Crisis – Strategic Culture Foundation https://strategic-culture.su Strategic Culture Foundation provides a platform for exclusive analysis, research and policy comment on Eurasian and global affairs. We are covering political, economic, social and security issues worldwide. Mon, 09 Mar 2026 10:21:01 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://strategic-culture.su/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/cropped-favicon4-32x32.png Crisis – Strategic Culture Foundation https://strategic-culture.su 32 32 Iran’s latest move in the GCC countries was a stroke of genius https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/03/09/irans-latest-move-in-the-gcc-countries-was-a-stroke-of-genius/ Mon, 09 Mar 2026 10:21:01 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=891021 Time for Gulf States’ fatal attraction to the U.S. to face a rethink? Iran has its eyes on throwing America out of the region for good.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

After just a week into Donald Trump’s war, there is very little to report which should or could please the U.S. president. Much of America’s infrastructure in the Middle East has been destroyed with U.S. soldiers now housed by hotels in GCC countries as there is nothing left of their bases. The stocks that these countries have as part of their air defence systems is almost depleted as military chiefs argue about how quickly they can be replaced (some THAAD and Patriot systems are being shipped from Japan and South Korea) and Iran is hitting Israel harder and harder each day.

Of course, due to the new draconian rules which Israel has imposed — that no military strikes that Iran succeeds in carrying out can be ‘reported’ on by journalists or even citizens who wish to post it on social media — as well as the comically corrupt, partisan way U.S. news outlets are covering the war, very little bad news gets seen by the public, if any.

Under this set up, it is hardly surprising that Trump went to war, given that he must have factored in a great deal of support from U.S. media, whom he claims to despise. In this regard, we can conclude that media itself is complicit in war crimes, given that it has played a huge role in the decision to go to war and also the day to day reporting of events on the ground.

A good example of the few points of the war which are reported, but done in such a distorted way, is the news that Iran has stopped its bombing of GCC Gulf states. This has been presented as a victory by the U.S. and a climb down by Iran. The truth though is that it is a considerable victory for Tehran as what is not being reported or even examined is the deal that Iran has struck with those countries. None of those countries will allow any kind of military activity now by U.S. forces there, which means the thousands of U.S. soldiers in hotels in these GCC countries might as well head back home as their role there is redundant. Of course it’s unlikely that Trump will move them out as such an event will be captured by many on social media and will look like a great defeat. But some analysts are going further and speculating that there is more bad news for Israel and the U.S. with this latest move. Not only has Iran insisted on no activity at all in these countries by U.S. forces but they have also said that when the war is over, all the bases must be completely shut down.

Sadly, the gesture didn’t hold for long as it is rumoured that Iran’s elite guard was angered by Trump’s response and so the missile attack on the GCC countries continued.

Against a backdrop of rumours spreading throughout the middle east that Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar were considering jointly to completely pull out their investment in the U.S., this move, even as a gesture, couldn’t have come at a worse time for Trump.

His media machine is working over time in spewing out so many fake news reports, like the recent one that the U.S. has total air superiority over Iran, that it will be interesting to see how this is spun in the coming days. But there is nothing but lies from the Trump camp and as a complicit western media scrum is happy to pump out these lies, people are obviously turning to social media or international news channels in the global south, like CGTN and Russia Today. For many Americans, they are simply too dumb to know how to even question the narrative. Where is the video footage to support these preposterous claims that American has air superiority over Iran? Within 24 hours of Trumps B2 bombers hitting nuclear sites in Iran last year in June, media were given video clips of the satellite imagery. So far, the claims by Trump’s people about air superiority, have not been matched with any evidence. None the less U.S. media reports it more or less like it is fact.

It’s a similar story with the claims about the U.S. navy sinking 20 Iranian vessels. Where’s the evidence? If we are to take into account completely defenceless ships like the unarmed frigate that was sunk in international waters after it returned from a joint exercise with India, it would seem that America is on the losing side. Not even Japanese naval strikes in the WWII would blow up enemies’ ships and not then pick up survivors. The Americans left 80 sailors to drown, the same seaman who posed with photos days earlier with Prime Minister Modi, who, it should be pointed out often claims that India is the “guardian of the Indian ocean”, a patently absurd claim. Many believe Modi sold the Iranians out and disclosed its position to the Americans, leaving many to question just how much he can be trusted with his present allies. Will Russia still sell its oil to India after such a betrayal?

It’s clear that the Iran war is already WWIII in many respects. Certainly each side has its partners and media have made much of Russia’s intelligence support to Iran pointing out American positions, while China has given Iran considerable military support both in state of the art radar systems and ground to air missile systems. The sinking of the Iranian ship shows us all though the depth of the desperation of America, that it needs to go as far as hunting for Iranian ships thousands of miles away and sinking them, even if they are unarmed as this ship was. Does that look like the act of a confident aggressor on a victory role? Hardly.

It isn’t just that America can barely hold the high moral ground for even a brief, ephemeral media moment, but more that the number of shocking tactical errors by Trump are piling up and having an impact. The failure to see that killing the supreme leader, who has been replaced by his son, a hard liner who has always wanted Iran to have a nuclear deterrent, was a major act of stupidity. Nearly all U.S. wars follow the same pattern of America under estimating its enemy and over estimating its own capabilities and this one is no exception. The move to bring GCC states closer to Iran and turn them against the U.S. is smart and what we could expect from Iran who has had years to prepare for this attack and has been given so many free lessons by America’s blunders — the best one being the June attack which resulted in Iran upping its game and identifying all the weak spots which needed work. The biggest miscalculation probably of all is going to war in the first place believing that regime change would be inevitable in days and therefore no longer term plans, in terms of military stocks, need to be addressed. American is about to run out of ammo. For the GCC countries, it’s quite possible that the deal might be reinstated in the coming days as a new truth emerges from the war, to date laden with the most absurd lies ever pumped out to media. While Donald Trump tells reporters on Air Force one that Iran was responsible for bombing its own school, GCC leaders will have to wake up to a new reality which is summed up by Henry Kissinger. “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.”

]]>
How much does this petrodollar cost? The contradictions of the New Gulf War https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/03/08/how-much-does-this-petrodollar-cost-the-contradictions-of-the-new-gulf-war/ Sun, 08 Mar 2026 11:01:20 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=891002 This time it will not be possible to blame Putin.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

From dream to nightmare, and all of it American

In the geopolitical system of the contemporary Middle East, the U.S. military presence is one of the most important structural elements of the regional security architecture. Since the 1990s, and with greater intensity after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has consolidated an extensive network of military installations in the Persian Gulf region. These bases—distributed across countries such as Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia—perform key operational functions: power projection, logistical support, control of energy routes, and deterrence against regional actors perceived as hostile.

An aspect often overlooked in public debate concerns the financial structure that has made the expansion of this military infrastructure possible. Numerous studies of the political economy of security highlight how a significant portion of the costs of building, maintaining, and expanding the bases has been borne by the Gulf monarchies themselves. In many cases, these countries have directly financed the construction of the facilities or have provided substantial contributions in the form of “host-nation support,” i.e., forms of economic participation in the operational and infrastructure costs of the U.S. armed forces stationed on their territory.

This funding model reflects a specific strategic logic. The Gulf monarchies, which have relatively limited military capabilities compared to the surrounding regional powers, have historically sought to compensate for this vulnerability through security agreements with an external power. Financial support for the U.S. military presence therefore represents, from an economic and political point of view, a form of strategic insurance: in exchange for investment in military infrastructure and territorial hospitality, host states obtain implicit or explicit guarantees of protection.

Nevertheless, this security architecture has significant geopolitical consequences. From the perspective of regional actors such as Iran, the network of U.S. bases in the Gulf is interpreted not only as a defensive system, but also as a means of strategic containment and potential offensive projection. U.S. military installations become an integral part of the threat structure perceived by Tehran.

Under international law on armed conflict, military infrastructure is a legitimate target when used for military operations or logistical support. Military and legal doctrine clearly distinguishes between civilian and military targets, and operational bases unambiguously fall into the latter category. In the context of the current New Gulf War, such installations can be considered strategic targets by the actors involved, in their own right and in accordance with the law.

However, the problem arises when these infrastructures are located near densely populated areas. Many bases in the Gulf are located near urban centers or economically vital areas, partly for logistical reasons and partly because urban development has gradually expanded around existing installations. This territorial configuration creates a structural risk for civilian populations living in neighboring areas.

In the event of missile attacks or military operations against such bases, the principle of distinction—a cornerstone of international humanitarian law—requires armed actors to avoid or minimize collateral damage as much as possible. However, in contemporary conflicts, the separation between military targets and civilian space is often extremely fragile. Even targeted operations can generate indirect effects, such as secondary explosions, fires, or damage to urban infrastructure.

As a result, the civilian population of host countries finds itself in a particularly vulnerable position. Paradoxically, the very states that have financed and hosted military infrastructure to strengthen their own security may find themselves exposed to additional risks in the event of regional escalation. Military bases, designed as instruments of deterrence, can become factors of strategic exposure.

From an economic and political point of view, this scenario raises questions about the distribution of responsibility for damage resulting from military operations against such installations. If the bases are used by an external power and play an operational role in its regional strategies, the question arises as to who should bear the economic and social costs of any collateral damage suffered by local communities.

In theory, international law provides mechanisms for state responsibility for unlawful acts and for damage resulting from military operations that do not comply with humanitarian norms, but in geopolitical practice such mechanisms are often difficult to apply, especially when conflicts involve major powers or complex military coalitions. International power dynamics tend to prevail over legal compensation procedures.

From the perspective of the political economy of war, the problem can also be analyzed in terms of externalities. The military presence of an external power generates strategic benefits for some actors—deterrence, protection of energy routes, stability of allied regimes—but at the same time can produce costs for others, particularly for civilian populations living in areas surrounding military infrastructure. When these costs are not internalized by strategic decision-makers, a form of asymmetry in the distribution of risks is created.

This leads to a broader political question: to what extent should host states and the military powers involved take economic responsibility for the damage suffered by local communities? No preventive compensation mechanisms, guarantee funds, or multilateral agreements providing for compensation in the event of attacks on military infrastructure have been developed. Strategic rivalries, military alliances, and proxy warfare contribute to an environment in which responsibilities are diffuse and difficult to attribute unequivocally. In this context, the perception of impunity or lack of attention to the civilian consequences of military operations can further fuel regional tensions and resentment.

The Gulf countries, monarchies that became such thanks to the dollar, are now victims of that same dollar, which became powerful thanks to them. A paradox that will go down in the history books.

The evolution of regional tensions suggests that these issues will become increasingly central to the debate on collective security in the Middle East and the sustainability of the region’s current military architecture. A broader reflection on the economic and political responsibility of the powers involved could be a necessary step in addressing the humanitarian and strategic consequences of a security system based on a permanent external military presence. And this choice is up to the Gulf countries alone, now that the ‘American dream’ of the petrodollar has turned out to be a bad nightmare.

And all this weighs on Europe

The failure of the Gulf project will have another consequence, the most impactful of all. It would not only be a regional geopolitical event, but would have systemic effects on the global economy and, particularly significantly, on European economies. Europe, in fact, is in a structurally vulnerable position with regard to international energy dynamics: its heavy dependence on hydrocarbon imports, combined with the progressive reduction of supplies from some traditional supply areas, makes the continent particularly sensitive to any geopolitical shock involving the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The Persian Gulf is one of the central hubs of the global energy system, with the Strait of Hormuz accounting for a significant share of world trade in oil and liquefied natural gas. Any increase in military tensions in the region—and in particular a direct confrontation with Iran, a regional power with missile capabilities and asymmetric deterrence tools—inevitably leads to an increase in the so-called energy risk premium. – inevitably leads to an increase in the so-called energy risk premium, a term used in commodity economics to indicate price increases due not so much to a real shortage of resources as to the perception of risk associated with the possibility of disruptions in supply chains.

For Europe, which has undergone a complex restructuring of its energy system in recent years, such dynamics could prove particularly burdensome. The energy crisis following the war in Ukraine has already highlighted the structural fragility of the European energy model. Rising gas and electricity prices have had a significant impact on industrial competitiveness, inflation, and the sustainability of public finances. A further shock from the Middle East would therefore risk amplifying existing economic tensions.

European industry, particularly energy-intensive industries such as chemicals, steel, and manufacturing, is directly dependent on stable energy prices. A prolonged increase in oil and gas costs inevitably leads to higher production costs, which in turn affects the international competitiveness of European companies. In the medium and long term, this process may accelerate deindustrialization or relocation to regions of the world with lower energy costs.

The effects can also be significant at the macroeconomic level. Rising energy prices tend to fuel inflation, reducing the purchasing power of households and forcing central banks to adopt more restrictive monetary policies. This mechanism can slow economic growth and aggravate the burden of public debt in many European countries. In other words, a conflict in the Persian Gulf could generate a chain of economic effects that extend far beyond the regional military theater.

In light of these dynamics, a question of economic and political responsibility emerges that is rarely addressed explicitly in the European debate. If strategic decisions taken by external actors – or by allies with greater military autonomy – have significant economic effects on European economies, it is legitimate to question how these costs are distributed within the international system.

This phenomenon reflects a broader feature of international governance: strategic security decisions are often taken in contexts where economic costs are distributed asymmetrically among the actors involved. Major military powers have a greater capacity to absorb economic shocks or to transfer part of the consequences to their economic and trading partners, and Europe, the EU as a political entity but also all European countries in general, are not superpowers.

This dynamic therefore raises questions about the European Union’s ability to develop a truly autonomous foreign and energy policy. In recent years, the debate on ‘European strategic autonomy’ has highlighted the need to strengthen the continent’s decision-making capacity in the areas of security, energy supplies, and industrial policy… but none of this has been achieved. The entire eurozone is a giant chimney that consumes energy purchased from outside, without any guarantees of supply, due to its own political incapacity. European leaders have engaged in geopolitical somersaults to declare war on Russia, but they have failed to notice that they would land on extremely hard and painful ground.

The point is: this time it will not be possible to blame Putin. On the contrary, European leaders run the risk of finding themselves buying back Russian energy resources, perhaps at a higher price or through other players, such as the United States of America itself. The Moscow government had already anticipated that such a situation would arise, and it was also clear to less experienced analysts. Now Europe will have to suffer the dramatic consequences of its political arrogance. Listening to London and Washington has not produced good results, but now… it is too late.
War

]]>
Monaco 2026, la conferenza che ha messo a nudo la crisi dell’Occidente atlantico https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/23/monaco-2026-la-conferenza-che-ha-messo-a-nudo-la-crisi-delloccidente-atlantico/ Mon, 23 Feb 2026 16:30:35 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890743 La 62ª Conferenza di Monaco non ha mostrato una comunità occidentale compatta, ma un’Europa inquieta tra pressioni statunitensi, crisi della fiducia transatlantica e ricerca di autonomia. In questo vuoto, la diplomazia cinese propone regole, multipolarismo e cooperazione pragmatica.

Segue nostro Telegram.

La Conferenza di Monaco sulla Sicurezza avrebbe dovuto rappresentare il tradizionale momento di coordinamento strategico tra Stati Uniti ed Europa. In realtà, si è trasformata nello specchio di una relazione transatlantica in affanno. L’appuntamento, tenutosi dal 13 al 15 febbraio con la partecipazione di responsabili politici e di sicurezza provenienti da oltre 110 Paesi e regioni e con più di 50 capi di Stato e di governo, è partito con una domanda non dichiarata ma evidente: quanto è ancora solido il quadro politico che ha retto l’Occidente negli ultimi decenni?

Il segnale più eloquente è arrivato già alla vigilia, con la pubblicazione del Munich Security Report 2026 e la sua copertina “Under Destruction”, richiamo simbolico a un ordine internazionale percepito come eroso dall’interno. Nella lettura proposta da molti analisti, il punto politicamente più sensibile è la crescita della percezione del rischio proveniente dagli Stati Uniti stessi, un dato che in alcuni contesti europei supera perfino quello legato alla Cina o alla Russia, a dimostrazione di una fiducia strategica incrinata, cioè della crisi del pilastro psicologico su cui si era costruita la comunità atlantica.

Il cuore del problema non è soltanto la divergenza di interessi, fenomeno fisiologico tra alleati, ma la trasformazione del metodo politico di Washington. In particolare, facciamo riferimento a una sequenza di mosse che ha fatto crescere la diffidenza europea: minacce tariffarie, linguaggio coercitivo, dossier Groenlandia, oscillazioni su dossier di sicurezza cruciali e un uso del potere che appare sempre più diretto. In altre parole, il problema non è solo la posizione subalterna dell’Europa rispetto agli Stati Uniti, situazione che si verifica da otto decenni, ma il fatto che Washington stia chiaramente optando per la leva della pressione, non per quella della concertazione.

Proprio a Monaco, il tentativo statunitense di “rassicurare” l’Europa ha mostrato tutti i suoi limiti. Il segretario di Stato Marco Rubio ha ribadito l’impegno di Washington sulla NATO e sull’Articolo 5 della Carta Atlantica, ma nel contempo ha insistito sul fatto che gli alleati europei debbano aumentare in modo sostanziale la spesa militare, con richieste che in molti ambienti europei sono state lette come politicamente e socialmente destabilizzanti. Il messaggio, percepito da numerosi osservatori, è stato ambiguo, ovvero volto a fornire garanzie formali da un lato, e a richiedere un totale allineamento e maggiori oneri dall’altro. Questa ambivalenza produce inevitabilmente un paradosso, con gli Stati Uniti che chiedono più fiducia nel momento in cui praticano una politica che ne consuma le basi.

Nello stesso contesto, anche le voci europee più atlantiste hanno iniziato a usare un lessico meno deferente. Interventi come quello del premier olandese Dick Schoof, che ha invitato l’Europa a mostrare la propria “spina dorsale”, indicano una mutazione culturale in corso. Schoof ha riconosciuto che l’Europa non può restare un mercato passivo e ha difeso una linea di commercio aperto che include anche la cooperazione con la Cina, insistendo sul fatto che non si può tornare alla logica della dipendenza unidirezionale. È un passaggio che dimostra come i governi europei, seppur non pronti ad “abbandonare” gli Stati Uniti, vogliano smettere di ridurre la politica estera europea a una funzione derivata delle priorità di Washington.

Questo slittamento, tuttavia, è ancora incompleto. Da anni l’Unione Europea parla di autonomia strategica, ma quando la pressione cresce torna a privilegiare la gestione dell’emergenza rispetto alla ricostruzione strutturale. Ad oggi, dunque, l’Europa possiede massa economica, tecnologia, mercato interno e una moneta internazionale, ma non ha ancora convertito queste risorse in una postura geopolitica coerente. Senza quella conversione, ogni crisi transatlantica si trasforma in una crisi di identità europea.

La Cina, dal canto suo, osserva attentamente il logoramento delle relazioni transatlantiche. La partecipazione del ministro degli Esteri Wang Yi alla Conferenza non è stata solamente un gesto simbolico di cortesia diplomatica, ma ha avuto soprattutto lo scopo di formulare una proposta di metodo. Nelle dichiarazioni rese in vista della Conferenza, la diplomazia cinese ha insistito su alcuni criteri: multipolarismo ordinato, rispetto del diritto internazionale, centralità del multilateralismo, cooperazione aperta e mutualmente vantaggiosa. Al di là delle formule, il messaggio politico è che, in una fase di frammentazione, la Cina si propone come attore che privilegia stabilità e regole, non logiche di blocco e coercizione.

La rilevanza di questa impostazione aumenta se la si confronta con la condizione europea emersa a Monaco. Da un lato, Bruxelles e le principali capitali cercano di difendere capacità industriale, autonomia tecnologica e margini diplomatici; dall’altro, restano intrappolate in un quadro di sicurezza che rende costoso qualsiasi scostamento dalla linea statunitense. Il risultato è una politica estera spesso oscillante: dura nei toni, incerta nelle scelte, vulnerabile alle crisi indotte. In questo spazio di ambiguità, la Cina non vuole offrire un modello da copiare come ha fatto Washington dal secondo dopoguerra in poi, ma si pone come un partner con cui negoziare interessi concreti su commercio, investimenti, energia, infrastrutture e governance globale.

A nostro modo di vedere, dunque, la Conferenza di Monaco ha mostrato almeno tre livelli di frattura. Il primo è interno all’Occidente: l’alleanza atlantica non è più una comunità di intenti automatici, ma un campo di negoziazione asimmetrica in cui Washington detta il ritmo e l’Europa rincorre. Il secondo è interno all’Europa: cresce la consapevolezza della dipendenza, ma manca ancora un consenso politico operativo per superarla. Il terzo è sistemico: il mondo multipolare avanza più velocemente della capacità occidentale di adattarvisi. E quando la struttura cambia, i riflessi ideologici diventano un ostacolo.

Per l’Europa, continuare a leggere la Cina soprattutto attraverso categorie ereditate dalla fase unipolare significa sbagliare diagnosi e quindi terapia. Se l’obiettivo è proteggere crescita, occupazione, coesione sociale e autonomia decisionale, allora serve una politica di equilibrio dinamico: relazioni stabili con gli Stati Uniti, ma senza subalternità; dialogo strutturato con la Cina; protagonismo europeo nei fori multilaterali. In questa cornice, Monaco 2026 non è stata soltanto una conferenza di sicurezza, ma una prova generale di riassetto geopolitico.

La questione decisiva, in fondo, è se l’Europa intenda rimanere un “territorio geopolitico” su cui altri proiettano forza, oppure diventare un “soggetto geopolitico” capace di definire priorità, strumenti e alleanze in funzione dei propri interessi storici. Oggi appare chiaro come il vecchio automatismo transatlantico non garantisca più né prosperità né sicurezza, e la risposta non può essere la nostalgia atlantista. Deve essere una strategia europea adulta, capace di negoziare con tutte le grandi potenze e di valorizzare la pluralità dei partner. Insomma, o l’Europa costruisce una postura autonoma in un mondo multipolare, anche aprendosi a un rapporto più maturo e non ideologico con la Cina, oppure continuerà a subire crisi altrui come se fossero il proprio destino.

]]>
Care Olimpiadi, in tutti i sensi https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/22/care-olimpiadi-in-tutti-i-sensi/ Sun, 22 Feb 2026 13:30:58 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890725 Un’Olimpiade può accelerare opere necessarie, migliorare i servizi, creare occupazione e rendere una città più vivibile. Oppure può gonfiare il debito pubblico, espellere residenti, lasciare impianti inutili e trasformare una promessa in un peso.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Le Olimpiadi invernali con la doppietta Milano-Cortina hanno rallegrato l’italiano medio in un periodo di forte tribolazioni. Un toccasana che decisamente ci voleva. Ma ci lasciano con una doccia fredda, decisamente invernale: bilanci della Fondazione Fondazione Milano-Cortina continuano a essere in rosso e, al momento, registrano una perdita pesantissima. Con il concreto pericolo che a pagare siano ancora una volta le casse pubbliche.

Se già prima dell’inizio della competizione c’era mezzo miliardo di disavanzo nel bilancio del Comitato (mica spiccioli!), smentito agli organizzatori, nel frattempo il budget è stato ritoccato verso l’alto, arrivando a circa 1,7 miliardi di euro (inizialmente erano previsti 1,3). Inoltre, è arrivato un intervento determinante del governo: la scorsa estate, attraverso il decreto Sport, è stata introdotta la figura di un commissario per le Paralimpiadi, al quale sono stati destinati 387 milioni di euro. In questo modo alcuni costi – originariamente inclusi nel dossier complessivo dei Giochi – sono stati separati, alleggerendo formalmente il bilancio di Milano-Cortina. Un espediente contabile che ha consentito di coprire le perdite senza dichiararle apertamente. Ma, a quanto pare, non è stato sufficiente.

A poche ore dalla cerimonia inaugurale allo Stadio San Siro, il consiglio di amministrazione si sarebbe riunito d’urgenza per tentare di sistemare i conti. Senza successo: l’ultimo bilancio previsionale si chiude con un passivo stimato intorno ai 100 milioni di euro, forse persino superiore. È vero che si tratta ancora di stime e che il risultato finale dipenderà da diversi fattori: si prova fino all’ultimo a tagliare le spese (anche se solo la cerimonia inaugurale, giudicata da molti discutibile, sembra sia costata quasi 50 milioni), mentre le entrate risultano inferiori alle attese.

Restano inoltre da chiarire alcune voci legate ai contributi del Cio e ai servizi che saranno coperti dal commissario governativo per le Paralimpiadi. Con una serie di condizioni favorevoli, gli organizzatori sperano di limitare i danni, ma il fallimento della gestione guidata da Andrea Varnier e Giovanni Malagò – amministratore delegato e presidente della Fondazione – appare ormai evidente.

La situazione è talmente critica che la Fondazione non ha ancora saldato neppure quanto dovuto a Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano e Comitato Italiano Paralimpico, cioè enti pubblici. In base agli accordi olimpici e paralimpici, a questi organismi spettano determinati ricavi, anche perché durante il ciclo olimpico rinunciano all’utilizzo del marchio dei cinque cerchi. Una gestione prudente avrebbe previsto il pagamento regolare del minimo garantito anno per anno, per poi fare i conti definitivi alla fine. Invece la Fondazione non ha quasi mai versato quanto dovuto.

Il Comitato Paralimpico, esasperato, si è rivolto direttamente al governo per ottenere le somme arretrate: risultano circa 4,46 milioni di euro per il biennio 2024-2025, a cui si aggiungono 1,8 milioni per il 2026, solo per quanto riguarda il minimo garantito, senza considerare eventuali ricavi aggiuntivi. Situazione simile per il Coni: è stato saldato il 2024, ma non il 2025, con un credito contabilizzato di circa 12 milioni di euro. E, intanto, il presidente De Sanctis del Comitato Paralimpico chiede l’intervento al Ministro dell’Economia.

E dopo, cosa rimarrà?

Poco o niente, o almeno così pare. La storia recente dei Giochi Olimpici offre due casi opposti, spesso citati per spiegare cosa significhi davvero lasciare un’eredità duratura — oppure fallire questo obiettivo. Olimpiadi di Barcellona 1992 è considerata l’esempio virtuoso per eccellenza: l’evento fu utilizzato come motore per accelerare una profonda trasformazione urbana attesa da decenni. Il lungomare, prima occupato da aree industriali e infrastrutture ferroviarie, venne restituito alla città; il Villaggio Olimpico si trasformò in un quartiere vivo e integrato; trasporti e spazi pubblici furono ripensati in modo strutturale. Ancora oggi una parte decisiva dell’identità e dell’attrattività internazionale di Barcellona affonda le radici in quelle scelte.

Di segno opposto è il caso delle Olimpiadi di Atene 2004. Molti impianti furono realizzati senza un piano credibile per il loro utilizzo successivo e, una volta spenti i riflettori, diverse strutture rimasero inutilizzate o in stato di abbandono, continuando però a gravare sui conti pubblici tra costi di manutenzione e debito. I Giochi non spiegano da soli la crisi della Grecia, ma ne sono diventati uno dei simboli più evidenti. La differenza tra questi due esempi non sta nell’evento in sé, bensì nella visione politica e urbana che lo orienta: costruire per due settimane o costruire per i vent’anni successivi.

C’è poi un aspetto meno visibile, ma forse decisivo: sfruttare i Giochi per cambiare il modo in cui lo Stato progetta e gestisce gli investimenti pubblici. Significa pianificare prima, monitorare durante, lasciare un’eredità solida dopo. Non rincorrere l’urgenza, ma definire traiettorie di lungo periodo. In fondo, la vera questione non è se le Olimpiadi generino risorse — è evidente che ne mobilitano moltissime — ma chi ne trae beneficio, chi si assume i rischi e chi rimane con il conto da pagare e le infrastrutture da gestire quando la festa finisce.

Un’Olimpiade può accelerare opere necessarie, migliorare i servizi, creare occupazione e rendere una città più vivibile. Oppure può gonfiare il debito pubblico, espellere residenti, lasciare impianti inutili e trasformare una promessa in un peso.

Non è l’evento a fare la differenza. È la politica, nel senso più profondo del termine: come si decide di impiegare quell’enorme quantità di risorse, e a vantaggio di chi. In questo senso, le Olimpiadi di Milano Cortina 2026 rappresentano, nel bene e nel male, un grande banco di prova. Non solo sull’organizzazione dei Giochi, ma su come l’Italia sceglie di investire su sé stessa. Ed è su questo — oltre che sulle medaglie — che vale la pena mantenere alta l’attenzione.

]]>
Britain is once again poisoning peace diplomacy with Russia and fueling war in Europe https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/20/britain-is-once-again-poisoning-peace-diplomacy-with-russia-and-fueling-war-in-europe/ Fri, 20 Feb 2026 19:17:47 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890705 Concocting propaganda is part of Britain’s toxic agenda.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

For discerning observers, there was an obvious attempt this week by Britain to poison a delicate stage in peace negotiations for ending the conflict in Ukraine.

The sabotage effort was as vivid as, well, how should we put it?, as vivid as a brightly colored dart frog from the South American rainforests.

Five European governments signed a joint statement this week that dramatically claimed that Russian opposition figure Sergey Navalny was murdered two years ago in a Siberian prison by poisoning.

The scripted drama and media orchestration always betray a psychological operation intended for public consumption, which warrants the rapid prescription of healthy scepticism as an antidote.

The intergovernmental report claimed that the lethal toxin allegedly used on Navalny was “epibatidine,” which is naturally produced in the skin of the dart frog. Without any evidence, Britain and four other European governments – France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden – asserted that Navalny was murdered by the Russian authorities. Oh, those evil, dastardly Russians… cue the theme music from a James Bond movie!

Moscow rejected the latest claim as “feeblemindedness of fabulists” and condemned the European governments and media for engaging in “necro-propaganda”. Russia claims that Navalny (47) died of natural causes while serving a 19-year prison sentence for extremism and corruption. He was thought to be suffering from congenital ill health and on various medications before he began his penal sentence.

The joint European government statement on Navalny’s alleged poisoning is suspect for several reasons. For a start, it provides no verifiable data on the supposed toxicological analysis or how biomedical samples were obtained two years after Navalny’s death. The timing is also suspicious, coinciding with the Munich Security Conference last weekend and the second anniversary of Navalny’s demise on February 16, 2024, suggesting that the announcement was timed to maximize media attention.

Moreover, this week saw another round of trilateral negotiations between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia on finding a political settlement to the four-year conflict in Ukraine. The talks are at a tricky stage with little traction or trust between Kiev and Moscow.

The exotic frog story seems conveniently loaded to poison the atmosphere in the negotiations.

Tellingly, it is the British government that is the main protagonist in instigating the “necro-propaganda”.

This is true to form. It was the British who confabulated the Novichok poison story about double agent Sergey Skripal in 2018, and the polonium radioactive poisoning of another former Russian spy, Alexander Litvinenko, in a hotel in London in 2006. The Sun tabloid has today dredged up the latter story on the back of the Navalny case. This all speaks of British intel-media orchestration.

In an interview for the BBC state broadcaster, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper claimed that the alleged poisoning of Navalny showed that the Cold War is not over and that “we need to be ready for Russian aggression continuing towards Europe.”

She said that Europe must impose more sanctions on Russia and supply more weapons to Ukraine. Hardly conducive to negotiations.

It is remarkable, too, how Britain is not a member of the European Union, yet London appears entitled to define foreign relations with Russia for the 27-member bloc.

It is also significant that the Americans did not seem to be involved in creating the latest twist in the Navalny narrative. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio appeared to be blindsided by the development, saying, “We don’t have reason to question it,” but he disclosed that the U.S. had not been involved. “These countries came to that conclusion. They coordinated that… it wasn’t our endeavor. Sometimes countries go out and do their thing based on the intelligence [sic] they gathered.”

This has all the hallmarks of Britain’s endeavor, and to be more accurate, it wasn’t based on factual intelligence. It was based on a concocted black propaganda to demonize Russia and derail the peace diplomacy.

Another significant development was that during the trilateral talks in Geneva, Britain’s National Security Advisor, Jonathan Powell, showed up unexpectedly at the venue in the Intercontinental Hotel, where he held unofficial sideline talks with the Americans and Ukrainians. Powell’s visit was unannounced by the British government. He wasn’t formally invited to attend. Why was a senior British intelligence figure hanging around a venue for private trilateral discussions?

Britain has a malicious record of sabotaging peace diplomacy in Ukraine. In April 2022, just when the Ukrainian and Russian sides had worked out an early end to the conflict that erupted in February, the then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson suddenly intervened to persuade the Kiev regime to fight on, with promises of more NATO weapons. The baleful result has been a four-year war, a slaughterhouse, with over one million Ukrainian soldiers dead and a large number of Russians.

The Trump administration wants to extricate itself from the proxy war in Ukraine against Russia. Washington seems to recognize that the gambit for “strategic defeat” of Russia is a dead-end.

Not so the Europeans, who, for various reasons, are still fixated on prosecuting the proxy war. The European political class seems to be more infected by Russophobia and is incapable of rational thinking or diplomatic engagement with Moscow.

The has-been empire that is Britain is taking a lead role in galvanizing the hostility in Europe towards Russia. It is to that end that London is the main protagonist in the so-called coalition of the willing, along with that other has-been empire, France. The proposal to deploy British and French troops to Ukraine as a “security guarantee” in the event of a peace deal is intended to act as a deal-breaker since Moscow has repeatedly stated that deployment of any NATO troops in Ukraine is unacceptable and non-negotiable.

Britain appears to be taking an increasing role in the covert mentoring of the Ukrainian regime. This week, the British Foreign Office announced the opening of a new embassy office in Lvov, in western Ukraine, which is a stronghold for anti-Russian nationalists and NATO weapons supplies. London said the new office in Lvov was to “expand the UK’s diplomatic [sic] presence in Ukraine as the two countries deepen their relationship.”

Ukraine’s former top military commander, Valery Zalushny, was appointed the ambassador to London in 2024. The “Iron General” is an admirer of Nazi figure Stepan Bandera, and is considered to be a strong contender to replace Vladimir Zelensky, no doubt under British tutelage.

Continuing the war in Europe gives the British state a political purpose and standing among the Europeans. For petty self-aggrandizement, London is exploiting Russophobia.

Concocting propaganda is part of Britain’s toxic agenda. The history of London’s incitement of wars in Europe – not least its sinister role in precipitating World Wars I and II – is consistent with the latest maneuvers to keep fueling the conflict in Ukraine.

]]>
The British military is strapped for cash and too small to fight https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/20/british-military-strapped-for-cash-and-too-small-fight/ Fri, 20 Feb 2026 11:41:14 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890691 UK defence is reportedly short of £28bn with the budget envelope that it has.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

An important job for any General is to make the case for larger military budgets. Britain is no different in that regard, not least in light of the government’s commitment to spend 3.5% of GDP on defence by 2035. Yet, it seems, in Britain today, that money there is none, while our army shrinks and we can’t build new military kit for toffee.

This week, fresh off the back of the Munich Security conference in which he urged NATO’s European allies to ‘spend more, deliver more, and coordinate more’, Prime Minister Keir Starmer mulled setting a higher level of ambition for defence spending; rumour spread that he was considering an increase to 3% in defence spending by the end of the current parliament, meaning by 2029.Unfortunately, the following day, there came a rebuttal, on the back of Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeve’s alleged refusal to sanction further increases in spending. Downing street back-tracked, claiming they had been misunderstood on the suggestion of an accelerated spending increase, and that the UK would hit the 3% target by2034, five years later.

Britain is strapped for cash. Earlier in January, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Richard Knighton, admitted that the UK was not ready for a full scale conflict [read, with Russia] “of the kind we might face”, in part, because the Ministry of Defence faced a massive funding shortfall. Specifically, UK defence is reportedly short of £28bn with the budget envelope that it has.

And this shortfall almost entirely sits within defence procurement. A proposed Defence Investment plan, to link spending to priorities under the UK Strategic Defence Review has been delayed, provoking criticism from the Parliament Defence and Public Accounts Committees of “sending damaging signals to adversaries”. The last full equipment plan, setting out procurement and support spending was published in 2022, almost four years ago. Since then, the UK Ministry of Defence has continued to obfuscate and delay.

That led the Public Accounts Committee to report in 2024 that there was “no credible [UK] Government plan to deliver defence capabilities”. They said, “the MoD has not had the discipline to balance its budget by making the difficult choices about which equipment programmes it can and cannot afford.” The UK defence procurement gravy machine is littered with a trainload of zombie projects that are woefully over budget and behind schedule. Indeed, the report stated that the plan had forecasts for some 1800 – you heard that right, eighteen hundred – equipment projects that the MoD has chosen to fund.

The budget allocated in 2022/3 already accounted for 49% of the UK’s total defence budget for 10 years, but was still £16.7 billion short of what was needed. Only two of the forty six projects in the Government Major Project Portfolio were reviewed as being highly likely to be delivered to time, budget and quality. Red faced at being called out for their woeful incompetence, the MoD hasn’t published its plans ever since.

Looking at the various prestige programmes inevitably reveals a litany of failure and ineptitude. The new Type 26 Frigate programme has faced repeated delays and cover overruns, with the eight vessels not expected to see operations until between 2028 (i.e. two years from now) and 2035.

Much of the waste lies in the Defence Nuclear Enterprise, responsible for the build of the Dreadnought class SSBNs, the Astute class SSNs and the proposed US-UK-Australian AUKUS SSNs, to replace the Astute attack subs, the last of which is still under construction. The UK finds itself in the remarkable position of starting a programme to replace an existing SSN class that is still being built. Former director of nuclear policy at the UK Ministry of Defence, Rear Admiral Philip Mathia, has said the UK is no longer capable of running its nuclear submarine programme, following years of mismanagement.

The Challenger 3 tank, which is actually not a new tank, but a modernisation of the existing Challenger 2 with a new turret, has yet to enter the production phase and won’t enter service until the 2030s; the plan initially envisaged all 148 tanks being delivered by the end of 2020s. The £5,5bn Ajax armoured vehicle programme, which the UK commissioned from General Dynamics in the US in 2014, has encountered consistent problems, and was described in a critical 2023 review of the programme as a highly visible symbol of the MoD’s poor procurement record. Use of the Ajax for training purposes was recently paused “indefinitely” after 35 service personnel reported injuries associated with vibration and noise, with the person leading the programme removed from their role.

I could go on and on. But the key point is that the Ministry of Defence appears so woeful at procurement, that those in charge of procurement probably couldn’t run a fruit and veg stall at the local market, let alone manage complex new weapons programmes.

What does this mean for the UK’s military standing worldwide? Our Army is now twenty times smaller than Russia’s. There have only been 3 recorded years since 1800 when the British Army was smaller than it is today. It was a close call in 1822 and 1823 with 72,000 troops then, compared to just over 73,000 today. But the difference being that two hundred years ago, the UK population was more than four times smaller than now. In April of last year, the Chief of the Defence Staff reported that the military was shrinking by 300 personnel per month.

The Royal Navy is apparently at its smallest size since 1650, the year after the end of the English Civil War. It now comprises a maximum 63 commissioned surface vessels and 9 deployable submarines, though many vessels are in long-term refit. This makes the Royal Navy, at maximum strength, almost 7 time smaller than the Russian Navy.

Desperate to show Britain’s continued military relevance, Prime Minister Starmer announced in Munich that the UK would deploy its Carrier Strike Group to the Arctic, in support of a US-led mission in 2026. Although the Carrier Strike Group we deployed to the Asia Pacific in 2025 comprised only 3 (yes, three) surface vessels. Then, on 17 February, the Chief of the RAF, Air Chief Marshall Harv Smyth, said that our fleet of F-35s would struggle in the Arctic cold. He was clearly doing that to put more pressure on the government to find extra money. However, tipping another £28bn into defence procurement black hole with no published plan for how it will be used is symbolic of how the British military continues to spiral into irrelevance.

The sad truth is that if we don’t find the money, our lacklustre defence projects will simply be delayed further, adding insult to injury. And if we do find the money, we may well nudge closer to hitting the 3% of GDP defence spending target by 2029. But we still won’t have any more troops. If you watched this in the popular Eighties political satire, Yes Minister, you might laugh. I, however, find it a joke in an altogether different way.

]]>
La crisis del liberalismo. ¿Italia hacia un retorno a los años de plomo? https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/14/crisis-del-liberalismo-italia-hacia-un-retorno-los-anos-plomo/ Sat, 14 Feb 2026 14:00:21 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890595 Entrevista a Andrea Zhok por Federico Dal Cortivo del diário L’Adige de Verona.

Ilustración: Fernando Vicente, España para la nueva edición del Manifiesto comunista de Marx y Engels.

08 de febrero 2026.

«En sistemas sociales más pobres pero capaces de solidaridad horizontal (familiar y comunitaria), las dificultades económicas son más tolerables».

Andrea ZHOK

Únete a nosotros en Telegram Twitter  VK .

Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

Federico Dal Cortivo, del diario L’Adige de Verona, ha entrevistado al profesor Andrea Zhok, filósofo académico, profesor de antropología filosófica y filosofía moral en la Universidad de Milán, investigador y ensayista. El tema de la entrevista es la crisis de la sociedad en la que vivimos.

Profesor Zhok, nos encontramos en un periodo de grandes cambios a nivel internacional, en el que la geopolítica es la protagonista y se están barajando muchas cartas. Pero lo que llama la atención es la profunda crisis que envuelve al sistema liberal, que parecía destinado a gobernar el mundo durante los siglos venideros y sobre el que Occidente había basado sus cimientos. Ahora, desde Estados Unidos hasta Europa, este modelo parece estar resquebrajándose. Me gustaría conocer su opinión al respecto.

Una crisis profunda: cultural, pero también material

«Se trata de una crisis muy profunda porque es a la vez cultural y material. En el plano cultural, la modernidad liberal siempre ha presentado elementos de fragilidad, ya que ha promovido un proceso de secularización sin lograr construir una ética normativa compartida que sustituyera a la anterior ética de matriz religiosa. En lugar de una ética normativa compartida, se pensó que bastaba con apelar a los derechos individuales y a los placeres del consumo, pero estas instancias no proporcionan ninguna base efectiva para fundar una ética pública».

«En ausencia de una ética pública sólida, los Estados tienden a desintegrarse desde dentro, la confianza en las clases dirigentes se derrumba, los conflictos sociales aumentan y la desorientación de los jóvenes en formación se vuelve explosiva. Pero mientras Occidente lograba alimentar un crecimiento sostenido, con una distribución elevada y difusa de los bienes, estos elementos de desintegración interna podían mantenerse bajo control: quien siente que tiene mucho que perder difícilmente se radicaliza. Sin embargo, las dos últimas décadas, en particular tras la crisis subprime, han iniciado un proceso de contracción comparativa del primado económico occidental».

«En sí mismo, no sería nada dramático, sino más bien fisiológico, frente al crecimiento de otras potencias regionales (BRICS). Pero en un sistema como el occidental, que ya ha perdido en gran medida la confianza en sus propias razones profundas (históricas, religiosas, espirituales, etc.) y que ha destruido los ordenamientos familiares y comunitarios, esta reducción de la capacidad económica resulta intolerable.

En sistemas sociales más pobres pero capaces de solidaridad horizontal (familiar y comunitaria), las dificultades económicas son más tolerables. En nuestro mundo, acaban representando la pérdida de la última identidad que quedaba, la de ser un «mundo avanzado» (al menos económicamente)».

¿Ve usted una alternativa al sistema liberal, al menos si no en Estados Unidos, en Europa, donde surgió el Estado social bajo diversas ideologías?

«Europa habría tenido la posibilidad de trazar un camino diferente, y en esencia lo hizo en los treinta años que siguieron a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Sin embargo, este camino dependía de una combinación de factores difícilmente repetible. En el plano económico existía una economía mixta, de tipo asistencialista, con un fuerte papel del Estado en las industrias estratégicas, en el sistema bancario y en las políticas industriales. Este modelo económico sigue siendo históricamente el que ha presentado la mayor tasa de reducción de la pobreza y de mejora de las condiciones de vida medias».

« Al mismo tiempo, en el plano ideal, existían dos grandes bloques ideológicos capaces de aportar una visión fecunda del mundo y de la sociedad; me refiero, naturalmente, al legado del cristianismo social y a la herencia socialista-comunista. A pesar de sufrir el conflicto entre las dos principales visiones del mundo en constante tensión, esas visiones convergían en concebir la vida social (familiar, comunitaria y nacional) como llena de promesas. »

«Hoy en día, reconstruir con esos materiales, aunque no es imposible en principio, resulta difícil, ya que desde los años 90 todo ese patrimonio ideal y también de experiencia económica ha sido sistemáticamente desmantelado. Europa ha aceptado, como si fuera un progreso, un proceso de radical americanización a todos los niveles, acabando por borrar rasgos profundos de su propia identidad, sin poder, por otra parte, perseguir el «sueño americano», que, además de estar en crisis, solo es materialmente perseguible en un estado-continente como los Estados Unidos, con una densidad de población muy baja (37 habitantes por km², frente a los casi 200 de Italia) y grandes recursos naturales».

¿Qué opina de los violentos enfrentamientos del 1 de febrero que pusieron a parte de Turín patas arriba, provocados por miembros y simpatizantes del «centro social Askatasuna»? ¿Ve en todo este «antagonismo» alguna forma real de revuelta contra el «sistema oligárquico dominante»? No tengo constancia de que estuvieran en juego la defensa de la familia, del hogar, del Estado social y de quienes trabajan y estudian.

«Me cuesta mucho emitir un juicio porque no estuve presente personalmente y los testimonios que he recibido sobre los hechos son contradictorios. Hay quienes subrayan el carácter predominantemente pacífico de las manifestaciones, mientras que otros destacan sus componentes destructivos y vandálicos. Por lo tanto, no quiero pronunciarme sobre estos enfrentamientos en concreto. Sin embargo, puedo observar una dinámica que ya se ha observado en muchos otros países europeos y que estamos empezando a ver en Italia».

«A falta de organismos intermedios (partidos, sindicatos, etc.) creíbles que se perciban como capaces de representar las reivindicaciones de los grupos más desfavorecidos o marginados, la tendencia natural es la aparición cada vez más frecuente de grupos exaltados y violentos, personas que no tienen una agenda política real y que están acostumbradas a pensar que nunca habrá una que les concierna».

«Decir que se trata de personas ignorantes, desorientadas, asociales, etc., no resuelve nada, aunque sea cierto. Si una sociedad no es capaz de «socializar» a sectores significativos de su población, esto acabará repercutiendo de forma brutal en la vida de todos. Esto no justifica ningún comportamiento violento, pero debería hacer comprender que pensar en intervenir solo desde el lado represivo no llevará muy lejos».

La crisis genera una revuelta no política, sino psicológica

Profesor Zhok, ¿no existe el riesgo de que ocurra lo que ya ocurrió en los llamados «años de plomo», que vieron las calles ensangrentadas por los enfrentamientos entre jóvenes de tendencias opuestas y contra la policía, vista como el brazo armado del Estado, pero que al final no afectaron en absoluto al sistema oligárquico-liberista dominante, sino todo lo contrario? ¿Qué opina usted?

«No creo que vaya a ocurrir nada parecido a los años de plomo, aunque las consecuencias podrían ser en parte similares. Hoy en día, la revuelta, cuando la hay, no es política, sino «psicológica». En Italia aún estamos lejos de los escenarios que se ven en Francia o Inglaterra, pero deberíamos aprender de esos errores para remediarlos con antelación. Solo en la noche de Fin de Año se quemaron 874 vehículos en Francia.

Esto no es una protesta política, no tiene ningún objetivo concreto, salvo expresar su malestar, su genérica ira. Una explosión progresiva de formas de vandalismo generalizado, conflictos dispersos y microcriminalidad capilar es el escenario que les espera, si no se producen cambios. Y sería grave que el resultado fuera un simple endurecimiento de la seguridad, el aumento de las penas, la vigilancia generalizada de la población, las restricciones a la libertad de movimiento, etc. Esto no resolvería nada y simplemente acabaría reduciendo la libertad de todos, empezando por los ciudadanos honestos».

Lo que falta en Italia, pero también en gran parte de Europa, para dar inicio a verdaderas protestas callejeras contra un modelo socioeconómico basado en el beneficio, el clásico «dios dinero», el mercado que se autorregula, las privatizaciones, la precariedad laboral, la baja natalidad, la inmigración salvaje, la microdelincuencia común ligada sobre todo a esta última y la delincuencia organizada en vertiginoso ascenso gracias al poder económico de la droga. En Italia, tanto el centroizquierda como el centroderecha se han esforzado mucho en las últimas décadas por favorecer todo esto. ¿Qué opina usted?

«Falta prácticamente todo. En primer lugar, falta una cultura alternativa capaz de revalorizar factores que se han tirado precipitadamente a la «basura de la historia»: la familia, las tradiciones culturales, el sentido del Estado, la conciencia de la propia historia.

Luego falta una estructura social qué permita que estos factores prosperen. Por decirlo de alguna manera, no se protege a la familia con una conferencia sobre lo bonita que es la familia y lo saludable que es la maternidad; está muy bien, pero ANTES hay que poner a las parejas en condiciones de formar una familia sin que ello acabe siendo un obstáculo para la carrera profesional, «cosa de perdedores» o «de inmigrantes», y similares».

«Lo mismo puede decirse de las tradiciones culturales y comunitarias, que no se cultivan con una pasarela política en la fiesta de la porchetta o en el estreno de la Scala. Aquí el tema se haría realmente demasiado largo y complejo, porque afecta a una multitud de niveles que han sido demolidos, desde la escuela, la universidad, los conservatorios, las comunidades locales, etc. Necesitaríamos una nueva clase política, una nueva clase dirigente, que haya estudiado y, sobre todo, que crea en algo que no sea solo su propio éxito privado. Pero siento dolorosamente el carácter ilusorio de este deseo en el contexto actual».

Publicado originalmente por Arianna Editrice.
Traducción:
Observatorio de trabajador@s en lucha

]]>
Una isla que aprende a dudar https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/13/una-isla-que-aprende-a-dudar/ Fri, 13 Feb 2026 14:05:52 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890577 En Cuba 2026, es un hecho que el sistema de poder está en una crisis irreversible. Esta tensión no es una abstracción académica, sino una experiencia cotidiana. La escuela —ese espacio que debería proteger la fragilidad del pensamiento joven— aparece hoy como un espejo opaco del sistema político: refleja consignas, pero no preguntas; quiere transmitir certezas, pero no verdades.

Pedro Pablo AGUILERA

Únete a nosotros en Telegram Twitter  VK .

Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

La crisis de valores que atraviesa la sociedad cubana, no nació de la nada ni cayó del cielo como un ciclón inesperado. Se gestó lentamente, aula por aula, examen tras examen, acto político tras acto político. No es una crisis de «ausencia», sino de «distorsión»: valores que se dicen defender mientras se practican sus contrarios.

Hannah Arendt advirtió que el totalitarismo no se conforma con gobernar acciones: necesita administrar conciencias. En Los orígenes del totalitarismo (1951), explicó que el verdadero triunfo del poder absoluto ocurre cuando las personas dejan de pensar, no por censura directa, sino por hábito.

El problema educativo no es únicamente lo que se enseña, sino lo que se vuelve impensable. El currículo escolar, cargado de épica congelada y lealtades obligatorias, funciona como vitrina de museo: héroes inmóviles, verdades sin fecha de caducidad, preguntas que nunca llegan al mostrador. Arendt llamaría a esto una antesala de la «banalidad del mal», desarrollada más tarde en su obra Eichmann en Jerusalén (1963): no hacen falta monstruos, basta con funcionarios obedientes que «cumplen orientaciones».

La ironía es amarga: se habla de «formar valores revolucionarios», pero se educa para la suspensión del juicio. Y cuando el juicio se atrofia, la moral se convierte en trámite administrativo y retardatario.

En Pedagogía del oprimido (1970), Paulo Freire explica que la educación bancaria —esa en la que el docente deposita contenidos y el alumno los memoriza— no solo empobrece el aprendizaje; legitima la desigualdad simbólica entre quien sabe y quien obedece.

En el contexto cubano, esta pedagogía adquiere una dimensión casi trágica. Se pide ejercitar el pensamiento crítico, pero solo dentro de ciertos márgenes autorizados. Se habla de participación, pero se penaliza la disidencia. Freire advertía que esta contradicción genera sujetos «adaptados», no sujetos «libres». De tal modo, la educación deja de ser camino de emancipación y se convierte en entrenamiento para la supervivencia ideológica. La antítesis es clara: se invoca la dignidad humana mientras se castiga la autonomía. Como si se pudiera enseñar libertad a condición de no usarla.

Desde Educación para la autonomía (1966) Theodor W. Adorno, un autor obligado en estos temas, dada la experiencia del nacional socialismo hace una pregunta recurrente que es incómoda para la dictadura cubana de hoy: ¿qué tipo de educación permite que el horror sea posible? La respuesta a tal interrogante resulta incómoda para la comprensión de todo autoritarismo: una educación que priorice la obediencia sobre el juicio.

Cuba no es la Alemania nazi, pero la psicología autoritaria no necesita campos de concentración para prosperar. Basta con aulas donde disentir tenga consecuencias, donde repetir garantice estabilidad y donde el silencio sea una forma de inteligencia práctica. Adorno advertía que la personalidad autoritaria se forma temprano, en la escuela y la familia, cuando la autoridad no se discute, sino que se «introyecta».

Aquí, la crisis de valores no es una rebelión juvenil contra normas antiguas; es el agotamiento moral de un sistema que pidió lealtad infinita a cambio de promesas cada vez más frágiles, que hoy se saben falsas.

Para entender la tragedia de la educación cubana hay que acudir asimismo a un autor como Michel Foucault. Sin referirse directamente a Cuba, parece que lo hace en su obra Vigilar y castigar (1975), pues percibe a la escuela como una institución disciplinaria que no necesita policías en cada aula: le basta con evaluaciones, expedientes, informes y ese gesto aprendido de «mejor no decir».

En el sistema educativo cubano el control no siempre es explícito; es atmosférico. Se sabe qué temas evitar, qué palabras usar, qué silencios respetar. El estudiante aprende rápido que el problema no es equivocarse, sino «salirse del guion». El panoptismo pedagógico funciona como una bruma: no se ve, pero sanciona, margina, condena, excluye. Así, los valores se redefinen sin anunciarlo. La verdad deja de ser correspondencia con la realidad y pasa a ser coherencia con el discurso oficial. La justicia se confunde con disciplina. La ética se reduce a fidelidad.

Como bien demuestra Martha Nussbaum en Sin fines de lucro (2010): sin empatía, no hay ciudadanía. Y sin ciudadanía, la educación es solo adiestramiento. En Cuba, el otro —el que piensa distinto, el que se fue, el que duda— ha sido progresivamente expulsado del relato educativo. No se le estudia, no se le escucha, no se le imagina. La escuela no enseña a comprender al diferente, sino a clasificarlo. Nussbaum llamaría a esto la muerte de la «imaginación narrativa».

La consecuencia es una sociedad desdoblada entre realidad oficial y no oficial; una sociedad hipócrita, cansada, desconfiada, donde la historia mutó en autocensura cotidiana; no por maldad, sino por aprendizaje. La Cuba de 2026 no es un derrumbe súbito, es una erosión paciente. La educación autoritaria no destruyó los valores; los «reprogramó». La obediencia se volvió virtud. El silencio, prudencia. La duda, peligro.

Pero no todo es terrible. Hoy, en las grietas del sistema educativo cubano, aparece algo nuevo: estudiantes que preguntan sin levantar la mano, docentes que insinúan más de lo que dicen, familias que ya no creen del todo. El cambio no vendrá; ya está aquí, aún sin los cambios curriculares que serán necesarios, sino con algo más modesto y radical: la existencia de una duda ante la realidad. Y ahí están el 11 de julio y las mil y una protestas de estos tiempos para probarlo.

Como escribió Arendt, «la educación es el punto en el que decidimos si amamos el mundo lo suficiente como para asumir la responsabilidad de él». Cuba está en ese punto. Y la escuela, quiera o no, será escenario del desenlace.

Publicado originalmente por  Cuba x Cuba

]]>
The future is Bad Bunny https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/13/the-future-is-bad-bunny/ Fri, 13 Feb 2026 12:28:35 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890575 By Andrew DAY

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Conservatives must offer something better.

Budapest – I was on a plane to Europe Sunday night as the Seahawks defeated the Patriots in what apparently was a very boring Super Bowl. Upon landing, I scrolled X and discovered that the halftime show, performed in Spanish by a Puerto Rican rapper named “Bad Bunny,” had drawn more attention than the game itself, and much outrage on the right.

That was not an altogether surprising discovery. This September, Bad Bunny’s selection as halftime star had irked many conservatives because of his tendency to wear dresses and complain about America’s enforcement of immigration law. Springing into action, the conservative Turning Point USA whipped up some counterprogramming: a halftime-show alternative starring the country-rock-rap artist Kid Rock.

Which way, Western man? A Latino gyrating through a stage of sugar cane, liquor stands, and bodegas that advertise they accept food stamps—the Bad Bunny option. Or a washed-up vulgarian in a baseball cap whose vocal styles alternate between gravelly ’90s post-grunge and cringy spoken word—that would be Kid Rock.

Points in favor of the former option: production value and cultural prestige. The right may now claim the White House, but the left still controls the culture, its ideology still guides the masses, and it’s damn good at culture (however depraved) and ideology (however stupid). As Bad Bunny bounced around, a Jumbotron behind him proclaimed, “The only thing more powerful than hate is love.” Who can argue with that? Most Western men will take the blue pill of Bad Bunny, if only because nearly all Western women will.

But there was a small problem with Bad Bunny’s song-and-dance routine: It wasn’t so much a musical performance as a celebration, and enactment, of America’s erasure. Near the end of the big show, he yelled “God bless America” and then proceeded to list all the countries that, in his view, constitute America, which included all the countries of Latin America. (Mr. Bunny yells and mumbles more than he sings, and a good thing too, as his crooning inexplicably sounds like the grunting Velociraptor in the kitchen scene of Jurassic Park.)

From a conservative perspective, or at least from the perspective of this conservative columnist, you should go the way of Kid Rock, not Bad Bunny. But the choice should be made without illusions: Siding with Kid Rock means joining the losers in America’s culture war, and not just because the Hispanic population will continue to grow in coming decades. Bad Bunny and others like him offer a kind of idealism, and I’ve read enough Nietzsche to sniff out the nihilism and ressentiment in Kid Rock’s empty negation of the left. In a battle between idealism and nihilism, the former will always, eventually, win.

Judging by my timeline on X, many conservatives were pleased with Bad Bunny or at least didn’t understand all the fuss. They somehow still haven’t grasped that “inclusion” is the wrong frame for understanding the mass influx of Hispanics across our southern border and the intensifying, negative cultural effects of that influx on our country. After all, there weren’t any non-Hispanic whites “included” in the choreographed gyrations this Sunday. (The hip hop legend Jay-Z, who has produced each Super Bowl halftime show since 2020, hasn’t once selected a white musician to headline the event, except for the racially confused rapper Eminem, who performed alongside four black Americans in 2022.)

The correct frame for understanding Bad Bunny’s performance is “Reconquista,” an ongoing, decadeslong cultural and linguistic submersion of America by Hispanics, their revenge for our victory in the Mexican–American War and domination of the Western Hemisphere. The Hispanics are taking back the southwestern United States, and more than that if they can get it. And you better not object—that would be hateful, not loving.

Reconquista originally denoted the reconquest by European Christians of the Iberian Peninsula, which Muslims had seized in the 700s. That hard-won recapture of old territory concluded in 1492, the same year Christopher Columbus, an Italian explorer funded by Spanish monarchs, sailed the ocean blue. The New World he discovered swiftly became an object of conquest and exploitation by Europeans, who back then still had blood flowing through their veins. In North America, Europeans replaced the natives, rather than lording over them as in Central and South America, and the seeds of a magnificent republic were sown.

Like the U.S., Europe today is seeing its territorial conquests reversed through mass migration from the Global South. In some ways, their situation is more dire than ours. Hispanic immigrants, by and large, are Christians and hard workers, and after arriving in America they tend to be socialized in some of our reddest states. (Some downsides: playing loud Mariachi music, undercutting Americans’ wages, and slowly turning our red states blue.) Europe’s most energetic newcomers, by contrast, flock to liberal cities and do things like chop off heads, gang-rape schoolgirls, and drive SUVs into crowds at Christmas markets. It’s pretty bad. And the Europeans don’t even have a Kid Rock, much less a Donald Trump.

They do have a Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary, and other nationalist politicians in the “postliberal” style. Here in Hungary, where I am attending thReconquistae annual Budapest Global Dialogue, I’ve gotten to hear from some of them, including Hungary’s foreign minister. They point out that Orban’s rejection of mass migration is plainly working, as Budapest remains a rare specimen of a dying breed: a European capital where women can walk alone at night.

Still, my experience at the two-day conference hasn’t filled me with newfound optimism. In years past, this well-organized and surprisingly glamorous event provided a platform to critics of the liberal world order. But what’s the point of such critics now? In the second year of Trump’s second term, the liberal world order, everyone agrees, is gone, and now’s the time to build something new. But the nationalist internationale so far seems about as promising a substitute for global liberalism as Kid Rock was for Bad Bunny.

Some speakers at the Budapest forum referred to the present crisis as an “interregnum,” but that implies a regnum to follow, which seems presumptuous. I see little reason to believe that a “new mode and order,” to use Machiavelli’s phrase, is being born. And if we do get a global system comprising petits nationalismes competing one against another, there’s a fair chance it’ll feature great-power wars, a resurgence of suppressed ethnic hatreds, and the demise of both dollar hegemony and stable trade regimes. In other words, our children could be less safe and much poorer than we were under liberal hegemony.

One European political scientist suggested to me that Trump himself has the spirit of a Machiavellian founder, as his White House renovations and plans to build an Arc de Triomphe reveal. And he displays an almost preternatural ability to find the weaknesses of liberalism and exploit them for political gain. But Trump increasingly appears sui generis, and one begins to ask how much of the death of liberalism has resulted from his uniquely combative and charismatic persona rather than structural factors. The White House will be bigger and golder after he leaves it, but will America be great again?

If post-liberalism fails, or fails to arise, one obvious possibility is reversion to liberalism, perhaps of a more formidable, albeit subtler, kind. Just as Bad Bunny jettisoned explicit wokeness and instead subliminally insinuated anti-white, anti-American ideas, liberal technocrats have learned that overt hostility to white majorities and to basic common sense plays poorly in the political realm. Over time, the liberals will find chances to resume their frontal assault. If you want a picture of the future, imagine Bad Bunny in a dress waving some Latin American flag in your face—forever.

Original article:  theamericanconservative.com

]]>
La Bulgaria tra contraddizioni politiche e instabilità https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/09/la-bulgaria-tra-contraddizioni-politiche-e-instabilita/ Sun, 08 Feb 2026 21:35:57 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890496 Un abbondante trentennio di transizione all’europeismo atlantista non ha convinto particolarmente i bulgari della presunta bontà della scelta occidentale

Segue nostro Telegram.

La cittadinanza manifesta piuttosto convinto dispiacere per la fine dell’esperienza socialista dentro il campo sovietico, latrice di stabilità e sicurezza sociale, oggi scomparse.

I giovani, più che con il voto elettorale o con un sondaggio di opinione, hanno manifestato dal 1989 ad oggi i loro convincimenti facendo le valigie. Nel 1989, ultimo anno alla guida dei comunisti bulgari di Todor Živkov, al potere dal 1954, nel ridente stato balcanico vivevano ben nove milioni di persone, oggi son rimasti in sei milioni e mezzo, principalmente anziani. Molti giovani negli anni ‘90 han preso la via di altre nazioni dell’Europa occidentale, oggi in tanti scelgono di andare a vivere e a lavorare in Russia.

I vincoli e le imposizione esterne della NATO e di Bruxelles sono costanti e non è un caso se i bulgari si apprestino a tornare alle urne in primavera per le ottave elezioni parlamentari in cinque anni. A dimostrazione di una crisi che attanaglia non soltanto il  sistema politico, ma più in generale manifesta una forte e diffuso disagio sociale.

La frammentazione politica di questa terra prospiciente il mar Nero e stretta tra la piana danubiana a nord e i monti Rodopi a sud è l’esempio massimo di come la cosiddetta “democrazia occidentale” rappresenti un colossale fallimento.

Già la transizione del 1990 potrebbe essere definita una specie di colpo di mano da parte di elementi del partito decisi a rimanere al potere, infatti il Partito Comunista Bulgaro diventa il Partito Socialista Bulgaro, di fatto in accordo con Michail Gorbačëv, il quale avrebbe minacciato i dirigenti di allora, altrimenti sarebbe intervenuto direttamente, come oggi tutta la documentazione archivistica conferma, sul modello rumeno, per una transizione imposta dall’esterno.

Il Partito Socialista Bulgaro guidato da Aleksandar Lilov ha vinto le elezioni pluripartitiche del 17 giugno 1990, a tutta dimostrazione che la maggioranza dei bulgari, allora votanti in oltre sei milioni, con il 47% dei consensi attribuito ai precedenti governanti, si mostrassero molto dubbiosi e poco inclini alla propaganda liberal – liberista sperticata con violenza dall’Occidente in tutta l’Europa Orientale.

Solo con le elezioni del 1991 l’Unione delle Forze Democratiche, accozzaglia liberista e anticomunista, vince di misura le elezioni e promuove una violenta privatizzazione della terra e dell’industria, creando milioni di disoccupati, masse impoverite e arrabbiate che nel 1995 riporteranno ai potere i socialisti con Žan Videnov, dando vita per tutto l’ultimo decennio del secolo scorso a un infruttuoso alternarsi di governi stretti tra vincoli internazionali sempre più difficili e incapacità di rilanciare la produttività interna.

Anni devastanti e distruttivi, una transizione verso un’economia di mercato capitalista sfacciatamente architettata dalla Camera di Commercio statunitense e totalmente fallimentare, prezzi in rapida e costante crescita, tagli di ogni tipo, distruzione dello stato sociale, austerità imposta dal Fondo Monetario Internazionale e dalla Banca Mondiale, tutto ciò porterà alla totale distruzione del modesto ma stabile tenore di vita della popolazione, facendo rimpiangere il passato socialista.

Nel 2001, a peggiorare la situazione, torna in Bulgaria l’ex zar bambino defenestrato dall’avvento del socialismo nel 1946, quando aveva sei anni. Simeone di Sassonia-Coburgo-Gotha si presenta sulla scena politica come il salvatore della patria nel momento del bisogno. Atteggiandosi a semplice cittadino, come Simeon Borisov, archiviando l’imbarazzante cognome Sakskoburggotski, ottiene alle elezioni del 18 giugno 2001 il 42,7% dei voti, raccolti tra i quattro milioni e mezzo che si sono recati alle urne. Le promesse altisonanti annunciano prosperità economica e lotta alla criminalità organizzata, tuttavia i bulgari capiscono presto di essersi lasciarti ingannare dall’ennesimo ciarlatano, subito in fuga dopo un solo mandato nel 2005, dopo aver ulteriormente inguaiato il popolo bulgaro obbedendo agli ordini di Washington e traghettando la Bulgaria nella NATO il 29 marzo 2004, un’adesione avvenuta nel quadro del più aggressivo e riprovevole allargamento antirusso dell’Alleanza Atlantica, che ha visto l’entrata nel sistema militare occidentale anche di Estonia, Lettonia, Lituania, Romania, Slovacchia e Slovenia.

L’entrata della Bulgaria nell’Unione Europea avverrà invece più tardivamente il 1° gennaio 2007, quella nell’euro soltanto il 1° gennaio 2026, dopo l’accesso nello spazio Schengen avvenuto il 31 marzo 2024.

Dileguatosi dalla politica, Simeon Borisov Sakskoburggotski si è dedicato all’immobiliare, cercando di ripristinare la sua proprietà su castelli e tenute della corona reale bulgara, nazionalizzati dalla Repubblica Popolare di Bulgaria guidata da Georgi Dimitrov, il grande dirigente dell’Internazionale Comunista, scomparso nel 1949 e oggi traslato al cimitero della capitale Sofia, dopo essere stato ospitato in un mausoleo nel centro cittadino la cui distruzione ha richiesto più giorni della sua edificazione.

Gli avanzi del partito zarista tuttavia rimangono al governo anche nella legislatura successiva, i soli tre milioni e mezzo di elettori recatisi alle urne nel 2005 premiano con il 31% dei consensi una coalizione tra socialisti, socialdemocratici e agrari, secondi al 20% gli zaristi, le due forze si coalizzano con il Movimento per i Diritti e le Libertà, forza politica della minoranza turca bulgara composta da almeno mezzo milione di donne e uomini, così come di quella islamico – pomacca formata da trecentomila persone e dei rom, che rappresentano anch’essi un’altra porzione rilevante della popolazione bulgara con almeno mezzo milione di cittadini.

È questo governo che traghetta i bulgari dentro l’Unione Europea, arrivano alcuni capitali stranieri, contribuendo a un aumento del prodotto interno lordo nazionale e pro capite, tuttavia la disuguaglianza sociale ed economica aumenta, inoltre lo stipendio medio bulgaro in vent’anni non ha significativi margini di crescita, essendo ancora oggi solo un terzo di quello medio dell’Unione Europea.

All’ombra dell’ex zar immobiliarista si fa spazio Bojko Metodiev Borisov, il quale diventa sindaco della capitale nel 2005 e fonda l’anno seguente il partito “Cittadini per lo Sviluppo Europeo della Bulgaria”, anch’esso ferocemente anticomunista, sebbene tanto lui quanto il padre avessero lavorato per il ministero degli interni al tempo del socialismo, con questo nuovo partito nel 2009 entra in parlamento con il 39,7%, mentre gli elettori scendono a quattro milioni e duecentomila, diventando subito primo ministro, condizionando la politica bulgara per oltre un decennio, poiché dopo il primo incarico dal luglio 2009 al marzo 2013, sarà di nuovo primo ministro dal novembre 2014 al gennaio 2017 e ancora da maggio dello stesso anno fino a maggio 2021.

Dall’aprile del 2021 all’ottobre del 2024 i bulgari sono chiamati a votare il parlamento ben sette volte, e nell’ultima occasione si recano ai seggi solo due milioni e mezzo di cittadini. Più o meno in tutte le occasioni risultata primo partito sempre quello di Borisov, tanto che l’attuale primo ministro dimissionario Rosen Dimitrov Željazkov è anch’egli parte di “Cittadini per lo Sviluppo Europeo della Bulgaria”.

Borisov si è arricchito negli anni ‘90 del Novecento tra servizi di sicurezza e forme non trasparenti di gestione del patrimonio personale e altrui, per quanto abbia sempre proclamato di agire contro ogni mafia, da più parti si ritene che la connivenza con settori opachi della società bulgara siano una componente essenziale del suo agire politico.

Proprio il convincimento di trovarsi fronte a un “modello di governo sbagliato e dannoso” ha spinto il presidente socialdemocratico della Bulgaria, già generale dell’aeronautica militare, Rumen Radev, risultato vittorioso tanto nel 2016, quanto nel 2021 contro i candidati del partito di Borisov, a dimettersi per candidarsi come primo ministro in vista delle imminenti elezioni primaverili. Rumen Radev ha attribuito proprio a Borisov la responsabilità della diffusa povertà e della sfiducia nelle istituzioni statali. La democrazia bulgara, ha affermato il presidente, “non sopravviverà se la lasciamo in balia di funzionari corrotti, cospiratori ed estremisti”.

Terzo protagonista della scena politica attuale, con oltre il 10% dei consensi, il magnate dei media Delyan Peevski, a capo del Movimento per i Diritti e le Libertà, accusato dall’Occidente di corruzione, tangenti e appropriazione indebita, probabilmente anche per la sua smaccata ostilità verso la pretesa subordinazione agli ordini atlantisti e bruxellesi.

Alle ultime elezioni hanno quasi raggiunto il 15% anche “Continuiamo il Cambiamento – Bulgaria Democratica” guidata da Kiril Petkov, il quale ha condotto i suoi studi in Canada e negli Stati Uniti e guida non a caso un partito totalmente allineato con l’Unione Europea e la Casa Bianca, nonché i sovranisti di “Rinascita”, fondati e tutt’ora diretti da Kostadin Kostadinov.

Quello che è certo, è che Rumen Radev intercetta una parte considerevole del consenso popolare ostile verso un trentennio di transizione liberal – liberista, la quale non ha dato il benessere ingenuamente sperato, così come quella porzione di cittadini che credono del tutto erroneo mantenere rapporti conflittuali con la Russia.

Infatti gli oppositori di Radev lo etichettano come filo-russo o addirittura come uomo del Cremlino, solo perché si è espresso contro le forniture di armi a Kiev e ha messo in guardia contro il proseguimento della guerra in Ucraina. Va in ogni caso ricordato che Radev ha trascorso praticamente tutta la sua carriera come ufficiale della NATO ed è stato addestrato presso la base aerea di Maxwell in Alabama, allo stesso modo non può essere considerato un oppositore dell’Unione Europea, anche se ha criticato l’introduzione dell’euro senza un’adeguata preparazione, al pari dell’integrazione nell’area Schengen, la quale non ha prodotto i benefici promessi, così come ha contestato le normative imposte da Bruxelles, le quali non tengono conto della realtà bulgara.

]]>