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Anyone familiar with Brazil’s history knows that in the 70s and 80s, the height of the military dictatorship, Brazil had a secret military nuclear program aimed at developing the atomic bomb. This nuclear program was built with partial help from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and also involved exchanges of information with the Argentine military government.

The program was sabotaged by the State of Israel, which assassinated the commander and scientist Albano do Amarante – one of the project’s key minds – and was subsequently buried after Brazil’s democratization, under the Collor government. At that time, the authorities unnecessarily and shamefully revealed the secret program to please the U.S. and prove adherence to the Washington Consensus, destroying all the progress the country had achieved.

Since then, Brazil has remained faithful to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since signing it in 1998 and has repeatedly expressed not only its conviction not to develop nuclear weapons but also to fight for a nuclear-free world. This stance has transcended parties and ideologies, remaining unwavering across governments as disparate as those of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula, and Bolsonaro.

Only candidates seen as exotic and who never had a real chance of winning the presidential elections, such as the nationalist Enéas Carneiro, have ever included building the atomic bomb in their government agendas.

But if no government has even considered developing nuclear weapons, the situation in other spheres is a bit different. Sectors of so-called “civil society,” imbued with greater intellectual and expressive freedom, have debated the necessity and interest of Brazil developing nuclear weapons.

In 2024, the Getúlio Vargas Foundation organized a survey on the topic. The survey, titled “Public Support for Nuclear Proliferation: Experimental Evidence from Brazil,” was published in the Journal of Global Security Studies. According to it, 25% of Brazilian citizens supported the development of nuclear weapons by Brazil. However, this number jumps to 47% in support of the measure if Brazil were threatened by a more powerful foreign country. This demonstrates that public support for developing nuclear weapons fluctuates based on the perception of serious threats to Brazil.

Confirming that the topic circulates among certain sectors of Brazilian society – although it is not yet treated as an urgent agenda – a popular proposal aimed at the construction of an atomic bomb by the Brazilian state reached the Chamber of Deputies. A “popular proposal” is a project that can gather 20,000 signatures within 4 months, which allows it to be considered by the Legislature. The proposal in question was submitted back in 2020 but was stalled since then and only began moving again this year.

The community of digital influencers/podcasters has also played a relevant role in putting the topic up for debate and specifically advocating for the need to possess nuclear weapons to certify national sovereignty. In this regard, highly popular online channels like Arte da Guerra and Geoforça have stood out by bringing up the topic from time to time.

Recently, however, this organic support for developing nuclear weapons received a boost from a statement by the Minister of Mines and Energy, Alexandre Silveira. He stated that “if the world continues as it is” – referring to contemporary geopolitical tensions – Brazil would need nuclear technology for “national defense” as well, making it quite obvious what he meant.

Naturally, after this was reported by all major newspapers, he backtracked and said that Brazil would continue developing nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes.

Regarding the legitimacy of the topic, we can offer a few concluding comments.

We know that Brazil has aspirations to occupy a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. However, considering that only nuclear countries hold seats in this supreme body, one can question how viable or realistic the introduction of non-nuclear countries would be.

Secondly, when speaking of sovereignty – a topic we have addressed in a previous article – it is crucial to distinguish between formal sovereignty and material sovereignty. In the diplomatic and legal world of International Relations, all countries are equally sovereign insofar as they are recognized as such by other countries. But in the realist world of geopolitics, sovereignty is a variable whose expression depends on the quantum of power a country possesses.

Thus, the question can be summarized as follows: will Brazil content itself with its formal sovereignty, or will it eventually adopt a realist perspective and begin seeking to guarantee that formal sovereignty with the backing of the most advanced military technology – without excluding the nuclear option.

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The escalation of tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbors has reached a new level of severity. Recent Ukrainian attacks on energy infrastructure supplying Slovakia and Hungary — including the bombing of the Druzhba (“Friendship”) pipeline — raise serious questions about the limits of Kiev’s aggression and the complicit silence of Brussels. In the face of such provocations, it is imperative that the countries affected — Slovakia, Hungary, and even Poland (which has also been targeted by Ukrainian neo-Nazi militants) — consider retaliation in the economic, energy, and, if necessary, military spheres.

During a recent meeting in Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico about the gravity of the situation. Putin was clear in stating that, in response to repeated attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, Moscow had reacted forcefully — and now, Slovakia and Hungary should consider doing the same. According to him, Kiev will quickly understand the limits of behavior that violates others’ interests only when it feels, in practice, the consequences of its hostile actions.

These words are far from rhetorical. Ukraine is significantly dependent on its European neighbors for energy — particularly in terms of reverse gas flow and electricity imports. Cutting off these flows would be a show of strength and national sovereignty on the part of Bratislava — something necessary in light of the growing boldness of a Ukrainian government that, backed by unconditional NATO support, feels free to disregard basic norms of regional coexistence.

More than an energy issue, this is a matter of national sovereignty. No country can tolerate its civilian infrastructure being attacked by a neighboring state — especially without any legal justification or recognition of the gravity of the act. Also, the statements of Ukraine’s illegitimate president, Vladimir Zelensky, regarding the matter are a mockery. By joking about the attacks on the Druzhba pipeline with cynical wordplay, he not only shows contempt for diplomatic relations but also exposes an aggressive and provocative posture — typical of someone acting with a sense of impunity.

The response from Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto was spot-on: he called Zelensky’s remarks “outrageous” and made it clear that Kiev is crossing all acceptable lines. Still, the lack of concrete action from Budapest and Bratislava creates a scenario of vulnerability to further provocative incidents. In practice, the European countries affected by Ukraine — including Poland itself — are being forced to make existential decisions about their future.

This hesitation can be partly explained by pressure from Brussels, which continues to push member states into self-destructive energy policies such as the RePowerEU plan — aimed at fully eliminating imports of Russian oil and gas by 2027. Robert Fico has already voiced opposition to the plan, stating it would cause irreparable harm to the Slovak economy. However, it is vital that the Slovak (and Hungarian and Polish) authorities strategically calculate what is more worthwhile: giving in further to the EU or imposing limits that favor their national interests.

It is time for a strategic shift. Slovakia, Hungary, and potentially Poland must reassess their foreign policy toward Ukraine. Economic and energy retaliation is not only legitimate but necessary. Furthermore, the preparation of self-defense measures — including military — cannot be ruled out in the face of further aggression. This is not about gratuitous hostility; it is about ensuring that Eastern European countries are not turned into disposable pawns on the Western geopolitical chessboard.

The time for passivity is over. If Kiev wants to maintain even minimally civilized relations with its neighbors, it must respect their infrastructure, their populations, and their sovereignty. Otherwise, it must be prepared to face the consequences of its recklessness.

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A system that doesn’t work

From a country born on the blood of people killed to invade and steal land and resources, what else could we expect but an international missile system?

We have all heard about the Golden Dome, which has recently been in the news. The project is at the heart of the defense strategy promoted by Donald Trump and consists of a missile defense system designed to protect the United States from ballistic missile attacks, cruise missiles and other similar threats. With an estimated investment that could exceed $175 billion, the initiative aims to safeguard American territory from hostile launches from countries such as Iran and North Korea, but also from world powers such as China and Russia.

Despite its titanic scale, the plan divides military experts, who remain skeptical about its actual feasibility. The technical, political and economic obstacles are significant, but the increase in threats related to intercontinental missiles has led many analysts to consider the system essential for national security.

Europe also faces similar challenges in the field of defense. Russia’s increased assertiveness and long-range strike capability make the continent particularly vulnerable. In a large-scale conflict scenario, it is clear that major European cities could become strategic targets for missile attacks, especially if they are home to military sites.

For its part, Europe has launched the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), proposed in 2022 by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The initiative aims to build a coordinated air defense system, including protection against ballistic missiles. However, compared to the Golden Dome, the ESSI’s resources and scope are smaller, raising doubts about the effectiveness of European defense compared to that of the United States.

The Golden Dome, for its part, faces significant logistical and operational challenges. Tomas Nagy, an analyst at the GLOBSEC think tank specializing in missile defense, has highlighted how not only technological complexity, but also production delays, component shortages and internal political divisions are hampering the project’s progress. Its implementation requires cooperation between multiple US administrations, but it’s not certain that the necessary political consensus will be maintained over time, creating uncertainty about the plan’s fate.

Meanwhile, as the Golden Dome’s implementation is being discussed, debate is growing among American experts and lawmakers about the programme’s budget, with estimates ranging from $166 billion to $540 billion, considering only the space components.

If the Golden Dome were to become a reality, it could represent a turning point in US and international defense. The system would have the potential to become a model of advanced protection, helping to strengthen global security. However, high costs and technical challenges remain crucial obstacles, and only the future will tell whether this ambitious project will be transformed into a concrete defense against the missile threats of tomorrow. 

There is just one small problem…

The Golden Dome missile defense system is clearly offensive in nature and violates the principle of the peaceful use of outer space, enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and constitutes a strategic deterrent to the rest of the world. Once again, an example of American arrogance. The US should have realized that the time when it could believe itself to be the master of the world and decree the end of history is over. But apparently this is not the case.

The 1967 Treaty regulates the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. The fundamental principles are few but clear:

• Outer space must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes;
• It is prohibited to place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space, in Earth orbit or on celestial bodies;
• It is prohibited to establish military bases, test weapons or conduct military exercises on the Moon or other celestial bodies;
• Space is free for exploration and use by all States, without discrimination;
• Access to celestial bodies is guaranteed to all;
• Exploration must be carried out in the interests of all humanity;
• No State may claim sovereignty over any portion of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies;
• Outer space is not subject to national appropriation by sovereignty, use, occupation or any other means;
• States are internationally responsible for all space activities, even if carried out by private individuals or enterprises, and must authorize and supervise such activities and are also responsible for damage caused by their space objects;
• States must act in good faith, international cooperation and transparency. If a mission may interfere with the activities of another State, adequate notification must be given. Activities must avoid harmful contamination of space or celestial bodies.

Now, it should be noted that the Treaty does not explicitly prohibit military presence in space, but limits its use to non-aggressive functions (i.e. navigation, surveillance and telecommunications), even though space is full of military satellites. The preventive function of the treaty – currently signed by 110 states – is at the heart of the entire document.

And where does the Golden Dome fit into all this? As already mentioned, this project is a clear violation of the 1967 Treaty and indeed constitutes an international threat that must be taken seriously by Organisations and courts of justice.

What purpose does such a system serve, other than to try to secure military supremacy?

Once again, it’s the logic of endless war that is guiding the choices of the United States of America. But beware: those who live by the sword die by the sword.

History will not be kind to those who play with the future of humanity for the sake of their own political vanity.

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The danger of nuclear escalation is real. The international balance has hitherto been based on deterrence as an instrument of ‘guarantee’. But if this changes or fails, what will happen?

The foundations of deterrence

Nuclear deterrence is a fundamental strategy in strategic and military science, which is based on using the threat of a devastating nuclear response to prevent the use of nuclear weapons or to deter strategic attacks by one or more adversaries. In its own right, it fits into the broader context of nuclear strategy, which concerns the use of nuclear weapons to protect national interests, defend security and influence the behaviour of adversary states. Nuclear deterrence assumed a central role during the Cold War and continues to be a crucial element of the defense policy of the many nuclear powers across the globe.

The concept is based on a psychology of international relations that aims to make the consequences of hostile action unacceptable to the adversary. Simple but very, very effective. In nuclear terms, it is a matter of making the enemy perceive that the costs of an attack, or of a conflict leading to the use of nuclear weapons, far outweigh the benefits they might gain from such an attack.

Nuclear deterrence can be divided into two main forms:

Direct Deterrence: it concerns the threat of using nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear or conventional attack by an adversary. The basic idea is that, if an adversary believes that attacking a deterring country entails the likelihood of devastating nuclear retaliation, it will choose not to attack.

Indirect deterrence: this refers to the use of the nuclear threat to influence an enemy’s behaviour in contexts not directly related to the use of nuclear weapons, such as conventional wars or strategic confrontations. In this case, the threat of nuclear escalation serves as a tool to influence an enemy’s decisions in conflict or crisis situations.

One of the main features of nuclear deterrence is the so-called nuclear triad, a concept developed by the United States during the Cold War, which consists of the combination of three main components:

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs): these are ground-launched missiles with a range of more than 5,500 km that can carry nuclear warheads and strike long-distance strategic targets, particularly enemy capitals and command centres. These are the ones we hear more and more about these days and are part of, for example, the reform of Russian nuclear doctrine promulgated by Vladimir Putin a few days ago.

Strategic bomber forces: long-range aircraft, such as the US B-52 bomber, which can carry nuclear warheads and strike strategic targets. These bombers can also be used in a retaliatory role because their mobility allows them to maintain a credible threat even in the event of a pre-emptive strike.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs): nuclear submarines, due to their ability to operate silently and remain hidden in the depths of the sea, provide a highly credible and difficult to destroy ‘second strike’ response. The presence of nuclear submarines in international waters reduces the probability that an adversary can destroy the entire nuclear arsenal before being hit in turn.

The nuclear triad is designed to ensure that, regardless of the type of attack suffered, at least a significant part of the nuclear force remains intact, ready to inflict devastating punishment in the event of an attack. This principle is known as ‘second strike capability ’ which is the basis of effective nuclear deterrence: the assurance that a nuclear attack will not go unanswered.

The logic of Mutual Assured Destruction

The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), is one of the main strategic doctrines defining nuclear deterrence. It states that, in a nuclear conflict between two nuclear powers, the probability of survival of either side would be extremely low, as both sides would inflict irreversible and catastrophic damage; hence, both sides are strongly deterred from initiating a nuclear conflict.

The logic of MAD is based on several fundamental principles:

– Credibility of the threat: to be effective, a threat of nuclear retaliation must be credible. This means that a nuclear power must possess sufficient nuclear forces and the political will to use them in the event of an attack.

– Mutual Vulnerability: both nuclear powers must be vulnerable to nuclear attack by the other, which means that both must possess survivable nuclear forces, such as nuclear submarines or underground ballistic missile silos.

– Uncertainty of outcome: although both powers can inflict devastating damage on the other, neither side can know with certainty what the outcome of a nuclear exchange would be, as the consequences could be globally catastrophic and unpredictable.

In addition to the basic principles, nuclear deterrence also includes advanced concepts related to credibility, communication and technological innovation.

Extended deterrence: a nuclear nation can extend its deterrence to allied countries by promising to defend them with its nuclear capability. This principle is the basis of NATO alliances, where the US offers nuclear protection to European allies.

De-escalation through non-first use: some nuclear nations, such as China, have adopted ‘non-first use’ (NFU) policies, pledging never to use nuclear weapons first, but reserving the right to respond to a nuclear attack with nuclear retaliation. This approach reduces the risk of escalation, but can also be seen as a weakness, as it may not offer a sufficiently strong deterrent.

Tactical nuclear weapons: in addition to strategic nuclear weapons, there are also ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons, i.e. weapons of reduced power intended for use in local theatres of war. These weapons raise debates on their ability to deter an attack, as they could lower the threshold for nuclear use. We have also heard a lot about these, especially since 2022, with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian SMO.

Command and control system: in order to ensure credible deterrence, nuclear powers must have an extremely robust and secure command and control system that prevents access to unauthorized commands and protects nuclear forces from sabotage or hacking attacks.

Risk after risk

Managing nuclear deterrence continues to be a key global security challenge.

The ongoing standoff over Ukraine has become a de facto direct confrontation between Russia and NATO, both of which have nuclear weapons that now operate without the safeguards of Cold War diplomacy. The breakdown of private communication, once the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence management, has given way to public communication in a media war. This dangerous change has drastically increased the likelihood of catastrophic miscalculations. Much worse than a Hollywood movie.

Bear in mind that during the Cold War, an imperfect but functional system of discreet diplomacy allowed signals to be clearly sent and received. Mutual understanding, even between enemies, helped prevent misunderstandings that could have resulted in a nuclear conflict. Today, this critical buffer is as if it had evaporated. Russia has adopted a direct and unambiguous approach, publicly marking its red lines in the absence of reliable diplomacy; its red lines are laid bare for the world to see, not because it seeks escalation, but because ambiguity has proved fatal in the face of Western double-speak. Meanwhile, the West is full of contradictions and media-fuelled gossip to a level of confusion that makes it difficult to discern information. However, deterrence remains a matter of credibility, and when credibility is at stake in the public eye, the risk of leaders being forced to act to ‘prove their threats’ becomes exponentially higher.

The West’s decision to abandon private diplomacy in favor of a megaphone posture reveals a dangerous mix of arrogance and short-sightedness. Western leaders are not simply toying with Moscow; they are toying with their domestic audience, strategic partners, and the citizens they inexorably observe.

The West’s strategy, built on the illusion of Russian hesitation, is a catastrophic miscalculation. Moscow has no illusions about what is at stake and its actions reflect an awareness of the existential threat posed by NATO provocations.

Unlike the Cold War, this is no longer a chess game in which careful strategy and mutual respect for red lines dictate the moves. It is a game of poker, played with nuclear chips, in which bluffing and risk strategy replace logic and restraint. The US and NATO, encouraged by their own propaganda, are betting that Russia will not escalate; but Russia will not give up its traditional existential defense, so it is prepared to do anything.

History will not be kind to those who play with the future of humanity for the sake of their own political vanity.

The Middle East is ‘conservative’ no more. Rather, a very different ‘Awakening’ is gestating.

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The long war to reaffirm western and Israeli primacy is undergoing a shape-shift. On one front, the calculus in respect to Russia and the Ukraine war has shifted. And in the Middle East, the locus and shape of the war is shifting in a distinct way.

Georges Kennan’s famed Soviet doctrine has long formed the baseline to U.S. policy, firstly directed toward the Soviet Union, and latterly, towards Russia. Kennan’s thesis from 1946 was that the United States needed to work patiently and resolutely to thwart the Soviet threat, and to enhance and aggravate the internal fissures in the Soviet system, until its contradictions triggered the collapse from within.

More recently, the Atlantic Council has drawn on the Kennan doctrine to suggest that his broad outline should serve as the basis of U.S. policy towards Iran. “The threat that Iran poses to the U.S. resembles the one faced from the Soviet Union after World War II. In this regard, the policy that George Kennan outlined for dealing with the Soviet Union has some applications for Iran”, the Atlantic report states.

Over the years, that doctrine has ossified into an entire network of security understandings, based on the archetypal conviction that America is strong, and that Russia was weak. Russia must ‘know that’, and thus, it was argued, there could be no logic for Russian strategists to imagine they had any other option but to submit to the overmatch represented by the combined military strength of NATO versus a ‘weak’ Russia. And should Russian strategists unwisely persevere with challenging the West, it was said, the inherent contrariety simply would cause Russia to fracture.

American neocons and western intelligence have not listened to any other view, because they were (and largely still are) convinced by Kennan’s formulation. The American foreign policy class simply could not accept the possibility that such a core thesis was wrong. The entire approach reflected more a deep-seated culture, rather than any rational analysis – even when visible facts on the ground pointed them to a different reality.

So, America has piled the pressure on Russia through the incremental delivery of additional weapons systems to Ukraine; through stationing intermediate range nuclear-capable missiles ever-closer to Russia’s borders; and most recently, by shooting ATACMS into ‘old Russia’.

The aim has been to pressure Russia into a situation where it would feel obliged to make concessions to Ukraine, such as a to accept a freezing of the conflict, and to be obliged to negotiate against Ukrainian bargaining ‘cards’ devised to yield a solution acceptable to the U.S. Or, alternatively, for Russia to be cornered into the ‘nuclear corner’.

American strategy ultimately rests on the conviction that the U.S. could engage in a nuclear war with Russia – and prevail; that Russia understands that were it to go nuclear, it would ‘lose the world’. Or, pressured by NATO, the anger amongst Russians likely would sweep Putin from office were he to make significant concessions to Ukraine. It was a ‘win-win’ outcome – from the U.S. perspective.

Unexpectedly however, a new weapon appeared on the scene which precisely unshackles President Putin from the ‘all-or-nothing’ choice of having to concede a bargaining ‘hand’ to Ukraine, or resort to nuclear deterrence. Instead, the war can be settled by facts on the ground. Effectively, the George Kennan ‘trap’ imploded.

The Oreshnik missile (that was used to attack the Yuzhmash complex at Dnietropetrovsk) provides Russia with a weapon, such as never before witnessed: An intermediate range missile system that effectively checkmates the western nuclear threat.

Russia can now manage western escalation with a credible threat of retaliation that is both hugely destructive – yet conventional. It inverts the paradigm. It is now the West’s escalation that either has to go nuclear, or be limited to providing Ukraine with weapons such as ATACMS or Storm Shadow that will not alter the course of the war. Were NATO to escalate further, it risks an Oreshnik strike in retaliation, either in Ukraine or on some target in Europe, leaving the West with the dilemma of what to do next.

Putin has warned: ‘If you strike again in Russia, we will respond with an Oreshnik hit on a military facility in another nation. We will provide warning, so that civilians can evacuate. There is nothing that you can do to prevent this; you do not have an anti-missile system that can stop an attack coming in at Mach 10’.

The tables are turned.

Of course, there are other reasons beyond the permanent security cadre’s wish to Gulliverise Trump into continuing the war in Ukraine, in order to taint him with a war that he promised immediately to end.

Particularly the British, and others in Europe, want the war to continue, because they are on the financial hook from their holdings of some $20 billion Ukrainian bonds which are in a ‘default-like status’, or from their guarantees to the IMF for loans to Ukraine. Europe simply cannot afford the costs of a full default. Neither can Europe afford to pick up the burden, were the Trump Administration to walk away from supporting Ukraine financially. So they collude with the U.S. interagency structure to make the continuation of the war proofed against a Trump policy reversal: Europe for financial motives, and the Deep State because it wants to disrupt Trump, and his domestic agenda.

The other wing to the ‘global war’ reflects a mirror paradox: That is, ‘Israel is strong and Iran is weak’. The central point is not only its cultural underpinning, but that the entire Israeli and U.S. apparatus is party to the narrative that Iran is a weak and technically backward country.

The most significant aspect is the multi-year failure as regards factors such as the skill to understand strategies, and recognize changes in the other sides’ capabilities, views and understandings.

Russia seems to have solved some of the general physical problems of objects flying at hypersonic speed. The use of new composite materials has made it possible to enable the gliding cruise bloc to make a long-distance guided flight practically in conditions of plasma formation. It flies to its target like a meteorite; like a ball of fire. The temperature on its surface reaches 1,600–2,000 degrees Celsius but the cruise bloc is reliably guided.

And Iran seems to have solved the problems associated with an adversary enjoying air dominance. Iran has created a deterrence fashioned from the evolution of cheap swarms drones matched up with Ballistic missiles carrying precision hypersonic warheads. It puts $1,000 drones and cheap, precision missiles up and against hugely expensive piloted airframes – An inversion of warfare that has been twenty years in the making.

The Israeli war however, is metamorphosing in other ways. The war in Gaza and Lebanon has strained Israeli manpower; the IDF have sustained heavy losses; its troops are exhausted; and the reservists are losing commitment to Israel’s wars, and are failing to show up for duty.

Israel has reached the limits of its capacity to put boots on the ground (short of conscripting the Orthodox Haredi Yeshiva students – an act that could bring down the Coalition).

In short, the Israeli army’s troop levels have fallen below present command ordered military commitments. The economy is imploding and internal divisions are raw and bruising. This is especially so due to the inequity of secular Israelis dying, whilst others stay exempt from military service – a destiny reserved for some but not others.

This tension played a major part in Netanyahu’s decision to agree to a ceasefire in Lebanon. The growing animus about Orthodox Haredi exemption risked bringing down the Coalition.

There are – metaphorically speaking – now two Israels: The Kingdom of Judea versus the State of Israel. In view of such deep antagonisms, many Israelis now see war with Iran as the catharsis that will bind a fractured people together again, and – if victorious – end all of Israel’s wars.

Outside, the war widens and shape-shifts: Lebanon, for now, is put on a low flame burner, but Turkey has triggered a major military operation (reportedly some 15,000 strong) in an attack on Aleppo, using U.S. and Turkish trained jihadists and militia from Idlib. Turkish Intelligence no doubt has its own distinct objectives, but the U.S. and Israel have a particular interest to disrupt weapons supply routes to Hizbullah in Lebanon.

The Israeli wanton onslaught on non-combatants, women and children – and its explicit ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian population – has left the region (and the Global South) seething and radicalised. Israel, through its actions, is disrupting the old ethos. The region is ‘conservative’ no more. Rather, a very different ‘Awakening’ is gestating.

With Oreshnik now entering the picture, everywhere the Hegemon will try to harass China they will also have to face Russia.

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When it comes to state of the art Russian weaponry, what the inestimable Ray McGovern defines as the MICIMATT – the whole Hegemonic complex – seems to dwell in perpetual stupor.

They had no clue about Kalibr, Sarmat, Khinzal, Zircon or Avangard before they were introduced. They had no clue about Oreshnik (‘Hazel”) before the 30-minute protocolar warning by the Russians, stating a missile test was coming, and it was not nuclear. The Americans assumed that would be just another ballistic missile test, as they happen routinely close to the Arctic.

Even President Putin didn’t know Oreshnik was ready for its close-up until the last minute. And Kremlin spokesman Peskov confirmed that only an ultra-rarefied circle knew Oreshnik even existed.

In a nutshell: the MICIMATT only sees what Russia shows off – and when it happens. Call it a leak-proof vow of secrecy permeating the Russian military complex – which, by the way, is a massive state, nationalized company, with a few private components.

And that offers the Russian government, in practice, better engineering, better physics, better mathematics and better practical, final results than anything across the self-important collective West.

Oreshnik – a kinetic weapons system – is a certified game-changer when it comes to military technology and warfare in more ways than one: actually several. Simple physics tells us that by combining enough kinetic force and mass, utter devastation is guaranteed, comparable to a low-to-medium yield nuclear weapon. With the added benefit of no radiation.

Oreshnik is an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), under development by Russia (along with other systems) even before Trump 1.0 pulled the U.S. out of the INF treaty in 2019.

A few concise analyses have pointed out how Oreshnik can be fitted into intercontinental (italics mine) non-nuclear missiles. The Russians are being very diplomatic, not stressing that if Oreshnik is launched from the Russian Far East, it can easily reach most latitudes across the USA.

Moreover, applying Oreshnik tech to tactical missiles – Putin late last week said this is already happening – also changes the whole tactical domain.

The new game in town is Russia being capable of unleashing ultra-high-velocity kinetic weapons literally anywhere around the world – after warning civilians to abandon the area around the targets. And there’s absolutely no defense against it, anywhere.

Nowhere to run, baby, nowhere to hide

It’s quite predictable that the woke, arrogant/ignorant MICIMATT, as well as NATO and the whole, brainwashed collective West simply have no idea what just hit them, seemingly out of the blue.

To be concise: a system with the destructive power of a tactical nuclear weapon but carrying the precision of a top sniper’s bullet.

Ergo, sitting duck billion-dollar aircraft carriers; the whole, 800-plus Empire of Bases; assorted underground bunkers; ICBM launch platforms; naval shipyards; not to mention NATO’s HQ in Brussels, the Aegis Ashore base in Redzikowo (Poland), the NATO joint force center in the Netherlands, southern NATO command in Naples – all these immensely expensive assets are fair game for non-nuclear Oreshniks capable of reducing them to dust in a flash after flying for mere minutes at over Mach 10.

By now multitudes around the world are aware that Oreshnik may reach Berlin in 11 minutes and London in 19 minutes. Also that launched from southern Russia, Oreshnik may reach the U.S. air base in Qatar in 13 minutes; launched from Kamchatka in the Far East, it may reach Guam in 22 minutes; and launched from Chukotka, it may reach Minuteman III silos in Montana in 23 minutes.

To quote the epic 1960s Motown hit: “Nowhere to run, baby, nowhere to hide.”

Graphic proof that the MICIMATT and NATO have absolutely no clue what hit them – and will hit them again – is the escalation dementia in effect even after Oreshnik’s warheads reduced a missile factory in Dnipropetrovsk to smithereens. And even after Moscow made it quite clear that they don’t need nuclear weapons to hit anything they want anywhere on Earth.

The MICIMATT plus NATO, in tandem, fired ATACMS twice against Kursk; released a P.R. trial balloon related to the suicidal possibility of sending nuclear weapons to Kiev; NATO warned businesses to enter a “wartime scenario”; NATO’s armchair admiral Rob Bauer, a Dutch non-entity, advocated pre-emptive bombings of Russia; Le Petit Roi in France and the ghastly British PM re-started the gambit of “troop deployments” to Ukraine (Starmer later backed off); and last but not least, the Liver Sausage government in Germany started to draw plans to use metro stations as air raid shelters.

All this escalation paranoia sounds like a bunch of screaming kids playing in their dirty sandbox. Because for all practical purposes it is Russia which is now ruling the escalation game.

Breaking up Russia-China is hard to do

And that brings us to Trump 2.0.

The Deep State has already targeted Trump with a vicious war – a de facto pre-emptive counter-insurgency, even before he attempts to do anything practical regarding NATO’s collapsing Project Ukraine.

His ideal off-ramp might be an Afghanistan-style exit, leaving all the burdens ahead to a basket of NATO chihuahuas. Still, that’s not gonna happen.

Andrey Sushentsov is a program director of the Valdai Club and dean of MGIMO’s school of International Relations. He’s one of Russia’s top analysts. Sushentsov released this pearl to TASS, among other things:

“Trump is considering ending the Ukrainian crisis, not out of any sympathy for Russia, but because he acknowledges that Ukraine has no realistic chance of winning. His goal is to preserve Ukraine as a tool for U.S. interests, focusing on freezing the conflict rather than resolving it. Consequently, under Trump, the long-term strategy of countering Russia will persist. The U.S. continues to benefit from the Ukrainian crisis, regardless of which administration is in power.”

Sushentsov fully recognizes how “the U.S. state system is an inertial structure that resists decisions it deems contrary to American interests, so not all of Trump’s ideas will come to fruition.”

That’s just one graphic illustration, among many, that Moscow harbors no illusions whatsoever about Trump 2.0. Putin’s conditions for an attempt to solve the Ukraine riddle have been known at least since June: total Kiev withdrawal from Donbass and Novorossiya; no Ukraine in NATO; end of all 15,000+ Western sanctions; and a non-aligned, nuclear-free Ukraine.

That’s it. Everything non-negotiable; otherwise the war will continue on the battlefields, the way Russia sees fit, until Ukraine’s total surrender.

Evidently the Five Eyes – actually only 2 (U.S.-UK) – plus minion France, side by side with the most powerful silos inside the Deep State will continue to force Trump to double down on Project Ukraine, which is an essential part of the Forever Wars ethos.

The best he might be able to do is to divert attention from Project Ukraine by accommodating the Old Testament psychopathological genocidals in Tel Aviv, plus the Zio-con armada in D.C., in their obsession of forcing Washington to fight their war on Iran. Talk about a slight change of focus of the Forever Wars.

Tehran not only exports most of its energy to China but is an absolutely essential node of the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) as well as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); that is, north-south and east-west crisscrossing Eurasia.

That would be the real war of choice – simultaneously against three BRICS (Russia, China, Iran). After all the American ruling class is already invested on a do-or-die Hybrid War against BRICS.

Still, the Trump 2.0/China face-off will be the fulcrum of the Hegemon’s foreign policy starting January 20. Virtually all of Trump’s appointments – as misguided as they may be – believe it is possible to break apart the Russia-China comprehensive strategic partnership and prevent China from buying energy from Iran.

There will be attempts to disrupt shipping lanes and supply lines – from the Maritime Silk Roads in the Indian Ocean rimland to the Northern Sea Route by the Arctic, including possible false flags along the INSTC.

But with Oreshnik now entering the picture, everywhere the Hegemon will try to harass China they will also have to face Russia. So the temptation to end Project Ukraine and NATO’s encroachment on Russia’s western borders will always be there in the back of Trump’s mind, part of a “seduce Russia to undermine China” syndrome.

The problem for the Hegemon is that the interlocking BRICS/SCO-wide Russia-China-Iran strategic partnerships do have other – kinetic – ideas.

For the first time, the Russian Federation has used its Strategic Missile Forces – and this is just the beginning of the escalation.

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November 21, 2024, will go down in Russian military history as the date of the first real combat deployment of the legendary and feared Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation (RVSN).

Created in Soviet times, the RVSN is the independent branch of the Russian Armed Forces responsible for the arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles, literally the “troops of the apocalypse” – responsible for firepower capable of causing a global catastrophe. Of course, the RVSN was involved in all the major nuclear tensions of the Cold War, including the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Norwegian Incident. Although it has remained on high combat alert several times, no actual military engagement has occurred until now.

NATO, however, exceeded all expectations of escalation in its provocations against Russia and succeeded in turning the Ukrainian conflict into the most dangerous security crisis in history. After the Western-Ukrainian side ignored repeated Russian warnings to cease long-range strikes against the Federation’s undisputed territory, Moscow had no alternative but to call in its most feared troops and authorize an unprecedented operation.

The target chosen was a military equipment factory in Dnepropetrovsk. The weapon used was a new missile, previously untested in real situations – nicknamed ‘Oreshnik’. Luckily for the Ukrainians, no nuclear warhead was attached to the missile, which worked as a conventional weapon despite its surprising speed and high lethality.

There are two main points to be understood from the attack on Dnepropetrovsk: on the one hand, this was a test for Moscow, which had the opportunity for the first time to use the Oreshnik missile technology in a real combat situation, confirming its absolute effectiveness. On the other hand, the attack was a kind of “last chance” for the enemy, as well as a major warning to Ukraine.

Moscow could have responded to the Ukrainian strikes on Bryansk and Kursk with nuclear weapons, as such a decision would have been fully in line with recent reforms in the Russian Nuclear Doctrine. However, once again mercy and a desire for de-escalation prevailed in the Kremlin’s decisions, leading to a warning being delivered to both NATO and Ukraine before the “final solution”.

For NATO, the message was clear: there is no military technology available that can stop Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. If the decision to go nuclear is taken, the targets will be hit without the Atlantic alliance and its proxies being able to do anything to prevent it.

For Ukraine, the warning was even deeper: Moscow made it clear that no one would “help” the neo-Nazi regime. Obviously, the Russian attack was noticed by the Americans in time. There are thousands of observers involved in various monitoring projects whose specific task is to see such maneuvers and prepare a response in time for the event of a nuclear crisis. In other words, Washington saw that the attack was happening and did nothing.

Perhaps the US held back from reacting out of fear. Perhaps it held back from reacting because it assumed the target would be Ukrainian. But in any case, there was no reaction. Washington did not issue an emergency plan for nuclear retaliation, even without any confirmation, until minutes after the targets were hit, that the Russian warheads contained nuclear material or not. In other words, the US, faced with dangerous uncertainty, chose to remain silent.

The American inaction was the best warning that could have been given to the Ukrainians. The Americans made it clear that they would do nothing to protect their proxy. If Russia launches nuclear weapons against Ukraine, Kiev will have to deal with the consequences alone. More than that, it must be emphasized that the Americans had no way of predicting whether the Russian strikes would target NATO or not, which is why the lack of an immediate retaliatory operation has an even deeper significance and calls into question even the “collective defense” of the Western alliance.

It would be great if the Ukrainians had learned their lesson and started de-escalating. However, hours after the incident, Kiev used long-range missiles again, this time hitting Krasnodar, in a new act of unprecedented escalation of violence. In other words, even though they know that they will fight alone and that they will suffer the consequences of a nuclear war without any foreign support, the Ukrainians continue to cross the red lines.

It is difficult to write about these topics in times of great tensions, because everything can change at any moment. By the time this analysis is published, Ukraine could face retaliation that would make everything I have said here obsolete. However, regardless of the Kremlin’s future decisions, November 21 will remain a milestone in Russian military history: now the intercontinental ballistic missiles are in the field and the RVSN is officially involved in the special military operation.

It might be interesting for Kiev’s decision-makers to remember the RVSN motto: “After us, silence.” The moment these forces are given permission to use their full potential, there will be no more sound in the enemy ranks. Either Kiev stops its deep attacks, or it will soon be too late.

How much longer will Europe follow the Western idiocracy? Has the time not come to choose to be on the right side of history?

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A new nuclear deterrence doctrine. This is the Russian Federation’s response to NATO’s further provocation, which has authorised and initiated the use of long-range missile systems on Russian territory, attacking the country.

In the simplest and most elementary logic, this is called ‘yet another declaration of war’. In military doctrine, it is a provocation aimed at verifying certain positions of the enemy regarding certain necessary elements in the strategic equation. Everything is bordering on the absurd, because in such a delicate phase as the transition between the Biden and Trump governments, the American establishment seems to have nothing better to do than to throw the whole of Europe into the precipice of destruction. But they are smarter in Moscow.

From doctrine to doctrine

Let us first take a look at the previous military doctrine on nuclear weapons and deterrence, issued in June 2020 by executive decree of President Vladimir Putin.

The decree defines the basic principles of state policy on nuclear deterrence, a cornerstone of the country’s defence strategy, outlining Russia’s official view on the use of nuclear weapons, identifying the risks, threats and specific conditions that could lead to their use, as well as establishing guidelines for the management of deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence is defined as a set of political, military, economic and diplomatic measures coordinated to deter a potential adversary from taking hostile action against Russia and its allies. The policy, avowedly defensive in nature, aims to preserve national sovereignty, territorial integrity and state security by maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear capability to prevent aggression and armed conflict. In the event of a military conflict, this policy aims to prevent escalation and bring hostilities to a conclusion acceptable to the Russian Federation.

Russia regards nuclear weapons as an instrument of extreme necessity, the use of which is reserved for critical situations. The decision to use them rests solely with the President, who may, if necessary, inform other nations or international organisations of his willingness or decision to do so. Conditions for use include responding to a nuclear or WMD attack against Russia or its allies, a conventional aggression that threatens the existence of the state, or an attack on critical infrastructure that compromises nuclear response capabilities.

The decree then identifies several threats that require nuclear deterrence, including the development and deployment of advanced weapons systems by states considered adversaries, the expansion of hostile military alliances, and the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns include the deployment of offensive weapons near Russian borders and the potential use of space for military purposes.

The guiding principles of Russian nuclear deterrence include adherence to international arms control commitments, continuity of defensive activities, adaptability of strategy to emerging threats, centralisation of state control, and maintenance of a minimal but sufficient nuclear arsenal to ensure national security. Deterrence is based on a combination of land, sea and air nuclear forces, maintained in a constant state of readiness.

Responsibility for implementing this policy is distributed among various state bodies. The President guides the overall strategy, while the Government deals with economic, diplomatic and technological aspects to sustain the nuclear potential. The Security Council coordinates the activities of the institutions involved, and the Ministry of Defence oversees the planning and execution of military measures.

There is a declared commitment of the Russian Federation to reduce international tensions and to prevent and defuse conflicts, while reserving the right to defend itself by all necessary means, including nuclear force, against any existential threat.

The new announcement

Putin announced the new nuclear deterrence doctrine, not yet made public on government channels but available in unofficial translation on Sputnik channels.

The most important differences, or rather the specifications added in the new executive decree, concern the following points:

• The nature of the enemy, which can be single or an alliance or bloc, extending its definition, in perfect consistency with the repeated announcements by Russian government officials about attacks by NATO and its member countries;
• The types of threats identified, which are extended to a wide range of strategic systems, also integrating space technologies;
• The mapping of domains, redefining the proximity to the Russian Federation and its military systems.

The streamlining and updating of nuclear deterrence doctrine poses an important warning to the entire West: Russia is ready for nuclear war.

The President made reference to previously undisclosed Russian hypersonic missile systems, Oreshnik, which came as no small surprise to the West, which had instead focused on information the Kremlin had leaked to distract from its preparedness for direct conflict. A system, the Oreshnik, capable of reaching Mach 10, exceeding the Western defence systems known to us.

The announcement was reiterated by Putin’s words on 21 November, when he spoke to the world giving a real ultimatum:

‘I repeat: we are testing the Oreshnik missile system under combat conditions in response to the aggressive actions of NATO countries against Russia. The question of further deployment of intermediate-range and short-range missiles will be decided by us depending on the actions of the U.S. and its satellites. The targets to be hit during further tests of our latest missile systems will be determined by us according to the security threats to the Russian Federation. We consider ourselves authorised to use our weapons against the military facilities of those countries that allow Ukraine to use their weapons against our facilities, and in the event of an escalation of aggressive actions, we will respond in an equally decisive and speculative manner. I recommend to the ruling elites of those countries that plan to use their military contingents against Russia to think seriously about it’.

To the folly of the American hegemon, Putin responds by appealing to the European countries, who are well aware that they are the ones who will be sacrificed in an unprecedented fratricidal war. How much longer will Europe follow the Western idiocracy? Has the time not come to choose to be on the right side of history?

Russia, therefore, responds with a counter-attack and a promise: we continue to use ‘conventional’ weapons, because we reserve the nuclear dessert for a better time. The choice of the menu is up to the West.

While it remains a hypothetical question as to whether Russia has surpassed the rest of the world in terms of fighting preparedness, it would be hard to name another seven days in recent history when the country has unveiled more potential game changers.

If anything demonstrates once and for all that Russia has dusted off the cobwebs of its Soviet past and moved boldly into the future, it was to be found at the MAKS-2021 Air Show in Moscow, held from July 20-25.

The star attraction of the international aviation salon, which draws thousands of visitors annually, was not seen roaring in the skies overhead, but rather it was tucked away inside of a mocked up pavilion. Resembling a premier of the latest Hollywood action flick, visitors lined up almost half a kilometer to catch a glimpse of the Sukhoi Su-75 ‘CheckMate,’ the new stealth fighter that state-owned United Aircraft Corporation touted as superior to Lockheed Martin’s F-35 joint strike fighter. All things considered, it seemed only fair that Russian President Vladimir Putin got the first preview of the aircraft.

YOUTUBE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNDrTSDmaZY

The rollout of the Su-75 is critical for Moscow on several fronts. First, it simply proves that Russia, if there was any doubt about it before, has broken the mold on technological breakthroughs achieved during the communist period. Up until now, the Russian Air Force has been dependent on two-engine warhorses, like the Su-35 and the MiG-35, formidable in their own right but expensive to produce and maintain.

By comparison, the streamlined and lightweight single engine Su-75 costs just $30 million dollars per machine and will allow Russia to close the aviation gap with NATO, which has been able to make up for its technological inferiority with raw numbers.

To quote an article by The Saker: “Russia’s main weakness when compared to the U.S./NATO is primarily quantitative: while they are much inferior, U.S./NATO aircraft are produced in huge numbers the Russian industrial base and finances cannot match, at least not by producing very advanced but also very expensive aircraft a la Su-35S.

“The RAF needs many cheap but highly effective combat aircraft and the Su-75 might well be “the” dream machine for Russia.”

Some of the main technological features of this highly anticipated aircraft include:

–     Top speed of 2400 km/h (about 1500mph or just under Mach 2);

–     Capable of engaging 6 targets simultaneously;

–     1500 kilometer combat range (932 miles);

–     The fighter is “open architecture,” which means it can be adapted to specific needs;

–     $25-30 million apiece to produce, which will make it attractive on foreign markets.

Aside from giving Russia a fearsome addition to its already airtight air defense system, it will also allow smaller countries to punch far above their weight. Insiders say that prospective state buyers of the state-of-the-art aircraft could include Egypt, Iran, Belarus, Venezuela and Syria, which nearly disintegrated into another Libya as multiple NATO states descended upon the country in a muddled attempt to dislodge Islamic State from the territory. Only with the participation of Russian forces – much to the dismay of the Western military alliance, by the way, which seemed content to let the extremist forces overrun the legitimate Syrian government of President Bashar Assad – was the terrorist cancer ultimately removed with surgical strikes.

Speaking of Syria, just this week the country came under consecutive attack by the Israeli Air Force, which has made a habit over the years of conducting airstrikes inside of the Arab republic with the excuse of acting in self-defense against “Iranian” forces operating inside of the country.

???? The Israeli Air Force is striking targets in Syria again. SAR Air Defense worked in the Syrian province of Homs@serious_war_eng pic.twitter.com/SJe79T0s4W

— Serious War (@serious_war_eng) July 22, 2021

According to reports by the Russian military, two Israeli F-16s launched four missiles from Lebanon airspace at Syria’s Homs province. All of the missiles were reportedly intercepted and destroyed by the Syrian Army using Russian-made ‘Buk’ air defense systems. Days earlier, Syrian air defenses, responding to yet another incursion, shot down seven of eight Israeli missiles during a July 19 raid. The missiles in that attack were launched over Syria proper, after the Israeli aircraft reportedly penetrated an area on the Jordanian border controlled by U.S. forces.

Coincidentally, just one day after the Israeli incursion into Syrian territory Russia released video of the new S-500 anti-aircraft system that is designed to shoot down fighter aircraft. The trials proved successful, with the missile seen obliterating a high-speed target as it streaked across the sky.

Earlier this month, Chief Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, Sergei Surovikin, said the new system will be capable of taking down enemy aircraft and even hypersonic weapons in “near-Earth space,” making the S-500 the first generation of such defensive weapons, RT reported.

According to the Ministry of Defense, “after completing all the assessments, there are plans to deliver the first of the S-500 systems to air defense-missile brigades near Moscow.”

Now as if all that were not enough, that same week of muscle-flexing saw the Russian Navy successfully test fire the Zircon missile, which hit a target in the White Sea at a distance of 350 kilometers while traveling at Mach 7, or seven times the speed of sound.

The test comes as competition in the Arctic is heating up, especially as climate change appears to be opening up the region to easier access to oil and gas deposits, as well as highly profitable shipping lanes.

In May, the Russian Ministry of Defense responded to increased U.S. and NATO activity in these frigid northern regions with the announcement that it would deploy a squadron of Su-34 fighter-bomber jets to an updated 14,000 sq. m military base located in the Franz Josef Land archipelago.

Whether or not the move will cool NATO’s engines in the region remains to be seen, but the newfound business and strategic potential in the Arctic remains simply too great for Russia to let down its guard.

On Sunday, July 25, the hyperactive week for the Russian military came to a festive close as Vladimir Putin formally kicked off the annual Navy Day parade in Saint Petersburg, where dozens of vessels – including the 186.4 meters (611 ft. 7 in.) cruiser Marshal Ustinov – sailed down the Neva River as huge crowds watched in awe from the banks.

“Today, Russia’s naval fleet has everything it needs for the guaranteed defense of the country, of our national interests,” the Russian leader proclaimed. “We can detect any enemy and, if necessary, carry out an unavoidable strike.”

Indeed, Russia has, in just one week, upped the military ante to such a degree that long-term peace in this part of the world is a very tempting thought. However, Russia’s long and turbulent history has taught it not to place too much hope on such elusive things. As the famous Russian proverb says, ‘Eternal peace lasts only until the next war.’

New revelations concerning Denmark’s systematic spying upon its closest neighbor leaders—Germany, France, Norway and Sweden—since 2013 were broadcast and published online by the public service medium Danmark Radio (DR), May 30.

1. EU/NATO allies have been spied upon for the United States by the Danish Intelligence Service (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste-FE), and without knowledge of parliament and, perhaps, even government leaders.
2. France, Norway and Sweden leaders spied upon have come forth with strong critiques and demands for an investigation, for full clarity, and an end to such “grotesque” behavior. They backed up Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel critical statements in 2014 when Edward Snowden revealed that the U.S. tapped into her private cell phone calls. Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme – BBC News
3. This spying by FE is code named Operation Dunhammer (1)

In addition to spying upon its neighbors, FE has been illegally and systematically spying upon its own citizens for United States economic profit and political interests. This has nothing to do with spying upon their ”enemies” (Russia, China, Iran, et. al.). Huge Intelligence Agency Scandal Rocks Denmark and Puts its “Deep State” on Trial – CovertAction Magazine.

FE is the equivalent to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. While the FE jurisdiction also covers military intelligence, they must not spy on Danish people—only foreigners and those in other countries. The Police Intelligence Service (PET) surveils Danes, as the FBI surveils people within the U.S.

Both FE and NSA refuse to comment. Nor has Barak Obama or Joe Biden apologized to Merkel, whom Obama told in 2013 that such tapping into her phone would not occur again.

For several months DR has been working with journalists from Sweden (SVT), Norway, Germany (Süddeutsche Zeitung, NDR, WDR) and France (Le Monde) on these new developments. Their work forced some of 35 national leaders known to be spied upon by the U.S. to come forth.

“We demand to be fully informed about matters concerning Swedish citizens, companies and interests. And then we have to see how the answer sounds from the political side in Denmark,” Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist told national broadcaster SVT.

Norway, Sweden Demand Answers on Espionage After Report of Denmark Helping NSA Spy on EU Politicians – Sputnik International (sputniknews.com)

“We take the allegations seriously,” his Norwegian counterpart Frank Bakke-Jensen told national broadcaster NRK.

Both defense ministers emphasized that their Danish colleague Defense Minister Trine Bramsen had failed to inform them about the NSA’s espionage against Denmark’s neighbors.

“We did not get to know anything concrete about the case at all,” Frank Bakke-Jensen of Norway complained.”

“The French Foreign Ministry’s minister of state for European affairs, Clement Beaune, called the possible U.S. spying campaign on European politicians a very serious thing, and called for further verification of the information…If confirmed, Beaune did not rule out ’consequences.’”

PM Emmanuel Macron said such behavior is “unacceptable among allies”.

“Danish Defense Minister Trine Bramsen said the government “can and will not enter into speculation about intelligence matters”, yet she emphasized that she views the systematic wiretapping of close allies “unacceptable”.

Just why is it that the Danish government “cannot” speak publically (that is democratically) or even privately to its neighbor leaders about its spying is not forthcoming.

Concerning the new revelations, Edward Snowden states: Edward Snowden på Twitter: “Biden is well-prepared to answer for this when he soon visits Europe since, of course, he was deeply involved in this scandal the first time around. There should be an explicit requirement for full public disclosure not only from Denmark, but their senior partner as well.” / Twitter

Snowden had first revealed some of the spying in 2013, including against Germany Chancellor Merkel. XKEYSCORE

Chancellor Angela Merkel and Helle Thorning-Schmidt. Photo by Emilio Esbardo. Crescita e occupazione in Europa | | il Nuovo Berlinese |

These developments add to earlier ones published by DR last August and December (Huge Intelligence Agency Scandal Rocks Denmark and Puts its “Deep State” on Trial – CovertAction Magazine and Outposts of the U.S. Surveillance Empire: Denmark and Beyond – CovertAction Magazine.)

Denmark will definitely not allow a full disclosure. That was made clear by politicians to DR when it first published the whistleblower’s revelations. DR judiciary reporter Trine Marie Ilsøee said, “We cannot expect that most of the possible illegalities committed will be made public.” She added that Denmark’s intelligence services are connected to and dependent upon foreign powers [i.e. U.S. and not Europe]. Denmark could be compromised if secrets were revealed. “After all, intelligence services operate in secrecy.”

The information of long-standing illegalities, including its constitution, by the Defense Intelligence Service, which the Danish Intelligence Oversight Committee presented last August, includes:

1. Withholding “key and crucial information to government authorities” and the oversight committee between 2014 and today;
2. Illegal activities even before 2014;
3. Telling “lies” to policymakers;
4. Illegal surveillance on Danish citizens, including a member of the oversight committee. (Some of this illegal spying had been shared with unnamed sources [perhaps the U.S.?]);
5. Unauthorized activities have been shelved and;
6. The FE failed to follow up on indications of espionage within areas of the Ministry of Defense.

When DR first exposed some of this spying, Defense Minister Bramsen suspended five FE leaders responsible. Under pressure from several political parties, and most likely the U.S., she reinstated them in different jobs at the same pay.

I wrote about this unconstitutional and anti-democratic policy of aiding and abetting the United States against Europe last December. Outposts of the U.S. Surveillance Empire: Denmark and Beyond – CovertAction Magazine

”Denmark’s military allows the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) to spy on the nation’s Finance Ministry, Foreign Ministry, private weapons company Terma, the entire Danish population, and Denmark’s closest neighbors: Sweden, Norway, France, Germany and the Netherlands (NL).”

Information the NSA acquired with the aid of Denmark’s Defense Intelligence Service was used to convince its government to buy Lockheed-Martin’s Joint Strike Fighter F-35 capable of carrying nuclear weapons, albeit Denmark forbids the possession of nuclear weapons on its territory.

“NSA and FE signed an agreement in 2008 that enables NSA to tap huge amounts of data sourced from Danish fiber-optic communication cables passing through Denmark. This metadata is stored by the Danish Defense Intelligence Service in a center built with NSA guidance and technical assistance on the small Danish island of Sandagergaard to which the NSA has access.

“Sandagergaard is one of three Danish military-intelligence ‘listening posts’ which trawls through and analyzes global internet data, seeking information, for example, on what Terma, Denmark’s largest weapons firm, has. This is clearly an intrusion on capitalism’s basic principle and need for free-market competition.”

On September 24, DR published articles (and broadcasted) exposed more illegal activity.

”FE may have violated one of the clear rules that apply to the Danish military and foreign intelligence service: FE is only set in the world to protect Denmark from external threats and to safeguard Danish interests abroad. FE may therefore only come into possession of Danish information by chance.”

Smug Defense Minister Trine Bramsen at ”flag day” ceremony for warring soldiers. Veteraner og udsendte soldater blev hyldet: Se fotos af flagdag og kranselæggelse på Kastellet. – politiken.dk

“Fiber optic cables suck up and copy metadata, sms, chat, telephone calls, emails. The cables fetch data over Danish internet traffic, tapping into Russian communication, as well as German and other European countries’ internet world. Whatever this new equipment is, it probably is similar to or more advanced than XKEYSCORE, which Denmark also possesses….Besides land-based electronic surveillance, there are hundreds of transoceanic submarine cables carrying information between many countries. For decades, Denmark has had a key European cable connected to the U.S., which NSA taps into. In addition, there are new submarine commercial cables.”

A military whistleblower first reported on illegal espionage to the military leadership in May 2015. His reports to superiors were ignored. He waited four years before he revealed illegal spying to the Danish Intelligence Oversight Committee. This undermanned five-person civilian oversight committee, founded in 2014, has only eight employees and a pauper’s budget of $1.3 million. It has no power to interrogate or even to see secret documents the FE wishes to hide.

The Defense Intelligence Service’s 2020 budget was $160 million. How the funds are used is secret, and no oversight committee knows how the money is used nor can they determine its usage.

NSA with FE “are deep inside and digging into some Danish industrial secrets, which is usually what we accuse the Chinese of doing all the time [Huawei],” Tobias Liebetrau, intelligence researcher for the Center for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen, told DR.”

Prime Minister Frederiksen and President Trump at NATO meeting in London. She said about her talk with Trump, “We swing well.” Mette Frederiksen ved mødet med Donald Trump. I venstre side ses Trine Bramsen og Jeppe Kofod.Shealah Craighead/The White House/Ritzau Scanpix

Colleague Finian Cunningham explains what European “allies” mean in “real politics”.

“What this clearly demonstrates beyond any equivocation is that the European governments are quislings and vassals under Washington’s control. They are not ‘allies’ as that word implies a mutual partnership of equals. They are abject lackeys to American power who cheat on themselves. Talk about treacherous!

“This explains why Russia and China have both seen their relations with Europe deteriorate so badly. Under the prevailing EU governments, it is virtually impossible for Moscow or Beijing to conduct productive relations with Europe. That would require the European Union to have a modicum of independence and autonomy. As it is, however, the Europeans are mere subordinates to Washington’s diktat. And so, America’s renewed Cold War hostility towards Russia and China is reflected unquestioningly by the European bloc. Because the Europeans are nothing but satellites of the US imperium.” US Spying on EU Lackeys – Sputnik International (sputniknews.com)

Conclusion

There are ironies in these matters. First is the betrayal of Denmark’s long-standing friendly association with European countries and its leaders. Also, it has been Social Democrat women feminist leaders who started these spying activities since 2013 when the first SD woman PM was elected, Helle Thorning Schmidt. Following Snowden’s revelations, she embraced her “comrade” Chancellor Angela Merkel assuring her that Denmark was not and would not be involved. All the while she was lying. Then the next Social Democrat woman prime minister, Merete Frederiksen, and her feminist war minister, Trine Bramsen, went deeper into NSA’s spying activities.

These so-called “social democrats”, who are usually referred to as “socialists” by the likes of wishy washy Bernie Sanders, even “communists” by the likes of Donald Trump and other Republicans, are the most endearing Danish politician lap dogs, even more so than the more honest bourgeois politician hawks, who openly swear never-ending loyalty to the United States no matter what.

Another irony is that Denmark’s media, both DR and daily newspapers, did not even cover the extradition trial of Julian Assange in England—nor do they support him. Apparently, Danish media is afraid to back up an active publisher who reveals how the U.S. spies upon any and all, as well as conducting aggressive wars for self-interest profiteering. Yet DR has published a Danish whistleblower’s expose of its own government spying for Big Daddy.

Following DR’s first FE/NSA expose, I spoke on the telephone with DR foreign affairs editor Niels Kvale about the U.S. government threat to all journalists who reveal its “national security secrets”. I told him that DR reporters could be prosecuted in the U.S. just as they seek to do with Julian Assange. Kvale replied: “I was not aware of that. This sounds interesting. Send me your article and I will inform our journalists.”

(1) Dunhammer in English means cattails or bulrush, which grow in bogs. “One particular famous story involving bulrushes is that of the ark of bulrushes in the Book of Exodus. In this story, it is said that the infant Moses was found in a boat made of bulrushes. Within the context of the story, this is probably paper reed (Cyperus papyrus).

When fish make beds over bulrush, they sweep away the sand, exposing the roots. This dense region of roots provides excellent cover for young fish.” Bulrush – Wikipedia.

So Operation Dunhammer could be Danish military intelligence spies’ metaphor for covering up its treachery against its own neighbor allies. Denmark is one of the U.S.’s closest Eyes, “9 Eyes”, which also includes Norway and France, and “14 Eyes”, which includes German and Sweden. That means that Denmark is U.S.’s lead Eye against allies Germany, France, Norway and Sweden. The Nordic countries have the same language and cultural roots, including having been the warring Vikings. Norway and Sweden were also under Danish colonial control for centuries. Outposts of the U.S. Surveillance Empire: Denmark and Beyond – CovertAction Magazine