Kurds – Strategic Culture Foundation https://strategic-culture.su Strategic Culture Foundation provides a platform for exclusive analysis, research and policy comment on Eurasian and global affairs. We are covering political, economic, social and security issues worldwide. Wed, 11 Mar 2026 10:59:59 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://strategic-culture.su/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/cropped-favicon4-32x32.png Kurds – Strategic Culture Foundation https://strategic-culture.su 32 32 El mosaico de la muerte por mil cortes https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/03/11/el-mosaico-de-la-muerte-por-mil-cortes/ Wed, 11 Mar 2026 15:00:45 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=891067 Se trata de una guerra de desgaste estructurada. Y el guion se ha escrito en Teherán.

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La defensa mosaica descentralizada de Irán —denominación oficial— se modifica constantemente: esa es la estrategia a largo plazo del IRGC, consistente en una muerte por mil cortes diseñada para desangrar al Imperio del Caos.

Recorramos los canales interconectados que impregnan el pantano inconstitucional, imposible de ganar y estratégicamente catastrófico construido por el Imperio del Caos.

La resiliencia mosaica y la estrategia a largo plazo de Irán; la tentación de ese espantoso culto a la muerte en Asia Occidental de pasarse a la energía nuclear; el inminente e inexorable infierno de los interceptores; el implacable impulso de China por deshacerse del antiguo orden (acumulando oro, deshaciéndose de dólares); el progreso de los BRICS en la creación de un sistema financiero paralelo; el colapso de los vasallos estadounidenses en varias latitudes: todo ello está acelerando un reinicio radical del sistema.

Y luego está Vladimir Putin, que, de forma casual, casi como una idea de último momento, anuncia que, después de todo, puede que no haya gas ruso para vender a la UE:

Quizás tenga más sentido que dejemos de suministrar gas a la UE y nos traslademos a esos nuevos mercados, y nos establezcamos allí (…) Una vez más, quiero subrayar: no hay ningún motivo político en esto. Pero si de todos modos van a cerrarles el mercado en uno o dos meses, quizá sea mejor marcharse ahora y centrarse en países que sean socios fiables. Dicho esto, no es una decisión. Solo estoy pensando en voz alta. Pediré al Gobierno que lo estudie junto con nuestras empresas.

El lamentable canciller Bratwurst pidió permiso al neocalígulo para que Alemania comprara petróleo ruso. Lo consiguió. Pero puede que no haya nada que comprar.

Se trata de una guerra energética, y la UE, una vez más, ni siquiera reúne los requisitos para ser un mendigo sin hogar. Sin gas de Qatar, sin petróleo y gas rusos. Ahora vuelvan a su guerra eterna obsesionada con la OTAN.

El bombardeo del oleoducto del CCG-petrodólar

Inmediatamente después del ataque decapitador del sábado pasado contra el líder supremo ayatolá Jamenei, Irán pasó a un mando y control descentralizados y a células con un plan de sucesión de cuatro niveles, lanzando incesantes salvas de misiles más antiguos y lentos y drones sacrificables para consumir baterías Patriot y sistemas THAAD a escala industrial. Con esa medida, Irán cambió las reglas del juego ya en el primer día de la guerra.

Cualquiera con un coeficiente intelectual superior a la temperatura ambiente sabe que utilizar tres Patriots —con un coste combinado de 9,6 millones de dólares— para defenderse de un solo misil balístico iraní sacrificable es completamente insostenible.

Por lo tanto, no es de extrañar que solo hicieran falta cuatro días de la guerra del sindicato Epstein contra Irán para que el sistema financiero mundial se volviera completamente loco. Se evaporaron 3,2 billones de dólares en cuestión de cuatro días, y la cifra sigue aumentando.

El estrecho de Ormuz está cerrado a todos los efectos prácticos, excepto para los buques rusos y chinos. Al menos el 20 % de las necesidades mundiales de petróleo no se están moviendo a ninguna parte. Toda la producción de GNL de Qatar está fuera de servicio, sin perspectivas de reanudación. El segundo yacimiento petrolífero más grande de Irak ha sido cerrado.

Y aun así, el volátil neocalígulo vocifera que su guerra, que se suponía que solo duraría un fin de semana, puede prolongarse durante cinco semanas, y otros payasos industriales y militares del Pentágono hablan de que se prolongará hasta septiembre.

Al fijar como objetivos legítimos los intereses estadounidenses en todo el Consejo de Cooperación para los Estados Árabes del Golfo (CCG), y no solo las bases militares, Irán ha puesto una bomba de relojería. Se trata de un ataque directo al petrodólar (para deleite silencioso de Pekín).

Sin duda, Teherán calculó que la reacción en cadena sería instantánea, hasta llegar al pánico como preludio de una nueva Gran Depresión generalizada.

La falta de petróleo, sumada a la inexistencia de una defensa significativa del CCG contra los misiles y drones iraníes, significa el fin de los torrentes de dinero falso de Wall Street.

Al fin y al cabo, la burbuja de la inteligencia artificial se financia con las “inversiones” del CCG. El nuevo bombardeo de Pipeineistán no es del tipo Nord Stream: es el bombardeo del oleoducto del petrodólar del CCG.

Todo esto está sucediendo en un tiempo récord, a medida que se perfecciona el mosaico descentralizado de Irán. Por ejemplo, una serie de misiles antibuque letales, que aún no se han utilizado, están coordinados por el IRGC, la marina, el ejército y las fuerzas aeroespaciales. Lo mismo ocurre con los drones.

Aunque los ataques con misiles balísticos no mantengan el ritmo inicial vertiginoso, son más que suficientes para seguir golpeando sin cesar las bases militares estadounidenses (cuyas defensas aéreas ya están en gran parte agotadas); sumir al culto de la muerte en Asia Occidental y al CCG en un infierno económico total; y aterrorizar hasta la muerte a todos los rincones de los “mercados globales”.

Y a pesar de todas las bravuconerías de Washington por parte del untuoso y payaso secretario de las guerras eternas, docenas de fortalezas militares subterráneas iraníes cargadas con decenas de miles de misiles y equipos siguen siendo invisibles e intocables.

Arruinar el modelo de negocio del Imperio del Caos

Esta es una guerra desesperada para salvar el petrodólar. Una potencia energética como Irán que comercia fuera del petrodólar es el anatema definitivo, especialmente porque el proceso va acompañado de la iniciativa de los BRICS para establecer sistemas de pago independientes.

La inmensa fragilidad estructural del CCG —los vecinos de Irán— los convierte en una presa ideal. Al fin y al cabo, todo su modelo de negocio se basa en el petrodólar a cambio de la ‘protección’ mafiosa de Estados Unidos, que se ha desvanecido en la arena en los cuatro primeros días de la guerra.

Es el momento de que la máquina de guerra asimétrica de Irán arruine el modelo de negocio del Imperio del Caos en tiempo real.

La prueba definitiva es la implosión del sueño bling bling de Dubái, mucho más que la devastación impuesta a los intereses relacionados con la Quinta Flota de Estados Unidos en Bahréin e incluso un misil balístico que destruyó el radar de matriz en fase AN/FPS-132, valorado en 1100 millones de dólares, en la base aérea de Al Udeid, en Qatar.

La ruptura coordinada y en curso del CCG, ya inevitable, significa en última instancia el fin del reciclaje del petrodólar, lo que abre el juego al petroyuan o al comercio de energía en una cesta de monedas de los BRICS.

“Jaque mate” proviene del persa “Shah Mat”, que significa “el rey está indefenso”. Bueno, es posible que el emperador neocalígulo no sepa que está desnudo, porque es incapaz de jugar al ajedrez. Pero está lo suficientemente asustado como para empezar a buscar desesperadamente una salida.

El corredor aéreo Astracán-Teherán

Ahora veamos el papel de Rusia. La atención debe centrarse en el corredor aéreo Astracán-Teherán, repleto de vuelos secretos de carga. El aeródromo militar de Chkalovsk, cerca de Astracán, es el centro logístico clave del corredor: cargamentos como el Il-76MD, el An-124 y el Tu-0204-300C van y vienen cubiertos con un material especial que reduce la visibilidad del radar y los oculta de los sistemas de rastreo civiles.

Su carga llega al aeropuerto de Mehrabad en Teherán (no es de extrañar que fuera bombardeado por Israel), Pyam y Shahid Behesthi en Isfahán. También se aplica la logística multimodal, ya que parte de la carga se entrega a través del Caspio.

Todo está coordinado por la 988.ª Brigada Logística Militar de Astracán. El contenido de la carga incluye componentes para sistemas de defensa aéreamódulos de guía por radar, sistemas hidráulicos para lanzamisiles y módulos de radar de detección de largo alcance.

Además, en virtud de un protocolo secreto, Rusia está suministrando a Irán tecnología de guerra electrónica de última generación, incluida una versión de exportación del Krasukha-4IR, capaz de interferir los sistemas de radar de los drones estadounidenses.

A esto hay que añadir que Irán pronto desplegará baterías S-400 completas, lo que le permitirá controlar hasta el 70 % del espacio aéreo iraní.

Cómo la tensión económico-política se volverá insoportable

Y ahora pasemos al papel de Turquía.

Hace solo dos meses, el MIT (servicio de inteligencia turco) advirtió directamente al IRGC de que combatientes kurdos estaban intentando cruzar de Irak a Irán.

Piénsese en ello: un miembro de pleno derecho de la OTAN que transmite información operativa urgente al IRGC justo cuando el sindicato Epstein se preparaba para la guerra.

Hay al menos 15 millones de kurdos viviendo en Irán. Lo último que quiere Ankara es que los kurdos se empoderen en Irán. A pesar de todas las insaciables maniobras del sultán Erdogan, sabe que no puede enfrentarse frontalmente a Teherán.

Necesita equilibrar una gran variedad de intereses que mezclan la OTAN, el corredor energético con Rusia, pero también el corredor energético hacia Occidente a través del oleoducto BTC, y el papel de ancla occidental del Corredor Medio hacia China.

Por eso, el supuesto misil balístico iraní que apuntaba a Turquía y que fue derribado por la OTAN no fue gran cosa: los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores Fidan (Turquía) y Aragchi (Irán) lo discutieron como adultos.

Existe una impenetrable niebla de guerra al respecto: el misil podría haber sido enviado para inutilizar la terminal petrolera del BTC y los posteriores drones lanzados sobre Georgia estaban diseñados para inutilizar el punto más débil del BTC.

Nada de esto está confirmado, y será imposible confirmarlo. También podría haber sido una operación de bandera falsa, aunque Teherán pueda estar muy interesado en cortar el 30 % del suministro de petróleo de Israel.

El BTC seguirá en funcionamiento, ya que atraviesa Georgia transportando crudo azerí a través del Cáucaso hasta la costa mediterránea turca. Bombardear el BTC encajaría en la estrategia iraní de cortar todos los corredores energéticos que alimentan al sindicato Epstein y sus acólitos a través del Golfo, el Cáucaso y hasta el Mediterráneo.

A lo largo del BTC, otras medidas lógicas de Irán serían atacar el oleoducto este-oeste de Arabia Saudí (que evita Ormuz); las plataformas de carga marítimas de Irak en aguas territoriales iraníes, que manejan 3,5 millones de barriles al día; y el centro de procesamiento de Abqaiq, que maneja la mayor parte del crudo saudí antes de que llegue a las terminales de exportación.

Si Irán, bajo una presión extrema, se ve obligado a atacar todo lo anterior, no hay ninguna reserva estratégica de petróleo en el planeta capaz de cubrir el déficit.

En esta infernal interconexión de corredores energéticos, rutas marítimas, cadenas de suministro globales, seguridad marítima y precios del petróleo fuera de control, solo los payasos del Pentágono pueden querer prolongar la guerra hasta septiembre. Asia, Europa y todos los importadores de energía del tablero de ajedrez ejercerán la máxima presión para lograr cualquier medida de distensión.

Sin embargo, la estrategia asimétrica de Irán sigue siendo inquebrantable: expandir la guerra horizontalmente y alargar al máximo el plazo para que la presión económica y política sea insoportable.

Traducción: esto no es una maniobra rápida para cambiar el régimen por parte de un grupo de psicópatas. Se trata de una guerra de desgaste estructurada. Y el guion se ha escrito en Teherán.

Traducción: Observatorio de trabajador@s en lucha

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How long will the Kurds keep fighting the West’s wars? https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/03/08/how-long-will-the-kurds-keep-fighting-the-wests-wars/ Sun, 08 Mar 2026 09:01:41 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890998 Kurds should stop importing foreign agendas and begin seeking integration within their own countries.

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In recent days, new reports about attempts by the United States to mobilize Kurdish militias against Iran have revived an old geopolitical question in the Middle East: how long will the Kurds continue to serve as shock troops for Western strategies? Recent history shows that this role has repeatedly ended in tragedy for the Kurds themselves.

Over the past decades, the Kurds have often been portrayed by Washington and its allies as a “natural partner” in the Middle East. In practice, however, this relationship has been deeply instrumental. Whenever a new regional crisis emerges, sectors of the Western establishment once again look to Kurdish armed groups as a convenient tool to pressure governments considered hostile. Today, the same logic is resurfacing in the context of the war against Iran.

The idea of fomenting Kurdish insurgencies inside Iranian territory follows the same script seen in other scenarios. The problem is that this strategy completely ignores the military and political realities of the region. Kurdish militias simply do not possess the strategic capacity to confront a consolidated state such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unlike low-intensity conflicts, a direct confrontation with Tehran would mean facing a sophisticated military apparatus, an efficient internal security network, and a highly resilient state structure.

In practical terms, any attempt to launch an armed insurgency inside Iran would likely be quickly neutralized. The predictable result would be the destruction of the militias involved and the suffering of local Kurdish populations. In fact, recent experiences in other countries already demonstrate the limits of such projects.

In Syria, Kurdish militias gained prominence during the Civil War and received extensive military support from the United States. However, this partnership proved extremely fragile. When Washington’s strategic interests shifted, Kurdish forces were left exposed to external offensives and regional pressures they were unable to contain, as recently seen in attacks by the HTS government against Kurdish regions.

The situation has been even clearer in Turkey. There, decades of armed confrontation involving Kurdish organizations have resulted in repeated military defeats. The Turkish state has repeatedly demonstrated that it possesses the capacity to crush ethnic insurgencies within its territory. Instead of advancing toward autonomy or political recognition, the cycle of confrontation has only reinforced the marginalization of these communities.

These precedents raise a fundamental question: why repeat the same mistake in relation to Iran?

Strategic reality suggests that any military adventure against Tehran would have a predictable outcome. The Iranian state possesses sufficient military resources, mobilization capacity, and internal legitimacy to rapidly crush insurgent militias. Attempting to turn the Kurds into a Western-backed instrument of war against Iran would only create unnecessary suffering for this population.

Beyond the military dimension, there is also an ideological and cultural issue that is often ignored. In several contemporary Kurdish political circles – especially those influenced by Western-backed structures – it has become common to adopt cultural agendas aligned with Western liberal discourse, including progressive identity politics and concepts associated with the so-called “woke” culture, as seen in the feminist and “queer” battalions in Syria.

While these agendas may resonate in certain Western political environments, they often distance Kurdish movements from the sociopolitical realities of the Middle East. Rather than strengthening their regional position, this alignment deepens the perception that some Kurdish groups act as extensions of external geopolitical projects. If the real goal is to achieve lasting political representation and stability for Kurdish communities, the path is likely a different one.

Historically, stateless peoples who achieved recognition and political rights did so through institutional integration and negotiation within the states in which they lived – not through separatism, the importation of foreign ideas, and permanent insurgencies fueled by external powers.

In this sense, the most rational strategy for the Kurds would be to abandon the role of auxiliary force for Western agendas. Instead of serving as cannon fodder in conflicts that benefit other actors, Kurdish movements should focus their efforts on internal political processes, seeking cultural rights, institutional participation, and peaceful coexistence.

Stability in the Middle East will hardly be achieved through the permanent fragmentation of the region’s states. On the contrary, peace tends to emerge when different communities find ways to coexist within existing national structures.

If Kurdish leaders understand this strategic reality, they may finally break the historical cycle of external instrumentalization. Only then will there be room for a future in which the Kurds cease to be disposable pieces in geopolitical games and begin to act as legitimate political actors within their own countries.

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Il mosaico della morte per mille tagli https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/03/08/il-mosaico-della-morte-per-mille-tagli/ Sat, 07 Mar 2026 22:21:37 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=891004 Si tratta di una guerra di logoramento strutturata. E la sceneggiatura è stata scritta a Teheran.

Segue nostro Telegram.

La difesa decentralizzata a mosaico dell’Iran – questa la denominazione ufficiale – viene costantemente modificata 24 ore su 24, 7 giorni su 7: questa è la strategia a lungo termine dell’IRGC, una morte per mille tagli progettata per dissanguare l’Impero del Caos.

Esaminiamo i canali interconnessi che permeano la palude incostituzionale, impossibile da conquistare e strategicamente catastrofica costruita dall’Impero del Caos.

La resilienza mosaica dell’Iran e la sua strategia a lungo termine; la tentazione per quel terribile culto della morte in Asia occidentale di passare al nucleare; l’inesorabile inferno degli intercettori che si avvicina;

l’incessante spinta della Cina ad abbandonare il vecchio ordine (accumulando oro, scaricando dollari); i progressi dei BRICS nella creazione di un sistema finanziario parallelo; il crollo dei vassalli americani, in diverse latitudini: tutto ciò sta accelerando un radicale riassetto del sistema.

E poi c’è Vladimir Putin, che con disinvoltura, quasi come un ripensamento, annuncia che alla fine potrebbe non esserci gas russo da vendere all’UE:

” Forse avrebbe più senso per noi smettere di fornire gas all’UE e spostarci verso quei nuovi mercati, affermandoci lì (…) Ribadisco: non c’è alcun motivo politico. Ma se tra un mese o due ci chiuderanno comunque il mercato, forse è meglio andarsene ora e concentrarsi su paesi che sono partner affidabili. Detto questo, non è una decisione. Sto solo riflettendo ad alta voce. Chiederò al governo di esaminare la questione insieme alle nostre aziende”.

Il deplorevole Cancelliere Bratwurst ha chiesto il permesso al neo-Caligola affinché la Germania potesse acquistare petrolio russo. Lo ha ottenuto. Tuttavia, potrebbe non esserci nulla da acquistare. Questa è una guerra energetica e l’UE, ancora una volta, non è nemmeno all’altezza di un mendicante senzatetto. Niente gas del Qatar, niente petrolio e gas russi. Ora tornate alla vostra guerra infinita ossessionata dalla NATO.

 Il bombardamento dell’oleodotto del CCG-petrodollaro

Subito dopo l’attacco decapitante di sabato scorso contro la Guida Suprema Ayatollah Kahamenei, l’Iran è passato a un comando e controllo decentralizzato e a cellule con un piano di successione a quattro livelli, lanciando raffiche incessanti di missili più vecchi e più lenti e droni sacrificali per consumare batterie Patriot e sistemi THAAD su scala industriale. Con questa mossa, l’Iran ha cambiato le regole del gioco già dal primo giorno di guerra.

Chiunque abbia un QI superiore alla temperatura ambiente sa che utilizzare 3 Patriot – per un costo complessivo di 9,6 milioni di dollari – per difendersi da un singolo missile balistico sacrificale iraniano è del tutto insostenibile.

Non c’è quindi da stupirsi che siano bastati solo 4 giorni di guerra del Sindacato Epstein contro l’Iran per mandare completamente in tilt il sistema finanziario globale. 3,2 trilioni di dollari sono andati in fumo in soli 4 giorni – e il conto continua a salire.

Lo Stretto di Hormuz è praticamente chiuso, tranne che per le navi russe e cinesi. Almeno il 20% del fabbisogno globale di petrolio non si muove da nessuna parte. L’intera produzione di GNL del Qatar è fuori servizio, senza alcuna ripresa in vista. Il secondo giacimento petrolifero più grande dell’Iraq è stato chiuso.

Eppure, il volubile neo-Caligola continua a sostenere che la sua guerra, che avrebbe dovuto durare solo un fine settimana, potrebbe protrarsi per cinque settimane, mentre altri esponenti del Pentagono parlano di un possibile prolungamento fino a settembre.

Prendendo di mira gli interessi statunitensi in tutto il CCG come obiettivi legittimi, e non solo le basi militari, l’Iran ha innescato una bomba a orologeria. Si tratta di un attacco diretto al petrodollaro (con la tacita soddisfazione di Pechino).

Teheran ha sicuramente scommesso che la reazione a catena sarebbe stata immediata, fino al panico come preludio a una nuova Grande Depressione generalizzata. L’assenza di petrolio, unita all’incapacità del CCG di difendersi in modo significativo dai missili/droni iraniani, significa la fine dei flussi di denaro fittizio di Wall Street. La bolla dell’intelligenza artificiale, dopotutto, è finanziata dagli “investimenti” del CCG.

Il nuovo bombardamento del Pipeineistan non è del tipo Nord Stream: è il bombardamento dell’oleodotto del GCC-petrodollaro.

Tutto questo sta accadendo in tempi record, mentre il mosaico decentralizzato dell’Iran viene messo a punto. Ad esempio, una serie di micidiali missili anti-nave – che non sono ancora stati utilizzati – sono coordinati dall’IRGC, dalla marina, dall’esercito e dalle forze aerospaziali. Lo stesso vale per i droni.

Anche se gli attacchi con missili balistici non stanno tenendo il passo con il ritmo iniziale vertiginoso, sono più che sufficienti per continuare a martellare costantemente le basi militari statunitensi (le cui difese aeree sono già in gran parte esaurite); per precipitare il culto della morte in Asia occidentale e il GCC in un inferno economico totale; e per spaventare a morte ogni angolo dei “mercati globali”.

E nonostante tutte le dichiarazioni di Washington da parte del viscido e buffo Segretario delle Guerre Eterne, decine di fortezze militari sotterranee iraniane cariche di decine di migliaia di missili e attrezzature rimangono invisibili e intoccabili.

 Mandare in bancarotta il modello di business dell’Impero del Caos

Questa è una guerra disperata per salvare il petrodollaro. Una potenza energetica come l’Iran che commercia al di fuori del petrodollaro è l’anatema definitivo, soprattutto perché il processo è accompagnato dalla spinta dei BRICS verso la creazione di sistemi di pagamento indipendenti.

L’immensa fragilità strutturale del CCG – i vicini dell’Iran – li rende una preda ideale. Dopo tutto, il loro intero modello di business è costruito sul petrodollaro in cambio di una “protezione” mafiosa degli Stati Uniti, che è svanita nella sabbia nei primi quattro giorni di guerra.

Segnale alla macchina da guerra asimmetrica dell’Iran per mandare in bancarotta il modello di business dell’Impero del Caos in tempo reale.

La prova definitiva è l’implosione del sogno bling bling di Dubai, molto più della devastazione inflitta agli interessi legati alla Quinta Flotta statunitense in Bahrein e persino di un missile balistico che ha distrutto il radar a scansione fasciata AN/FPS-132 da 1,1 miliardi di dollari alla base aerea di Al Udeid in Qatar.

Il crollo coordinato e in corso del CCG, già inevitabile, significa alla fine la fine del riciclaggio del petrodollaro, aprendo il gioco al petroyuan o al commercio di energia in un paniere di valute BRICS.

“Scacco matto” deriva dal persiano “Shah Mat”, che significa “il re è impotente”. Ebbene, l’imperatore neo-Caligola potrebbe non sapere di essere nudo, perché incapace di giocare a scacchi. Tuttavia, è sufficientemente preoccupato da iniziare a cercare disperatamente una via d’uscita.

 Il corridoio aereo Astrakhan-Teheran

Ora passiamo al ruolo della Russia. L’attenzione dovrebbe concentrarsi sul corridoio aereo Astrakhan-Teheran, affollato di voli cargo segreti. L’aeroporto militare di Chkalovsk, vicino ad Astrakhan, è il principale hub logistico del corridoio: cargo come l’Il-76MD, l’An-124 e il Tu-0204-300C fanno la spola coperti da un materiale speciale che riduce la visibilità radar e li nasconde ai sistemi di tracciamento civili.

I loro carichi arrivano all’aeroporto Mehrabad di Teheran (non sorprende che sia stato bombardato da Israele), Pyam e Shahid Behesthi a Isfahan. Si applica anche la logistica multimodale, poiché alcuni carichi vengono consegnati attraverso il Mar Caspio.

Tutto è coordinato dalla 988ª Brigata logistica militare di Astrakhan. Il contenuto dei carichi comprende componenti per sistemi di difesa aerea, moduli di guida radar, sistemi idraulici per lanciamissili e moduli radar di rilevamento a lungo raggio.

Inoltre, in base a un protocollo segreto, la Russia fornisce all’Iran sistemi di guerra elettronica all’avanguardia, tra cui una versione per l’esportazione del Krasukha-4IR, in grado di disturbare i sistemi radar dei droni statunitensi.

A ciò si aggiunga che l’Iran schiererà presto batterie S-400 complete, che gli consentiranno di controllare fino al 70% dello spazio aereo iraniano.

 Come lo stress economico-politico diventerà insostenibile

E ora passiamo al ruolo della Turchia.

Solo due mesi fa il MIT, i servizi segreti turchi, ha avvertito direttamente l’IRGC che i combattenti curdi stavano cercando di attraversare il confine dall’Iraq all’Iran.

Riflettiamo su questo: un membro a pieno titolo della NATO che trasmette informazioni operative urgenti all’IRGC proprio mentre il Sindacato Epstein si preparava alla guerra.

Ci sono almeno 15 milioni di curdi che vivono in Iran. L’ultima cosa che Ankara desidera è che i curdi in Iran acquisiscano potere. Nonostante tutte le insaziabili manovre di copertura del Sultano Erdogan, egli sa che non può antagonizzare frontalmente Teheran.

Deve bilanciare una miriade di interessi che mescolano la NATO, il corridoio energetico con la Russia, ma anche il corridoio energetico verso l’Occidente attraverso l’oleodotto BTC e il ruolo di ancora occidentale del Corridoio Centrale verso la Cina. Ecco perché il presunto missile balistico iraniano che avrebbe puntato sulla Turchia e sarebbe stato abbattuto dalla NATO non è stato un evento di grande rilevanza: i ministri degli Esteri Fidan (Turchia) e Aragchi (Iran) ne hanno discusso in modo maturo.

C’è una nebbia di guerra impenetrabile al riguardo: il missile potrebbe essere stato lanciato per danneggiare il terminale petrolifero BTC e i successivi droni lanciati sulla Georgia potrebbero essere stati progettati per colpire il punto più debole del BTC.

Nulla di tutto ciò è confermato e sarà impossibile confermarlo. Potrebbe anche trattarsi di una falsa bandiera, anche se Teheran potrebbe essere molto interessata a tagliare il 30% dell’approvvigionamento petrolifero di Israele.

Il BTC continuerà a essere in gioco, poiché attraversa la Georgia trasportando il greggio azero attraverso il Caucaso fino alla costa mediterranea turca. Bombardare il BTC rientrerebbe nella strategia iraniana di recidere ogni corridoio energetico che alimenta il sindacato Epstein e i suoi accoliti attraverso il Golfo, il Caucaso e fino al Mediterraneo.

Lungo il BTC, altre mosse logiche dell’Iran sarebbero quelle di attaccare l’oleodotto saudita est-ovest (che bypassa Hormuz); le piattaforme di carico offshore dell’Iraq nelle acque territoriali iraniane che gestiscono 3,5 milioni di barili al giorno; e l’hub di lavorazione di Abqaiq che gestisce la maggior parte del greggio saudita prima che raggiunga i terminali di esportazione.

Se l’Iran, sotto estrema pressione, fosse costretto a colpire tutti i suddetti obiettivi, non esisterebbe alcuna riserva strategica di petrolio sul pianeta in grado di coprire il deficit.

In questa infernale interconnessione di corridoi energetici, rotte marittime, catene di approvvigionamento globali, sicurezza marittima e prezzo del petrolio fuori controllo, solo i responsabili del Pentagono potrebbero desiderare di prolungare la guerra fino a settembre. L’Asia, l’Europa e tutti gli importatori di energia sulla scena internazionale eserciteranno la massima pressione per qualsiasi misura di allentamento della tensione.

La strategia asimmetrica dell’Iran rimane tuttavia immutabile: espandere la guerra orizzontalmente e allungare al massimo i tempi per rendere insopportabile lo stress economico-politico.

Traduzione: non si tratta di una manovra per un rapido cambio di regime da parte di un gruppo di psicopatici. Si tratta di una guerra di logoramento strutturata. E la sceneggiatura è stata scritta a Teheran.

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Até quando os curdos serão bucho de canhão para o Ocidente? https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/03/07/ate-quando-os-curdos-serao-bucho-de-canhao-para-o-ocidente/ Sat, 07 Mar 2026 14:48:31 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890996 Os curdos deveriam parar de importar pautas estrangeiras e começar a buscar integração em seus próprios países.

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Nos últimos dias, novos relatos sobre tentativas dos Estados Unidos de mobilizar milícias curdas contra o Irã reacenderam uma velha questão geopolítica do Oriente Médio: até quando os curdos aceitarão servir como força de choque das estratégias ocidentais? A história recente mostra que, repetidamente, esse papel termina em tragédia para os próprios curdos.

Ao longo das últimas décadas, os curdos foram apresentados por Washington e seus aliados como um “parceiro natural” no Oriente Médio. No entanto, na prática, esse relacionamento tem sido profundamente instrumental. Sempre que surge uma nova crise regional, setores do establishment ocidental voltam a olhar para grupos armados curdos como uma ferramenta útil para pressionar governos considerados hostis.

Hoje, a mesma lógica aparece novamente no contexto da guerra contra o Irã.

A ideia de fomentar insurgências curdas dentro do território iraniano segue o mesmo roteiro visto em outros cenários. O problema é que essa estratégia ignora completamente a realidade militar e política da região. As milícias curdas não possuem capacidade estratégica para enfrentar um Estado consolidado como a República Islâmica do Irã. Diferentemente de conflitos de baixa intensidade, um confronto direto com Teerã significaria enfrentar um aparelho militar sofisticado, uma rede de segurança interna eficiente e uma estrutura estatal altamente resiliente.

Em termos práticos, qualquer tentativa de insurgência armada dentro do Irã tenderia a ser rapidamente neutralizada. O resultado previsível seria a destruição das milícias envolvidas e o sofrimento das populações curdas locais. Aliás, a experiência recente em outros países já demonstra os limites desse tipo de projeto.

Na Síria, milícias curdas ganharam protagonismo durante a Guerra Civil e receberam amplo apoio militar dos Estados Unidos. No entanto, essa parceria revelou-se extremamente frágil. Quando os interesses estratégicos de Washington mudaram, as forças curdas ficaram expostas a ofensivas externas e a pressões regionais que não tinham capacidade de conter, como recentemente vistos nos ataques do governo da HTS contra as regiões curdas.

A situação foi ainda mais clara na Turquia. Ali, décadas de confronto armado envolvendo organizações curdas resultaram em sucessivas derrotas militares. O Estado turco demonstrou repetidamente que possui capacidade para esmagar insurgências étnicas em seu território. Em vez de avançar na conquista de autonomia ou reconhecimento político, o ciclo de confrontos apenas reforçou a marginalização dessas comunidades.

Esses precedentes levantam uma pergunta fundamental: por que repetir o mesmo erro em relação ao Irã?

A realidade estratégica indica que qualquer aventura militar contra Teerã teria um desfecho previsível. O Estado iraniano possui recursos militares, capacidade de mobilização e legitimidade interna suficientes para esmagar rapidamente milícias insurgentes. A tentativa de transformar os curdos em instrumento de guerra contra o Irã apenas criaria sofrimento para essa população sem necessidade alguma.

Além da dimensão militar, existe também uma questão ideológica e cultural frequentemente ignorada. Em vários círculos políticos curdos contemporâneos, especialmente aqueles influenciados por estruturas apoiadas pelo Ocidente, tornou-se comum a adoção de agendas culturais alinhadas ao discurso liberal ocidental – incluindo pautas liberais e conceitos associados à chamada cultura “woke”, conforme visto com os batalhões feministas e “queer” na Síria.

Embora essas agendas possam ter ressonância em determinados ambientes políticos ocidentais, elas frequentemente afastam os movimentos curdos das realidades sociopolíticas do Oriente Médio. Em vez de fortalecer sua posição regional, esse alinhamento aprofunda a percepção de que certos grupos curdos atuam como extensões de projetos geopolíticos externos. Se o objetivo real for alcançar representação política duradoura e estabilidade para as comunidades curdas, o caminho provavelmente é outro.

Historicamente, povos sem Estado que alcançaram reconhecimento e direitos políticos o fizeram por meio da integração institucional e da negociação dentro dos Estados nos quais vivem, não através de separatismo, importação de ideias estrangeiras e insurgências permanentes alimentadas por potências externas.

Nesse sentido, a estratégia mais racional para os curdos seria abandonar o papel de força auxiliar de agendas ocidentais. Em vez de servir como “bucha de canhão” em conflitos que beneficiam outros atores, movimentos curdos poderiam concentrar seus esforços em processos políticos internos, buscando direitos culturais, participação institucional e coexistência pacífica.

A estabilidade do Oriente Médio dificilmente será alcançada por meio da fragmentação permanente dos Estados da região. Pelo contrário, a paz tende a surgir quando diferentes comunidades conseguem encontrar formas de convivência dentro das estruturas nacionais existentes.

Se as lideranças curdas compreenderem essa realidade estratégica, poderão finalmente romper o ciclo histórico de instrumentalização externa. Somente então haverá espaço para um futuro no qual os curdos deixem de ser peças descartáveis em jogos geopolíticos e passem a atuar como atores políticos legítimos dentro de seus próprios países.

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So, are the Kurds really ready to fight for Trump in Iran? https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/03/07/so-are-the-kurds-really-ready-to-fight-for-trump-in-iran/ Sat, 07 Mar 2026 13:21:39 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890986 It is hardly surprising that after six days of war, Trump will be looking for regional partners to help him go ahead with a ground invasion.

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In recent days, a baptism of fake news has been hitting people’s social media timelines which mostly confuses readers about the real situation on the ground when examining the war between Iran and Israel/U.S. Few understand or appreciate just how much of it is being produced by Mossad and the CIA as part of the information war which is necessary, given how unprepared the U.S. was and how subsequently badly the war is going for Donald Trump. Even the messaging is a mess, with at least three versions of why the U.S. entered the war, with the final explanation given by Trump being that Iran is run by religious fanatics – a claim hard to take seriously given that Paula White-Cain, Trump’s spiritual advisor, has broken the internet with her speaking-in-tongues spasm at an evangelistic gathering.

Fake news is creating a lot of confusion and misreporting, yet it is hardly surprising that after six days of war, Trump will be looking for regional partners to help him go ahead with a ground invasion – when it becomes more obvious to him that this is the only way a country can be taken, even though the U.S. has an atrocious record of trying this itself and failing spectacularly.

And so, news of “the Kurds” being ready to fight for the U.S. against Iranian soldiers within Iran has to be seen in the correct light. Whenever you read sloppy western journalists’ copy and such terms as “the Kurds” are used, it’s worth noting that you’re in a grey zone of truthful reporting. The news which emerged on the 6th of March, of Kurds ready to fight in Iran, is partially true. One particular Kurdish group, an opposition group in exile from Iran, is ready to take up arms but have told journalists only if some of Iran’s weapon dumps can be destroyed first.

But there are two things about the Kurds in the Middle East always worth remembering. One, they are not united, despite being spread across at least four countries – Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. And secondly, they seem to be constantly betrayed by anyone who teams up with them, almost like a curse.

What’s interesting about those who have been quoted from this group living in exile in Iraq is that they have hinted that they take it for granted that America will short-change them. The problem with such an approach to any partnership is that if you believe you are going to be cheated, then there is only one way to prepare for it: to cheat those who you expect are about to cheat you.

It’s hard to know if these reports about this particular Kurdish group being ready to be part of – or be the sole member of – a ground force can be taken seriously. But it is clear to see that other Kurdish groups in the region are not following suit. In fact, the president of the KRG in Iraq has gone as far as to state that his government and its forces will not support Israel and the U.S. in their endeavours in Iran.

This doesn’t bode well for Israel and the U.S. The only real group which could and should sign up to attacking Iran would logically be the Kurds, who have always kept good relations with Israel, and so it could be argued that their geopolitics are aligned with those in Tel Aviv. It is speculated by some analysts that at one point Israel was even promising the Kurdish region of Iraq that it could look forward to becoming an independent country if it were to align itself more fortuitously with Israel. So, for the KRG president to go this far only shows a lack of confidence in the operation.

The truth is that the recent betrayal by Trump of the Kurds in Northern Syria – a disciplined fighting army which chalked up a number of successful battles against ISIS during the height of the Syrian war – has probably put the dampeners on any deal with the majority of Kurds. Trump dropped them and aligned himself with the Syrian leader in Damascus, despite years of the U.S. supporting the YPG. This move not only shows how unreliable and capricious his decisions are, but also that the attack on Iran is something which has not been properly thought through.

For the Iranian Kurds, they see an opportunity to slip over the border and try to take control of some of the Kurdish regions, in line with the U.S. and Israel’s idea of carving up the country into many regions.

Kurds in Iran have a long history of fighting against both the current Islamic Republic and the monarchy that preceded it. Both regimes have marginalised them, in particular during the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. It’s often reported that while they share a desire to see the current authorities overthrown, the Kurdish groups have also clashed with other opposition groups — notably the faction led by the former shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, who has accused the Kurds of being separatists aiming to carve up Iran. It would seem that the only group they could arguably align themselves with, as they seem to fight with everyone, is Trump. But how long could this last before this relationship turns sour and they then become an enemy? The Kurds themselves even have a saying which refers to the mountains as their only friends.

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The mosaic of death by a thousand cuts https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/03/05/the-mosaic-of-death-by-a-thousand-cuts/ Thu, 05 Mar 2026 13:53:45 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890962 This is a Structured War of Attrition. And the screenplay has been written in Tehran.

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Iran’s Decentralized Mosaic Defense – the official denomination – keeps being tweaked 24/7: that’s the IRGC’s long-term strategy of a death by a thousand cuts designed to bleed the Empire of Chaos dry.

Let’s wade through the interconnected canals permeating the unconstitutional, unwinnable, strategically catastrophic Empire of Chaos-built swamp.

Iran’s mosaic resilience and long-term strategy; the temptation for that ghastly death cult in West Asia to go nuclear; the approaching, inexorable Interceptor Hell; China’s relentless drive to ditch the old order (hoarding gold, dumping dollars); the BRICS’s progress in creating a parallel financial system; the collapse of American vassals, in several latitudes: all that is accelerating a radical system reset.

And then, there’s Vladimir Putin, just casually, almost like an afterthought, annoncing there may not be any Russian gas to be sold to the EU after all:

“Maybe it would make more sense for us to stop supplying gas to the EU ourselves and move to those new markets, and establish ourselves there (…) Again, I want to stress: there’s no political motive here. But if they’re going to close the market to us in a month or two anyway, maybe it’s better to leave now and focus on countries that are reliable partners. That said, this isn’t a decision. I’m just thinking out loud. I’ll ask the government to look into it together with our companies.”

The pitiful Bratwurst Chancellor asked permission from neo-Caligula for Germany to buy Russian oil. He got it. But there may be nothing to buy. This is an energy war, and the EU once again does not even qualify as a homeless beggar. No Qatar gas, no Russian oil and gas. Now go back to your NATO-obsessed Forever War.

The bombing of the GCC-petrodollar pipeline

Immediately after the decapitation strike last Saturday on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Kahamenei, Iran switched to decentralised command and control and cells with a 4-level deep succession plan, launching relentless volleys of older, slower missiles and sacrificial drones to consume Patriot batteries and THAAD systems in industrial scale. With that move, Iran changed the rules of the game alread on Day One of the war.

Anyone with and IQ over room temperature knows that to use 3 Patriots – $9.6 million combined cost – to defend against a single Iranian sacrificial ballistic missile is completely unsustainable.

So it’s no wonder that it took only 4 days of the war of the Epstein Syndicate on Iran for the global financial system to go completely bonkers. $3.2 trillion evaporated in a matter of 4 days – and counting.

The Strait of Hormuz for all practical purposes is closed – except for Russian and Chinese vessels. At least 20% of global oil needs are not moving anywhere. Qatar’s entire LNG production is off line – with no resumption in sight. Iraq’s 2nd larget oil field has been shut down.

And still, volatile neo-Caligula vociferates that his war that was supposed to last only a weekend may drag for five weeks, and other industrial-military Pentagon clowns are talking about all the way to September.

By lasering on US interests across the GCC as legitimate targets – and not only military bases – Iran set a time bomb. This is a direct attack on the petrodollar (to the silent delight of Beijing). Tehran certainly gamed that the chain reaction would be instantaneous – all the way to panic as preamble to a new, generalized Great Depression.

No oil, plus no meaningful GCC defense against Iran’s missiles/drones means no more torrents of Wall Street fake money. The AI bubble, after all, is being financed by GCC “investments”. The new Pipeineistan bombing is not of the Nord Stream kind: it’s the bombing of the GCC-petrodollar pipeline.

All that is happening in record time as Iran’s decentralized mosaic is fine-tuned. For instance, an array of deadly anti-ship missiles – which have not been used yet – are coordinated by the IRGC, the navy, the army, and aerospace forces. Same for drones.

Even if ballistic missile attacks are not keeping up with the initial, breakneck pace, they are more than enough to keep steadily hammering US military bases (whose air defenses are already largely depleted); plunge the death cult in West Asia and the GCC in total economic hell; and scare to death every nook and cranny of “global markets”.

And for all the chest-thumping in Washington by the oily, clownish Secretary of Forever Wars, dozens of Iranian underground military fortresses loaded with tens of thousands of missiles and equipment remain invisible – and untouchable.

Bankrupting the Empire of Chaos business model 

This is a desperate war to save the petrodollar. An energy powerhouse like Iran trading outside the petrodollar is the ultimate anathema, especially because the process is coupled with the BRICS drive towards setting up independent payment systems.

The immense structural fragility of the GCC – Iran’s neighbors – makes them an ideal prey. After all, their entire business model is built on the petrodollar in exchange for a Mafioso US “protection”, which has vanished in the sand in the first four days of the war.

Cue to Iran’s Asymmetric Warfare Machine bankrupting the Empire of Chaos business model in real time.

The definitive exhibit is the implosion of the Dubai bling bling dream – much more than the devastation imposed on US 5th Fleet-related interests in Bahrain and even a ballistic missile destroying the $1.1 billion AN/FPS-132 phased array radar at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

A coordinated, in progress GCC crack up, already inevitable, eventually means the end of petrodollar recycling, opening the game to the petroyuan or energy trade in a basket of BRICS currencies.

“Checkmate” comes from the Persian “Shah Mat”, meaning “the king is helpless”. Well, Emperor neo-Caligula may not know he’s naked, because he’s incapable of playing chess. But he’s scared enough to start desperately looking for a way out.

The Astrakhan-Tehran air corridor

Now for the role of Russia. The focus should be on the Astrakhan-Tehran air corridor, crammed with secret cargo flights. The Chkalovsk military airfield near Astrakhan is the key logistical hub of the corridor: cargoes such as the Il-76MD, the An-124 and the Tu-0204-300C are shuttling back and forth covered with special material that reduces radar visibility and hides them from civilian tracking sytems.

Their cargo arrives in Mehrabad airport in Tehran (no wonder it was bombed by Israel), Pyam and Shahid Behesthi in Isfahan. Multimodal logistics also apply, as some cargo is delivered via the Caspian.

Everything is coordinated by the 988th Military Logistics Brigade from Astrakhan. Cargo contents include components for air defense systems; radar guidance modules; hydraulic systems for missile launchers; long-range detection radar modules.

On top of it, under a secret protocol, Russia is supplying Iran with state of the art electronic warfare, including an export version of the Krasukha-4IR, capable of jamming the radar systems of US drones.

Add to it that Iran will soon deploy full-fledged S-400 batteries – which will allow it to control as much as 70% of Iranian airspace.

How the economic-political stress will become unbearable

And now for the role of Turkiye.

Only two months ago the MIT – Turkish intel – directly warned the IRGC that Kurdish fighters were trying to cross from Iraq into Iran. Let that sink in: a full NATO member passing time-sensitive operational intelligence to the IRGC just as the Epstein Syndicate was getting ready for war.

There are at least 15 million Kurds living inside Iran. The last thing Ankara wants is empowered Kurds in Iran. For all of Sultan Erdogan’s insatiable hedging, he knows he can’t frontally antagonize Tehran. He needs to balance a cornucopia of interests mixing NATO; the energy corridor with Russia – but also the energy corridor to the West via the BTC pipeleine; and the role of western anchor to the Middle Corridor to China.

That’s why that alleged Iranian ballistic missile allegedly pointing to Turkiye and shot by NATO was not a big deal: Foreign Ministers Fidan (Turkiye) and Aragchi (Iran) discussed it like adults. There’s impenetrable fog of war about it: the missile might have been sent to cripple the BTC oil terminal and subsequent drones launched on Georgia designed to cripple the weakest spot of the BTC.

None of that is confirmed – and will be impossible to confirm. That might as well have been a false flag – even though Tehran may be quite interested to cut off 30% of Israel’s oil supply.

The BTC will continue to be in play, as it weaves across Georgia carrying Azeri crude across the Caucasus to the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Bombing the BTC would fit the Iranian strategy of severing every energy corridor feeding the Epstein Syndicate and its acollites across the Gulf, the Caucasus and all the way to the Mediterranean.

Along the BTC, other logical Iranian moves would be to attack the Saudi East-West pipeline (it bypasses Hormuz); Iraq’s offshore loading platforms in Iranian territorial waters that handle 3.5 million barrels a day; and the Abqaiq processing hub that handles the majority of Saudi crude before it reaches export terminals.

If Iran under extreme stress is forced to hit all of the above, there’s no strategic petroleum reserve on the planet capable of  covering the gap.

In this hellish interconnection of energy corridors, shipping lanes, global supply chains, maritime security and the oil price going out of control, only Pentagon clowns can possibly want to prolong the war until September. Asia, Europe, and every energy importer across the chessboard will be applying maximum pressure for any measure of de-escalation.

Iran’s asymmetric strategy though remains immovable: expand the war horizontally, and stretch the timeline to the max to make the economic-political stress unbearable.

Translation: this is not a quick regime change stunt by a bunch of psychos. This is a Structured War of Attrition. And the screenplay has been written in Tehran.

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Trump ha tradito i curdi in Siria. E ora? https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/10/trump-ha-tradito-i-curdi-in-siria-e-ora/ Tue, 10 Feb 2026 14:24:37 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890523 Le relazioni in Medio Oriente sono difficili da definire e, anche quando funzionano, sono spesso effimere e raramente durano nel tempo.

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Le relazioni in Medio Oriente sono complesse da definire e, anche quando funzionano, sono spesso effimere e raramente durano nel tempo. Recentemente abbiamo assistito alle manovre strategiche dell’Occidente in Siria con la caduta di Assad, seguita rapidamente dall’insediamento del terrorista più brutale emerso dall’Iraq o dalla Siria dopo la caduta di Baghdad nelle mani delle forze statunitensi nel 2003: Ahmed Al-Sharaa, il cui gruppo scissionista dell’ISIS, Al Nusra, si è distinto per il suo livello unico di depravazione e brutalità nei confronti degli ostaggi occidentali, alcuni dei quali sono stati bruciati vivi, il tutto filmato e pubblicato sui social media per ottenere il massimo impatto. Il suo sostegno da parte di Trump e Israele ha scioccato molti, poiché ha confermato i nostri peggiori sospetti di anni, evidenziati da un’e-mail inviata da Hillary Clinton in cui si affermava che i terroristi sunniti, indipendentemente da quanto medievali e barbari fossero i loro metodi, anche contro gli occidentali, dovevano essere utilizzati per due scopi: uno, combattere l’Iran e i suoi rappresentanti nella regione; e, secondo, come strumento di pubbliche relazioni da fornire a giornalisti creduloni a cui era stata raccontata la “guerra al terrorismo” e che erano tenuti a essere agenti diligenti per mantenere viva l’illusione.

La più grande ironia è che quando Trump è entrato in carica nel gennaio 2017 ha adottato una guerra in Iraq e Siria – iniziata da Obama – contro questi gruppi terroristici, uccidendone molti e cacciandoli dalla loro città califfale di Raqqa in Siria con l’assistenza di consiglieri militari iraniani. Questa guerra fittizia era importante per la sua immagine e per i suoi rapporti con i leader del CCG, che fingevano anch’essi che quei gruppi terroristici dovessero essere affrontati. La verità è che, sebbene molti siano stati uccisi e le città chiave dell’Iraq siano state liberate, sia dalle forze irachene che dalle truppe curde (queste ultime impegnate nei combattimenti più duri), in realtà tutto ciò che l’Occidente stava facendo era creare un enorme teatro dell’inganno. L’intera operazione e la sua filosofia erano come il Truman Show. È stato un grande atto di inganno. La realtà era che l’ISIS era uno strumento estremamente utile per gli Stati Uniti e l’Occidente, principalmente come arma brutale contro le forze di Assad, e che al mondo dovevano essere date alcune garanzie che i dollari o gli euro dei contribuenti occidentali non stavano sostenendo la sua barbarie in nome dell’egemonia statunitense. Un’altra scomoda realtà era che l’ISIS e Nusra, sebbene frammentati, cadevano in due grandi campi per gli americani: quelli che potevano essere effettivamente pagati e controllati e quelli che non potevano. Quando molte di queste città furono conquistate, furono create delle “rotte di fuga” per consentire a migliaia di persone di andarsene e stabilirsi altrove. Molti si trasferirono nella parte sud-orientale della Siria, vicino a una base statunitense.

In tutto questo caos, c’era anche un partner degli Stati Uniti che è stato utilizzato come strumento sia contro Assad che contro l’ISIS: i curdi. Il loro esercito, guidato principalmente dal PKK e chiamato YPG (Unità di protezione popolare), era composto da combattenti formidabili e si è rivelato molto utile agli americani durante l’intera guerra intrapresa per rovesciare Assad. Nel 2013, l’ISIS ha ottenuto una serie di conquiste territoriali in Siria, in particolare la città di Raqqa, che i jihadisti avevano dichiarato loro capitale. Il mondo è rimasto sconvolto dalla portata della brutalità, caratterizzata da decapitazioni pubbliche, schiavitù sessuale, torture e tentativi di genocidio del popolo yazidi. Per un certo periodo i giornalisti hanno scritto numerosi articoli sulle ragazze yazidi comprate come schiave sessuali e su come venivano trattate dai loro nuovi mariti dell’ISIS, molti dei quali provenivano dal Regno Unito e non parlavano nemmeno l’arabo.

E non dovremmo mai dimenticare che questi gruppi hanno anche istigato e ispirato atti di terrorismo in tutto il mondo.

Pertanto, l’Occidente ha un grande debito nei loro confronti per il loro impegno nella lotta contro l’ISIS e Nusra, ma in questa confusione di geopolitica ambigua che nessuno riesce a districare, men che meno lo stesso Trump, sono stati semplicemente abbandonati dal presidente Trump, con grande soddisfazione, ovviamente, del presidente Erdogan della Turchia. Proprio di recente alcune città chiave nel nord della Siria sono state conquistate dalle forze siriane, dando ad Al-Sharaa più territorio nella regione che controlla tutto il petrolio, lo stesso petrolio che per anni è stato spedito e venduto a Israele a prezzi ridotti e che dipende dalle strade che attraversano la Turchia. Non è chiaro cosa accadrà a quei convogli di petroliere, ma la vittoria di cui gode il leader siriano gli conferisce ora un vantaggio su Israele, che alcuni potrebbero vedere come un vantaggio di Trump. Trump ha abbandonato i curdi come mossa strategica per mostrare a Bibi la forza che esercita? È anche un modo per costruire una nuova struttura di potere con Erdogan ora pronto a distruggere il PKK? Inoltre, è un indizio del fatto che sta per ritirare tutte le forze statunitensi dall’Iraq, dato che è un segreto di Pulcinella che la base nel nord della Siria fosse un punto di rifornimento per loro? Se sta pianificando un attacco all’Iran, potrebbe prendere in considerazione la possibilità di ritirarle completamente dall’Iraq, il che spiegherebbe e giustificherebbe il motivo per cui non desidera più alcuna forza statunitense anche nel nord della Siria. È difficile vedere una logica nelle sue idee contrastanti, ma tradire i curdi può essere considerato solo poco saggio. Gli esperti di Medio Oriente saranno pronti a sottolineare che non è il primo presidente degli Stati Uniti a farlo – sia Ford che Nixon li hanno traditi e hanno stretto un accordo con Saddam Hussein nel 1975 – e che tutte le partnership con i curdi sono generalmente di breve durata, quindi lo hanno comunque tenuto conto nelle loro prospettive geopolitiche. Tuttavia, si potrebbe pensare che per qualsiasi tipo di intervento militare contro l’Iran egli avrebbe bisogno di tutti gli alleati che può raccogliere, dato che gli Stati arabi del CCG hanno già dichiarato la loro neutralità in qualsiasi guerra che dovesse scoppiare. L’America può permettersi un nuovo nemico che cerca vendetta nella regione?

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Trump knifes the Kurds in Syria in the back. And now? https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/06/trump-knifes-kurds-in-syria-in-back-and-now/ Fri, 06 Feb 2026 09:00:25 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890440 Relationships in the Middle East are hard to define and even when they work are often ephemeral and seldom last the course

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Relationships in the Middle East are hard to define and even when they work are often ephemeral and seldom last the course. Recently we have seen the smoke and mirrors of how the west operates in Syria with the downfall of Assad followed swiftly by the installation of the most brutal terrorist to emerge from Iraq or Syria since Baghdad fell to U.S. forces in 2003: Ahmed Al-Sharaa, whose ISIS splinter group Al Nusra was marked by its unique level of depravity and brutality against western hostages, some of whom were burned alive – all filmed and placed on social media for maximum impact. His support by Trump and Israel shocked many as it confirmed our worst suspicions for years, highlighted by an email sent by Hillary Clinton which stated that Sunni-based terrorists, no matter how medieval and barbaric their methods – even against westerners – were to be used for two purposes: one, to fight Iran and its proxies in the region; and two, for PR fodder to give to gullible journalists who were told about the “war against terrorism” and obliged to be the dutiful agents to keep the illusion alive.

The biggest irony is that when Trump took office in January 2017 he adopted a war in Iraq and Syria – which Obama started – against these terror groups, killing many of them and driving them out of their caliphate city Raqqa in Syria with the assistance of Iranian military advisers. This phoney war was important for his profile and his relations with GCC leaders who also pretended that those terror groups needed dealing with. The truth is that, although many were killed and key cities in Iraq were liberated, both by Iraqi forces and Kurdish troops (the latter doing the tougher fighting), in reality all the West was doing was creating one huge theatre of deception. The entire operation and its ethos was The Truman Show. It was a great act of deceit. The reality was that ISIS was a hugely useful tool for the U.S. and the West mainly as a brutal weapon against Assad forces and that the world needed to be shown some assurances that western tax payers’ dollars or euros were not supporting its barbarity all in the name of U.S. hegemony. Another awkward reality was that ISIS and Nusra, although splintered, fell into two broad camps for the Americans: those who could actually be paid and controlled and those who couldn’t. When many of these cities were taken, ‘rat lines’ were created to allow thousands to leave and set up elsewhere. Many moved down to the south eastern part of Syria close to a U.S. base.

In all this mayhem, there was also a U.S. partner which was also used as a tool against both Assad and ISIS: the Kurds. Their mainly PKK-led army, called the YPG – The People’s Protection Units – were formidable fighters and were very useful to the Americans during the entire war waged to topple Assad. In 2013, ISIS made a series of territorial gains in Syria, in particular the city of Raqqa which the Jihadists had declared their capital. The world was stunned by the sheer scale of the brutality, marked by public beheadings, sexual slavery, torture and the attempted genocide of the Yazidi people. For a period there was a wave of stories journalists wrote about Yazidi girls being bought as sex slaves and how they were treated by their new ISIS husbands – many of whom had come from the UK and couldn’t even speak Arabic.

And we should never forget that these groups also instigated and inspired acts of terrorism across the globe.

And so for their commitment to fight ISIS and Nusra the West owes them a great debt, but in this confusion of duplicitous geopolitics which no one can untangle, least of all Trump himself, they have just been abandoned by President Trump, to the delight of course of President Erdogan of Turkey. Just recently some key cities in the north of Syria were overtaken by Syria’s forces, giving Al-Sharaa more territory in the region which controls all the oil – the same oil which for years has been shipped and sold to Israel at cut price and relies on roads going right across Turkey. It’s unclear what will happen to those oil tanker convoys, but the victory that the Syrian leader enjoys gives him leverage over Israel now, which some might see as Trump’s leverage. Did Trump abandon the Kurds as a power play to show Bibi the strength he wields? Is it also a way of building a new power structure with Erdogan now primed to destroy the PKK? And add to that, is it a hint that he is about to pull out all U.S. forces from Iraq, as it is the worst kept secret that the base in Northern Syria was a supply post to them? If he is planning a strike on Iran, he might consider removing them entirely from Iraq, which would explain and justify why he no longer wants any U.S. forces in Northern Syria also. Whether there is logic in his own conflicting ideas is hard to see, but betraying the Kurds can only be seen as unwise. Seasoned Middle East hacks will be quick to point out that he is not the first U.S. president to do that – both Ford and Nixon sold them out and did a dirty deal with Saddam Hussein in 1975 – and that all partnerships with the Kurds are generally short term, so they have factored it into their own geopolitical outlook anyway. But you would have thought with any kind of military venture against Iran, he would need all the allies he can muster, given that the GCC Arab states have already stated their neutrality in any war which kicks off. Can America afford a new enemy who seeks to avenge in the region?

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Is al-Julani losing his grip on the Damascus Caliphate? https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/01/24/is-al-julani-losing-his-grip-on-the-damascus-caliphate/ Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:26:43 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890210 Due to the incompetent foreign policy of American and European governments, the Middle East is back to square one – back to 2011 and a new war on terror.

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In recent weeks, we have seen how Caliph al-Julani – known globally as Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa – struggles to maintain control over his caliphate, formerly known as Syria. He is slowly losing his command over the territory and his grip on the Syrian people. Under his one-year rule, numerous massacres have been committed against Alawites, Christians, Druze, and, most recently, the Kurds.

The first major massacre targeted the Alawites. The most intense violence occurred between March 6 and 9, 2025, concentrated in the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus – home to most of Syria’s Alawites and Christians, including those in Safita and the Valley of the Christians (Wadi al-Nasara).

The massacre erupted on March 6, 2025, when remnants of Assad’s legitimate army launched coordinated attacks on the caliphate’s new security forces in cities like Jableh and Baniyas. These so-called security forces consist largely of foreign fighters who joined al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups to sow terror in Syria and Iraq – a conflict the West labeled a civil war. The trigger was U.S. inaction and illegal wars in Iraq, which created ISIS in Camp Bucca, unleashing a monster that remains untamed to this day.

In the West, the group was known as ISIS in 2014; in the Arab world, as Daesh. Sunni Bedouin tribes, still traveling between Syria and Iraq, also joined ISIS in 2014 and have since been incorporated into the caliphate’s security forces. In collaboration with other jihadists, they carried out the recent attacks.

The so-called Syrian army is no longer a unified force like under the Assad government but a patchwork of hundreds of militias – jihadists, pro-Turkish factions, Arab tribes, al-Qaeda affiliates, and foreign fighters, primarily from Central Asia.

Under the Assad government, attempts were made to educate the Bedouin of Deir ez-Zor and elsewhere, but these efforts failed. The Bedouin communities of Deir ez-Zor traditionally inhabit the Euphrates region and the al-Badia desert, with major tribes including the al-Ogaydat, Baggara, and Bani Khalid. The Bani Khalid tribe was responsible for the Druze massacres. They still live as they did centuries ago – with multiple wives, many children, and a brutal adherence to Sharia law, much like al-Julani and his caliphate.

Back to the Alawite massacre: in response to the March 6 attacks, forces affiliated with the new caliphate – including the so-called Ministry of Defense and various Sunni militias, including the aforementioned Bedouin – launched a counteroffensive.

These jihadists and Bedouin-jihadists went door to door, asking residents if they were Sunni or Alawite. Those identified as Alawite – men, women, and children – were often executed without trial. In Baniyas alone, more than 300 people were killed during a three-day terror campaign that included the execution of women, men, children, the elderly, and the sick.

Next came the massacre of the Druze, whom the Damascus caliphate views as apostates, along with the Alawites and Kurds.

The violence against the Druze began in April 2025 in Jaramana and Sahnaya, towns in the Rif Dimashq Governorate, after a falsified audio recording – falsely attributed to a Druze leader and promoted by the caliphate – insulted the Prophet Muhammad. More than 100 Druze fighters and civilians were killed, including at least 43 in an ambush on a relief convoy by caliphate-allied forces.

The massacres continued in Suwayda, southern Syria, where the U.S.-led uprising for regime change began in 2011 with the arming of Iraqi jihadists – remnants and paid mercenaries of the former Iraqi army under Saddam Hussein. Iraq, where the U.S. launched a bloody war under false pretenses in 2003, is the cradle of all modern Middle Eastern wars.

Violence against the Druze in Suwayda flared in July 2025, with the worst outbreaks beginning on July 13 after renewed conflict between Druze and Bedouin-jihadists. UN experts and human rights groups reported systematic atrocities committed by caliphate-affiliated forces and local militias. By the end of July, the death toll was estimated between 600 and 2,000, including at least 1,000 Druze civilians.

This was followed by a horrific attack on the national hospital in Suwayda, where witnesses reported patients executed in their beds or thrown from rooftops. Doctors and medical staff were also killed on the spot. Reported violations included summary executions, public beheadings, forced suicides, and sexual violence.

The caliphate’s most recent massacre targeted the Kurds, beginning in late December 2025 and early January 2026. Heavy fighting broke out in the Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo between Kurdish Democratic Forces (SDF) – formerly supported by the U.S. and Western proxies – and caliphate forces.

The Kurds, who have fought fiercely against jihadists since 2012 in places like Afrin and Kobane, now face many of those same jihadists in ministerial positions within the al-Julani caliphate. Violent clashes erupted on December 22–23, 2025. The caliphate claimed the SDF attacked its checkpoints; the SDF accused the caliphate of initiating the assault.

On December 23, the caliphate cut off electricity to the affected neighborhoods and imposed a blockade, restricting food and medical supplies. The Kurds faced starvation, and their hospital was bombed – a familiar tactic of the al-Julani caliphate, previously used against the Druze. Hundreds were killed. Female Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers were reportedly sexually assaulted, mutilated, and thrown from rooftops – horrors perpetrated by the barbarians the world now calls Syria’s new government.

Heavy weapons and shelling continued despite temporary ceasefires. The Kurds were eventually driven out during the cold winter, fleeing advancing caliphate forces.

The caliphate spins lie after lie for its naive Western allies, including the EU. But America, too, has shot itself in the foot with its appalling policies in Syria and the Middle East. By helping this puppet caliph to power, it fueled violence with now-immeasurable consequences. The caliph has opened the gates of hell: the the al-Hawl camp, where thousands of ISIS terrorists are held, has seen mass escapes after the gates were flung open.

According to an SDF commander: “Attacks on detention centers for ISIS fighters and their families in al-Shaddadi and al-Hol camps are escalating dangerously. Al-Hol Camp has been targeted by heavy attacks and attempts to storm it. Guards were attacked by military convoys, armored vehicles, and tanks, forcing them to withdraw. We have now withdrawn to predominantly Kurdish areas – protecting them is a red line. We don’t know what will happen to the camps; they are no longer under our control. Reports indicate many ISIS terrorists have escaped and joined the new so-called Syrian government forces.”

Even the belligerent Lindsay Graham, a staunch Christian Zionist, is now involved – but far too late. The massacres have already happened; these are the so-called peace interventions of the U.S. Now there is also a “Gaza peace board,” which has nothing to do with money, because violence in the new caliphate continues unabated for Palestinians, just as it did in former Syria and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon.

Due to the incompetent foreign policy of American and European governments, the Middle East is back to square one – back to 2011 and a new war on terror. Groups are being pitted against each other, and many illiterate factions, such as the Bedouin and the group to which al-Sharaa belongs, have not adapted to the modern era. They live as if in the Middle Ages, under Sharia law.

The West, including America and Europe, condemned the Assad government – yet under it, there was modernity, institutions, free education, and healthcare. These underdeveloped groups reject that progress and are supported by America and Europe, who seek to realize their colonial aspirations. The Middle East has been robbed of its oil by criminals. It is time for the region to develop and become great again, like during the Golden Age of Islam (8th–13th centuries), which contributed profoundly to science, culture, and philosophy – the very foundations of modern European civilization. Instead of gratitude, the West has exploited Arab countries to this day, fostering immense and lasting hatred among Arabs toward the U.S. and Europe – a dangerous sign the West would be wise to heed.

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What does the claim that ‘Turkey and the SDF met in Incirlik’ indicate? https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/04/07/what-does-the-claim-that-turkey-and-the-sdf-met-in-incirlik-indicate/ Mon, 07 Apr 2025 11:00:13 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=884523

If the agreement materializes, it could either stabilize Syria or trigger new power struggles, reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East once again.

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Some media outlets close to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and reporting from the region claim that the SDF and Turkey met at the Incirlik Air Base in Adana to discuss the conditions of a “ceasefire.”

According to these unconfirmed reports, the meeting was mediated by the United States.

The SDF delegation, led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) leader Salih Muslim, reportedly established contact with the Turkish side through the Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nuh Yılmaz.

Allegedly, the discussions included the complete dissolution of the YPG and its eventual integration into the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under a unified command with the Syrian Army.

If the YPG ceases to exist through this integration process, Turkey is said to be willing to recognize the SDF’s civilian administration, with the process being carried out under the guarantorship of the Syrian government, France, and the United States.

Furthermore, it is claimed that if any activity against Turkey occurs either inside or outside Syria, these agreements will be rendered null and void, granting Turkey the right to conduct military operations.

If all these claims are true, this would mark one of the most significant developments in the new era of “U.S.-sponsored peace” in Syria.

What Does This Mean and for Whom?

United States: The integration of the long-supported SDF/YPG into the new Syrian structure — something the Trump administration openly considered a “burden” — and the resolution of a major point of tension with Turkey.

Syria: A crucial step toward achieving the much-needed “stability” for the new government, paving the way for international aid and fostering a new climate of “peace.”

Turkey: A propaganda victory in counterterrorism efforts for the domestic audience, strengthened influence in Syria through the success of HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) governance, and the reinforcement of its long-term expansionist neo-Ottoman ideological foundation.

The Bigger Picture:

With the approval of all regional stakeholders, the entire Syrian territory is poised to become a new central front for the anticipated large-scale “Iran operation.”

If these claims turn out to be true, it could signify a major geopolitical shift in Syria. The dissolution of the YPG and its reintegration into the Syrian Army under an SDF umbrella might present a diplomatic win for all parties involved—Turkey, the U.S., and the Syrian government. However, this transition would not be without obstacles.

The biggest challenge lies in the commitment of the actors to the terms of the deal. Would the U.S. truly support a Syria-centric solution, or is this another temporary maneuver to ease tensions with Turkey? Can Turkey fully trust that the SDF, once rebranded, will no longer pose a security threat?

Moreover, the fate of other actors in the region—Russia, Iran, and even non-state groups—remains uncertain. If this agreement materializes, it could either stabilize Syria or trigger new power struggles, reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East once again.

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