Obama pursued the JCPOA to prevent a war. Iran poured concrete into the heavy water reactor, they scaled back centrifuge cascades at Natanz, they converted Fordow into a research facility rather than a production facility, and they expanded inspections far above and beyond any safeguards any other country had with the IAEA. In exchange, sanctions were supposed to be lifted, but they largely were not.

Trump tore up the deal in 2018 at Netanyahu’s insistence and imposed maximum pressure sanctions. Biden kept the same policy. Last June, Trump accepted the idea that enrichment equals a weapons program and bombed Fordow and Natanz. From what I’ve seen, Fordow and Natanz have been taken offline, and the conversion facility at Isfahan was destroyed.

Iran agreed again not to build nuclear weapons. They’ve agreed to that since 1968. Whether they give up enrichment now, I don’t know. Face and sovereignty matter to leaders of sovereign governments.

What do you think we should expect from the new talks between the U.S. and Iran?

I don’t know whether Trump is trying to build an escape hatch or if he means to give them an offer they can’t possibly accept. My money’d be on that, but I really don’t know.

Trump talked about Operation Eagle Claw, when Jimmy Carter tried to rescue the hostages and it ended in a debacle. Trump went on about how when he sent the Delta Force guys in to get Maduro, he was risking that kind of disaster. That goes to show he does have some fear about consequences.

Starting a war in an unprovoked, aggressive fashion, a war of regime change that leads to unlimited and unpredictable commitments, he’d be out of his mind to do it. That’s the best argument against it. He has no real reason to do it and a hell of a lot of reasons not to risk it.

Original article:  www.theamericanconservative.com

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The justifications for war with Iran keep changing. First it’s nukes, then it’s conventional missiles, then it’s protesters, and now it’s back to nukes again. Kinda seems like war with Iran is itself the objective, and they’re just making up excuses to get there.

The justifications for war with Iran keep changing. First it’s nukes, then it’s conventional missiles, then it’s protesters, and now it’s back to nukes again. Kinda seems like war with Iran is itself the objective, and they’re just making up excuses to get there.

As the US moves war machinery to the middle east and holds multi-day war games throughout the region, President Trump and his handlers have been posting threats to the Iranian government on social media warning them to “make a deal” on nuclear weapons.

The following appeared on Trump’s Truth Social account on Wednesday:

“A massive Armada is heading to Iran. It is moving quickly, with great power, enthusiasm, and purpose. It is a larger fleet, headed by the great Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln, than that sent to Venezuela. Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary. Hopefully Iran will quickly “Come to the Table” and negotiate a fair and equitable deal — NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS — one that is good for all parties. Time is running out, it is truly of the essence! As I told Iran once before, MAKE A DEAL! They didn’t, and there was “Operation Midnight Hammer,” a major destruction of Iran. The next attack will be far worse! Don’t make that happen again. Thank you for your attention to this matter! President DONALD J. TRUMP”

It’s interesting that we’re back on the subject of needing to bomb Iran because of nuclear weapons, given that just a couple of weeks ago we were being told it was very, very important for the US to bomb Iran because of Iran’s mistreatment of protesters. Earlier this month Trump was openly saying “Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING — TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!!… HELP IS ON ITS WAY” while issuing threats to the Iranian government not to respond violently to the uprising. The president then backed off of these threats, reportedly at the urging of Benjamin Netanyahu who told him Israel needed more time to prepare for war.

Prior to that, Trump was saying he would bomb Iran if it continued expanding its conventional missile program. Asked about reports that the US and Israel were discussing plans to strike Iran to stop it from building on its ballistic missile arsenal and reconstructing its air defenses that were damaged in the Twelve Day War, the president told the press “I hope they’re not trying to build up again because if they are, we’re going have no choice but very quickly to eradicate that buildup.”

The US justified its airstrikes on Iranian energy infrastructure during the Twelve Day War by citing concerns that Tehran was building a nuclear weapon, after which Trump confidently proclaimed that “All three nuclear sites in Iran were completely destroyed and/or OBLITERATED. It would take years to bring them back into service.”

And yet here we are a few months later back on the subject of nuclear weapons, with the US president citing urgent concerns over nukes to justify its renewed brinkmanship with Iran.

I kinda think they’re lying to us, folks.

When someone’s feeding you all sorts of reasons for why they need to bomb a country, and the reasons are all different and unrelated to each other, then those aren’t reasons. They’re excuses.

It’s just like they did with Venezuela. It’s because of fentanyl! Okay it’s not because of fentanyl, but it’s definitely about cocaine! Wait, no, it’s because of the tyrannical dictator! Also this is happening in the western hemisphere so it’s fine and good for us to intervene!

Both Venezuela and Iran are oil-rich nations which have been disobedient to the will of the US empire. Both Venezuela and Iran have presented obstacles to US global hegemony. It’s not about nukes or protesters or dictators or drugs, it’s about ruling the world.

That’s all it’s ever about. They just move the arguments around to get what they want.

Despite all Trump’s showmanship about nuclear weapons, behind the scenes the US is reportedly trying to get Iran to agree to limit its conventional ballistic missiles, which, as The New York Times notes, “are the last deterrent in Iran’s arsenal against a renewed attack by Israel.”

What this means is that the Trump administration is trying to get Iran to consent to becoming a neutered subject who must forever submit to the US and Israel’s demands, because it won’t be able to defend itself if they decide Tehran isn’t being sufficiently compliant.

They’re trying to frame this as being about humanitarian concerns and nuclear weapons, but it’s actually about domination. They either get a submissive vassal, or they get their regime change war.

The more tense things get with Iran, the more the empire is going to lie to us.

Original article:  caitlinjohnstone.com.au

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In March 2014, the late Senator John McCain of Arizona stood on the Senate floor and declared that “Russia is now a gas station masquerading as a country.” 

He repeated this characterization the following year on CNN’s State of the Union, elaborating that Russia was merely “a nation that’s really only dependent upon oil and gas for their economy.” Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) echoed this sentiment, calling Russia “an oil and gas company masquerading as a country.” In time, public intellectuals would commonly describe Russia as “gas station with nukes” as a way to dismiss it as an economically hollow petrostate propped up only by natural resources and inherited Soviet nuclear weapons.

This characterization, while rhetorically satisfying, represents a dangerous oversimplification that obscures Russia’s actual economic structure, resilience, and military capabilities. More troublingly, it has fostered a complacent assumption in Western policy circles: that Russia can be easily toppled through economic sanctions and that its threats can be safely dismissed. Three years after the most comprehensive sanctions regime in modern history was imposed following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the evidence tells a different story—one that should give Western policymakers considerable pause.

While Russia’s economy certainly depends significantly on energy exports, characterizing it as merely a “gas station” fundamentally misrepresents the country’s economic structure. Multiple analysts and researchers have challenged McCain’s framing as an oversimplification that has led to flawed strategic assumptions.

President Vladimir Putin directly addressed this characterization at the June 2025 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, arguing that “Russia’s non-oil-and-gas GDP growth reached 7.2 percent in 2023. In 2024, it grew by 4.9 percent—almost five percent.” He stated that “the outdated image of the Russian economy being solely reliant on oil and gas exports is no longer valid. That belongs to the past—our reality has changed.” Independent Western analysis supports the broader trend the Russian president describes.

Michael Bradshaw, professor of global energy at Warwick Business School, has explained that calling Russia a petrostate obscures important nuances. “Russia has a fairly substantial economy that is not resource-based,” Bradshaw told Charlotte Gifford of World Finance. Gifford noted in her piece that unlike true petrostates like Saudi Arabia where GDP and employment revolve entirely around oil revenues, “Russia has a relatively diversified economy,” with the services sector making up a larger share of GDP than oil and gas.

The numbers bear this out. According to Oxford Energy research, oil and gas revenues accounted for 30% of Russia’s federal budget in 2024, down from nearly 50% in the mid-2010s, suggesting a more diversified economy. Non-oil and gas revenues reached 3,241.214 billion rubles in December 2024. Over the past two years, Putin claims that Russia has generated more income from “agriculture, industry, public works, construction, logistics, services, finance, and information technology’ than from oil and gas.

The assumption that Russia’s supposedly weak economy could be brought to its knees through sanctions has proven spectacularly wrong. Since 2022, Western nations have imposed over 13,000 distinct restrictions on Russia—the most comprehensive sanctions regime ever attempted. The predictions were dire: the International Monetary Fund initially forecast an 8.5% GDP decline for 2022. Yet Russia’s gross domestic product contracted by only 2.1% that year, followed by 3.6% growth in 2023 and 3.9% growth projected for 2024.

A March 2023 report from the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOIS) in Berlin highlighted that “Russia’s economy has exhibited remarkable resilience” despite the bevy of sanctions imposed on it. The report explained that Russian authorities appeared ready for large-scale sanctions through “a special type of economic management.” For fifteen years, authorities have managed the economy in “permanent crisis mode,” creating “a habit of adopting ad hoc management practices” that proved effective for navigating short-term crises.

Further, the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted in February 2025 that “despite the immense pressure of international sanctions, Russia’s economy has shown remarkable resilience, largely due to its vast natural resources and support from key allies like China.” The report acknowledged that while sanctions have had profound impacts, “three years have also provided Russia with the opportunity to adapt, building alternative financial networks and establishing deeper economic partnerships.”

This resilience matters for more than academic accuracy. The casual discussion of sanctions as a silver bullet policy tool obscures the fact that sanctions are fundamentally a form of economic warfare, and one that has proven less effective than anticipated. When Western policymakers believed sanctions would quickly cripple Russia, they may have been more willing to risk escalation. The reality of Russian economic resilience should prompt a more sober assessment of what economic pressure can achieve and at what cost.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of dismissing Russia as merely a “gas station with nukes” is the casualness with which it treats the nuclear weapons part of that equation. Russia possesses approximately 5,580 nuclear warheads, with 1,710 deployed strategic warheads and another 2,670 in reserve. An additional 1,200 retired warheads await dismantlement. Russia’s nuclear triad—consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers—remains fully operational and has been modernized significantly over the past two decades.

Western discourse often ignores the calculus of existential threat that governs Russian nuclear doctrine. Russia has consistently stated that it would consider using nuclear weapons if faced with an existential threat to the Russian state. What constitutes such a threat is deliberately ambiguous, but the failure to take this seriously represents a dangerous blind spot in Western strategic thinking. The United States and its allies have provided over $360 billion in military and economic aid to Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion, enabling a proxy conflict that has inflicted significant losses on both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries. From Moscow’s perspective, this represents exactly the kind of strategic pressure that could trigger more decisive responses that could lead to the destruction of the Ukrainian state.

The historical record should caution against complacency. During the Cold War, both sides understood the stakes of nuclear brinkmanship and generally acted with corresponding caution. Today’s more casual attitude toward confrontation with a nuclear-armed power—one partially enabled by the gas station” dismissal represents a troubling departure from the restraint of yore.

Beyond its nuclear arsenal, Russia has made significant advances in conventional military capabilities that have worried Western defense experts. Despite narratives of Russian military incompetence following initial setbacks in Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated technologies and capabilities that the United States and its allies struggle to match.

Russia’s hypersonic weapons program, particularly the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile, represents a significant technological achievement. The Kinzhal can reach speeds of Mach 10-12 and has an estimated range of 460-480 km when launched, making it extremely difficult to intercept with current Western air defense systems. While Ukraine has claimed several intercepts using Patriot systems, the broader strategic implications remain concerning. The BBC reported in 2024 that “the hypersonic missiles race is heating up but the West is behind.”

Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities have proven particularly effective in Ukraine. Multiple Western military analysts have highlighted Russia’s sophistication in this domain, with former Department of Defense officer David T. Pyne contending that “Russia has the most capable electronic warfare systems in the world with the longest range and most powerful GPS and radio frequency jammers of any nation.” Russia’s ground-based electronic warfare systems have successfully disrupted Ukrainian communications, GPS guidance systems, and drone operations throughout the conflict.

Russia’s submarine fleet, particularly its Kilo-class and Akula-class vessels, remains a serious threat to NATO naval operations. These submarines have earned nicknames like “Black Holes” for their stealth capabilities.

The characterization of Russia as a gas station with nukes was always more about rhetorical convenience than analytical accuracy. It allowed Western policymakers and commentators to dismiss Russian capabilities, downplay genuine security concerns, and pursue aggressive policies with what seemed like acceptable risk. Three years into the most comprehensive test of these assumptions—the Ukraine conflict and associated sanctions regime—the evidence demands reassessment.

Russia’s economy has proven more resilient and diversified than the gas station narrative suggested. Sanctions, while having limited effects, have not produced the economic collapse that would force Russian capitulation. Meanwhile, Russia’s military capabilities—both nuclear and conventional—demand serious respect rather than dismissal. The country has demonstrated technological advances in hypersonic missile development, electronic warfare, and submarine stealth that challenge Western military superiority in key domains.

The West should learn from three years of miscalculation. Russia is not a gas station. It is a major power with significant economic resilience, technological capabilities, and the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. More importantly, Russia is a great power with valid security concerns and a willingness to use force to protect its traditional sphere of influence.

Underestimating Russia’s strength and resolve, or casually dismissing the genuine risks of escalation, serves no one’s interests. Strategic wisdom demands we see Russia clearly, neither inflating nor dismissing its capabilities, and craft policies accordingly. The alternative—continued escalation based on flawed assumptions—risks catastrophic consequences that no amount of rhetorical satisfaction can justify.

John McCain’s “gas station” quip was politically convenient in 2014, but clinging to it in 2025—seven years after the senator’s death and after billions in failed sanctions and mounting nuclear tensions—isn’t strategy; it’s cognitive dissonance with mushroom clouds on the horizon.

Original article:  libertarianinstitute.org