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Let the games begin

Here we are. The Strait of Hormuz is the new “war game.” In just a few days, the world has begun to tremble, even more than it already was.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important maritime passages in the global economic system. Located between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, it connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and, via the Arabian Sea, with the Indian Ocean. Its geographical position makes it a real “bottleneck” for global energy trade, as most oil and liquefied natural gas exports from the Middle East must pass through this narrow maritime corridor. For this reason, the Strait of Hormuz is not only economically important, but also strategically and geopolitically significant, constituting one of the most sensitive points for global energy security.

Geographically, the strait has a minimum width of about 33 kilometers, while the navigation lanes used by commercial ships are much narrower, organized according to a maritime traffic system with two corridors of about three kilometers each, separated by a safety zone. This configuration makes maritime traffic particularly vulnerable to disruptions, accidents, or military tensions. For this very reason, the control and security of the Strait of Hormuz are considered a strategic priority for many states and international organizations.

From a geo-economic perspective, the strait is a key hub for the global trade in hydrocarbons. According to leading international energy analyses, around one-fifth of the oil consumed globally passes through this passage. Every day, between 20 and 21 million barrels of oil and petroleum products pass through the strait, accounting for around 20% of global consumption. In addition to crude oil, a significant share of the global trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through this route, especially that exported from Qatar, one of the world’s leading producers of LNG. It is estimated that around 25-30% of the global trade in liquefied natural gas passes through the Strait of Hormuz.

The main commodities passing through this passage are therefore crude oil, refined products, and liquefied natural gas. However, in addition to energy resources, the strait is also crossed by container ships, bulk carriers, and tankers carrying other types of cargo, such as chemicals, metals, industrial raw materials, and consumer goods destined for Asian, European, and North American markets. The presence of large commercial ports in the Persian Gulf, such as those located in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, further contributes to the intensity of trade flows through the strait.

The main players involved in the geopolitical dynamics of the Strait of Hormuz are primarily the coastal states, particularly Iran and Oman, which directly border the strait and share territorial control over it. Iran, in particular, exerts a strong strategic influence on the region, thanks in part to its military presence along the coast and on the islands near the strait. From a political and military standpoint, Tehran has repeatedly declared, in situations of international tension, the possibility of restricting or blocking maritime traffic in the strait as a means of geopolitical pressure.

Alongside the states directly bordering the strait, other key players are the major oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These states depend heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for the export of their energy resources to major international markets. Consequently, the stability and safety of navigation in the strait are considered essential for their economies and for the balance of global energy markets.

A leading role is also played by the major international powers, particularly the United States, which maintains a significant military presence in the Persian Gulf region. The US Navy, through its Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain, conducts patrol and maritime security operations to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait. Other powers, such as the United Kingdom and France, also periodically participate in naval surveillance and security missions in the region. In recent years, China has also shown a growing strategic interest in the stability of Middle Eastern energy routes, given its heavy dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf.

From a legal and diplomatic point of view, navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is governed by various international rules and agreements. The main regulatory framework is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982. This convention establishes the principle of “right of transit” in straits used for international navigation, guaranteeing civilian and military vessels the possibility of passing through these passages without unjustified interference from coastal states. However, Iran has not formally ratified UNCLOS and has repeatedly expressed restrictive interpretations of the right of transit, arguing for the need to regulate the passage of foreign warships in its territorial waters.

In addition to the international legal framework, there are also several multilateral initiatives and maritime security missions aimed at ensuring the stability of the strait. These include the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), an international coalition created in 2019 with the aim of protecting commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Several countries are participating in this initiative, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other regional partners.

Another important element is infrastructure investment aimed at reducing dependence on the strait. Some Gulf countries have developed alternative pipelines that allow oil to be exported without passing through Hormuz. Significant examples include the pipeline connecting Saudi Arabia’s oil fields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, and the pipeline connecting Abu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. However, the capacity of these alternative infrastructures remains limited compared to the total volume of energy exports from the region.

It is therefore a crucial hub of the world’s economic geography and one of the most sensitive points in the global energy system, whose security and stability can shift the financial balance of entire regions of the world.

Geopolitical perspectives

Now that the strategic and geo-economic value of the strait is clear, let’s try to think about the disaster that is unfolding and, above all, who benefits from it. Who, indeed, is the question. At first glance, this operation fits consistently into the plan to dissolve Europe with its political and financial powers.

In fact, it is the eurozone that is suffering the hardest blow, in a dramatic way. The possibility that logistics, transport, and even industrial production will suffer a sharp slowdown is a well-founded fear and, unfortunately, a very real one. In fact, it is already happening. But this is consistent, we repeat, with the intention to destroy the European architecture. This is a mission that Trump has declared and that also suits Putin’s Russia, and not only that: none of the other countries like the old European power order, especially those that have suffered decades or centuries of European colonialism. And, to be honest, they do not like America either, with its return to imperialism, heir to that of Europe, but everything must be dealt with in its own time, and now is the time for the collapse of the old continent.

Now, given its function as a central hub for global energy trade, any significant change in freedom of navigation in the strait would have immediate effects not only on energy markets but also on the geopolitical balance between the major world powers. From a strategic analysis perspective, at least three distinct scenarios can be hypothesized: the total closure of the strait to naval traffic, a selective closure aimed at favoring certain trading partners, and a prolonged militarization of the area.

The first scenario involves the total closure of the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Such an event, even if temporary, would have extremely significant consequences for the global economy. Since approximately 20% of the oil consumed worldwide passes through this passage, its interruption would immediately cause a severe shock to energy supply, the prelude to which we are already seeing in part at this very moment. The prices of oil and liquefied natural gas would rise rapidly on international markets, with knock-on effects on inflation, industrial production, and financial stability. In short, chaos. And chaos is always useful to someone, because it allows them to do things that cannot be done in times of peace and order. Is that clear?

A total blockade of Hormuz would put everyone in crisis to the point of having to take remedial action. A short war would involve a very strong show of force by the US and Israel (even atomic weapons would be considered), and would allow the conflict to be resolved quickly, effectively crushing Iran in a violent war, perhaps with the support of other European countries and those in the Gulf. To do this, the conditions must be extremely sophisticated, with a complex game of blackmail and power leverage that leaves no other choice for all participants. America would have to find, or violently demand, exceptional decision-making authority and military operational capability, while also resolving the moral dilemma. In practice, Iran would have to be placed in a position where it could be accused of being the absolute evil and responsible for all the consequences of the blockade. The information war and the speed of action in a multi-domain context would play a central role here.

For Europe, the consequences would be particularly significant. Although in recent years the European Union has partially diversified its energy sources, especially after the energy crisis linked to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a significant share of oil and gas imports continues to come from the Middle East. The closure of the strait would lead to a drastic reduction in supplies from countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. This would put severe pressure on European energy markets, forcing member states to increase imports from other areas such as the United States, West Africa, or the North Sea, at significantly higher costs.

The impact on Asia would be even greater, as many Asian economies are more dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, India, and especially China import a significant portion of their energy needs via routes through the Strait of Hormuz. A total closure of the passage could therefore slow down economic growth across the entire Asian region, causing instability in financial markets and potentially triggering emergency policies to secure energy supplies. However, let’s not make the mistake of thinking that China and other Far Eastern countries will allow this to happen without reacting…

The second scenario envisages a selective closure of the strait, limited to ships bound for or coming from Europe, with preferential treatment for Asian trade routes, particularly those bound for China and Russia. Although complex from an operational and legal point of view, this scenario could emerge in a context of strong geopolitical polarization, characterized by the formation of opposing economic blocs.

In such a situation, some Gulf producer countries could decide to favor their Asian partners, who are already the main buyers of Middle Eastern oil. China, for example, has become the world’s leading oil importer over the past two decades and has developed increasingly close economic relations with several countries in the region. A selective closure of the strait could therefore further strengthen the energy link between the Persian Gulf and East Asia.

For Europe, the consequences would be particularly problematic, as it would be excluded from one of the world’s main energy routes. This could accelerate the process of reorganizing energy supply chains, increasing European dependence on alternative suppliers such as the United States, Norway, or African countries. At the same time, such a scenario would strengthen the geopolitical weight of Asia, and China in particular, in the global energy system.

Furthermore, selective discrimination in maritime traffic could call into question some fundamental principles of international maritime law, increasing the risk of diplomatic and military tensions. The European Union and its allies could respond with economic pressure, naval protection missions, or diplomatic initiatives aimed at restoring freedom of navigation.

However, it is true that this second scenario would cause the war to be prolonged and reshaped. Diplomacy would play a greater role here, seeking ways in and out of Tehran. Iran would have a very interesting card to play. The theater of operations would be remodeled, probably transforming the Gulf into a “special” area, with temporary and atypical management, in which the players would confront each other at different times or through alliances, without completely freeing the area from conflict. Medium- and long-term timescales, with which to manually redefine the global balance of power. It is (perhaps) a less bloody scenario.

Finally, the third scenario concerns the prolonged militarization of the Strait of Hormuz for a period exceeding 100 days. In this case, maritime traffic would not necessarily be interrupted, but it would be subject to a high level of military control, with the constant presence of naval fleets, surveillance systems, and potential incidents between the armed forces of different countries.

Long-term militarization would have a significant impact on the costs of maritime trade. Shipping companies and maritime insurers would significantly increase risk premiums for ships passing through the area, making the transport of goods and energy resources more expensive. This increase in logistics costs would inevitably be reflected in the final prices of raw materials and industrial products in a much more significant way than is already the case.

From a geopolitical perspective, a prolonged military presence could transform the Strait of Hormuz into a veritable zone of strategic confrontation between major powers. The United States, European powers, China, and potentially other emerging powers could strengthen their naval presence in the region to protect trade routes and their energy interests. This would increase the risk of military incidents or unintended escalation.

At the same time, prolonged militarization could further encourage the development of alternative routes and infrastructure, such as land pipelines or new sea routes through other regions. However, such solutions would require very high investments and long implementation times, making it difficult to completely replace the strategic role of the Strait of Hormuz in the short term.

Once again, the question returns to the initial one: who benefits? The world is changing very quickly.

Segue nostro Telegram.

L’Europa primo importatore di armi al mondo

Il 9 marzo 2026 lo Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ha pubblicato il suo rapporto annuale sui trasferimenti di armi convenzionali. Il dato principale è inequivocabile: l’Europa è diventata la prima regione importatrice di armi al mondo, superando per la prima volta dagli anni Sessanta sia l’Asia-Oceania sia il Medio Oriente. Le importazioni europee di sistemi d’arma maggiori sono più che triplicate (+210%) nel periodo 2021-2025 rispetto al quinquennio precedente, passando dal 12% al 33% del totale globale.

Il volume complessivo dei trasferimenti internazionali di armi è cresciuto del 9,2% tra i due periodi — il maggiore aumento dal 2011-2015 — e questo incremento è quasi interamente trainato dall’Europa. Come ha dichiarato Mathew George, direttore del programma SIPRI sui trasferimenti di armi: “L’aumento brusco dei flussi di armi verso gli Stati europei ha spinto i trasferimenti globali in crescita di quasi il 10%. Le consegne all’Ucraina dal 2022 sono il fattore più evidente, ma la maggior parte degli altri Stati europei ha iniziato a importare significativamente più armi per rafforzare le proprie capacità militari contro una crescente minaccia percepita dalla Russia.”

Chi compra. L’Ucraina è il primo importatore mondiale in assoluto, con il 9,7% delle importazioni globali (rispetto allo 0,1% del quinquennio precedente). Seguono in Europa la Polonia e il Regno Unito. I tre Paesi insieme assorbono quasi la metà delle importazioni europee. Ma il fenomeno è diffuso: le importazioni dei 29 Paesi NATO europei sono cresciute del 143% nel periodo.

Il caso della Polonia è emblematico. Le importazioni polacche sono aumentate dell’852% — quasi nove volte — rispetto al 2016-2020. Varsavia è il primo importatore NATO in Europa, con il 17% del totale delle importazioni NATO europee e il 3,6% di quelle mondiali. La quasi totalità delle forniture proviene da fuori Europa: il 47% dalla Corea del Sud e il 44% dagli Stati Uniti. La Polonia sta costruendo quello che dichiara essere il più grande esercito di terra d’Europa, equipaggiandosi quasi esclusivamente con armi americane e sudcoreane.

Chi vende. Gli Stati Uniti hanno ulteriormente consolidato il proprio dominio come fornitori di armi, passando dal 36% al 42% del mercato globale delle esportazioni. In termini assoluti, le esportazioni americane sono cresciute del 27%. Il dato strategicamente più rilevante è questo: per la prima volta in due decenni, la quota maggiore delle esportazioni americane è andata all’Europa (38%) anziché al Medio Oriente (33%). Le esportazioni USA verso l’Europa sono aumentate del 217%. Il 48% di tutte le importazioni europee proviene dagli Stati Uniti — soprattutto aerei da combattimento e sistemi di difesa aerea a lungo raggio.

La Francia è il secondo esportatore mondiale con il 9,8% del mercato, in crescita di oltre un quinto. L’80% delle esportazioni francesi va però fuori dall’Europa — soprattutto a India, Egitto e Grecia. La Germania è salita al quarto posto globale, superando la Cina, con il 5,7% del mercato — anche grazie alle forniture all’Ucraina.

466 F-35 ordinati dall’Europa. Un numero riassume la dipendenza europea dagli Stati Uniti meglio di qualunque analisi: alla fine del 2025, dodici Paesi europei avevano 466 caccia F-35 di Lockheed Martin ordinati o preselezionati per l’ordine. A questi si aggiungono almeno 78 ordini israeliani di sistemi missilistici di difesa aerea e 66 ordini tedeschi per analoghi sistemi. L’Europa sta investendo massicciamente in armi — ma le sta comprando in America.

Il paradosso: comprare armi da chi ti destabilizza

Il rapporto SIPRI fotografa un paradosso che nessun commentatore mainstream osa nominare. L’Europa sta triplicando le importazioni di armi perché percepisce una crescente minaccia dalla Russia e una crescente incertezza sull’impegno americano a difendere i propri alleati. Lo dice testualmente il rapporto: “Le percezioni di minaccia riguardo alla Russia, amplificate dalle incertezze sull’impegno degli USA a difendere i propri alleati europei, hanno alimentato la domanda di armi tra gli Stati membri NATO.”

Tradotto: l’Europa compra armi americane perché non si fida più degli americani. La stessa America di Donald Trump che ha abbandonato l’Ucraina, minacciato di invadere la Groenlandia (territorio di un alleato NATO), attaccato verbalmente Spagna e Regno Unito nel mezzo della guerra contro l’Iran, e ha dichiarato apertamente che le esportazioni di armi sono uno strumento di politica estera — come esplicita la nuova America First Arms Transfer Strategy.

L’Europa sta comprando sicurezza dallo stesso Paese che produce la sua insicurezza. E ogni caccia F-35 acquistato, ogni sistema Patriot installato, ogni miliardo speso al Pentagono è un miliardo che non va all’industria europea della difesa — quella stessa industria che Bruxelles dice di voler rafforzare con programmi come il SAFE (Security Action for Europe), dotato di 150 miliardi di euro in prestiti agevolati per acquisti intra-UE.

Ma i numeri parlano chiaro: nonostante la retorica dell’autonomia strategica, il 48% delle armi europee viene ancora dagli USA. L’Europa non è una potenza che si riarma per difendersi: è un cliente che si riarma per comprare protezione. Pedina, non giocatore.

Bunker nucleari a ruba fra i funzionari USA

Mentre l’Europa compra armi per prepararsi alla guerra, chi la guerra l’ha lanciata si prepara a sopravviverle. Secondo un’inchiesta del Telegraph ripresa da ZeroHedge, almeno due membri senior del gabinetto Trump hanno acquistato bunker anti-nucleari privati dall’inizio del conflitto con l’Iran.

Ron Hubbard, proprietario della Atlas Survival Shelters — azienda texana specializzata in rifugi sotterranei — ha dichiarato di essere stato “inondato di chiamate” dall’inizio delle operazioni militari, con un aumento delle richieste di dieci volte rispetto alla media. Ha rivelato che due membri del gabinetto Trump sono tra i nuovi clienti: “Uno di loro mi ha mandato un messaggio ieri, chiedendomi: ‘Quando sarà pronto il mio bunker?'”

I rifugi in questione non sono cantine rinforzate. Sono strutture in acciaio temprato con porte blindate anti-esplosione, sistemi di purificazione dell’aria, e dotazioni di lusso — cinema, piscine, poligoni di tiro — progettate per resistere ad attacchi con droni o testate convenzionali. I prezzi partono da 20.000 dollari per i modelli base e arrivano a diversi milioni per i compound più sofisticati.

Lo stesso Hubbard è però brutalmente onesto sui limiti: “Nessun bunker al mondo è progettato per resistere a una bomba bunker-buster americana. Se gli americani ti vogliono morto, sei morto.” L’ironia è tragica: i membri del governo che hanno ordinato il bombardamento dell’Iran si comprano rifugi perché sanno che le ritorsioni sono inevitabili.

L’azienda ha aperto un nuovo ufficio a Dubai — dove le richieste sono esplose dopo che i missili iraniani hanno colpito la città. “Pensavano di non vedere mai cadere bombe. Adesso che le bombe cadono, vorranno tutti un rifugio. È un dato di fatto.” Atlas Survival Shelters fatturava in media 2 milioni di dollari al mese nel 2026; per il prossimo mese prevede ricavi di 50 milioni. Il business della paura nucleare è il più fiorente dell’economia di guerra.

Tra i clienti precedenti dell’azienda figurano nomi come Mark Zuckerberg e Andrew Tate. Le élite globali si preparano al peggio. Non perché siano paranoiche — ma perché conoscono le conseguenze di ciò che hanno messo in moto.

Due facce della stessa medaglia

I due fenomeni — l’Europa che si riarma e i funzionari USA che comprano bunker — non sono notizie separate. Sono le due facce della stessa medaglia, e quella medaglia si chiama economia di guerra permanente.

Da un lato, l’industria bellica americana raccoglie i dividendi della paura: il 42% del mercato globale delle armi, 466 F-35 ordinati dall’Europa, esportazioni in crescita del 217% verso il Vecchio Continente. BlackRock — il più grande gestore patrimoniale del pianeta — detiene miliardi in Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman ed Elbit Systems. Ogni bomba sganciata sull’Iran è un ordine di riacquisto. Ogni sistema Patriot installato in Europa è un contratto pluriennale di manutenzione e munizioni.

Dall’altro, chi siede ai tavoli dove si decide la guerra sa perfettamente che le conseguenze sono incontrollabili. Lo Stretto di Hormuz — attraverso cui transita il 20% del petrolio mondiale — è di fatto chiuso dal 28 febbraio. Il Brent ha superato i 120 dollari. Il Qatar ha dichiarato la force majeure sui contratti di gas. L’Iran ha colpito Dubai, basi americane, territorio israeliano. I missili balistici iraniani hanno dimostrato di poter raggiungere obiettivi che si credevano al sicuro.

E chi ha innescato tutto questo? Gli stessi che ora comprano bunker. Non è cinismo: è la logica interna del sistema. La guerra genera profitti per chi la finanzia, terrore per chi la subisce, e rifugi sotterranei per chi la ordina. Il circuito è perfetto.

L’Europa paga il conto

L’Europa si trova intrappolata in una spirale autodistruttiva. Spende per riarmarsi contro una minaccia russa reale ma strumentalmente amplificata, comprando armi dal Paese che destabilizza il suo fianco orientale e il suo approvvigionamento energetico. L’Europa riceve tra il 12 e il 14% del proprio GNL dal Qatar attraverso Hormuz — forniture ora interrotte. La dipendenza dal gas americano cresce, e con essa la subordinazione politica.

Il programma europeo SAFE da 150 miliardi dovrebbe incentivare acquisti intra-UE, ma i grandi fornitori europei — Francia, Germania, Italia — continuano a esportare la maggior parte delle proprie armi fuori dal continente. La Francia vende l’80% fuori Europa. L’UE ha un volume di esportazioni pari al 28% del mercato globale — quattro volte la Russia, cinque volte la Cina — ma non riesce a equipaggiare sé stessa. Come ha osservato il generale Hodges: “La relazione transatlantica esiste ancora, ma non è più la stessa e probabilmente non lo sarà mai più.”

Lo SIPRI stesso nota che la “nuova strategia America First per i trasferimenti di armi” dell’amministrazione Trump rende esplicito ciò che era sempre stato implicito: le esportazioni di armi americane sono uno strumento di controllo politico, non di solidarietà tra alleati. Ogni F-35 venduto all’Europa è un vincolo di dipendenza tecnologica, logistica e strategica che durerà decenni.

La guerra è il prodotto

Il rapporto SIPRI esce il 9 marzo 2026 — dieci giorni dopo l’inizio delle operazioni militari USA-Israele contro l’Iran. I dati coprono il periodo 2021-2025, quindi non includono ancora l’impatto dell’attuale conflitto. Ma come ha dichiarato il ricercatore SIPRI Pieter Wezeman, gli Stati del Medio Oriente avevano già piazzato ordini significativi prima dell’escalation — e il conflitto in corso spingerà ulteriormente la domanda, “soprattutto di sistemi anti-missile e di difesa aerea.”

La spesa globale per la difesa ha raggiunto i 2.700 miliardi di dollari nel 2024 — un aumento del 9,4% in termini reali, il più alto dalla fine della Guerra Fredda. Il commercio di armi è tornato ai volumi del 1989, l’ultimo anno della Guerra Fredda. Non è un caso: stiamo vivendo l’inizio di una nuova Guerra Fredda, ma questa volta con bombe vere che cadono su Teheran, Dubai e le petroliere nel Golfo Persico.

La domanda che il rapporto SIPRI non pone — ma che noi poniamo — è: chi beneficia di questo ciclo? L’Europa, che spende sempre di più e si sente sempre meno sicura? I cittadini americani, i cui funzionari comprano bunker mentre spendono le loro tasse in bombe? O i gestori di fondi, le lobby del complesso militare-industriale, i donatori che finanziano le campagne e dettano le guerre?

La guerra è il prodotto. Il caos è la materia prima. L’Europa compra armi, l’America compra bunker, e chi siede al tavolo dove si decidono i conflitti conta i profitti.

Lo scacco matto è in corso. Ma chi lo sta dando a chi?

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The proverb “revenge is a dish best served cold” traces to French (“La vengeance se mange froide”), appearing in English literature by the 19th century. Most Americans do not know the French orign of the proverb… 

It entered popular culture thanks to Star Trek. In Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (1982), Khan Noonien Singh delivers the line during a tense video call with Admiral Kirk:

Ah, Kirk, my old friend… do you know the Klingon proverb? ‘Revenge is a dish best served cold.’ And it is very cold…

As the war against Iran continues to escalate, Russia finds itself in a powerful position to deal with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which has kowtowed to the United States and allowed the US to dominate militarily the Persian Gulf on behalf of Israel, and India, which has taken advantage of their long friendship with Russia to engage in a disgustingly abject act of sycophancy with Israel at the expense of fellow BRICS member Iran. Russia has delivered a firm diplomatic message to both.

During an Ambassadorial Roundtable in Moscow on March 5, 2026, Sergei Lavrov addressed the Ambassadors from the GCC countries, who had come to Moscow seeking Putin’s intervention in shutting down Iran’s military operations in retaliation for the sneak attack by Israel and the United States. The event was supposed to focus on the Ukrainian crisis, digital threats, and international information security, but Lavrov devoted significant time to the escalating Middle East conflict, particularly the US-Israeli military strikes on Iran and Iran’s retaliatory actions affecting Gulf states.

The GCC ambassadors reportedly urged Russia to pressure Iran to de-escalate and halt its missile/drone strikes on or over their territories (e.g., targeting US/Israeli-linked sites). Lavrov responded critically and pointedly rejected a one-sided approach. Lavrov shut them down in an extraordinary display of tough love. I’ve posted the video of his remarks below.

Lavrov began by expressing condolences for civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure in Persian Gulf countries caused by the ongoing conflict. But he immediately challenged the GCC’s selective criticism… He asked whether they had condemned the “US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran” or specific incidents like the reported killing of 170 schoolgirls in Minab by US/Israeli actions). Ouch!

He continued by highlighting their hypocrisy in pushing for pressure only on Iran while not equally condemning the initiators (US and Israel), noting that accepting such a request would imply acceptance of the original aggression.

Lavrov asserted that the ongoing US and Israeli operations were aimed at driving a wedge between Iran and its Arab neighbors (GCC states), noting that these actions were an attempt to sabotage recent positive normalization trends (e.g., Saudi-Iran rapprochement, UAE/Iran engagement).

He advocated for a unified, balanced international response: an immediate cessation of all hostilities (not just Iranian ones), political/diplomatic settlement, and safeguarding legitimate security interests of all Persian Gulf states.

He reminded the Ambassadors that Russia has long promoted a Concept of Collective Security in the Persian Gulf (for over 20 years) and expressed appreciation for GCC efforts in this regard (e.g., trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi). He concluded by calling on the GCC and others to add their voices to calls for de-escalation and against selective UN resolutions (e.g., any Bahrain-proposed draft condemning only Iran). Without issuing a direct threat, Lavrov was putting the GCC on notice that Russia expected them to hold Israel and the United States accountable for the economic disaster that is confronting the GCC.

Then there is India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent trip to Israel was ill-timed, coming three days before Israel and the US attacked Iran. Although India is one of the founders of BRICS, he made a big show of elevating the India-Israel relationship from a “strategic partnership” to a “Special Strategic Partnership for Peace, Innovation, and Prosperity.” Modi signed 16 agreements and announcement of 11 joint initiatives in areas like defense (joint development/production with tech transfer), critical/emerging technologies (led by national security advisors), cyber security (Indo-Israel Cyber Centre of Excellence in India), agriculture, water management, labor mobility (facilitating over 50,000 Indian workers in Israel over five years), culture, education, and more.

Modi, along with Netanyahu, announced the advancement of free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations (first round concluded, next in May; Modi stated a deal would be finalized “soon”). He also reaffirmed India’s strong defense and counter-terrorism cooperation with Israel, including potential transfers like Iron Dome technology. Talk about bad timing. Modi’s obsequious behavior in Israel was a direct insult to the other members of BRICS… Advocating warm relations with a country guilty of genocide has not been well-received by other BRICS members.

The attack by Israel and the United States on Iran, a member of BRICS, has created a potentially catastrophic economic problem of Modi and India. India imports the vast majority of its crude oil needs (around 85-88% of total consumption), as domestic production is limited. India’s total crude oil imports average roughly 5 million barrels per day (bpd) in recent data (early 2026 figures). The Persian Gulf countries (primarily Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Qatar; sometimes broadly including other Middle East suppliers) are a major source, especially via the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of these flows pass. Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz has created an emergency situation for India.

The war against Iran has given Russia tremendous leverage over India. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, in remarks made on March 6, 2026, emphasized that Russia would not disclose specific quantitative data on oil exports to India, citing “too many ill-wishers” and security concerns. This came in response to reports of potential large deliveries (e.g., up to 22 million barrels in a week) amid India’s supply crunch. Peskov also noted the Iran war has significantly boosted demand for Russian energy resources, positioning Russia as a “reliable supplier” of oil and gas.

Russia, instead of leaving India to sleep in the bed it made with Israel, highlighted its readiness to support India, but at a cost. For instance, earlier in March (around March 4), sources indicated Russia was prepared to divert oil cargoes (e.g., ~9.5 million barrels near Indian waters) and potentially raise India’s share of Russian crude imports to up to 40%. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak mentioned receiving “signals of renewed interest” from India in larger volumes due to the crisis.

Amid the surge in demand for Russia’s Urals crude, Russia hit India with a firm, but diplomatic, reminder of the cost of betraying a friend. Prior to the attack on Iran, Russia sold oil to India with deep discounts ($10-13 below Brent pre-conflict). While promising to help India compensate for its loss of Persian Gulf oil, Russia inoformed Modi that India would have to pay a premium of $4-5 over Brent for March/April deliveries. This reflects market forces rather than explicit “assurances” of continued discounts; some reports frame it as Russia treating it more as “business” without prior friendship-based concessions.

I am speculating here, but I think Modi is going to reconsider the agreements he made with Israel… Especially if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed for six months or more. What do you think?

Original article:  sonar21.com

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LNG shipping rates have gone from $40,000 to $300,000 per day — a 650% vertical climb in less than a week — and the men who ordered the strikes that caused this are still strutting around the Oval Office talking about “strength.” 

That is not strength. That is the economics of catastrophe unfolding in real time, and it will reach every kitchen table from Tokyo to Turin before anyone in the beltway finishes reading the intelligence brief they probably won’t bother to read anyway.

The Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day transit, representing north of 20% of global seaborne oil trade — has effectively ceased to function as a commercial corridor, and what’s doing the closing is less about Iranian missiles, and more the insurance market, the invisible hand of capital that everyone in Washington claims to worship suddenly delivering its honest verdict on Operation Epstein Epic Fury. Major commercial operators, oil companies and insurers have effectively withdrawn from the corridor, creating a de facto closure comparable in character to the Red Sea disruption — but with far larger volumes at stake. The market has spoken. The war lobby apparently has not listened.

Qatar declared force majeure on gas exports, and sources say it may take at least a month to return to normal production volumes — meaning global gas markets will experience shortages for weeks even in the unlikely scenario the conflict ends today. Read that sentence again slowly. Even if it stopped right now. Even if every bomb stopped falling this afternoon and every missile went cold, the damage is already baked in, the supply chain already severed, the cryogenic infrastructure already in shutdown sequence — because the cryogenic nature of LNG requires specialised storage maintaining temperatures of approximately -160°C, making it impossible to simply store excess production in temporary facilities, and once disruptions occur, restarting operations requires weeks of careful, sequential rehabilitation to avoid thermal shock to the entire system.

Qatar supplies 20 percent of the world’s LNG — and if that’s off the table, countries must scramble for what remains. Japan scrambles. South Korea scrambles. Taiwan scrambles. India, which sources nearly half of its LNG intake from Qatari supply under long-term contracts , scrambles. These are not abstract geopolitical actors — these are the factories that make your semiconductors, the power grids that keep hospitals running, the fertiliser supply chains that feed a billion people, and every one of them is now competing in a spot market that has been stripped of a fifth of its supply overnight. This is what cascading systemic failure looks like before it hits the news cycle.

Dutch TTF futures, Europe’s benchmark gas contract — rose 35% on Tuesday alone, with prices on the week running roughly 76% higher, while the Japan-Korea Marker benchmark reached a one-year high. Europe, still carrying the scar tissue of 2022 when Russia’s war on Ukraine sent the continent into an energy convulsion it spent hundreds of billions surviving, is now staring down a second shock — this one detonated by an ally that drew the target circles, pulled the trigger, and handed Europe the wreckage as a fait accompli — no consultation, no warning, no framework for what follows, just the bill. The shutdown also affects downstream products including urea, polymers, methanol and aluminium , meaning the price destruction moves through industrial supply chains like a slow haemorrhage through every sector that uses energy as an input — which is every sector.

Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd and CMA CGM have all suspended operations through the Strait of Hormuz, rerouting vessels around the southern tip of Africa — adding weeks to transit times and driving costs across the entire container shipping ecosystem. The global just-in-time economy was already running thin margins after Covid, and now it absorbs voyages six weeks longer with insurance premiums at the ceiling and no clear date when any of it normalises. Every delay is a price. The Bangladeshi textile worker whose factory loses power this month didn’t vote for this war. The Filipino seafarer rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope for the third time this year didn’t either. The cost transfers downward with perfect precision — away from the people who made the decision, toward everyone who had no part in it and no protection from it.

Because what is happening is not a regional energy disruption — it is the deliberate removal of approximately one quarter of the world’s seaborne energy supply from the global market, not by accident, not by miscalculation in the margins, but as the direct and foreseeable consequence of a war of choice waged on behalf of a government in Tel Aviv that has now pulled Washington into a confrontation with consequences that will metastasise across every economy on the planet that cannot print its own reserve currency. Countries heavily reliant on imported energy with limited fiscal space — Japan, India, South Africa, Turkey, Hungary, Malaysia — are the most exposed to the shock, while the architects of this disaster enjoy the insulation of domestic shale production and the privilege of pricing oil in their own currency. The Global South will pay the highest price for a war it never voted for, never wanted, and was never once consulted about.

The Covid pandemic cost the world approximately $13 trillion and this will be orders of magnitude worse to a level of economic suicide that would make Darwin roll in his grave. There is no exit ramp here, only the compounding arithmetic of a war of choice whose costs will be distributed with ruthless precision to everyone who had no say in the choosing. It will arrive not as a headline but as a bill — a gas bill in Rotterdam, a power cut in Karachi, a factory closure in Busan, that no emergency fund will fully reach in time. Billions of people across Asia, Africa, and the Global South are now the unconsulted collateral of a war fought for reasons they were never given a vote on and objectives they were never shown. They will survive it, most of them. They will rebuild, and they will remember — with a clarity that no Pentagon briefing, no State Department white paper, and no carefully worded presidential statement will ever extinguish — exactly who decided, and exactly who paid. But the invoice for betrayal will come due and that will dwarf the economic one.

Original article:  islanderreports.substack.com