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LNG shipping rates have gone from $40,000 to $300,000 per day — a 650% vertical climb in less than a week — and the men who ordered the strikes that caused this are still strutting around the Oval Office talking about “strength.” 

That is not strength. That is the economics of catastrophe unfolding in real time, and it will reach every kitchen table from Tokyo to Turin before anyone in the beltway finishes reading the intelligence brief they probably won’t bother to read anyway.

The Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day transit, representing north of 20% of global seaborne oil trade — has effectively ceased to function as a commercial corridor, and what’s doing the closing is less about Iranian missiles, and more the insurance market, the invisible hand of capital that everyone in Washington claims to worship suddenly delivering its honest verdict on Operation Epstein Epic Fury. Major commercial operators, oil companies and insurers have effectively withdrawn from the corridor, creating a de facto closure comparable in character to the Red Sea disruption — but with far larger volumes at stake. The market has spoken. The war lobby apparently has not listened.

Qatar declared force majeure on gas exports, and sources say it may take at least a month to return to normal production volumes — meaning global gas markets will experience shortages for weeks even in the unlikely scenario the conflict ends today. Read that sentence again slowly. Even if it stopped right now. Even if every bomb stopped falling this afternoon and every missile went cold, the damage is already baked in, the supply chain already severed, the cryogenic infrastructure already in shutdown sequence — because the cryogenic nature of LNG requires specialised storage maintaining temperatures of approximately -160°C, making it impossible to simply store excess production in temporary facilities, and once disruptions occur, restarting operations requires weeks of careful, sequential rehabilitation to avoid thermal shock to the entire system.

Qatar supplies 20 percent of the world’s LNG — and if that’s off the table, countries must scramble for what remains. Japan scrambles. South Korea scrambles. Taiwan scrambles. India, which sources nearly half of its LNG intake from Qatari supply under long-term contracts , scrambles. These are not abstract geopolitical actors — these are the factories that make your semiconductors, the power grids that keep hospitals running, the fertiliser supply chains that feed a billion people, and every one of them is now competing in a spot market that has been stripped of a fifth of its supply overnight. This is what cascading systemic failure looks like before it hits the news cycle.

Dutch TTF futures, Europe’s benchmark gas contract — rose 35% on Tuesday alone, with prices on the week running roughly 76% higher, while the Japan-Korea Marker benchmark reached a one-year high. Europe, still carrying the scar tissue of 2022 when Russia’s war on Ukraine sent the continent into an energy convulsion it spent hundreds of billions surviving, is now staring down a second shock — this one detonated by an ally that drew the target circles, pulled the trigger, and handed Europe the wreckage as a fait accompli — no consultation, no warning, no framework for what follows, just the bill. The shutdown also affects downstream products including urea, polymers, methanol and aluminium , meaning the price destruction moves through industrial supply chains like a slow haemorrhage through every sector that uses energy as an input — which is every sector.

Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd and CMA CGM have all suspended operations through the Strait of Hormuz, rerouting vessels around the southern tip of Africa — adding weeks to transit times and driving costs across the entire container shipping ecosystem. The global just-in-time economy was already running thin margins after Covid, and now it absorbs voyages six weeks longer with insurance premiums at the ceiling and no clear date when any of it normalises. Every delay is a price. The Bangladeshi textile worker whose factory loses power this month didn’t vote for this war. The Filipino seafarer rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope for the third time this year didn’t either. The cost transfers downward with perfect precision — away from the people who made the decision, toward everyone who had no part in it and no protection from it.

Because what is happening is not a regional energy disruption — it is the deliberate removal of approximately one quarter of the world’s seaborne energy supply from the global market, not by accident, not by miscalculation in the margins, but as the direct and foreseeable consequence of a war of choice waged on behalf of a government in Tel Aviv that has now pulled Washington into a confrontation with consequences that will metastasise across every economy on the planet that cannot print its own reserve currency. Countries heavily reliant on imported energy with limited fiscal space — Japan, India, South Africa, Turkey, Hungary, Malaysia — are the most exposed to the shock, while the architects of this disaster enjoy the insulation of domestic shale production and the privilege of pricing oil in their own currency. The Global South will pay the highest price for a war it never voted for, never wanted, and was never once consulted about.

The Covid pandemic cost the world approximately $13 trillion and this will be orders of magnitude worse to a level of economic suicide that would make Darwin roll in his grave. There is no exit ramp here, only the compounding arithmetic of a war of choice whose costs will be distributed with ruthless precision to everyone who had no say in the choosing. It will arrive not as a headline but as a bill — a gas bill in Rotterdam, a power cut in Karachi, a factory closure in Busan, that no emergency fund will fully reach in time. Billions of people across Asia, Africa, and the Global South are now the unconsulted collateral of a war fought for reasons they were never given a vote on and objectives they were never shown. They will survive it, most of them. They will rebuild, and they will remember — with a clarity that no Pentagon briefing, no State Department white paper, and no carefully worded presidential statement will ever extinguish — exactly who decided, and exactly who paid. But the invoice for betrayal will come due and that will dwarf the economic one.

Original article:  islanderreports.substack.com

Thomas FAZI

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“Es hora de cerrar el grifo”, anunció la presidenta de la Comisión Europea, Ursula von der Leyen, la semana pasada, en su decimonoveno intento de presionar a Rusia.

El último paquete de sanciones propuesto incluye la prohibición de importar gas natural licuado (GNL) ruso a partir de enero de 2027, un año antes de lo previsto inicialmente, y amplía las sanciones a las refinerías y los comerciantes de petróleo de terceros países, como China y Rusia, acusados de ayudar a Rusia a eludir las sanciones.

Sobre el papel, esto se presenta como un paso decisivo para “recortar los ingresos de guerra de Rusia” y obligar a Moscú a sentarse a la mesa de negociaciones. En la práctica, no es más que la continuación de una política que ha fracasado una y otra vez.

Rusia no se ha rendido y ha redirigido los flujos de energía a otros lugares, mientras que Europa se ha visto paralizada por el aumento de los precios y se ha encerrado en una posición de dependencia permanente de Estados Unidos.

Antes de la invasión de Ucrania en 2022, Rusia era el mayor proveedor de petróleo y gas natural de la UE. Desde entonces, la cuota de Rusia en las importaciones de petróleo de la UE ha caído del 29 % al 2 %, y la de gas, del 48 % al 12 %.

Sin embargo, las importaciones no han cesado por completo. Dos gasoductos siguen operativos: el gasoducto Druzhba, que sigue suministrando petróleo a Hungría y Eslovaquia, y el gasoducto TurkStream, que suministra gas a Bulgaria, Hungría, Grecia y Rumanía.

Mientras tanto, la UE se ha apresurado a sustituir el gas ruso, transportado por gasoductos, por GNL, mucho más caro y volátil, cuya cuota en el total de las importaciones de gas de la UE se ha más que duplicado, pasando del 20 % al 50 %.

Casi la mitad de este GNL procede ahora de Estados Unidos, lo que convierte a Europa en el mercado más importante para las exportaciones de GNL estadounidenses.

Lo irónico es que, mientras la UE se jactaba de reducir las importaciones por gasoducto procedentes de Rusia, ha aumentado discretamente sus compras de GNL ruso, la mayor parte del cual se destina a Francia, España, los Países Bajos, Bélgica e Italia.

Se trata simplemente de una cuestión de realidad económica: el GNL ruso no solo es «significativamente más barato» que el gas licuado estadounidense, sino que los acuerdos existentes vinculan a los compradores europeos a los suministros rusos.

Sin embargo, nada ilustra mejor lo absurdo del régimen de sanciones de la UE que el hecho de que Europa siga importando indirectamente grandes cantidades de petróleo ruso.

En lugar de comprar crudo barato directamente a Rusia, como solía hacer, ahora compra productos refinados a países como la India y Turquía, que importan crudo ruso, lo refinan y lo revenden a Europa con un importante margen de beneficio.

Solo en los primeros seis meses de 2025, la UE y Turquía importaron 2,4 millones de toneladas de productos petrolíferos de la India. Las estimaciones sugieren que dos tercios de esta cantidad procedían de crudo ruso. En efecto, la UE y Turquía pagaron a la India alrededor de 1 500 millones de euros por petróleo que era ruso en todo menos en el nombre.

Esto significa que Europa está pagando ahora más por el mismo petróleo ruso que antes, al tiempo que paga más por el GNL para sustituir el gas ruso que llega por gasoducto.

Así, el bloque se ha disparado dos veces en el pie: primero, al sustituir el barato gas ruso que llega por gasoducto por el más caro GNL estadounidense (y ruso), y luego al sustituir las importaciones directas de petróleo ruso por compras indirectas y más costosas a la India y Turquía.

Las consecuencias han sido brutales. Europa ha soportado tres años consecutivos de estancamiento industrial.

Alemania, que en su día fue el motor del continente, está experimentando ahora una desindustrialización total, con 125 000 puestos de trabajo industriales perdidos solo en las últimas semanas.

Rusia, por su parte, ha salido relativamente indemne, redirigiendo sus exportaciones a Asia y consolidando su asociación con China. Desde el punto de vista de los intereses a largo plazo de Europa, el camino obvio sería renormalizar las relaciones económicas con Moscú, reanudar las importaciones de energía barata y trabajar para negociar el fin de la guerra.

Pero la racionalidad desapareció hace tiempo de la política europea. De hecho, Bruselas ha redoblado sus esfuerzos, anunciando no solo la prohibición del GNL, sino también una prohibición de facto del uso futuro de los gasoductos Nord Stream, al tiempo que sabotea cualquier esfuerzo de paz.

La justificación, una vez más, es que las sanciones obligarán a Rusia a poner fin a la guerra en los términos de Occidente.

La realidad es que 18 paquetes de sanciones no han logrado este objetivo, y el decimonoveno no lo conseguirá. Lo que sí hará, sin embargo, es profundizar la dependencia de Europa respecto a Estados Unidos.

De hecho, el momento en que se ha anunciado el nuevo paquete de sanciones no es casual. Solo unos días antes, Donald Trump lanzó un ultimátum a los aliados de la OTAN.

Declaró que Estados Unidos solo impondría nuevas sanciones “importantes” a Rusia una vez que los europeos hubieran acordado dejar de comprar petróleo ruso.

Fue más allá y sugirió que la OTAN impusiera aranceles del 50-100 % a China y la India, a las que acusó de eludir las sanciones. Insistió en que tales medidas debilitarían el “fuerte control” de Rusia sobre sus socios.

Trump incluso afirmó que detener las importaciones de energía rusa, junto con los elevados aranceles a China, sería “de gran ayuda” para poner fin al conflicto.

La lógica es desconcertante. Europa no tiene poder para obligar a China o la India a dejar de comprar petróleo ruso. Los aranceles a esos países alimentarían una inflación altísima y desencadenarían contramedidas arancelarias que devastarían a los exportadores europeos, sin cambiar apenas su comportamiento de compra.

Incluso los diplomáticos de la UE reconocen en privado que las condiciones de Trump son poco realistas, como probablemente el propio Trump entiende muy bien. Sin embargo, sus demandas revelan la esencia transaccional de la política transatlántica actual.

El ultimátum de Trump encaja con una estrategia más amplia de Estados Unidos: dominar el mercado energético europeo. El secretario de Energía de Estados Unidos, Chris Wright, lo dejó claro: “Quieres tener proveedores de energía seguros que sean tus aliados, no tus enemigos”.

Según el plan de Washington, Estados Unidos podría representar casi tres cuartas partes de las importaciones de GNL de Europa en pocos años. De hecho, ExxonMobil ahora espera que Europa firme contratos de varias décadas para el suministro de gas estadounidense como parte de su compromiso de comprar 750 000 millones de dólares en energía estadounidense.

Hasta hace poco, los países de la UE se resistían a este tipo de acuerdos, por miedo a depender de los combustibles fósiles y a que se echaran por tierra los objetivos climáticos.

Pero las cosas han cambiado. La italiana Eni ha firmado recientemente un acuerdo de 20 años con Venture Global, su primer acuerdo a largo plazo con un productor estadounidense de GNL.

Edison y la alemana Sefe han firmado acuerdos similares. El resultado es una dependencia estructural del gas estadounidense —que no solo es más caro, sino que también tiene una huella de carbono mucho mayor que el gas ruso transportado por gasoducto— durante las próximas décadas. Se trata de un ejemplo clásico de vasallaje geopolítico.

Pero la cosa empeora. A pesar de que se le pide a Europa que rompa todos los lazos con la energía rusa, han surgido informes sobre conversaciones secretas entre ExxonMobil y la petrolera rusa Rosneft para reanudar la cooperación en el gigantesco proyecto Sakhalin, en el Lejano Oriente ruso.

Si se confirma, significaría que, mientras a los europeos se les prohíbe comprar gas y petróleo rusos baratos, las empresas estadounidenses se preparan discretamente para volver.

El objetivo, al parecer, es comprar energía rusa a bajo precio, revenderla a un precio superior y expulsar del juego a competidores como Turquía y la India.

Pero hay un claro defecto en esta estrategia. Es difícil imaginar que las empresas estadounidenses reanuden realmente sus negocios con Rusia mientras la guerra continúa, especialmente cuando Washington amenaza con sanciones cada vez más estrictas contra Rusia y sus socios clave, como China y la India.

De hecho, el director ejecutivo de Exxon ha negado los rumores. Esta contradicción pone de relieve los límites del enfoque transaccional de Trump: la creencia de que puede separar claramente la economía de la política, llegando a acuerdos comerciales con Moscú mientras desafía los objetivos geopolíticos y de seguridad más amplios de Rusia.

“El resultado es una paradoja geopolítica tan retorcida que casi desafía la comprensión”.

Mientras tanto, la presión para desvincular a Europa de la energía rusa solo ha fortalecido la asociación estratégica entre Moscú y Pekín. A principios de este mes, firmaron un memorando para construir el gasoducto Power of Siberia 2, un proyecto de 13 600 millones de dólares que se extiende a lo largo de 2600 kilómetros a través de Mongolia. Si se confirma, suministraría 50 000 millones de metros cúbicos de gas al año a China, lo que proporcionaría a Pekín una fuente fiable de energía barata.

Para Europa, esto es un desastre. Al haberse aislado voluntariamente de la energía rusa, el continente se ha comprometido ahora a un futuro de precios altos y baja competitividad.

Rusia, por el contrario, se está asegurando mercados a largo plazo en Asia. El nuevo gasoducto también tendría implicaciones para Estados Unidos.

Los analistas predicen que el gasoducto provocará un “choque estructural” en el comercio mundial de GNL, reduciendo la dependencia de China de los cargamentos marítimos y socavando las ambiciones de Estados Unidos de conseguir contratos a largo plazo.

Pero esto solo pone de relieve por qué es imperativo que Estados Unidos mantenga a sus Estados clientes lo más dependientes posible de los combustibles fósiles estadounidenses.

Desde este punto de vista, la guerra ha sido todo un triunfo para Estados Unidos: ha garantizado beneficios extraordinarios para sus empresas energéticas y ha vinculado a Europa aún más estrechamente a sus prioridades geopolíticas.

De hecho, es difícil evitar la sospecha de que este resultado formaba parte del planteamiento inicial. Después de todo, crear una brecha permanente entre Europa y Rusia, al tiempo que se asegura Europa como mercado cautivo para la energía estadounidense, ha sido posiblemente un objetivo constante de la estrategia estadounidense durante décadas.

Al adoptar sanciones que se alinean con las demandas de Trump, Bruselas está sacrificando lo que le queda de autonomía. El resultado es una paradoja geopolítica tan retorcida que casi desafía la comprensión.

Los gobiernos europeos, atrapados por su propia retórica y por un compromiso dogmático con la confrontación permanente con Moscú, se han colocado en una posición ridícula.

Han permitido que Trump plantee sus exigencias como un perverso quid pro quo: puede presentar el daño económico que se inflige Europa a sí misma y su creciente dependencia de la energía estadounidense como el precio que deben pagar para acelerar su propio declive estratégico.

En general, la política energética de la UE desde 2022 ha sido un caso de libro de daño autoinfligido. Al aislarse de los suministros baratos de Rusia, ha brindado a Estados Unidos una oportunidad única para dominar el mercado energético europeo.

Al adoptar sanciones, que no han logrado debilitar a Rusia, pero han devastado la industria europea, Bruselas ha convertido al continente en un peón geopolítico.

Los líderes europeos afirman defender los valores y la solidaridad; en realidad, están presidiendo un proceso de desindustrialización y declive, al tiempo que continúan agravando peligrosamente las tensiones con Rusia.

A menos que se produzca un cambio drástico, el futuro del continente será de estancamiento e irrelevancia y, en el peor de los casos, de guerra total.

Publicado originalmente por UnHerd.
Traducción: Observatorio de trabajadores en lucha

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Europe will either continue the war at huge cost to avoid a reckoning with its disastrous policy towards Russia, or end the war, and face the prospect of Ukrainian membership which will tear the EU apart. No wonder the Eurocrats are bang out of ideas and throwing out more pointless sanctions.

Few things characterise the emptiness of European energy policy that Ursula von Der Leyen’s announcement that the Nordstream 1 and 2 pipelines would be hitherto banned. In what has been described as a significant escalation, she announced on X that ‘Europe is putting Nordstream 1 & 2 behind for good.’ Both pipelines lay empty, and some were destroyed by a terrorist attack in September 2022. Nothing says escalation less than a sanction with zero economic cost.

And this latest move also signals increasing desperation in Europe about what to do about Russia, in circumstances where no one wants to fight Russia. The arrival of Friedrich Merz as German Chancellor has undoubtedly shifted the centre of gravity of EU policy towards Berlin, as he tries to position himself as the tough kid on the block.

But I want to be the first to predict that Merz won’t survive a full term in office.

The weight of domestic concern in Germany about self-defeating foreign policy is turbo-charging the growth of AfD which has become Germany’s most popular party since the February elections, according to polls.

As I, and many others, have said before, European industry has been crippled by high energy prices, and we are told, this is Russia’s fault. But it is manifestly driven by self-defeating energy policies in Brussels and Berlin. Rather cutting energy connections, the only answer is to boost global supply which would inevitably bring uncomfortable choices about Russian pipelines back to the table. Should this happen, von der Leyen’s credibility and Merz’s honeymoon in office, would suffer a cold shower.

Taking every step possible to delay or prevent a ceasefire in Ukraine simply kicks the sloshing bucket of iced water further down the slippery bathroom floor.

Yet citizens suffering under the weight of high prices will still remember that before the war started, gas prices in Europe were extremely low – comparable to U.S. gas prices today – because of hugely favourable global supply. LNG from the U.S., the Middle East and Africa together with piped gas from Norway and Russia, pushed the wholesale price of gas down to levels not seen since 2005.

European LNG imports had risen sharply after the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 increasing from only 10% of to nearly 50% today, while Russian piped gas kept flowing. As part of this, imports from the U.S. tripled in volume between 2021 and 2023 and they now make up almost 50% of total European LNG imports.

Cutting Russian gas pipelines has had a devastating effect on the European supply equation.

Read the European press and you’ll hear often how U.S. LNG is too expensive, which contributes to the economic headwinds manufacturers in Germany and else are facing. Emmanuel Macron has in the past called out the U.S. as ‘unfriendly’ for selling expensive LNG. But this is deeply misleading.

Back in 2019, there was more gas than the world could possibly use, bearing down on prices. The fact of piped or shipped was immaterial to the glut in supply. The surge in U.S. supplies was doing to global gas prices what the glut of U.S. shale oil was doing in January 2016 when prices sunk to $26 per barrel.

The 2016 oil price collapse put immense pressure on Russia’s economy, which is heavily reliant on tax from oil and gas exports. Russia’s current account surplus in 2016 hit its lowest level since 1999, pinching tax income significantly. And that was at a time when Russia was pumping record amounts of oil and gas.

Because herein lies a truth; the global price of energy has a much bigger impact on Russia than the amount of energy that you buy from Russia.

When President Trump talks to OPEC about slashing the oil price, and, by extension, the gas price, he thinks that this will damage Russia’s economy more than cutting Russian supplies

However, Russian monetary policy today is very different to 2016. A low rouble is embraced which helps to offset energy price slumps and brings in bigger surpluses when prices soar.

That’s why the second strand of von der Leyen’s grand plan – getting the G7 to agree to reduce the oil price cap from $60 to $45 – may also not work. And, in any case, G7 agreement to this will only be possible if the United States agrees. While Trump has spoken often about reducing the oil price by boosting global supply, it is far from clear that he will sign up to imposing another exogenous sanction on Russia, at a time when his administration is looking to reset relations with the Kremlin.

Mothballing Russian pipelines as putative punishment for Putin’s war in Ukraine is having the opposite effect – restricting supply, pushing up prices and hurting Europe far more than it is hurting Russia.

And, of course, Europe finds itself caught in a perfect storm of bad economic options. Continue the war at a huge economic cost, to delay the inevitable reckoning with its self-defeating policy with Russia. End the war and face an even bigger political and economic cost of admitting Ukraine as a member.

I have said before, admitting Ukraine to the EU would shake the financial foundations of the bloc and cause such widespread resistance, that Ukraine could only join on second-class terms and conditions. Specifically, countries like France and Poland will block and delay to avoid handing their generous subsidies to Kyiv.

It should come as no surprise that the newly elected President of Poland, Karol Nawrocki, has already said that Ukraine should not be admitted to the EU. He is not alone. Hungary’s Prime Minster Viktor Orban has long said that Ukraine’s accession to Europe would be an economic disaster.

It might be for some EU countries. The bigger problem, if you consider it a problem, is that it would cause a political disaster and an unravelling of the European project. What is happening political in Germany will, too, happen in France, and the lawfare against Le Pen will only accelerate that. It’s now a matter of when, not if, National Rally runs the government in Paris. When that happens, expect to see an increasingly nationalist France head for the exit triggering an implosion of the project.

Only radical reform, slashing the EU institutions and handing sovereignty back to member states can prevent this from happening. The chances of that, right now, appear very low.

Segue nostro Telegram.

L ‘industria europea ‘industria dai prezzi elevati dell’energia e ci viene detto che è colpa della Russia. Ma la colpa è delle politiche energetiche autolesioniste di Bruxelles e Berlino. L’unica risposta è aumentare l’offerta globale, il che potrebbe comportare scelte scomode riguardo agli oleodotti russi.

Il Financial Times ha recentemente riportato la notizia che alcuni Stati membri europei stanno valutando la possibilità di riavviare le forniture di gas russo in caso di un futuro cessate il fuoco in Ucraina. Si tratta di un’ipotesi che si sta rivelando controversa, non da ultimo tra gli Stati russofobi più accaniti come la Polonia e i Paesi baltici. Ma potrebbe avere un senso economico, non per la Russia, ma per l’Europa.

Prima dell’inizio della guerra, i prezzi del gas in Europa erano estremamente bassi – paragonabili a quelli statunitensi di oggi – grazie a un’offerta globale estremamente favorevole. Il GNL proveniente dagli Stati Uniti, dal Medio Oriente e dall’Africa, unitamente al gas convogliato dalla Norvegia e dalla Russia, ha fatto scendere il prezzo all’ingrosso del gas a livelli mai visti dal 2005.

Le importazioni europee di GNL sono aumentate bruscamente dopo lo scoppio della crisi ucraina nel 2014, passando da appena il 10% a quasi il 50% di oggi, mentre il gas russo trasportato dai gasdotti ha continuato a fluire. In questo contesto, le importazioni dagli Stati Uniti sono triplicate in volume tra il 2021 e il 2023 e ora rappresentano quasi il 50% delle importazioni totali di GNL in Europa.

Leggendo la stampa europea si sente spesso dire che il GNL statunitense è troppo costoso, il che contribuisce alle difficoltà economiche che i produttori tedeschi e non solo stanno affrontando. In passato Emmanuel Macron ha definito gli Stati Uniti “ostili ” per la vendita di GNL costoso. Ma questo è profondamente fuorviante.

Nel 2019 c’era più gas di quanto il mondo potesse utilizzare, con conseguente riduzione dei prezzi. Il fatto che fosse convogliato o spedito era irrilevante ai fini dell’offerta.

L’impennata delle forniture statunitensi stava facendo ai prezzi globali del gas quello che la sovrabbondanza di petrolio di scisto statunitense stava facendo nel gennaio 2016, quando i prezzi erano scesi a 26 dollari al barile.

Il crollo del prezzo del petrolio del 2016 ha esercitato un’immensa pressione sull’economia russa, che dipende in larga misura dalle imposte provenienti dalle esportazioni di petrolio e gas. L’avanzo delle partite correnti della Russia nel 2016 ha toccato il livello più basso dal 1999, riducendo notevolmente le entrate fiscali. E questo in un momento in cui la Russia stava pompando quantità record di petrolio e gas.

Perché qui sta una verità: il prezzo globale dell’energia ha un impatto molto più grande sulla Russia rispetto alla quantità di energia che si acquista dalla Russia.

Quando il Presidente Trump parla con l’OPEC di ridurre il prezzo del petrolio e, di conseguenza, il prezzo del gas, pensa che questo danneggerà l’economia russa più della riduzione delle forniture russe.

Tuttavia, la politica monetaria russa di oggi è molto diversa da quella del 2016. Un rublo basso è abbracciato, il che aiuta a compensare i crolli dei prezzi dell’energia e porta a maggiori surplus quando i prezzi salgono.

Quindi, anche il taglio del prezzo del petrolio a 45 dollari – di cui parla Trump – potrebbe non avere un impatto così grande sulla Russia come lui crede. E, in ogni caso, questi prezzi saranno possibili solo cambiando radicalmente l’equazione dell’offerta.

La chiusura degli oleodotti russi come punizione per la guerra di Putin in Ucraina sta avendo l’effetto opposto, limitando l’offerta, facendo salire i prezzi e danneggiando l’Europa molto più di quanto non stia facendo la Russia.

Nel 2018, l’Europa ha importato 201 BCM di gas dalla Russia, soprattutto attraverso i gasdotti, pari al 38% delle sue importazioni totali di gas. Dall’inizio della guerra, l’Europa ha interrotto 185 BCM di potenziale fornitura annuale, pari al 35% delle sue importazioni totali di gas.

Questo include la distruzione o la sospensione dei gasdotti Nordstream (110 miliardi di metri cubi), la sospensione del gasdotto Yamal attraverso la Bielorussia (33 miliardi di metri cubi) e ora l’interruzione del transito del gas attraverso l’Ucraina all’inizio del 2025 (42 miliardi di metri cubi). Ciò lascia solo 17,5 BCM di capacità di gasdotto attraverso la Turchia per il gas russo.

Sul fronte della domanda, la Commissione europea ha incoraggiato l’accumulo di gas indotto dalla paura, alimentando ulteriormente l’inflazione.

A ciò si aggiunge la Germania, un tempo motore economico dell’Europa e ora suo malato. Sebbene a lungo termine la sua strategia energetica verde possa avere un senso, chiudere le centrali nucleari rimaste nel 2023, l’anno successivo all’inizio della guerra in Ucraina, è stato quanto di più sciocco possa esistere. Non c’è da stupirsi che Annalena Baerbock, ministro degli Esteri verde della Germania, stia facendo tutto il possibile per incolpare la Russia, e non il suo partito politico, per l’incidente economico che la Germania si è autoinflitta.

Sulla scia di questa impennata della domanda, in Europa si assiste a una massiccia attività di profitto da parte dei commercianti che siglano contratti a lungo termine con i fornitori statunitensi e vendono il gas a un prezzo maggiorato.

I prezzi non mentono. Il costo del gas naturale in Europa è astronomico rispetto a quello americano. Alla fine del 2024, i prezzi del gas naturale negli Stati Uniti erano di 3 dollari per MMBtu rispetto ai 13,55 dollari in Europa, una differenza di quattro volte e mezzo.

Uno dei motivi per cui l’economia statunitense è cresciuta del 2,8% e quella russa di oltre il 3% è l’abbondanza di energia a basso costo in entrambi i Paesi. L’anno scorso i quadranti economici del Regno Unito e dell’Eurozona si sono spostati appena.

Nel frattempo, la forza delle esportazioni russe non mostra segni evidenti di indebolimento. Dopo un anno estremamente redditizio nel 2022, la Russia ha registrato un surplus commerciale di 88 miliardi di dollari nel 2023 e di 120 miliardi di dollari nel 2024, con due terzi delle esportazioni di petrolio e gas. Non c’è molto da pensare che il 2025 sarà diverso.

Perché il gas, come il petrolio, scorre dove c’è domanda. La guerra in Ucraina ha visto una continua crescita delle forniture di gas russo alla Cina. La Russia ha aumentato le esportazioni di GNL verso l’Europa, a un prezzo più alto rispetto alle forniture di gas più economiche via tubo. E ora la Russia sta sviluppando una rotta di approvvigionamento del Caspio verso l’Iran.

È un promemoria tempestivo di come, nella guerra in Ucraina, la statistica sia ancora una volta vittima della tirannia del pensiero a breve termine.

Ci troviamo nella situazione in cui l’Europa viene indebolita e la Russia rafforzata dalla decisione di Bruxelles di interrompere le forniture di gasdotto, con i leader europei che la bollano come un successo.

Se il Presidente Trump vuole “trivellare, baby, trivellare” per inondare l’Europa con ancora più gas naturale liquefatto (GNL) americano, allora i leader europei dovrebbero dire “nave, baby, nave”, poiché ciò farebbe scendere i prezzi, fornendo all’industria europea una spinta disperatamente necessaria. Non ditelo a voce troppo alta, ma anche l’acquisto di gas russo via tubo potrebbe aiutare l’Europa.

Mothballing Russian pipelines as putative punishment for the war in Ukraine is having the opposite effect.

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European industry is being crippled by high energy prices, and we are told, this is Russia’s fault. But it is driven by self-defeating energy policies in Brussels and Berlin. The only answer is to boost global supply which may involve uncomfortable choices about Russian pipelines.

The Financial Times recently reported that some European member states are pondering restarting supplies of Russian piped gas on the back of any future ceasefire in Ukraine. This is proving controversial, not least among hard-line Russophobe states like Poland and the Balts. But it might make economic sense, not for Russia’s sake, but for Europe’s.

Before war started, gas prices in Europe were extremely low – comparable to U.S. gas prices today – because of hugely favourable global supply. LNG from the U.S., the Middle East and Africa together with piped gas from Norway and Russia, pushed the wholesale price of gas down to levels not seen since 2005.

European LNG imports had risen sharply after the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 increasing from only 10% of to nearly 50% today, while Russian piped gas kept flowing. As part of this, imports from the U.S. tripled in volume between 2021 and 2023 and they now make up almost 50% of total European LNG imports.

Read the European press and you’ll hear often how U.S. LNG is too expensive, which contributes to the economic headwinds manufacturers in Germany and else are facing. Emmanuel Macron has in the past called out the U.S. as ‘unfriendly’ for selling expensive LNG. But this is deeply misleading.

Back in 2019, there was more gas than the world could possibly use, bearing down on prices. The fact of piped or shipped was immaterial to the glut in supply.

The surge in U.S. supplies was doing to global gas prices what the glut of U.S. shale oil was doing in January 2016 when prices sunk to $26 per barrel.

The 2016 oil price collapse put immense pressure on Russia’s economy, which is heavily reliant on tax from oil and gas exports. Russia’s current account surplus in 2016 hit its lowest level since 1999, pinching tax income significantly. And that was at a time when Russia was pumping record amounts of oil and gas.

Because herein lies a truth; the global price of energy has a much bigger impact on Russia than the amount of energy that you buy from Russia.

When President Trump talks to OPEC about slashing the oil price, and, by extension, the gas price, he thinks that this will damage Russia’s economy more than cutting Russian supplies

However, Russian monetary policy today is very different to 2016. A low rouble is embraced which helps to offset energy price slumps and brings in bigger surpluses when prices soar.

So, even cutting the oil price to $45 – which Trump is talking about – might not have as big an impact on Russia as he believes. And, in any case, those prices will only be possible by radically changing the supply equation.

Mothballing Russian pipelines as putative punishment for Putin’s war in Ukraine is having the opposite effect – restricting supply, pushing up prices and hurting Europe far more than it is hurting Russia.

In 2018, Europe imported 201 BCM of gas from Russia, mostly through pipelines, accounting for 38% of its total gas imports. Since the war started, Europe has shut down 185 BCM in potential yearly supply, or 35% of its total gas imports.

This includes the destruction or suspensions of the Nordstream pipelines (110 bcm), the suspension of the Yamal Pipeline via Belarus (33 BCM) and now the cutting off of gas transit via Ukraine at the start of 2025 (42bcm). That leaves just 17.5 BCM in pipeline capacity through Turkey for Russian gas.

On the demand side, the European Commission has encouraged fear-induced gas stockpiling pouring further fuel on inflation.

Add to that Germany, once the economic engine of Europe and now its sick man. While in the long-term, its green energy strategy might make sense, closing its remaining nuclear power stations in 2023, the year after war in Ukraine started, was foolish as best. Little wonder that Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s Green Foreign Minister, is doing all she can to blame Russia, and not her own political party, for Germany’s self-inflicted economic car crash.

On the back of this surge in demand, there is massive profiteering in Europe by traders sealing long term contracts with U.S. suppliers and selling gas on at a mark-up.

Prices don’t lie. The cost of natural gas in Europe is astronomical compared to in America. At the end of 2024, U.S. natural gas prices were $3 per MMBtu compared to $13.55 in Europe, a four-and-a-half fold difference.

One of the reasons that the U.S. economy grew at 2.8% and the Russian economy grew by over 3% is both countries’ abundance of cheap energy. The UK and Eurozone economic dials barely shifted last year.

Meanwhile, Russia’s export strength shows no obvious signs of weakening. After a hugely profitable year in 2022, Russia pulled in a trade surplus of $88bn in 2023 and $120bn in 2024 with two thirds of its exports oil and gas. There’s little to suggest 2025 will be different.

Because gas, like oil, flows to where the demand is. War in Ukraine has seen continued growth in Russian gas supplies to China. Russia has increased its LNG exports to Europe at a higher price than cheaper piped gas supplies. And Russia is now developing a Caspian supply route to Iran.

It’s a timely reminder of how, in the war in Ukraine, statecraft has again become victim to the tyranny of short-term thinking.

We are in the situation where Europe is being weakened, and Russia is being bolstered, by the decision in Brussels to cut off supplies of pipeline gas, with European leaders trumpeting this as success.

If President Trump wants to ‘drill, baby, drill, to flood Europe with even more American liquefied natural gas (LNG) then European leaders should say ‘ship, baby, ship’, as that would drive prices down, providing European industry with a desperately needed boost. Don’t say it too loudly, but buying Russian piped gas might help Europe too.

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Empecemos con la historia de un imperio fanfarroneando a los cuatro vientos.

El Sr. Disco Inferno ordena a la OPEP y a la OPEP+ que bajen el precio del petróleo porque, en su opinión, eso podría resolver la guerra en Ucrania, es decir, obligar a Moscú a sentarse a la mesa debido a la disminución de los ingresos energéticos.

Eso en sí mismo resume el nivel de basura que POTUS (1) está recibiendo de su cornucopia de acrónimos que pasan por inteligencia.

Trump en Davos:

Voy a pedir a Arabia Saudí y a la OPEP que bajen el precio del petróleo (…) Si el precio bajara, la guerra entre Rusia y Ucrania terminaría inmediatamente. Ahora mismo, el precio es lo suficientemente alto como para que la guerra continúe (…) Con la bajada de los precios del petróleo, exigiré que los tipos de interés bajen inmediatamente. Y, del mismo modo, deberían bajar en todo el mundo. Los tipos de interés deberían seguirnos.

Como era de esperar, la OPEP+, dirigida básicamente por Arabia Saudí y Rusia, dijo «Nyet».

Aparte del hecho de que no les importan mucho los tipos de interés, en el frente energético seguirán haciendo lo que tienen planeado, incluida la pronta disminución de la producción, pero a niveles aceptables.

Standard Chartered, uno de los principales actores, señaló que la OPEP tiene un poder limitado para poner fin a la guerra de inmediato mediante la reducción del precio del petróleo, y que los ministros de la OPEP consideran este intento de ‘estrategia’ muy ineficiente y costoso.

Hasta aquí los dictados imperiales.

El plan de victoria estratégica de Chihuahua

Como se ha destacado anteriormente, Estados Unidos, a través del fracking, tiene suficiente gas para el consumo interno, pero no lo suficiente para exportar en masa a la UE, debido a problemas de licuefacción.

Esto explica por qué, incluso comprando más energía estadounidense a precios exorbitantes, la UE sigue dependiendo de facto en gran medida del GNL ruso —y de fuentes no estadounidenses— desde el sabotaje de los gasoductos del Mar del Norte, revelado en detalle por Sy Hersh.

Incluso a plena capacidad, el Imperio del Caos simplemente no puede suministrar todo el gas que necesita la UE; a esto se suma la falta de inversión en exploración adicional, que es muy necesaria, y en la infraestructura necesaria para satisfacer la creciente demanda de la UE.

En el mercado petrolero nacional de EE. UU., las cosas se vuelven positivamente kafkianas.

El transporte por camión en EE. UU., una industria de servicios masiva depende del diésel ruso importado, que debe mezclarse con petróleo Made in America para que sea apto para los camiones.

Ahora volvamos a Davos, que llegó y se fue sin apenas dejar huella. La tóxica CE Medusa von der Leyen dijo en Davos que Europa había “reducido sustancialmente”, y “en un tiempo récord”, su dependencia de los combustibles fósiles rusos.

Tonterías. La realidad energética de Europa es sombría. El GNL ruso de Novatek tiene actualmente un precio de entre 4,5 y 4,7 dólares por MMBtu. Eso es más caro que el gas de gasoducto, pero sigue siendo mucho más (cursiva mía) barato que el GNL estadounidense.

Todos los profesionales del sector, desde el Golfo Pérsico hasta Amberes, saben que Europa está importando GNL ruso como nunca antes lo había hecho. Eso es todo, o una muerte seca.

Paralelamente, Rusia triplicará su capacidad de suministro de GNL para 2035. Resultado final: sea lo que sea lo que se les ocurra a esos ‘comisarios de energía’ en Bruselas, Rusia seguirá siendo esencial en lo que respecta a la seguridad energética europea.

No hay límites, ni siquiera estratosféricos, para la estupidez de la eurocracia, que corroe el sistema como una plaga. Los europeos no solo han conseguido cerrar sus propios gasoductos, sino que siguen ‘investigando’ el ataque terrorista de facto de Nord Stream.

Resultado final: ahora importan más (cursiva mía) gas ruso, pero por medios diferentes, de terceros proveedores, y pagando una fortuna.

Esto es lo que se puede describir como el Plan de Victoria Estratégica de Chihuahua.

El Tesoro de EE. UU. sanciona a Disco Inferno

Las exportaciones de GNL de Rusia alcanzaron un máximo histórico el año pasado, con un crecimiento del 4 % y un suministro de 33,6 millones de toneladas. El récord mensual fue de 3,25 millones de toneladas en diciembre de 2024, un 13,7 % más que en noviembre.

El mayor exportador ruso es Yamal LNG: 21,1 millones de toneladas, un 6 % más que en 2023.

Ahora, el famoso estruendo estadounidense, en forma del subsecretario de Estado de Recursos Energéticos, Geoffrey Pyatt, ordena la “terminación total” del gas ruso exportado a Europa.

Al diablo con lo que puedan pensar (y necesitar) naciones como Hungría, Austria y Eslovaquia.

Pyatt declaró ante el Atlantic Council:

Hoy somos el mayor exportador de GNL del mundo, y para el final de la administración Trump, habremos duplicado lo que estamos haciendo hoy […] La decisión se ha tomado claramente en Bruselas para llegar a cero [suministros de gas de Rusia] para 2027… y Estados Unidos apoya firmemente ese objetivo».

Vaya. ¿Es que esta gente no lee siquiera los titulares básicos? Según informa Politico, la UE está ‘devorando’ gas ruso a niveles sin precedentes desde principios de 2025, importando 837 300 toneladas métricas de GNL solo en las dos primeras semanas del año.

El acuerdo de tránsito con Ucrania se cerró definitivamente, al menos por ahora, a partir del 1 de enero. La acción ahora está en las rutas marítimas.

El Tesoro de EE. UU. entra en escena con un nuevo paquete de sanciones contra el comercio de petróleo ruso, que afecta a hasta 5,8 millones de barriles diarios enviados por mar.

Tal y como están las cosas, el mercado mundial del petróleo está experimentando un superávit de unos 0,8 millones de barriles al día. Los precios del petróleo para 2025 deberían mantenerse en torno a los 71 dólares por barril de crudo Brent (en la actualidad, están en 76,2 dólares). No es exactamente lo que quiere el Sr. Disco Inferno.

Supongamos, pues, que esos 5,8 millones de barriles de petróleo ruso, sometidos a duras sanciones, desaparecieran del mercado mundial. En este caso, los precios del petróleo se dispararían a una media de 150 a 160 dólares el barril.

Una vez más, no es lo que quiere el Sr. Disco Inferno: prometió a gritos —y sigue prometiendo— una superpotencia petrolera MAGA, mientras reduce los precios del petróleo a un máximo de 50 dólares el barril.

Según el presupuesto de Rusia para 2025, el precio del petróleo es de 65,9 dólares el barril.

Si el Tesoro de EE. UU. logra hacer su magia y ‘desaparecer’ con esos 5,8 millones de barriles, los ingresos rusos aumentarían a unos 88 200 millones de dólares, incluso teniendo en cuenta exportaciones mucho más bajas.

Los altos precios del petróleo perjudican la competitividad estadounidense. Así que alguien debería decirle al Sr. Disco Inferno que esta táctica del Tesoro de EE. UU. es en realidad más negativa para los sueños trumpianos que para Rusia.

En toda Eurasia, Rusia está en una buena posición, especialmente con sus socios del BRICS. El Power of Siberia a China va viento en popa, y el Power of Siberia II debería empezar a funcionar en 2030. El aumento de las exportaciones de GNL a Irán es un hecho, especialmente tras la firma de la asociación estratégica a principios de este mes.

Este año también se firmará un acuerdo en Rusia para transportar GNL (Gas Natural Licuado) a Afganistán mediante convoyes de camiones cisterna. El siguiente paso será Pipelineistán: quizás, finalmente, los pasos necesarios para construir una variante del gasoducto TAPI (Turkmenistán-Afganistán-Pakistán-India), pero con gas procedente de Rusia.

El mayor cliente de GNL ruso, aparte de China, es, por supuesto, la India, socio de los BRICS. A Rusia, Irán, Afganistán y la India les interesa que Pakistán se estabilice, no que Islamabad esté controlado por Washington, como ocurre en la actualidad, para la apertura definitiva de rutas de GNL ruso a la India. Eso sucederá, con el tiempo.

En cuanto a los chihuahuas europeos, disfruten de sus fantasías de “derrota estratégica”. Sigan ladrando y comprando GNL ruso.

Traducción: Observatorio de trabajadores en lucha

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Cominciamo con la storia di un Impero che si vanta al vento.

Mr. Disco Inferno ordina all’OPEC e all’OPEC+ di abbassare il prezzo del petrolio, perché, secondo lui, questo potrebbe risolvere la guerra in Ucraina – come a dire costringere Mosca a sedersi al tavolo a causa della diminuzione delle entrate energetiche. Questo riassume di per sé il livello di spazzatura che viene dato in pasto al POTUS dalla sua cornucopia di acronimi che passano per informazioni.

Trump a Davos: “Chiederò all’Arabia Saudita e all’OPEC di abbassare il costo del petrolio (…) Se il prezzo scendesse, la guerra Russia-Ucraina finirebbe immediatamente. In questo momento, il prezzo è abbastanza alto da far continuare la guerra (…) Se il prezzo del petrolio scende, chiederò che i tassi di interesse scendano immediatamente. E, allo stesso modo, dovrebbero scendere in tutto il mondo. I tassi di interesse dovrebbero seguirci”.

Com’era prevedibile, l’OPEC+ – gestita fondamentalmente da Arabia Saudita e Russia – ha detto Nyet. A parte il fatto che non si preoccupano molto dei tassi d’interesse, sul fronte energetico continueranno a fare ciò che hanno programmato, compresa una prossima diminuzione della produzione, ma a livelli accettabili.

Standard Chartered, uno dei principali operatori, ha osservato che l’OPEC ha un potere limitato per porre fine immediatamente alla guerra riducendo il prezzo del petrolio, con i ministri dell’OPEC che considerano questo tentativo di “strategia” molto inefficiente e costoso.

Alla faccia dei diktat imperiali.

Il piano strategico di vittoria di Chihuahua

Come evidenziato in precedenza, gli Stati Uniti – grazie al fracking – hanno abbastanza gas per il consumo interno, ma non abbastanza per esportarlo in massa nell’UE, a causa di problemi di liquefazione. Questo spiega perché, anche acquistando più energia americana a prezzi esorbitanti, l’UE rimane di fatto largamente dipendente dal GNL russo – e da fonti non statunitensi – dopo il sabotaggio dei Nord Streams, svelato in dettaglio da Sy Hersh.

Anche a pieno regime, l’Impero del Caos non è in grado di fornire tutto il gas di cui l’UE ha bisogno; a ciò si aggiunga l’assenza di investimenti sia nell’esplorazione supplementare, di cui c’è estremo bisogno, sia nelle infrastrutture necessarie a soddisfare l’aumento della domanda dell’UE.

Sul mercato petrolifero statunitense, le cose si fanno decisamente kafkiane. L’autotrasporto statunitense – un’enorme industria di servizi – dipende dal diesel russo importato, che deve essere miscelato con petrolio Made in America per essere adatto ai camion.

E ora torniamo a Davos, che è andata e tornata a malapena registrando una battuta d’arresto. La tossica Medusa von der Leyen ha dichiarato a Davos che l’Europa ha “ridotto sostanzialmente”, e “a tempo di record”, la sua dipendenza dai combustibili fossili russi.

Sciocchezze. La realtà energetica dell’Europa è desolante. Il GNL russo di Novatek ha attualmente un prezzo di circa 4,5-4,7 dollari per MMBtu. È più costoso del gas dei gasdotti, ma ancora molto (corsivo mio) più economico del GNL americano.

Tutti gli operatori del settore, dal Golfo Persico ad Anversa, sanno che l’Europa sta importando GNL russo come mai aveva fatto prima. È tutto, o una morte secca. Parallelamente, la Russia triplicherà la sua capacità di fornitura di GNL entro il 2035. Risultato finale: qualunque cosa possano inventarsi i “commissari all’energia” di Bruxelles, la Russia rimarrà essenziale per la sicurezza energetica europea.

Non ci sono limiti – nemmeno stratosferici – alla stupidità dell’eurocrazia, che corrode il sistema come una piaga. Gli europei non solo sono riusciti a chiudere i propri gasdotti, ma stanno ancora “indagando” sull’attacco terroristico de facto al Nord Stream.

Risultato finale: ora importano più (corsivo mio) gas russo, ma con mezzi diversi, da fornitori terzi, e pagando una fortuna.

Questo è ciò che può essere descritto come il piano strategico di vittoria di Chihuahua.

Il Tesoro americano sanziona Mr. Disco Inferno

L’anno scorso le esportazioni russe di GNL hanno raggiunto un livello record, con una crescita del 4% e una consegna di 33,6 milioni di tonnellate. Il record mensile è stato di 3,25 milioni di tonnellate nel dicembre 2024, il 13,7% in più rispetto a novembre.

Il maggiore esportatore russo è Yamal LNG: 21,1 milioni di tonnellate, il 6% in più rispetto al 2023.

E ora il proverbiale baccano americano, con l’assistente del Segretario di Stato per le risorse energetiche Geoffrey Pyatt che ha ordinato la “completa cessazione” delle esportazioni di gas russo in Europa.

Al diavolo ciò che nazioni come Ungheria, Austria e Slovacchia possono pensare – e di cui hanno bisogno.

Pyatt ha dichiarato al Consiglio Atlantico: “Oggi siamo il più grande esportatore di GNL al mondo ed entro la fine dell’amministrazione Trump raddoppieremo quello che stiamo facendo oggi […] La decisione è stata chiaramente presa a Bruxelles di arrivare a zero [forniture di gas dalla Russia] entro il 2027… e gli Stati Uniti sostengono fortemente questo obiettivo”.

Oh, cielo. Ma queste persone leggono almeno i titoli dei giornali? Come riportato da Politico, l’UE sta “divorando” il gas russo a livelli senza precedenti dall’inizio del 2025, importando 837.300 tonnellate metriche di GNL solo nelle prime due settimane dell’anno.

L’accordo di transito con l’Ucraina è stato chiuso definitivamente – almeno per ora – a partire dal^1° gennaio. L’azione si concentra ora sulle rotte marittime.

Il Tesoro degli Stati Uniti ha presentato un nuovo pacchetto di sanzioni contro il commercio petrolifero russo, che prevede fino a 5,8 milioni di barili al giorno trasportati via mare.

Allo stato attuale, il mercato petrolifero globale registra un’eccedenza di circa 0,8 milioni di barili al giorno. I prezzi del petrolio per il 2025 dovrebbero rimanere intorno ai 71 dollari per un barile di Brent (attualmente sono 76,2 dollari). Non proprio quello che vuole il signor Disco Inferno.

Supponiamo quindi che questi 5,8 milioni di barili di petrolio russo – sottoposti a rigide sanzioni – scompaiano dal mercato globale. In questo caso il prezzo del petrolio salirebbe alle stelle, raggiungendo una media di 150-160 dollari al barile. Ancora una volta, non è quello che vuole il signor Disco Inferno, che ha promesso a gran voce – e continua a promettere – una superpotenza petrolifera MAGA, abbassando i prezzi del petrolio al massimo a 50 dollari al barile.

Secondo il bilancio russo del 2025, il petrolio ha un prezzo di 65,9 dollari al barile.

Se il Tesoro americano riuscisse a fare la sua magia e a “sparire” con quei 5,8 milioni di barili, le entrate russe salirebbero a circa 88,2 miliardi di dollari, anche considerando esportazioni molto più basse.

Gli alti prezzi del petrolio danneggiano la competitività americana. Quindi qualcuno dovrebbe dire al signor Disco Inferno che questa mossa del Tesoro americano è in realtà più negativa per i sogni trumpiani che per la Russia.

In tutta l’Eurasia, la Russia sta bene, soprattutto con i suoi partner BRICS. Il Power of Siberia verso la Cina va a gonfie vele e il Power of Siberia II dovrebbe entrare in funzione entro il 2030. L’aumento delle esportazioni di GNL verso l’Iran è un affare fatto, soprattutto dopo la firma del partenariato strategico all’inizio di questo mese.

Quest’anno sarà firmato in Russia anche un accordo per il trasporto di GNL in Afghanistan tramite convogli di autocisterne. Il prossimo passo sarà il Pipelineistan: forse, finalmente, i passi necessari per costruire una variante del gasdotto TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India), ma con il gas proveniente dalla Russia.

Il maggior cliente del GNL russo, oltre alla Cina, è ovviamente l’India, partner dei BRICS. È nell’interesse della Russia, dell’Iran, dell’Afghanistan e dell’India avere un Pakistan stabilizzato – non una Islamabad telecomandata da Washington, come nell’assetto attuale – per l’apertura definitiva delle rotte del GNL russo verso l’India. Questo accadrà, col tempo.

Per quanto riguarda i chihuahua europei, godetevi le vostre fantasie di “sconfitta strategica”. Continuate a blaterare e a comprare il GNL russo.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Let’s start with the tale of an Empire bragging to the wind.

Mr. Disco Inferno orders OPEC and OPEC+ to lower the price of oil, because, in his mind, that may solve the war in Ukraine – as in forcing Moscow to the table because of dwindling energy revenues. That in itself summarizes the level of garbage being fed to POTUS by his cornucopia of acronyms passing for intel.

Trump at Davos: “I’m going to ask Saudi Arabia and OPEC to bring down the cost of oil (…) If the price came down, the Russia-Ukraine war would end immediately. Right now, the price is high enough that that war will continue (…) With oil prices going down, I’ll demand that interest rates drop immediately. And, likewise, they should be dropping all over the world. Interest rates should follow us.”

Quite predictably, OPEC+ – basically run by Saudi Arabia and Russia – said Nyet. Apart from the fact they don’t care much about interest rates, on the energy front they’ll keep doing what they have planned to do, including soon decreasing production, but at acceptable levels.

Standard Chartered, a major player, noted that OPEC has limited power to end the war immediately by reducing the oil price, with OPEC ministers considering this attempt at “strategy” as very inefficient and costly.

So much for imperial diktats.

The Chihuahua Strategic Victory Plan

As highlighted before, the U.S. – via fracking – has enough gas for domestic consumption, but not enough to export en masse to the EU, because of liquification problems. That explains why even buying more American energy for exorbitant prices, the EU de facto remains largely dependent on Russian LNG – and non-U.S. sources – since the sabotage of the Nord Streams, unveiled in detail by Sy Hersh.

Even at full capacity, the Empire of Chaos simply cannot deliver all the gas the EU needs; add to it virtually no investment in both badly needed extra exploration plus the infrastructure necessary to meet increased EU demand.

On the domestic U.S. oil market, things do get positively Kafkaesque. U.S. trucking – a massive service industry – is dependent on imported Russian diesel, which needs to be mixed with Made in America oil in order to be suitable for trucks.

Now cut again to Davos, which came and went barely registering a blip. Toxic EC Medusa von der Leyen told Davos that Europe had “substantially reduced”, and “in record time”, its dependency on Russian fossil fuels.

Nonsense. Europe’s energy reality is bleak. Russian LNG from Novatek is currently priced at around $4.5–$4.7 per MMBtu. That’s more expensive than pipeline gas but still much (italics mine) cheaper than American LNG.

Every industry pro from the Persian Gulf to Antwerp knows that Europe is now importing Russian LNG like it never did before. That’s it – or a dry death. In parallel, Russia will triple its LNG supply capacity by 2035. End result: whatever those “energy commissioners” in Brussels may come up with, Russia will remain essential when it comes to European energy security.

There are no limits – even stratospheric – for Eurocracy stupidity, which corrodes the system like a plague. The Europeans not only have managed to shut off their own gas pipelines but are still “investigating” the Nord Stream de facto terror attack.

End result: they are now importing more (italics mine) Russian gas, but by different means, from third-party suppliers, and paying a fortune.

This is what can be described as the Chihuahua Strategic Victory Plan.

U.S. Treasury sanctions Mr. Disco Inferno

Russia’s LNG exports hit a record high last year, growing by 4% – and delivering 33.6 million tons. The monthly record was 3.25 million tons in December 2024 – 13.7% more than November.

The largest Russian exporter is Yamal LNG: 21.1 million tons, 6% more than in 2023.

Now cut to proverbial American rumble, in the form of Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt ordering the “full termination” of Russian gas exported to Europe.

To hell with what nations like Hungary, Austria and Slovakia may think – and do need.

Pyatt told the Atlantic Council, “Today we are the largest LNG exporter in the world, and by the end of the Trump administration, we will have doubled what we’re doing today […] The decision has clearly been made in Brussels to get to zero [gas supplies from Russia] by 2027…and the United States strongly supports that goal.”

Oh dear. Do these people even read the basic headlines? As reported by Politico, the EU is “devouring” Russian gas at unprecedented levels since the start of 2025, importing 837,300 metric tons of LNG just in the first two weeks of the year.

The Ukraine transit deal was shut off for good – at least for now – starting on January 1^st. The action now is on the maritime routes.

Enter the U.S. Treasury with a new – what else – sanctions package against Russian oil trade, targeting up to 5.8 million barrels a day shipped by sea.

As it stands, the global oil market is experiencing a surplus of about 0.8 million barrels a day. Oil prices for 2025 should remain at around $71 for a barrel of Brent crude (as it stands, it’s $76.2). Not exactly what Mr. Disco Inferno wants.

So let’s assume these 5.8 million barrels of Russian oil – under stiff sanctions – would vanish from the global market. In this case we would have oil prices skyrocketing to an average of $150 to $160 a barrel. Once again, not what Mr. Disco Inferno wants: he vociferously promised – and keeps promising – a MAGA oil superpower, while lowering oil prices to max $50 a barrel.

According to Russia’s 2025 budget, oil is priced at $65.9 a barrel.

If the U.S. Treasury manages to work its magic and “disappear” with those 5.8 million barrels, Russian revenues would go up to around $88.2 billion, even considering much lower exports.

High oil prices hurt American competitiveness. So somebody should tell Mr. Disco Inferno this U.S. Treasury gambit is actually more negative to Trumpian dreams than to Russia.

Across Eurasia, Russia is sitting pretty, especially with its BRICS partners. Power of Siberia to China is on a roll, and Power of Siberia II should start operating by 2030. A boost on LNG exports to Iran is a done deal – especially after the signing of the strategic partnership earlier this month.

This year a deal will also be signed in Russia to transport LNG to Afghanistan via tanker convoys. Next step will be Pipelineistan: perhaps, finally, the necessary steps to build a variant of TAPI (the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline, but with gas coming from Russia.

The biggest customer for Russian LNG, apart from China, is of course BRICS partner India. It’s in the interests of Russia, Iran, Afghanistan and India to have a stabilized Pakistan – not an Islamabad remote-controlled by Washington, as in the current setup – for the final opening of Russian LNG routes to India. That will happen, in time.

As for the European chihuahuas, enjoy your “strategic defeat” fantasies. Keep yapping – and buying Russian LNG.

Why one has to be very fanatical not to understand how the U.S. is a brutally expensive burden for European citizens.

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At a time when the Commission and von der Leyen are trying to find new answers to yet another gas crisis in the European Union, which, in the middle of winter, is once again testing the entire strategy of energy transition from Russian gas to what the European CEO calls “diversification” of supplies, all the accusations that Europe has been led to commit energy suicide are returning to the media, with many of the blame, wrongly in my opinion, falling on the “green transition”.

Let’s be clear, this is not about the “green transition” and its validity, a transition which, on a continent without enough fossil resources or nuclear power stations, is fully justified. What is at stake is the destruction of the main pillars on which the energy security of European nations is, and was, based. The green transition is included, as we shall see.

And it is precisely this destruction that is at the root of the current European gas crisis, the U.S.’s ability to create it, and everything that will follow. First, it was a security crisis caused by NATO — which knew that the Russian Federation would oppose its expansion. In connection with the European Union, the role of NATO is dealt with extensively in declassified CIA documentation.

Although the current gas crisis is the result of desperate tactics on the part of the U.S., at a time when its relative external decadence — internally the decadence is absolute — is forcing it to cannibalize Europe, Canada, Japan, and other vassals, it has only been possible because there is a power structure in Europe at the service of the U.S. However, this tactic contradicts the investment made by the U.S. at the time of the Cold War, which created space, together with the social and democratic pressure that existed at the time and originated from powerful trade unions and class political parties, for the construction of a welfare state that the North American peoples themselves never enjoyed, except Canada. And this is one of the biggest contradictions — and perhaps obstacles — in the U.S.’s instrumentalization of the EU.

This gas crisis has also undergone phases. In the first phase, the actions against Russian gas were almost exclusively against natural gas via pipeline. The fact is that until the 14th package of sanctions, little had been done against the supply of LNG. The 14th package of sanctions inaugurated the second phase of the attack, which consisted of creating conditions to prevent the expansion of European investments in Russian LNG. I predict that this will not change under Trump and let’s see if the European nations that are starting to buy cheap Russian LNG gas will comply with those sanctions, since, for the moment, the U.S. isn’t able to comply with all the EU LNG needs.

The fact is that with the round of sanctions following the “special military operation”, the U.S. has curbed the supply of natural gas to Germany, mainly by forcing Germany to replace natural gas via pipeline with LNG supplies. To curb the massive use of Russian LNG, which is cheaper because it is closer, because of discounts and lower extraction costs, sanctions were imposed on Russian banks, excluding them from SWIFT, banning the use of the SPFS (Russian financial messaging system) and creating obstacles to long-term negotiations with the Russian Federation. The result? The countries that were already buying LNG from Russia continued to do so, more or less in the same quantity, or acceptable quantities, benefiting from the long-term contracts they had already signed (France, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands), but Scholz’s Germany switched from natural gas via Nord Stream to American LNG and other sources. This was a major attack on Germany and its economy, and one of the expected consequences of the operation. The truth is that Russian LNG that is coming to the EU is mostly bought by the countries that used to buy it in the past and less by new contracts and new clients.

Also to curb the purchase of Russian LNG, individually and through long-term contracts, the von der Leyen Commission created a system of aggregated gas purchases, to manage the purchase and reserves collectively, taking advantage of the larger scale and the resulting negotiating advantages — in theory, of course. Incidentally, the countries that have signed up for this aggregated purchase and storage are obliged to respect a minimum reserve of gas purchased in this way, amounting to 15% of total reserves. It seems to me that by combining this requirement with the fact that Ursula von der Leyen has been promoting U.S. LNG, the aim is to guarantee a minimum, predictable supply of LNG from Uncle Sam.

Ursula von der Leyen even blatantly lied, saying that American LNG is cheaper, when it is known that the Russian Federation currently makes huge discounts on gas and oil and that, even if it didn’t, long-term contracting meant cheaper gas. In addition, LNG imports other costs that are not associated with gas via pipeline (transportation, insurance, storage, transfer), and, taking these costs into account, Russia is closer than the U.S. The fact is that, while before 2019, the EU was buying a residual amount of LNG from the U.S., by the end of 2023, the U.S. was already supplying around half of the LNG bought and meeting half of Europe’s needs.

However, as the installed capacity for buying, transhipping, and storing American LNG increased, at the same time as purchases of Russian LNG were recovering, the Druzhba episode arose, which had, in my opinion, at least two objectives: an increase in gas prices in Europe and a consequent need in the increase in U.S. supplies. The U.S. wins both ways.

This issue is so important to the U.S. that it is a Think Thank in the U.S. (the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis) that has the best data, even used by the von der Leyen commission itself, accurately monitoring the natural gas and LNG purchased by the EU from… the Russian Federation! It should be noted that, in this regard, the strategy used by von der Leyen to justify the use of U.S. LNG and do without Russian gas was not based solely on security issues. European doctrine on the need to “diversify” supply sources is widespread. There’s nothing wrong with that, if weren’t a fallacy.

Today, “diversification” is the motto. Why? Because the U.S. can’t sell all the LNG the EU needs. However, according to the aforementioned IEEFA report, the U.S. has infrastructures under construction throughout the EU which, when completed in 2030, will correspond to an increase in supply capacity of 100% more than today and 76% more than the aggregate European demand for gas on that date. You don’t have to be very clever to predict what will happen: If today American LNG supplies about 50% of needs, by then the U.S. will be able to supply 100%, considering current consumption! And that would lead us to what I expect to be the third phase of the U.S. LNG coup d’etat.

In my opinion, several scenarios could happen: the “diversification” discourse will gradually give way, or through a new crisis, to a discourse on the benefits of “exclusivity” of supply to the U.S.; the U.S., knowing the level of political cooptation it enjoys in the EU, will get the EU to pay more, justifying this higher price with greater security and trust in the supplier. Moreover, even at the market price, as the EU’s transition to LNG pushes up the cost of this commodity, the U.S. will always be able to count on high profits from this operation. “Democratic” and “human rights-respecting” gas has to be more expensive, right? Even if it comes from fracking, a practice banned in Europe.

Another question remains about the EU’s energy future. Given current consumption, the U.S. will be able to meet all the EU’s supply needs by 2030. In addition, gas consumption is falling in the European Union, and by 2030 consumption is expected to be half of what it is today. If by then, the U.S. has doubled its current supply capacity, where will the LNG sold go?

One can tell me that the EU will resell it, but it will be difficult for several reasons: LNG from other sources is cheaper; LNG from other sources has lower extraction costs than American shale; countries will move towards the green transition, reducing LNG consumption, which will further lower the price; Turkey will be a major hub for gas by pipeline, which is cheaper and less polluting.

That’s why I’m wondering about the future of the green energy transition in the EU and how it will or won’t progress, and about the role of the so-called “far right” in a possible setback in the use of renewable energies. And knowing that the U.S. and the EU want to heavily tax Chinese photovoltaic panels, which are much cheaper and responsible for the exponential increase in the use of solar energy… What a great way for the U.S. to delay Europe’s transition to renewable energies because of the need for greater investment in times of need.

That’s why one has to be very fanatical not to understand how the U.S. is a brutally expensive burden for European citizens. Peace in the NATO-Russian Federation war in Ukraine will only be possible in this light if all international tension is maintained because it is this tension, this permanent security crisis that feeds the coffers of the U.S. LNG industry. The war in Ukraine is, you could say, a gas-fuelled war!

By Olivia ROSANE

In what it calls “one of the most blatant examples of the ‘shock doctrine,'” a new Greenpeace report released today reveals how the gas industry took advantage of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to lock Europe and the U.S. into building new liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure that threatens the well-being of both frontline communities and the entire planet.

Projects approved in the U.S. alone could, by 2030, push its exports past what the International Energy Agency has budgeted for the entire global LNG trade if world leaders want to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and stop global warming at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, the report said.

“Our investigation exposes the truth behind the corporate and political push for more fossil gas imports from the U.S. to European countries: The bottom line is that fossil gas only profits the industry, it is dirty, toxic, not needed, and not wanted,” said Anusha Narayanan, climate campaign director with Greenpeace USA.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 sent the E.U. into an energy crisis as it scrambled to prepare for the following winter without relying on Russian gas–which supplied almost 40% of the block’s gas in 2021. The U.S. rushed to fill in the gap, with E.U.’s imports skyrocketing by 140 percent in 2022, making the bloc the world’s top importer of U.S. gas.

However, the solution pushed by the gas industry in both countries was not a stop-gap measure to keep homes warm in the short-term while building up renewable energy capacity to insure against similar crises in the future, as Greenpeace details in the report titled Who Profits From War – How Gas Corporations Capitalise from War in Ukraine.

Instead, the E.U.’s REPowerEU plan invested $20.9 billion in gas infrastructure. The bloc has already started building eight liquefied gas terminals and has proposed 38 more. In the U.S., new gas infrastructure approved so far would double export capacity to 439 billion cubic meters per year. Many of the gas contracts last 10 to 15 years, and most of the projects won’t even begin working until 2026, too late to satisfy the initial need but in plenty of time to spew greenhouse gasses into the air during a critical decade for climate action.

According to Greenpeace’s estimate, the new European infrastructure would emit 950 million tonnes of CO2-eq per year while U.S. export terminals—including those in operation, under construction, and approved for construction—would emit 1,824 million tonnes of CO2-eq per year. Taken together, that’s the yearly equivalent of adding 604 million new cars to the roads.

“The gas industry is using today’s news–the war and the energy crisis–to try to lock in more gas for decades, even though the industry knows it’ll be disastrous for the climate and international stability.”

“The gas industry is using today’s news–the war and the energy crisis–to try to lock in more gas for decades, even though the industry knows it’ll be disastrous for the climate and international stability,” senior research fellow at the Oxford Sustainable Law Programme Ben Franta said in a DeSmog report cited by Greenpeace.

That report detailed how the gas industry changed its messaging following Russia’s invasion from emphasizing the “energy transition” to “energy security.” In the 10 months before February 24, 2022, four major industry groups only tweeted about energy security three percent of the time. Afterwards, the number of tweets on the theme skyrocketed by more than ten times. In the lead up to RePowerEU, one of these groups–Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE)–lobbied policy makers for more LNG projects and argued that their focus should be less on 2050 climate targets and more on the immediate crisis.

“The extreme energy prices of last year, and the current threats to security of supply require a focus on the shorter term,” the group said.

Yet critics warn such a shorter term focus would have disastrous consequences for everyone except fossil fuel companies, who have already made record profits off the energy crisis.

U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres has called on both the U.S. and the E.U. to bump up their carbon neutrality deadlines to 2040, and, to limit warming to 1.5°C, the E.U. needs to stop burning gas by 2035.

The new infrastructure is not required to meet current needs, Greenpeace said. The U.S. already has enough in place to increase short-term exports to Europe, and, despite last year’s crisis, according to the IEA, natural gas demand in the bloc actually fell its farthest ever in 2022 by 55 billion cubic meters. Yet, beyond interfering with its decarbonization timeline, the E.U.’s pivot from Russian gas via pipeline to imported LNG also threatens its climate goals because LNG is more carbon intensive and often comes from fracked U.S. gas that Greenpeace calls one of “the most polluting and dirty forms of energy in the world.”

The use of fracked gas also exacts an environmental justice cost. Most of the new U.S. export infrastructure is being funded by E.U. banks, despite the fact that many of these banks have a ban on financing fracking and many EU countries have also banned the practice within their borders because of health and environmental concerns. Living near oil and gas activity–including fracking–has been linked to cancer, respiratory disease, low birth rates, and other health impacts, and all but one of the U.S. LNG terminals either in operation or under construction is located in an area considered “disadvantaged” by the Sierra Club.

Community advocate John Beard of Texas, lives near three such terminals: the “Sabine Pass LNG”–the nation’s largest terminal–the under-construction “Golden Pass LNG,” and the Port Arthur LNG project.

“There is no such thing as ‘freedom’ gas.”

“There is no such thing as ‘freedom’ gas,” he told Greenpeace. “It comes with a cost. That cost is the lives and health of people in the Gulf South and deadly climate consequences worldwide.”

Greenpeace is calling on policymakers in both the U.S. and E.U. to move away from expanding LNG infrastructure before it’s too late. Among other things, the advocacy group recommended that the E.U. stop using fossil gas by 2035 and phase out LNG even earlier; cancel all plans to build new terminals and expand current ones; and both stop long-term export contracts and prevent existing ones from being extended. In the U.S., the Biden administration should stop approving new projects that would worsen the climate crisis, stop approving LNG exports, and put its political weight behind ending international funding for LNG and other fossil fuels at the upcoming G7, G20, and COP28 conferences.

“Citizens voted for transformative climate action,” Narayanan said. “Governments must lead in the climate fight, not be puppeteered by gas operators who sacrifice the health and safety of communities simply to boost their profits.”

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