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To each his own style

When Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power in September 2022 after overthrowing the corrupt, pro-Western junta following a crisis of insecurity and instability, it was clear that the new course would bring many surprises.

With his government, Traoré initiated a series of radical changes in state institutions, inevitably postponing elections in order to rebuild the state and combat the jihadist insurgencies afflicting part of the national territory, as well as to emancipate the country from the colonial orbit still present. This attempt was successful, yielding exceptional results.

Now, on January 29, 2026, the junta issued a formal decree dissolving all political formations registered in the PASE, including those that had previously been suspended but were still operating internally. With this decision, Burkina Faso eliminated the entire legal framework governing parties, financing, the status of the opposition, and pluralistic political activity.

This is a move that, in the eyes of Western moralism, always a victim of itself and double standards, seems absurd, but in reality it is not. We are witnessing a series of sudden changes in the world that should make us understand that the old way of understanding politics and what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ has come to an end.

Let’s take an example from the past and try to bring it up to date in order to understand the political significance of Traoré’s act for his people and his country.

In ancient Rome, there was the institution of the dictator, conceived not as an ordinary form of government but as an exceptional remedy for dealing with situations of grave danger. Understanding how it worked helps us grasp a central feature of ancient political thought: the idea that, in times of extreme crisis, the survival of the community may require a temporary concentration of power.

In the Roman Republic, ordinary power was distributed among annual and collegial magistrates, in particular the two consuls, controlled by the Senate and the people’s assembly. However, when military emergencies, internal revolts, or institutional paralysis occurred, the Senate could recommend the appointment of a strong politician, the dictator, formally designated by one of the consuls. He received the imperium maius, that is, authority superior to that of the other magistrates, and ruled with very broad powers, not subject to the veto of the tribunes of the plebs.

However, his term of office was limited in time, usually six months, or in any case until the crisis was resolved. Niccolò Machiavelli dwelled at length on the political significance of the Roman dictatorship. In his Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, he writes: “Dictatorships were very useful to the Roman Republic, and were never the cause of its ruin.”

Machiavelli observes that the institution, precisely because it was regulated and limited, made it possible to deal with emergencies without destroying the constitutional order. In his view, the real danger is not extraordinary power in itself, but its transformation into permanent power. For this reason, he distinguishes between a dictatorship “ordered by law” and an arbitrary seizure of power: the former strengthens the state, the latter subverts it.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, too, in The Social Contract (Book IV), recognizes the need for extraordinary powers in exceptional circumstances. He writes: “There are cases in which the salvation of the country requires that the authority of the laws be suspended.” However, he specifies that such suspension must be temporary and aimed at restoring legal order. Rousseau looks precisely to the Roman example to argue that a republic can provide for emergency mechanisms without renouncing its principles, as long as the purpose remains clear: to save the political community.

We can also cite Carl Schmitt, the famous 20th-century jurist and political scientist, who in his text Political Theology states: “The sovereign is the one who decides on the state of exception.” Schmitt distinguishes between a commissarial dictatorship—similar to the Roman one, aimed at defending the existing constitutional order—and a sovereign dictatorship, which instead aims to create a new one. In the Roman model, the dictator was a commissary: he acted to restore the republican order, not to establish a different one. His legitimacy derived precisely from being an instrument of preservation of the order, not of arbitrary transformation.

The actual functioning of the Roman dictatorship confirms this theoretical approach. The dictator appointed a Magister Equitum as his deputy, concentrated military command in his own hands, and could make quick decisions without the usual deliberative steps. The other magistrates remained formally in office but were subordinate to his authority. However, republican custom and the time limit acted as a structural brake. The dictatorship was therefore an institutional interlude provided for by Rome’s unwritten constitution. The important thing was that it did not turn into a tyranny, i.e., a despotic, centralized government subject to the will of the tyrant, which went beyond the limits permitted by law. The Roman dictatorship was not born as a negation of republican freedom, but as a means of defending it in exceptional times.

The colonial problem and African solutions

The decision to dissolve the old parties and trade unions in Burkina Faso has aroused the curious indignation of some moralists, both ours and foreign. In reality, however, it can be seen as a prudent move aimed at ‘Africanizing’ politics. These formations, not only in Burkina Faso, have never brought concrete benefits nor have they succeeded in resolving the country’s difficulties. On the contrary, they have often contributed to aggravating the problems they promised to address. For this reason, the direction taken by Burkina Faso is considered legitimate, and it is not even the first African nation to have adopted a similar approach.

If the principle that “African problems need African solutions” is valid, then parties and unions modeled on European political systems—perceived as legacies of the colonial past and instruments of its neocolonial continuation—should disappear. Not only would they be ineffective, but they would even be harmful to the country they claim to govern. According to this view, they would not be working in the interests of the local population, but rather in those of the former colonial powers and new external influences, thus becoming foreign and unwelcome presences.

Multi-party politics is also described as problematic in several African contexts, as it allegedly fuels clan and tribal divisions. The same would apply to other countries that adopt imported political and institutional models that are inconsistent with their own history and culture. One wonders what sense Western-style political systems and languages make in realities that are neither culturally nor politically Western. Party divisions, behind ideological labels, would often end up mirroring identity fractures, favoring the fragmentation of the state. Instead, institutional models that are an authentic expression of local culture, developed autonomously, would be necessary, but only after severing the political and cultural ties inherited from colonialism and then reinforced by neocolonialism.

According to this interpretation, the old ‘European-style’ parties would have managed the state as private property, pursuing the interests of the ruling elites and their family networks through extensive systems of corruption. On the one hand, they guaranteed an internal kleptocratic regime, while on the other, they ensured that the former colonial power and other external actors retained control of national resources. They were, therefore, instruments of neocolonialism, whose corruption was also a means of exerting pressure and enriching themselves at the expense of the population.

The phenomenon of terrorism would also fit into this picture, described not as a true antagonist of ‘European-style’ politics, but as a complement to it. Neocolonial party politics and armed groups would divide up the territory in a fragile and violent balance, destined to continue over time. Paramilitary terrorism would thus become a useful tool for keeping the country in a state of permanent instability, especially when the old party system was no longer sufficient, even with the use of military emergency regimes.

Traoré, although he resembles a dictator (according to certain Western media outlets that confuse tyranny with dictatorship), is in reality a truly and fully African politician. In the African political tradition—which is extremely varied and differentiated from region to region, we must emphasize—there are institutions and practices that, while not identical to Roman dictatorship, have some functional similarities. The African continent has never had a single political model, but a plurality of systems ranging from centralized monarchies to confederations to segmentary societies without centralized state power.

In several pre-colonial kingdoms of West Africa—such as the Mali Empire, the Songhai Empire, or the Ashanti Kingdom—the sovereign (mansa, askia, asantehene) held strong authority, but often mediated by councils of elders, clan chiefs, or notables. In times of war or external threat, however, power tended to become further centralized, with a reduction in ordinary deliberative spaces. In present-day Ghana, formerly the Ashanti Kingdom, the Asantehene ruled together with a council of chiefs, but in times of war, military command took on a predominant position and general mobilization implied a form of strengthened authority, legitimized not by a formal suspension of the rules, but by the urgency of collective survival. This type of strengthening of the executive branch is reminiscent, in function, of the ‘commissioner dictatorship’ described by Carl Schmitt: extraordinary power aimed at defending the existing order, not destroying it.

The Ethiopian Empire, one of the longest-lasting African state structures, had a sovereign (negus or negusa nagast) with sacralized authority. Although regional nobility and local structures existed, the emperor could centralize significant powers in times of rebellion or external threat. Legitimacy derived not only from force, but from a theological-political conception of power.

Here we can see a parallel with the idea, also present in European thought, that in times of crisis, unity of command is essential. Unlike the Roman model, exceptionality was not always limited in time by a short term of office: authority was structurally strong, but could be intensified in extraordinary circumstances.

The underlying element in all these various forms was the restoration of community harmony, since the legitimacy of power derives not only from formal legality, but from the ability to maintain balance between groups, lineages, and interests. This is an essential element of the African political spirit (which Europeans have tried to destroy).

Political philosopher Kwasi Wiredu has highlighted how, in various West African traditions, consensus was the guiding principle of government, but precisely because consensus was fundamental, when it was seriously broken, decisive intervention may have been necessary to restore order. Strong authority was justified not as domination, but as a means of restoring collective balance, and the concentration of power was not seen as a value in itself, but as a temporary tool to prevent the fragmentation of the community.

We could cite many other examples, but let us take a few more recent ones. In the post-independence period, several African leaders theorized forms of strong government as a response to state fragility and ethnic or regional divisions. Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania argued that competitive multipartyism could accentuate artificial divisions, while a more unitary system would favor nation building.

Systemic corruption, terrorism at the doorstep, the disastrous economic legacy of the French franc… Under such conditions, in the case of today’s Burkina Faso, it would not have been possible to speak of genuine democracy or security, given the conditions left behind by the old colonial system. Those who today denounce the insecurity and spread of terrorism in these countries—well beyond the Sahel—did not do so then, and the reasons for this silence are easy to guess.

Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s act is not the beginning of a despotic reign of terror, but rather an exemplary act that leaves its mark on the international scene and reaffirms once again that Africa is and must be fully African. With all due respect to the old Western colonial power order, which should rather think about its own disastrous end, instead of extending judgments and legitimacy licenses throughout the world.

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It is a comical oddity that those working in communications are often the worst communicators of all – and journalists may be the worst among them. When I consider MENA governments generally, I see a clear lack of foresight in communication that others often miss. Government information departments nearly always operate on a linear model of message delivery, failing to grasp that communication must be a two-way street.

In the summer of 2016, I waited for hours in line at the Syrian embassy in Beirut to submit an application for a journalist visa to enter Syria. The lack of a reply, I suppose, is an answer in itself – but it underscores my broader point: communication is not a dark art, yet most governments in the region get it spectacularly wrong, especially in their dealings with foreign journalists.

To date, the limited influence Rabat once had with foreign journalists – up until around 2010, when attitudes distinctly shifted – has dwindled to practically nothing. Many might argue this is preferable: why engage with journalists if it means allowing them into Morocco to write negative stories?

I would beg to differ. Hardly a week passes without a negative story about Morocco – always written by a journalist based in Europe – hitting the stands, feeding the world’s appetite for critical reporting on the kingdom, especially in France. It is not simply that having fewer foreign correspondents in Morocco lends credibility to more sensational, sloppy reporting from newsroom stars in Paris. It also means nuanced subjects that once entered the media ecosystem now get left by the wayside.

So imagine my sympathy for Morocco’s latest dilemma: the struggle to attract Anglo-Saxon journalists to write about Western Sahara. This challenge was highlighted in a recent opinion article  featuring Rabat’s doyen of the international media scene, Dr. Yasmine Hasnaoui. What the author – and likely Dr. Hasnaoui herself – may not realize is the decline in English-speaking journalists in Morocco and how Rabat’s policies are directly responsible for this new media landscape.

With almost no British or American correspondents based in Morocco, how could an obscure subject like the Sahara ever see the light of day in Europe’s press? In 2007, when I arrived in Morocco, there were 155 foreign journalists accredited by the Ministry of Communication, many in the prime of their careers. Today, there are around 70, most of them younger and less established.

Rabat’s decision-makers would have you believe the world has changed and that this shift has nothing to do with them – that it reflects a new trend in London, Paris, and Washington side-lining foreign correspondents. But that is simply untrue. The real reason is that Rabat itself has, since around 2010, made it increasingly difficult for foreign correspondents to obtain accreditation. The flawed logic behind this is a kind of twisted arithmetic: the risk of negative coverage – or even the balanced scrutiny that foreign journalists bring to issues that could otherwise spiral out of control – outweighs the benefits of their presence, which include holding the government accountable for governance failures and human rights scandals.

But on major issues, like how Western Sahara is reported and debated, Rabat has clearly miscalculated. The Sahara receives no meaningful coverage because the very people in the Anglo-Saxon world who could have written about it – seasoned foreign journalists once based in Rabat – have all been run out of town. The irony is beguiling: Rabat’s elites now lament the lack of coverage on one of their most cherished issues, even though not a single major U.S. or U.K. newspaper has had a correspondent, freelance or otherwise, based in Rabat since around 2011.

Yet negative press continues to flow from London, Paris, and Washington – whether stories about the king’s private life, animal cruelty, protesters beaten in custody, or a missing French national. There are no longer journalists in Morocco to cover these stories with the objectivity and diligence needed for the country to present itself and its achievements in the proper light. The 2023 hit piece on the king by The Economist, delving into the private life of Mohammed VI, would likely never have been commissioned if Morocco weren’t shrouded in such mystery and enigma – a direct result of stifling foreign journalists’ ability to work in the country in the first place.

So what message is being sent? At best, there is no message at all. Those who are interested are left waiting and drawing their own conclusions – much like my own application for a Moroccan press card, submitted in Rabat last October, which is still pending.

With the World Cup coming to Morocco, this may be the perfect moment to adopt a more thoughtful approach to media relations and turn the page on this outdated method of treating foreign journalists like enemies of the state. Managed well, they can be your greatest asset – not only as communicators who can spark informed debate on issues like Western Sahara, but as ambassadors who promote the country to foreign investors.

For the past 15 years, I have watched Morocco fall on its own sword, getting this equation spectacularly wrong and paying a heavy price for its misjudgement. It is time to turn the page, leave the Assad school of public relations behind, and recognize that making Rabat a hub for foreign journalists covering North Africa – or even the continent – can only benefit Morocco. Consider Dubai and Beirut: both are media hubs that enjoy positive returns from journalists who are often more agreeable when reporting on their host country than on its neighbours.

Can Morocco really move forward with a Herculean PR opportunity like the World Cup while clinging to such an antiquated and flawed approach to handling the press? With so much at stake, surely Moroccans deserve better.

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Dangerous geographies

In 1944, while war raged in Europe and Asia, and four years before the creation of the State of Israel, a group claiming to represent Jewish refugees during the war approached the Ethiopian government to request refuge in the eastern Ethiopian province of Harrar and in the western part of British Somalia.

The confidential proposal, copied to the US State Department, suggested that the territory “be reserved for the immigration of European Jews and placed under an autonomous regime administered by the refugees themselves.”

Expressing great personal sympathy for the plight of European Jews, Emperor Haile Selassie rejected the proposal, stating that Ethiopia’s “sincere desire” to “help the victims of aggression is in no way consistent with the request that the nation itself reserve an entire province for any group of refugees.”

Somaliland, understood as the only regions of the former British Somalia now under the control of the Isaaq clan, eastern Sudan, in particular Darfur and Kordofan, governed by the RSF’s “Peace and Unity” administration, and southern Yemen, dominated by the STC, in which al-Hirak represents the main but not exclusive component, heir to the 1994 secessionist movement and, further upstream, to the clan aggregations that merged into the former Yemeni Socialist Party of the RPDY, constitute the three main crypto-states that the Israeli-Emirati strategic convergence aims to transform into fully sovereign entities through the recognition of their separation from Mogadishu, Khartoum, and Sana’a.

As noted by Africa expert Filippo Bovo, although these entities do not enjoy any recognition under international law, these secessions have in fact existed for some time. However, this cannot be taken as justification for accrediting them politically, thereby legitimizing the civil and fratricidal conflicts that form their basis. The Isaaq’s aspirations for independence are fueled by the subordination and outright “capture” of other clans within a state run as if it were a private possession. Hemedti’s RSF project to proclaim a state in eastern Sudan is steeped in the blood of ethnic cleansing operations carried out against local non-Arab or non-Arabic-speaking populations, following patterns that directly recall the Janjaweed DNA of this militia. Similarly, the revival of South Yemeni independence evokes the experience of a state that was already structurally unstable (like the other two), in which violent and continuous clan compromises were hidden behind the facade of supposed real socialism, with power conquered or preserved through bloodshed.

In all cases, these are historical identities that Israel and the United Arab Emirates, following their own ‘geopolitical rationale’, exploit and instrumentalise to dismantle unitary states, leveraging local allies and intermediaries. These include countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Libya, Rwanda, and Uganda, as well as a constellation of non-state actors such as al-Shabaab, IS-Somalia, STC, RSF, M23, JNIM, ISWAP, along with various clan and tribal factions willing to cooperate. The area concerned stretches from the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa, from the Nile Valley to the Great Lakes, from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The goal is to ensure the security of strategic routes of primary importance, as well as to preserve highly profitable forms of neocolonial extraction—from gold to critical minerals—while containing or neutralizing those states that, in their geopolitical doctrine, are perceived as significant strategic rivals in the region, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Eritrea. To use an automotive metaphor, this strategy of destabilization between Africa and the Middle East, after an already problematic start in Somaliland, now seems to be running on ‘three cylinders’ in southern Yemen: it would be more prudent to stop at the repair shop than to risk continuing the journey.

In an attempt to avoid a head-on collision with Saudi Arabia—which will not release hundreds of billions of dollars of investment in the US economy until Washington ends Emirati support for RSF, STC, and Somaliland—the US has notified Israel, the Emirates, and Ethiopia that it will not recognize Hargeisa’s independence. For Addis Ababa, which was aiming to reactivate the agreements with the Isaaqs provided for in the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (recognition of Somaliland in exchange for Ethiopian port and naval access, financed by Abu Dhabi), this was a significant blow. At the same time, Washington is increasingly at odds with the Ethiopian government, both over this issue and over its support for the RSF in Sudan, in coordination with the Emirates, as well as over the pressure exerted on Eritrea regarding the port of Assab.

Subsequently, Riyadh struck a shipment of weapons destined for the STC and coming from the Emirates in Mukalla, southern Yemen. The deterioration in relations between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates is becoming increasingly evident, and this attack is an unequivocal sign of this: the cargo, originating in the Emirates, was destined for an ally of Abu Dhabi but an enemy of Riyadh, in a port—Mukalla—where the Emirates have a presence, control, and investments. The message was also directed at Israel, which operates more discreetly in the same area. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia issued a veritable ultimatum to the Emirates, demanding the withdrawal of their forces from southern Yemen and the cessation of support for the STC.

The STC, in turn, fell into line, announcing the end of relations with Abu Dhabi, ordering the withdrawal of Emirati forces within 24 hours, and imposing a 72-hour border blockade in areas under its control, with the sole exception of routes authorized by Riyadh. The Israeli-Emirati strategy therefore appears increasingly jammed, also proceeding ‘on three cylinders’. The escalation between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, which today signals the willingness of these two actors to strike each other directly, inevitably involves other regional players—including some that have remained in the background until now—and will in all likelihood produce new flare-ups throughout the region stretching from the Great Lakes to the Nile Valley, from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula. For this reason, Somalia-Somaliland, Yemen, and Sudan are the first, but not the only, cornerstones on which it is now more necessary than ever to focus attention.

Activist and head of the Jewish Aid Committee Hermann Fuernberg first described the proposal in a 1943 pamphlet, emphasizing why the territory of Harrar would be perfect:

“This territory is large enough… [and] inhabited by a small agricultural population, which should not create great difficulties. However, it will be necessary to remember the lessons learned from the Palestinian experience, namely to prevent the territory from being invaded by people from other parts of Ethiopia and to keep foreign agitators away.” From this, everything becomes clear.

Never ever

In this regard, the international reaction has been very harsh.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Monday condemning Israel’s recognition of the breakaway Republic of Somaliland, after Taiwan became the first state to support Tel Aviv’s decision. Beijing expressed its opposition to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a “sovereign and independent state” and to the establishment of diplomatic relations with it, as stated by Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian. “No country should encourage or support separatist movements within other states to pursue selfish interests,” he said, while urging Somalia to end “separatist activities and collusion with external forces.” China, he concluded, “firmly supports the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Somalia and opposes any initiative that compromises its territorial integrity.”

Obviously, Iran, along with other Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, and Pakistan, rejected and condemned Netanyahu’s initiative. In an interview with Fox News, Netanyahu spoke of wanting to stabilize “democratic Islamic states” based on the model of what happened in Syria, i.e., placing terrorists as puppet leaders in order to keep entire areas of the country in check.

What about Somalia? Thousands of Somali citizens took to the streets in various cities across the country to protest against Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, denouncing the decision as a violation of international law and a threat to regional stability. Demonstrations took place in Mogadishu, Baaydhabo, Hobyo, and Guriceel, where protesters marched carrying Somali and Palestinian flags and signs condemning Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland as an independent state.

Somalia’s National Consultative Council — which includes President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, federal state leaders, and governors — called Israel’s recognition an “illegal act” that could undermine peace and stability in an area stretching “from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.” Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, leader of the Yemeni resistance movement Ansarullah, also condemned the decision on Sunday, warning that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be considered a direct military threat by the resistance.

The African Union reiterated its support for the unity of Somalia, rejecting any possibility of recognizing Somaliland, while the Arab League called the Israeli initiative a clear violation of international law.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also expressed strong condemnation, stressing that the decision sets an extremely dangerous precedent.

Similarly, the European Union reiterated its respect for Somalia’s internationally recognized borders. During Monday’s meeting of the UN Security Council, all member countries — with the sole exception of the United States — criticized Israel’s decision, warning that it risks further destabilizing Somalia and neighboring states. Washington refrained from formally condemning Israel’s recognition of the secessionist region, but made it clear that the US position on Somaliland remains unchanged.

Somalia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Abu Bakr Dahir Osman, accused Israel of deliberately promoting the fragmentation of the country, expressing concern that the decision could encourage the forced transfer of Palestinians to northwestern Somalia. “This disregard for law and morality must be stopped,” he said.

Israel’s intention, however, is clear: this geographical area of the Gulf of Aden marks the access to the Red Sea and therefore to the Suez Canal. It is an indispensable route for the business interests of Israel and Europe in general, including the United States. Military trade, crude oil, and many goods from the service sector pass through there. Israel has invested in the IMEC corridor, guaranteeing passage from Suez and Haifa, so total control of traffic in the Red Sea is an indispensable prerogative. But Israel is equally aware that this channel is under the strategic influence of the Houthis and, therefore, of the entire Axis of Resistance, which will leave no escape for the Zionist entity’s ambitions.

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Tucker Carlson recently exposed to the general public something already known by critics of neoconservatism: that Western interference in the Middle East has contributed to wiping the oldest Christian communities off the map. If Samuel Huntington replaced Fukuyama as the official philosopher and drew a map in which the Arabic-speaking world is Muslim, then the United States bombed the Middle East and sponsored Islamic radicals who did and do their utmost to expel or kill Christian communities. In the Holy Land, the work of cleansing is carried out by Israel, which does not differentiate between Muslims and Christians.

Protestantism copies the victimhood ethos of Judaism. Both faiths like to portray Rome as a tyrant. But if Judaism has a fresh Holocaust to victimize itself, Protestantism needs to look to global news to find Christian martyrdom in some corner of the world. Well, Tucker introduced them to Christians in Israel, giving a voice to the Pastor of Bethlehem and Mother Agapia, an Orthodox nun in the West Bank. In light of them, the “Judeo-Christian” concept sounds like a contradictory fiction.

Not long after, outrage against the persecution of Christians in Nigeria appeared on the internet. One of the celebrities who stood out was the Jewish comedian Bill Maher, a typical left-wing Zionist. In an evident imitation of those who denounce the genocide in Palestine, Maher told his audience that images of the genocide of Christians in Nigeria were accessible all over the internet, and that there is something wrong with you if you don’t care about them. Immediately afterwards, he practiced the only sport known to a large part of the Western right: denouncing the hypocrisy of the left. The public was then led to believe that the left was not interested in the Palestinians, but only wanted to protect the enemies of Western Judeo-Christian civilization: Muslims.

This occurred between the end of September and the beginning of October. In mid-October, Associated Press reported that Senator Ted Cruz (Tel Aviv Ted) “has been trying to rally fellow evangelical Christians and urge Congress to designate Nigeria as a violator of religious freedom with unfounded claims of ‘Christian mass murder,’ which the government of the West African nation has vehemently rejected as false.” Things got to such a crazy point that a Polish member of the European Parliament promised to rescue Nigerian Christians in a short time. On November 5, Trump finally presented Ted Cruz’s ideas and promised to take action against Nigeria if it continues to condone the murder of Christians.

The fact that this story of persecution of Nigerian Christians has had so much involvement in social media and even institutional politics is very worrying, because it demonstrates that a problematic mix of politicization with ignorance affects indiscriminately comedians, tweeters, Western parliamentarians, and the president of the most powerful country in the world. Let’s be clear: Nigerian Christians being massacred by Nigerian Muslims is simply impossible without a major civil war.

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the sixth most populous country in the world, with approximately 236 million inhabitants. Like other African countries, Nigeria still has distinct ethnic divisions, which often intersect with religious divisions (for example, the Hausa tribe is Muslim, the Igbo tribe is Christian). To make things easier, however, Nigeria has an important contrast between the Muslim North and the Christian South, the latter being richer and more developed compared to the former. According to a 2018 CIA estimate, Nigerians are divided into 53.5% Muslim, 10.6% Roman Catholic, 35.3% other Christians, and 0.6% other religions. Thus, according to the CIA, Muslims were only a slight majority in 2018. This month, thanks to the politicization of the issue, the Pew Research Center published an estimate that divides the country into 56.1% Muslims, 43.4% Christians, and 0.6% other religions. There is no official data. According to Pew Research, religious demographics are controversial in Nigeria, and the government avoids including them in the census.

If Christians happens to make up only 40% of Nigeria, that’s more than 94 million Christians – who are concentrated in the richest and most developed part of the country. Someone should tell the Trumpist Pole that he wants to bring another 100 million immigrants to Europe.

The images of persecuted Christians in Nigeria exist because of Boko Haram, which, like ISIS, persecutes anyone who does not follow its particular branch of Islam. Like ISIS, Boko Haram is a scourge for any Muslim-majority area. Thus, Nigeria’s problem with Boko Haram is similar to Brazil’s problem with factions: the state cannot or does not want to quell a paramilitary organization that oppresses its citizens. In Brazil, a country with an overwhelming Christian majority, there is even a Protestant drug cartel that persecutes Catholics and followers of religions of African origin (the Terceiro Comando Puro); therefore, Trump could, if he wanted, claim that Brazil condones religious persecution in general or even Christian persecution in particular (because of the Catholics, omitting the religion of the persecutors). Trump wouldn’t do it only because here there is no Muslim villain to condemn, and that’s what interests the Zionist lobby.

The mainstream of Protestantism has turned into Zionism – and has even ended up resurrecting the crusades for this purpose. If in Luther’s time Protestants did LARP of persecuted Christians from Antiquity to deny medieval Christianity, nowadays Antiquity has disappeared from the horizon and Protestants like Pete Hegeseth do LARP of crusaders. History is full of ironies.

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Finally, as we head towards Christmas during the first year of Trump’s second term, it would seem that the Moroccan elite can sleep well at night knowing for sure that there is no risk whatsoever of Trump turning the clock back on his position of Western Sahara. But they know this not through Trump’s actions or statements, or even those of Israel (which is de facto paid lobbyist for the Moroccans in DC) but through Russia. Yes, that’s right, you read correctly. Finally, Russia has pulled a rabbit out of the hat and offered the Moroccans a supporting vote on the Sahara, hedging their bets in the region, given their strong ties to Algeria. It was as though there was a race on between Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and Steve Witkoff, Trump’s envoy of sorts, to get an unofficial peace deal in place between Rabat and Algiers. And despite Algiers rejecting Morocco’s own proposal on how both countries could cool down their military spending, Putin’s move to bring Morocco closer was a stroke of genius as it calms tensions and creates an environment of dialogue.

During a press briefing in mid-October, Lavrov said Russia is ready to support Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara if all members of the United Nations Security Council agree.

“The Sahara issue, which has been on the table for 50 years, was initially heading toward a referendum, but the situation later changed,” Lavrov said. “The Moroccan proposal for autonomy falls within the framework of self-determination. This option can be a solution as long as it is provided for by the United Nations and in line with [UN] resolutions.”

He added, “If it is acceptable to everyone, it is acceptable to us as well.”

And so, quite suddenly, all the ambiguity about relations between Morocco and Russia disappears. Relations are back to pre-Ukraine war where both sides hammered out an association agreement in 2018 – with talk which followed that of Russia building water desalination plants and nuclear power stations. At the drop of a hat, Trump’s man in the region, has been outfoxed by Russia with Morocco now standing to gain on a grand scale in the years to come. Russia is a hugely important ally for Morocco as Rabat’s ‘non-aligned’ status just got an upgrade. Now, you could call Morocco ‘super non-aligned’ while it plays both dutiful wife or willing mistress to both U.S. and Russia concurrently. Quite a feat of diplomacy which Nasser Bourita should be congratulated for.

And yet, in many ways, it could be argued that Morocco has better relations with Moscow than with Washington and much of its ambitions will be linked to this relationship and what fruits it can provide. Secondly, with Russia behind Rabat, Morocco will be able to play the Russia card when it sees fit for whatever benefits which present themselves. It’s not quite the same thing with the Americans as, arguably, Rabat has no real, tangible working relationship with Washington, but choses to use Israel as its chief lobbyist there through the powerful AIPAC. The steadfastness of this ephemeral ménage à trois is hard to predict and certainly, the Moroccans feel short changed by what Israel has produced for them to date.

But being closer now to Russia can only be a good thing and a smart move as Trump now has two superpowers facing him when Morocco is discussed, both Israel and Russia. Much has recently been made of Russia’s move, with one media outlet pointing out that Moscow now will have a balancing act in the region as it struggles to keep good relations with Algeria, one of its top customers for Russian-made weapons, it should be noted. But those same pundits fail to see the irony of the statement as it is Morocco now who is the champion of manipulating its non-aligned status with the US which surely can only last as long as Trump remains in office – or might be shattered if he has a mega tantrum as he did with China recently. This is truly the definition of a ‘special relationship’ when one partner allows the other to fraternize, flirt and even share the duvet with one’s adversaries without the row in the morning back home.

Russia also made a smart move though. It showed that it’s a superpower and such powers can switch countries aggressive policies on and off at the drop of a hat, but it is also worth noting that Russia’s influence in the continent just grows and grows. When Lavrov tours Africa, it’s like you are witnessing a mega star in front of the continent’s leaders. When Witkoff arrives, it reminds people of that video footage of Germany’ former foreign minister arriving in an Asian capital, coming out of the plane and looking hard for even one dignitary to meet her. Russia moving closer to Morocco is a win-win as both countries profit from one another’s global relations and Morocco for many is seen as a good platform to reach out to francophone African countries. But if Morocco says to the Americans “we do love you, but we won’t accept you telling us who we can make friends with” then one has to wonder what impact that has on the continent itself. Who’s next? Perhaps this was Lavrov’s thinking. What a cunning old fox!

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Leading the way to a better future

A word of advice: keep your eyes on what is happening in the Sahel. And, above all, do not ignore the underlying reasons and the ways in which Africa is now rising again thanks to the Alliance of Sahel States.

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are three contiguous, landlocked states that occupy a huge swath of territory straddling the southern Sahara and the Sudano-Sahelian region. Together, they account for almost half of West Africa’s total area—about 45%—and about 17% of its population, with a combined total of over 73 million inhabitants (26.2 million in Niger, 23.8 million in Mali, and 23 million in Burkina Faso). These figures alone demonstrate the demographic and geographic weight of the Sahelian triad.

The societies of these countries share strong common traits, the result of centuries of cultural and commercial exchanges and geographical proximity that has fostered the sharing of social norms and practices, cultures still largely based on community values, oral tradition as the preferred means of transmitting knowledge, predominantly agricultural economies, and social structures strongly influenced by religion, which shapes people’s lives in a vertical openness to existence.

Like the rest of West Africa, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso experienced all the contradictions of French colonial rule in the 20th century, contradictions that exploded in a dramatic fashion during World War II. The official European narrative rarely mentions that a significant proportion of the soldiers and laborers employed to liberate Europe from Nazism came from the French colonies in West Africa, including present-day Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Thousands of Africans fought and died on European soil, and their war experience fueled a new political consciousness that paved the way for demands for equality and self-determination.

The first anti-colonial organizations

It was after World War II, in a context of attempts to establish socialism in Africa, that anti-colonial movements took hold and achieved significant successes.

Let’s proceed in historical stages. In Niger, the Nigerien Progressive Party was founded in 1946, affiliated with the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, a large pan-African and anti-colonial coalition led by figures such as Modibo Keïta in Mali and Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea. The RDA began by demanding equal rights with French citizens, but within a few years it moved to a position of total break with the colonial system.

In Burkina Faso, the Voltaic Union joined the RDA to build a common front for liberation on a regional scale. Socialism in Burkina Faso took on a particular connotation during the presidency of Thomas Sankara, who transformed the then Upper Volta into Burkina Faso, ‘the land of honest men’. His vision, inspired by Marxism-Leninism but deeply adapted to the African context, aimed at a model of autonomous development based on social justice, popular participation, and economic independence from colonial powers and international financial institutions.

Sankara launched a vast program of reforms that included land redistribution, the promotion of subsistence agriculture, and mass literacy. Thousands of schools, wells, and health centers were built in rural areas with the aim of reducing inequalities between cities and the countryside. His policy encouraged the role of women, abolishing oppressive traditional practices and promoting their active integration into the economic and political life of the country.

Burkinabe socialism differed from the Soviet model in its strong community roots and focus on self-sufficiency. It openly criticized foreign debt, considering it a mechanism of neocolonial subjugation, and rejected the personal enrichment of leaders. Sankare’s leadership was austere and charismatic, as he sought to build a sense of national identity and solidarity among citizens at a time of great difficulty for the African peoples of the Sahel.

Despite significant achievements in terms of social and infrastructural development, Burkina Faso’s socialist project met with internal and external resistance. A lack of resources, international isolation, and conflicts with local elites led to growing tensions, culminating in the 1987 coup d’état in which Sankara was assassinated.

Immediately afterwards, Blaise Compaoré took power, ushering in a thirty-year period characterized by a gradual abandonment of socialist policies. The new regime sought to normalize relations with Western powers and international financial institutions, liberalizing the economy and reducing the scope of Sankara’s popular reforms. This transition generated growing disillusionment among citizens, as promises of inclusive development and social justice gave way to corruption, inequality, and instability.

In 2014, a popular movement forced Compaoré to resign, ushering in a period of political uncertainty with weak civilian governments unable to respond to rising insecurity, exacerbated by the spread of jihadist groups in the Sahel. Subsequent presidents, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré and Paul-Henri Damiba, failed to stabilize the country or resume the path of social development, fueling discontent.

In this context of crisis, the military leader Ibrahim Traoré seized power in a coup d’état in September 2022, reviving Sankara’s socialist and independence dream and becoming a beacon for all oppressed peoples around the world.

The international situation had accelerated this process, especially due to the political presence of France and the UK. France’s heavy defeat in Indochina in 1954 and the intensification of the war in Algeria, which lasted until 1962, reduced Paris’s ability to maintain control over its colonies. Charles de Gaulle attempted to preserve at least part of the empire by offering a compromise: in 1958, he called a referendum on the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic. The African territories were offered two options: vote ‘yes’ to remain in the French-African Community, keeping the centers of power under French influence, or vote ‘no’ for immediate independence, but risking political rupture and economic isolation.

Djibo Bakary—founder of the Sawaba party (which means “freedom” in the Hausa language) and head of government after the 1957 elections—led the “no” campaign. Only Sékou Touré’s Guinea really managed to reject De Gaulle’s offer, gaining immediate independence in 1958 as the first French colony in West Africa.

Leaders in favor of breaking away were often subjected to internal repression, fueled by cooperation between colonial officials, traditional leaders, and the new African “évoluée” elite educated in French schools and destined to perpetuate the existing order. De Gaulle sent a new governor, Don Jean Colombani, who mobilized the entire administrative and security apparatus to sabotage the referendum and weaken the Sawaba, which was also opposed to French exploitation of Nigerien uranium. The “yes” vote officially prevailed thanks to massive electoral manipulation.

Nevertheless, Guinea’s victory in 1958, following the independence of British Ghana in 1957, forced Paris to gradually give ground. In 1960, as many as 17 African states—14 of which were former French colonies—proclaimed independence. However, this was largely a case of “independence with a flag”: the national symbol changed, but not the economic structure. French influence remained intact thanks to a dense network of ‘cooperation’ agreements which, through technical assistance protocols, defense agreements and, above all, the CFA franc system, ensured Paris substantial control. These agreements obliged African states to repay the infrastructure built during the colonial period (often with forced labor), granted France preemptive rights on strategic exports—particularly uranium—guaranteed French companies tax exemptions thanks to the principle of non-double taxation, imposed the use of the CFA franc controlled by the French Treasury, thus limiting monetary and fiscal sovereignty, and maintained French military bases with free use of infrastructure, including communications and transmissions.

The case of Niger is emblematic. A 1961 defense agreement with Côte d’Ivoire and Dahomey (now Benin) granted France unlimited use of military infrastructure and assets and explicitly defined the role of the French armed forces as guarantor of economic interests, listing strategic raw materials (hydrocarbons, uranium, thorium, lithium, beryllium) and obliging the signatory countries to inform Paris of any export projects and to facilitate the storage of these resources for French defense needs. In this way, the military apparatus became a real instrument for protecting the commercial and geopolitical interests of Paris, which did not want to leave Africa, too important to maintain its colonial financial power and manage its internal wealth on the European continent.

Autonomy and retaliation

After independence in 1960, Modibo Keïta’s Mali sought to embark on an autonomous path inspired by socialism: the creation of state-owned enterprises, the nationalization of key sectors, and, above all, the introduction in 1962 of a national currency outside the CFA franc area. The French reaction was immediate: diplomatic isolation, trade restrictions, and suspension of technical and financial assistance. The resulting economic crisis paved the way for the 1968 coup d’état by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, supported by France, which brought Mali back into the CFA franc zone in 1984.

In the 1980s and 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, Paris reformulated its African policy by introducing ‘political conditionality’: at the 1990 La Baule summit, François Mitterrand declared that aid would be linked to democratic reforms such as multipartyism. At the same time, the IMF and the World Bank imposed Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs): austerity, public sector cuts, trade liberalization. In Mali, these packages accompanied the return to the CFA franc in 1984.

The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was a second shock: officially, it was intended to boost exports and stabilize finances, but in reality it led to price increases, wage erosion, and widespread protests. This new phase combined economic liberalization and externally imposed governance reforms: a facade of “democratization” that consolidated neocolonial control through debt, privatization, and donor-led state restructuring.

These instruments of domination were gradually joined by a Western military presence, particularly from the U.S., when in 2002 the U.S. launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which marked the beginning of a lasting military presence in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania, later extended to Burkina Faso with the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership of 2005.

Since 2011, French and U.S. operations have intensified: U.S. drones, training missions led by AFRICOM, military bases in Gao, N’Djamena, Niamey, Ouagadougou, France’s Operation Barkhane, and the G5 Sahel joint force (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger). Much has changed. Religious terrorism has also been present, keeping the region in a state of precariousness and insecurity, becoming a scourge that is difficult to combat in many areas.

It was in that same year, 2011, that the planned destruction of Gaddafi’s Libya took place, opening the door to uncontrolled arms trafficking and the proliferation of jihadist groups. Libya was a regional pillar, but once bombed, it also destroyed the African Union’s mediation efforts. Sooner or later, the West will have to pay for the enormous harm done to Libya.

Towards ever greater independence

While military interference eroded sovereignty, transnational corporations continued to extract wealth from the Sahel under highly unfair conditions.

This chronic economic dependence has consolidated structural underdevelopment, limiting the ability of states to diversify their economies and negotiate more favorable trade terms. The result is permanent fragility that exposes them to external pressures and fuels political, social, and security crises, where it is not possible today to have only political independence, but it is also necessary to have economic independence.

Since the 1990s, coups and regime changes have become recurrent phenomena, reflecting elites competing for power in weak institutional contexts. Corruption, inadequate public services, and the exclusion of marginalized groups have undermined state legitimacy and increased public mistrust in many African countries.

The recent history of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger shows that the formal independence achieved in the 1960s did not mean effective sovereignty. From the economic mechanisms of “colonial debt” and the CFA franc to defense agreements that integrated French strategic interests, to the “conditionalities” imposed in the 1980s and 1990s and the Western military missions of the 21st century, old forms of domination have in many cases been transformed rather than dissolved, and current leaders who genuinely want to change the situation are faced with a complicated state structure that needs to be completely overhauled. What is more, it is a Western, European structure that needs to be readapted to the African world.

Understanding this trajectory is essential to interpreting the current political phase in the Sahel: only by placing contemporary crises in this historical context can we grasp the meaning of the claims to sovereignty and the radical choices made by governments and civil societies in the region.

Full and effective independence, with sovereignty and autonomy, is possible, but it is still a work in progress, it is not yet complete, and above all, it is a process that starts with an ideological consolidation of ‘who’ and ‘what’ these peoples are. This is followed by the choice of which political forms to adopt, according to their own sensibilities and traditions, even declining socialism in ways unknown to European experience. Driving out what remains of the colonialists, dismantling all their structures, and rebuilding their lands with an African spirit is a mission that will require courage and sacrifice.

One cannot fail to conclude with a quote from President Captain Ibrahim Traoré: “Together and in solidarity, we will triumph over imperialism and neocolonialism for a free, dignified, and sovereign Africa.”

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André Ventura (chief of Chega, a neofascist Portuguese party) ordered a Te Deum to be celebrated, Luís Montenegro (chief of Portuguese government) turned to the Constitutional Court and challenged, slapping with a fist on the palm of the other hand, “well done, well done, so as not to have oddities”. Paulo Rangel (Portuguese minister of Foreign Affairs) sent an email to Netanyahu assuring that we know very well how to honour his examples, António Costa sent an emoji with applause and even von der Leyen called the head of Portuguese government instilling in him the courage to continue fighting a dishevelled Constitution of the Republic.

For the peace of mind of all of us, let us rejoice for this, the plague of the dying people landed on a disjointed raft on the profitable sands of the Algarves will return to where it came from and from where it should never have left. Our privileged race no longer accepts being sullied and is not to blame for the fact that the hungry castaways, relying on the myths of our traditional hospitality and the recognized humanism of our distinguished grandparents, were born at the wrong time and place and, on top of that, with a skin colour that is too tarnished.

If they were like us, with the added advantage of having blond hair and blue eyes and had arrived in high-end cars from the lands of Galicia and Volhynia added to Ukraine, then it would be fine, there would always be room for one more, for many more.

But to dare to come from North Africa in rediscovered times of purification of the race is a complete unconsciousness, a defiant provocation.

The authorities and judges on duty looked at the laws with the aseptic and technocratic eyes that were theirs and did what they had to do: send them away.

The rescue entities set up some tents and, for that, they even had the good will to cancel a few sporting events; They gave soup and some reinforced sandwiches to the intruders, reserved some hospital beds for the weakest until they managed to get up and now the ward that is late. We fulfilled our evangelical mission and, from then on, they will die elsewhere because this is a matter that already concerns us.

It is true that these three dozen potential terrorists and criminals came from a country that is very much our friend and represents “our civilization” in North Africa, under the firm and democratic command of King Mohammed VI. Morocco is like our brother in the European Union, it is a pity that it has developed into a continent of uncivilized and barbarians, But we have been careful to make special arrangements with him so that he feels almost like one of us.

It has its pockets of poverty, of course. There are many Moroccans like the Portuguese, with no choice but to try to survive, with the dignity possible, in other countries. It is very likely that there are even tents on that land, but that is because those responsible for them have not yet received training in Loures and other creative Portuguese municipalities on the methods to end them.

Morocco, moreover, still has in its favour the fact that it is a kind of Israel much closer here, thus deserving the corresponding attention of the governments of the European Union for treating the people of Western Sahara as our ally Netanyahu takes care of the Palestinians. In this case, however, there are even more advantages for our side: as the champion of democracy that he is, King Abdallah VI can manage as he pleases the riches of Western Sahara that do not belong to him, especially the generous fishing resources. And it does so even in an altruistic way, allowing the brothers of the EU, among them us, as its dear neighbours, to share at will in the great banquets of prey in the territorial waters of Western Sahara, under the democratically impotent eyes of their legitimate owners.

King Mohammed VI is a friend, but friends, friends, business aside, and he cannot be distracted by the indigent people who live upset in his country and want to disturb the safety of others with clandestine manoeuvres and jumping.

Insurance precautions

Yes, this is not an exaggeration. Those three dozen human rags who risked themselves, attracted by the mirage of a better life, in the waters of the Atlantic and under the scorching summer sun, are a threat to Europe’s security. So, our rulers say and there is no doubt about them. Truly, I tell you that this hunger tourism is many times worse than barefoot tourism.

As if the expansionist urges of the Russian barbarians weren’t enough, we still have to face the terrible threat of the starving North Africans, envious of the brilliance of our lives and, perhaps, determined to sully the purity of our Portuguese blood.

The government and its “no means no” allies want to end these threats and put an end to the permissive coexistence with inferior peoples, yet another mania left over from the catastrophe of April 25, 1974. As our good friend Netanyahu so aptly puts it, regarding the “separation wall” that safeguards Zionist purity, “us here and them there.” This is how it should be, this is how it will be at the hands of Montenegro, Ventura, and their more or less “liberal” neighbours. Racism? Xenophobia? Segregationism? These are anachronistic labels, incompatible with the new times that are on the horizon, times of redemption established, as one hopes, under the crackle of periscopes and canes of admirals and generals, who have been away from leading the flock for too long.

Well, the mess that’s already going on here is enough, and it will take so long to correct it. Returning these three-dozen starving, menacing individuals to their place of origin is a dissuasive example that will serve as a warning to other would-be insolent individuals, and an indelible sign that things are changing now. Was a one-year-old child among the potential criminals? It doesn’t matter. The Prime Minister and also the President of Israel, Netanyahu and Herzog, our gurus, have already taken care to warn, regarding Gaza, that these people, the barbarians, are born terrorists. No softness, soft hearts, or contemplation. In this case, their elimination is essential to combat Hamas. Here, we must nip the evil in the bud so that we don’t have to suffer recurrences.

Furthermore, our diligent authorities did well to thoroughly investigate the wooden coffin—or “the boat”—some called it that—in which the invaders arrived. You never know what tricks and schemes the drug traffickers have, even disguising themselves as hungry people to do business. Off the nearby beach, however, a luxurious yacht carrying dozens of kilos of cocaine may have anchored, but who would suspect such a sophisticated arrangement?

In Portugal, studies by police authorities and social and sociological researchers are occasionally cited, stating that the percentage of immigrants involved in crime is negligible. Furthermore, the immigrant communities integrated into the Portuguese social fabric contribute their labour and remarkable generosity to the survival of the Social Security system. These communities, in so many cases, are willing to perform menial tasks for which the Portuguese elites no longer feel called. Some even claim that, in the event of a mass expulsion of immigrants, the country’s economy and the quality of life of the Portuguese would plummet.

This, our authorities assure, is nothing more than malicious manipulation by those who refuse to accept change and, ultimately, are complicit in a process of adulterating the original racial purity of the Portuguese, destroying much of the Lusitanian authenticity that Salazarism had so ably cultivated.

It is clear that the expulsion of the refugees (immigrants would be if they stayed here) who arrived from Morocco is nothing more than the application of the advice of the far-sighted Josep Borrell, when he was “minister” of foreign affairs of the European Union, and who recommended the defence and security of our “garden of civilization” surrounded by barbarians on all sides. The fact that the invaders were impoverished was not at all reassuring in terms of European security, because they would soon be in full threat mode from the moment they were given a bed, table and clean clothes, as has always been the case until now. No illusions.

In short, they are very well expelled, if only to die, a circumstance that, moreover, would relieve the demographic pressure on this overpopulated planet of ours, which would require the application of the visionary eugenics programs for which, as good followers of the genius Kissinger, some attendees of the Davos Forum are responsible.

Others will follow, if we let Ventura and Montenegro continue with their hands in the dough of government affairs. They will do everything to guarantee, in their own way, the security of Europe according to the model of von der Leyen, Macron, Kallas, Merz, Costa, Meloni, Tusk, Orban and other sociopaths, under the tutelage of the always reliable and lucid Donald Trump, illuminated by the beacon of democracy that is NATO. Thirty-odd hungry people from Morocco have had the audacity to defy the rules of this established order and will receive exemplary treatment. The great united and pure Europe has gallantly overcome this cowardly ordeal.

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Of course it’s all about Alaska. Here’s what’s in play. But it’s the shadowplay that’s even more exciting.

Across the world, for those who grew up in the Cold War Swingin’ Sixties, the temptation is irresistible to cast Donald Trump as Goldfinger  (but who would play Oddjob? Hegseth?)

Goldfinger, after all, is a powerful, ruthless gambler. His 21^st century motto would be “Obliterate & Plunder”. In fact, sequentially, an orgy of obliteratin’ and plunderin’ if the occasions present themselves. Everything subjected to the search for the Golden Deal. My way. The only way.

Yet now it’s possible that Goldfinger may have met its appropriate – collective – match.

This is what happened the last time a summit took place in Alaska, in this particular case US-China in a shabby hotel in Anchorage. That shook the geopolitical chessboard to the core. Trump-Putin might – but only under quite specific conditions.

There’s only one realistic, optimal endgame for Alaska: a joint declaration of intent, pointing to a follow-up, as in the next meeting to be held in Russian territory. A sort of starter for the long and winding road towards a real reset of US-Russia relations, including a possible settlement in the proxy war in Ukraine.

Essentially, they may agree to keep talking. Yet what really matters is what may be implied by the promise: Goldfinger refrains from imposing secondary sanctions on Russia’s partners.

That will constitute a tremendous BRICS victory (Iran excluded. Actually, two strategic allies of Russia would be excluded: Iran and the DPRK).

BRICS are actively building a coalition to stare down Goldfinger. The key players are Bear, Dragon, Toucan and Elephant – all four original founders of BRIC. Nightingale should be added later, as it is linked via geopolitical/geoeconomic strategic partnerships with Bear, Dragon and Elephant.

When it comes to the Alaska nitty gritty, the top Bear needs to consider all the ramifications of what is an imperative for the Russian General Staff and the vast intel apparatus in Moscow: unless Goldfinger minions stop weaponizing and providing precious intel to Ukraine is all its forms, the mythic “ceasefire” that Goldfinger and the pack of toothless chihuahuas in Europe desperately want will be just an intermission to allow Ukraine to rearm to the hilt.

That’s a tough call for the top Bear: he has to placate his domestic, radical critics who blast him for sitting down with the enemy, and at the same time he must deliver the goods to his under-siege BRICS allies.

BRICS counteract Goldfinger’s Plunder tactics

Bear, Dragon, Toucan and Elephant are involved in breathless telephone diplomacy to articulate their collective response to Goldfinger’s Tariff/Plunder drive.

Examples. Modi on Brazil: “A strong, people-centric partnership between Global South nations benefits everyone.”

Lula on India: “Brazil and India are, so far, the two most affected countries. We reaffirmed the importance of defending multilateralism and the need to address the challenges of the current situation.”

Xi to Lula: China backs Brazil to defend its national sovereignty; BRICS is “a key platform for building consensus in the Global South.”

Goldfinger’s Tariff Plunder works in several ways.

On India: because New Delhi refuses to open its vast agricultural market to tariff-free Made in USA imports (45% of India’s population directly depends on agriculture); and because India buys Russian oil at much-needed discount prices.

On Brazil: because the ultimate target is regime change and free reign to plunder Brazil’s natural wealth.

So far, Goldfinger’s Plunder antics have been stellar when it comes to engineering their own blowback: from allienating even allies – see abject European submission – to de facto burying multilateral trade, not to mention international law.

Example: just a few hours before the tariff “pause” on Made in China products was about to expire, Goldfinger signed an executive order extending the deadline for another 90 days. Translation: TACO, all over again. If the tariff “pause” went through, the economy of the $37 trillion-indebted “indispensable nation” would be in even more dire straits.

Then there’s Goldfinger’s possible Arctic gameplay, already examined here. There’s virtually no evidence Russia would allow the US to participate in the development of the Arctic-wide Northern Sea Route (NSR), or Arctic Silk Road in Chinese terminology.

The role of Russia’s Atomflot – 11 nuclear icebreakers, 9 of them in action, 2 being built, including Project 10510 Rossiya, a behemoth capable of navigating anywhere in the Arctic anytime – in parallel with Russia’s astonishing arsenal of new weapons systems, these are absolutely key variables on any serious discussion on any possible US-Russia partnership post-Alaska.

Goldfinger’s obsession to cage Nightingale

Now let’s look at Nightingale – an immensely complex case. Goldfinger has totally embarked on a multi-track maximum pressure/tension remix against Iran: forcing Hezbollah to disarm; forcing the collapse of Lebanon into factional war; legitimizing the “al-Qaeda R Us” dismemberment of Syria; forcing snapback UN-backed sanctions on Tehran.

Then came the Goldfinger-hailed “historic peace summit” with Azerbaijan’s Aliyev and Armenia’s Pashinyan.

Well, what Baku and Yerevan really signed under Goldfinger’s watchful eye is not a peace deal: it’s a mere memorandum of understanding (MOU).

Their Joint Declaration is extremely vague – and non-binding. What is promised is a “let’s keep talking” set up: “We acknowledged the need to continue further actions to achieve the signing and ultimate ratification of the [Peace] Agreement.”

It remains to be seen what happens with the much-ballyhooed 99-year American grip on the Zangezur corridor – trimphally named Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) – complete with grabbing 40% of its revenues (Armenia would get only 30%) and placing 1,000 American mercenaries to patrol Armenian territory, right south of Nightingale’s borders.

The big story is of course Goldfinger eager to snatch at least one connectivity corridor in southern Eurasia – in the strategic south Caucasus, using a gangster-minded MI6 asset (Aliyev) and a national traitor (meek Pashinyan), which will be discarded and/or sweetened in due time. Crucially, NATO membership was offered to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Deep State’s game plan is total control: what really matters is the opening to establish a NATO corridor all the way to the Caspian.

There’s no way Nightingale will let that happen, not to mention Bear and Dragon: it would mean a direct NATO threat not only to the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), which unites three BRICS (Russia, Iran, India) and crosses the Caspian, but also the Chinese Silk Roads, whose corridors traverse Iran with possible branch outs to the Caucasus.

Nightingale has already made it quite clear it will not allow any kind of change of status for the Zangezur corridor. And it has the necessary missile arsenal to back it up. IRGC Deputy Commander Yadollah Javani: Iran “will not allow an American corridor on its border.”

Wherever it comes from, Goldinger or the Deep State, the pressure by the Empire of Chaos is relentless. There will be no respite in the Hybrid – and otherwise – Wars on BRICS, especially on the new Primakov triangle (“RIC” as in Russia, Iran, China).

Alaska in principle should be about a reset of all US-Russia security matters – geopolitical, commercial, military, with Ukraine being just a subset. That will be a major stretch. It’s hard to imagine Putin being able to impress on Trump, on the same table, the finer points of NATO/US ceaseless plots to undermine, harass and destabilize Russia.

The most probable outcome is that the proxy war – and the SMO – will keep rollin’ on, but with the Deep State making extra bundles of euros by selling tons of weapons for NATO to dispatch to Kiev. But even without the promise of a new, serious, US-Russia security architecture, BRICS may still stand a chance to snatch a victory out of Goldfinger’s latest photo op.

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(Click on the image to enlarge)

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Trump’s threats to punish countries like India who buy Russian oil is starting to spook Rabat, as Morocco has more to lose than just trade if it upsets the Donald.

Have you ever wondered about couples who renew their marriage vows? Personally I have always found it odd, as, if a couple’s marriage is so rock solid, then surely the whole spectacle of the renewal isn’t necessary?

Just recently it was announced by Morocco’s own state media that Donald Trump had assured Rabat, once again, that he recognizes Western Sahara as Morocco’s. This message of assurance to the King, followed one earlier made by his own foreign minister Marco Rubio back in April. Why are these messages needed, you might ask? It is simply that Trump’s own erratic style has caused concerns around the world as many leaders have lost confidence in him and in America following his own controversial tariffs strategy which seems to be showing no signs at all of benefiting American businesses or addressing blue colour workers’ concerns over keeping their jobs. World leaders simply cannot keep up with the madness of the Donald for the simple reason that there is no real, long-term strategy in anything he does on the foreign policy circuit. Most is feral experimentation based on his foibles, whims and guidance by others who are blowing smoke in his eyes while working on their own agenda, like Israel.

The recent campaign in Iran has failed entirely in its objectives and made Israel weaker and more vulnerable; the tariffs hike is not showing any signs at all in what it set out to do – devalue the dollar, attract inbound investment in the U.S. economy, create jobs and enamel U.S. hegemony around the world. Recent figures just out show that the U.S. economy is floundering at best, while heading towards a recession at worse. And Trump’s handling of Putin, over Ukraine, also calls into question not only his judgement, his ability to work with heavyweight world leaders but also his lack of consistency in almost all foreign policies. Trump promised voters that he was for peace and wanted to end the killing, but just this week the Senate has approved 1bn USD funding for Ukraine.

His latest strategy to become more of an enemy with Russia by trying to directly undermine its economy through secondary sanctions is so dangerous, as is the recent childish threats made on social media, that it makes the possibility of a war with Russia more realistic by the day. It’s also another classic example of him doing a U-turn on his own initiatives, or at least those of his office, given that it was the U.S. who initially pushed India to buy Russian oil.

And so threatening India, Brazil and China that if they don’t stop buying Russian oil, there will be massive tariffs – some say 100 percent – on their goods entering the U.S. market is stupid on a scale that we haven’t seen before.

But it also worries a number of Global South countries who fear him changing his mind on other pledges that he’s made.

Trump’s second term in office has unshackled him from the cabal of advisers who often held him back from being entirely free to do what he wants at any given moment, simply based on the latest tantrum and insecurity attack. Trump 2.0 has none of these people and we can see it with how he is handling Russia.

It’s unlikely that India will kowtow to these latest threats, despite some reports indicating that they’re already looking for new oil suppliers. In the case of China, it is simply laughable that Trump can even float the idea that the U.S. is even in a position to threaten Beijing when so many U.S. companies are dependent on rare earths and minerals China has in abundance. We will have to see if Brazil responds to the threats recently made by one of Trump’s closest confidents Lindsey Graham, yet it’s unlikely going to change its policies. All that the foolish new strategy by Trump’s will achieve is that the BRICS projects moves forward at a more concerted pace, acquiring sooner rather than later its own currency and bank clearing system to challenge SWIFT.

But you can understand why the messages from Trump were recently sent to Morocco. Rabat must have been getting increasingly skittish about the secondary sanctions threats against those who buy Russian oil and wondering whether Trump will withdraw his earlier move which gave Western Sahara’s sovereignty bid to Morocco – made in the last days of his first term. Clearly these messages from him to Rabat are aimed at calming tensions in the ministry of foreign affairs in Rabat as well as the palace.

It’s important to remember though that Trump’s seemingly good relations with Morocco and his support for its sovereignty of Western Sahara is entirely down to the power Israel has over him and his administration. Trump probably couldn’t find Morocco on a world map but probably knows that Hilary Clinton’s campaign against him in 2016 received considerable backing from the King of Morocco. And so it’s this key relationship – not with Rabat but with Israel – which determines the Sahara deal. Morocco buys all its oil from Russia yet has been obliged since the start of the Ukraine war to give an impression, to media at least, that Moscow is persona non grata.

This was certainly the case during the Biden administration yet once Trump came to power again some analysts and commentators (including myself) made the erroneous assumption that relations between Rabat and Moscow would blossom again. Who could forget the photo of Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov having a cosy meeting with Morocco’s FM Bourita while both at a UN assembly just weeks before Trump won the U.S. elections a second time around? Most thought that with a Trump win, previous mega projects announced by both sides involving Russia building nuclear power and water desalination plants would take off where they left off.

But it never happened. The strategy of Mr Bourita, no doubt under instruction from the palace, was to continue to keep an impression going that Moscow was still a ‘frenemy’ until we know for sure that relations between Trump and Putin are going to remain good – given all the positive vibes at the very beginning of Trump’s second term. It was a wise move. If the relationship turned sour, then Trump may well, out of petulance, wind back his Sahara deal with Morocco if Rabat had openly good relations with Moscow. Since Rabat has kept it cool, it would seem that Trump has little reason to play this card.

And so Rabat continues the charade of pretending to have poor relations with Russia when in fact it doesn’t. The situation is very delicate and Mr Bourita has gone to great lengths to make sure there are no signs that full diplomatic status has been restored, despite the somewhat comical scenario of Russia having a fully functioning embassy in Rabat. Mr Bourita’s own officials have even blocked my own press accreditation application, as a correspondent for RT, such is the palpable tension over the matter, despite Russia’s own diplomatic corps talking with their opposite number in MOFA to allow me to have a press card. All to no avail as, despite me working in Morocco since 2007 for Euronews, CNN and many other media giants like the Daily Mail, Rabat deems it unwise to give me a press card with RT as such a move might upset the apple cart – a vehicle so dexterously yet delicately held together that one miniscule pot hole might send the wheels flying off, such is the tightrope that Morocco walks between Russia’s oil deal and Trump’s capricious relationship with both Morocco and Israel. Of course my blocked press card can’t be anything to do with Rabat’s new tougher measures which are designed to deter senior journalists settling here and breaking away from the offered narrative to go rogue and report on facts. Perish the thought!

Levity aside though, can the Moroccans trust Trump? Of course not, as why all this kafuffle of late and the reassurances that keep coming? Surely the more times you assure your wife you won’t cheat on her when you go on your latest oversees business trip, the more she will assume that you will do precisely that. And she’d be right.

The real worry for Rabat is that they and the Sahara endorsement are used as a card against Israel if Trump ever needs to demonstrate his perceived supremacy over Netanyahu and Putin simultaneously. Given Trump’s declining foreign policy conduits, the demise of the domestic economy, the Epstein affair and the failure of him to secure peace in Ukraine, there is no telling what Trump will do when the U.S. media start to turn on him. It’s starting with Epstein as the questions won’t go away but it is more worrying for him that the business press are going to have a field day with numbers in the coming months.

Trump may well seek solace in foreign policy and doing his trick – constantly changing policies to bedazzle a public who can’t keep up with it all in the press – while he struggles to grasp the rudimentary requirements of leadership. We cannot rule out U.S. troops being sent to Ukraine if for nothing else to boost his confidence and to distract U.S. media. And we certainly cannot rule out a major falling out with Netanyahu which could have calamitous implications for Morocco which has no defensive measures in place to defer the impact – no international media presence, no strong lobbying neither in London or Washington – leaving it vulnerable. Morocco always thinks of international diplomacy in bite sizes and hides behind the ‘neutrality’ stance. If Morocco ever needed its own billion dollar Al Jazeera type channel in three languages, it is now. Rabat always thinks small but there can be no better example of how this goes against national interests than the present crisis that Morocco currently has with Trump.

It might be time for Rabat to hedge its bets and improve relations with Moscow. But I’m not counting on getting my press card any day soon. America’s marriage vows with Morocco are due to be renewed again any day soon offered to a country that understands more than anyone how fake marriages work.