Albania – Strategic Culture Foundation https://strategic-culture.su Strategic Culture Foundation provides a platform for exclusive analysis, research and policy comment on Eurasian and global affairs. We are covering political, economic, social and security issues worldwide. Mon, 23 Feb 2026 19:59:15 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://strategic-culture.su/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/cropped-favicon4-32x32.png Albania – Strategic Culture Foundation https://strategic-culture.su 32 32 Eurasia’s great divide: Mapping support for Russia and Ukraine https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/02/23/eurasias-great-divide-mapping-support-for-russia-and-ukraine/ Mon, 23 Feb 2026 19:58:33 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=890760 Nearly four years into the conflict in Ukraine, public opinion across Eurasia reveals a continent sharply divided along historical and geopolitical fault lines. This infographic, based on Gallup data, maps which countries lean toward Moscow and which toward Kiev.

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La situazione nei Balcani continua a surriscaldarsi pericolosamente https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/03/27/la-situazione-nei-balcani-continua-surriscaldarsi-pericolosamente/ Thu, 27 Mar 2025 13:30:48 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=884304 Gli eventi in Bosnia ed Erzegovina continuano ad aggravarsi, ma non solo lì, ma in tutti i Balcani, si stanno verificando importanti movimenti

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Dopo l’aumento delle tensioni in Bosnia-Erzegovina, dove la procura federale di Sarajevo ha chiesto l’arresto di Milorad Dodik, leader dell’entità serba del Paese, lo scorso 13 marzo è intervenuto Stéphane Dujarric, portavoce del Segretario generale delle Nazioni Unite, ribadendo il suo appello alla moderazione: “Invitiamo tutti i leader politici a sostenere pienamente e facilitare il lavoro delle istituzioni statali per consolidare la pace e garantire la stabilità”.

Tuttavia, la situazione sta continuando pericolosamente a surriscaldarsi, a causa delle pressioni contrapposte.

Dopo una sessione maratona di due giorni, l’Assemblea nazionale della Republika Srpska (RS) ha adottato una nuova bozza di costituzione e un nuovo progetto di legge sulla protezione dell’ordine costituzionale interno. Entrambi i decreti mirano ad affermare una maggiore autonomia per la Repubblica serba di Bosnia, creando istituzioni separate, tra cui un esercito e una magistratura, e contenendo disposizioni per l’autodeterminazione e il diritto di formare confederazioni con altri Paesi, con evidente riferimento alla futura unione tra Banja Luka e Belgrado.

L’Ufficio dell’Alto Rappresentante, OHR, che supervisiona l’attuazione degli accordi di pace che hanno posto fine alla guerra del 1992-95 in Bosnia, ha criticato il progetto di legge, affermando che “costituisce una grave violazione dell’Accordo di pace di Dayton e del quadro costituzionale della Bosnia ed Erzegovina, aprendo nuovi casi di responsabilità penale per coloro che compiono queste azioni”.

In risposta, l’Assemblea della RS ha approvato leggi che vietano alla procura statale, al tribunale, all’Agenzia statale per le indagini e la protezione (SIPA) e all’Alto consiglio giudiziario e della Procura di Sarajevo di esercitare la giurisdizione nella Repubblica Serba. Tra le altre cose, si stabilisce che l’Assemblea nazionale e il Governo della Srpska possono sospendere l’attuazione di qualsiasi atto, misura o attività delle istituzioni a livello della Federazione Bosniaca che non abbia una base nella Costituzione della Bosnia Erzegovina (BiH). Le leggi che non rientrano nella giurisdizione esclusiva della BiH o che non derivano da accordi tra entità non avranno effetto giuridico in Srpska. È previsto che le leggi approvate dall’Assemblea parlamentare della Bosnia-Erzegovina saranno applicate in Srpska solo dopo essere state confermate dall’Assemblea nazionale della Repubblica serbo-bosniaca.

La bozza della nuova Costituzione sarà sottoposta a 30 giorni di discussione pubblica prima di essere inviata all’Assemblea serbo-bosniaca per la votazione finale. Essa stabilisce inoltre che Banja Luka sarà la capitale della Republika Srpska, mentre Sarajevo Est, con il suo centro amministrativo a Pale, riceverà lo status di sede del governo. Le disposizioni fondamentali definiscono la Republika Srpska come un’entità costituzionale e giuridica sovrana, unificata e indivisibile, confermata dalla volontà del popolo e dall’Accordo quadro generale per la pace in Bosnia Erzegovina, come trattato internazionale, nonché dalla Costituzione della BiH. La Republika Srpska è definita come lo Stato del popolo serbo e di tutti i popoli e cittadini che vivono al suo interno, garantendo quindi le minoranze lì presenti.

Il disegno di legge, adottato con procedura d’urgenza, prevede in particolare l’azione penale per 21 reati, tra cui attacchi all’ordine costituzionale della Republika Srpska, minacce alla sua integrità territoriale, sabotaggio, spionaggio e mancato rispetto delle decisioni emesse dalle autorità della Repubblica. Inoltre, criminalizza “l’ostruzione della lotta contro il nemico”, “il servizio in un esercito nemico” e “l’aiuto al nemico”.

Nel frattempo, le autorità di Banja Luka hanno istituito una propria polizia di frontiera, mettendo fine alla commistione nella gendarmeria confinaria della Bosnia Erzegovina voluta dall’OHR.

Ma il domino balcanico non rischia di spezzarsi solo in Bosnia Erzegovina.

Dopo l’immensa manifestazione a Belgrado contro il Presidente serbo Vucic, Albania, Kosovo e Croazia hanno firmato una dichiarazione congiunta di cooperazione in materia di difesa. Intervenendo alla cerimonia della firma a Tirana, il Ministro della Difesa albanese Pirro Vengu ha sottolineato l’importanza di questa cooperazione di fronte alle attuali sfide regionali: “In un ambiente di sicurezza fragile, condividiamo una valutazione comune delle minacce. Il nostro impegno per rafforzare le capacità di difesa è più forte che mai”, ha affermato. Il Ministro della Difesa croato Ivan Anusic e il suo omologo kosovaro Ejup Maqedonci hanno descritto la dichiarazione come un passo significativo verso il rafforzamento della sicurezza e della stabilità regionale, nonché verso il miglioramento delle capacità di affrontare rischi e sfide comuni. La dichiarazione congiunta sottolinea inoltre l’impegno dell’Albania e della Croazia, entrambi Stati membri della NATO, nel sostenere le aspirazioni del Kosovo alla piena integrazione nelle strutture regionali ed euro-atlantiche. Il Primo Ministro del Kosovo Albin Kurti ha accolto con favore l’accordo, definendolo “un passo estremamente importante per la sicurezza e la pace nella regione”. Questa cooperazione trilaterale, hanno concluso i firmatari dell’intesa, riflette la crescente partnership strategica tra i tre Paesi, sottolineando la collaborazione militare, la stabilità regionale e gli obiettivi di sicurezza condivisi.

Vucic, preoccupato che anche la Bulgaria possa unirsi a questo formato difensivo, ha naturalmente subito domandato contro chi sia rivolta tale alleanza, intuendone la natura preventiva rispetto alle sue intenzioni di giocare la carta del nazionalismo in Republika Srpska e in Kosovo e Metohija per uscire dall’impasse interna.

Belgrado si è opposta alla mossa, sostenendo che Albania e Croazia, insieme al “rappresentante illegittimo delle istituzioni temporanee di autogoverno di Pristina”, hanno adottato misure che compromettono la stabilità regionale: “La Repubblica di Serbia, in quanto garante della pace e della neutralità militare nei Balcani, esige giustamente risposte sulla natura e sugli obiettivi di questa cooperazione in materia di sicurezza”, secondo quanto riportato dal Ministero degli Esteri. La Serbia ha avvertito che la creazione di un’alleanza militare senza consultare Belgrado è preoccupante, soprattutto considerando il coinvolgimento del Kosovo, che la Serbia non riconosce come Stato indipendente.

Evidentemente incoraggiata dalla NATO, alla condanna di Belgrado è seguita quella di Pristina. Il Ministero degli Esteri del Kosovo ha reagito affermando di considerare la dichiarazione del Ministero degli Esteri serbo non solo come “aggressiva e minacciosa”, ma anche come una palese violazione dell’accordo di Bruxelles “che stabilisce chiaramente che la Serbia non ostacolerà le relazioni internazionali del Kosovo e non affermerà di parlare a nome del Kosovo nelle relazioni con altri Stati e organizzazioni”. Secondo le autorità kosovare, “la Serbia resta la più grande minaccia alla sicurezza regionale”.

Dopo aver oscillato per lungo tempo tra opposte pressioni nella speranza che l’arrivo di Trump alla Casa Bianca potesse rafforzarlo, sembra ora che il tempo per Vucic stia per scadere e a breve il Presidente serbo dovrà definitivamente chiarire l’orientamento geopolitico del proprio Paese.

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Who breached promises – NATO or Russia? https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/03/15/who-breached-promises-nato-or-russia/ Sat, 15 Mar 2025 17:00:11 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=884087

Albania and Croatia became official members in April 2009, followed by Montenegro in June 2017.

By Imtiaz GUL

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With NATO’s expansion and Europe’s push to militarise Ukraine, history’s forgotten promises resurface – was Russia the real violator, or has the West rewritten the rules? And at what cost to Europe’s future?

Speaking to media after the Euro-Summit on Ukraine in London (March 2), British Prime Minister Keir Starmer made a critical, albeit dubious, point about a possible “breach” of a deal by Russia. He said, “We cannot accept a weak deal like Minsk – which Russia can breach with ease.”

By linking the word “breach” to Russia, Starmer implied that the latter has often violated agreements, suggesting that Europe must work to put Ukraine in a strong negotiating position. However, this dubious insinuation belies history. In 2017, the National Security Archive at George Washington University declassified 30 documents related to commitments and assurances made by Western leaders to Russia in 1990, when the fall of the Berlin Wall appeared imminent.

No major Western media outlet ever reported on or referenced these documents, noted authors Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton in a study published for NATO Watch in January 2018.

Let us examine the historical record to determine who actually breached commitments.

Starmer’s statement reminds us of American international relations experts such as Prof Jeffrey Sachs and Prof John Joseph Mearsheimer. Both call out the West for its unilateral critique of Russia without context. They have long argued that NATO’s relentless eastward expansion – after Moscow dismantled Warsaw Pact – triggered security alarms in Moscow. It was, in fact, a continuous US-led NATO strategy to create a sort of “ring of fire” around Russia and China.

Military bases in the South China Sea region and the eastern Pacific Rim (Japan, Koreas, the Philippines, Australia and others) served as a bulwark against China. Similarly, in Eastern Europe, the continuous accession of multiple Baltic states projected NATO’s power eastward, eventually forcing Russia to respond by taking Crimea in 2014. More importantly, historical evidence suggests that it was NATO that breached its promises to Moscow.

The declassified documents revealed a torrent of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and into 1991, according to a NATO Watch paper, published on January 2, 2018.

President George HW Bush had assured President Gorbachev during the Malta Summit in December 1989 that the US would not take advantage of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests, stating, “I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall.”

The first concrete assurance came on January 31, 1990 when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher made a major public speech in Tutzing, Bavaria, on German unification. He said, “The changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an impairment of Soviet security interests. Therefore, NATO should rule out an expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e., moving it closer to the Soviet borders.”

In February 1991, then-US Secretary of State James Baker assured his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, that in a post-Cold War Europe, NATO would no longer be belligerent – “less of a military organization, much more of a political one, with no need for independent capability.”

He promised Shevardnadze “iron-clad guarantees that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward.” On the same day in Moscow, Baker famously told Gorbachev that the alliance would not move “one inch to the east.”

In a meeting with Gorbachev the following day (February 10), German Chancellor Helmut Kohl reiterated the same assurance: “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity. We have to find a reasonable resolution. I correctly understand the security interests of the Soviet Union.”

According to the NATO Watch paper, “The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991. Discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory. Subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled over NATO expansion were founded on written contemporaneous memos and telephone conversations at the highest levels.”

The declassified documents list Bush Senior, Genscher, Kohl, CIA Director Robert Gates, French President Mitterrand, British PMs Thatcher and John Major, and NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner.

Their assurances against NATO expansion evaporated into thin air in 1997 when Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited into NATO, followed by formal accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia on March 29, 2004.

Albania and Croatia became official members in April 2009, followed by Montenegro in June 2017. The Republic of North Macedonia joined in March 2020, Finland in April 2023, and Sweden in March 2024.

The documents released by the GWU archives echoed the criticism by former CIA Director Robert Gates, who warned against “pressing ahead with the expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”

It is the latter-day Western leaders who have breached their commitment not to pursue NATO’s eastward enlargement. The mainstream Western media also contributed to the falsification of historical facts by consistently demonising Russia – projecting it as an encroaching monster.

The Euro-Summit in London and its four-point declaration on Ukraine represent yet another attempt to enforce the permanent militarisation of the Ukraine-Russia border.

Without the US military’s involvement in this coalition the efficacy of the declaration remains doubtful. Further militarisation of Ukraine could lead to the hemorrhaging of Western European economies and deepen political divisions leading to far-reaching consequences.

As the Euro-Summit’s latest declarations pave the way for further escalation, it is worth asking: How much longer can 32-member NATO dismiss its own role in fueling tensions? And, more importantly, what price will Europe pay for ignoring the lessons of history?

Original article: tribune.com.pk

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Kosovo, a time-bomb to extend the European front https://strategic-culture.su/news/2024/11/05/kosovo-time-bomb-extend-the-european-front/ Tue, 05 Nov 2024 10:59:04 +0000 https://strategic-culture.su/?post_type=article&p=881723

Self-proclaimed Kosovo, created with the help of the weapons of Albanian terrorists, remains one of the most serious problems in the region.

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The Balkans remain the ‘powder keg of Europe’: a region that has been kept unstable for more than a century, where ethnic and political conflicts are continually fuelled, under the careful direction of the Western powers, in order to have a ‘time bomb’ always at the ready, to be detonated at the opportune moment.

Considering Kosovo in the European strategic equation

Self-proclaimed Kosovo, created with the help of the weapons of Albanian terrorists and supported by the US and almost all EU countries (with the exception of a few states), remains one of the most serious problems in the region.

Kosovo and Metohija have become key areas for arms and drug trafficking through the Balkans, affecting the entire European continent. Montenegro, separated at the turn of the century from Serbia, is under constant pressure to accentuate its distancing from its ‘sister’ Serbia. The same happens in Macedonia. The anti-Serbian policy, as is well known, is continually nurtured throughout the Balkans, particularly in the ‘Croatian’ part. NATO’s military presence with the KFOR (Kosovo Force) missions and the US base at Bondsteel, illegally on Serbian territory, defines a permanent hotspot of instability, binding together the other NATO centres scattered throughout the Balkan region.

The United States and the European Union are encouraging Serbia to recognise Kosovo, with sometimes unexpected results. On 4 September 2020, the President of Serbia and the ‘prime minister’ of Kosovo signed and sent to Donald Trump a document entitled Washington Accord in which Kosovo and Serbia committed themselves to a kind of upheaval in international relations, in an exquisitely American-centric key.

On the strategic level, the Agreement first of all envisages the accession to the Mini-Schengen announced in October 2019, desired by Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic to strengthen regional economic cooperation between the Western Balkan states by implementing the ‘four freedoms’ of the EU, i.e. the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. One of the biggest risks is the implementation of an application for EU membership, causing a degeneration of diplomatic relations and an escalation of military influence (i.e. occupation) on the part of the US.

On the foreign relations front, the document envisaged the opening of the Merdar border (already anticipated since 2011), a series of facilitations in the recognition of documents, professional and academic qualifications and, very important on a historical-cultural level, a sort of joint commission for the recognition of persons missing since the end of the conflict in 1999 (remember that Kosovo has always accused Serbia of delaying and hindering efforts to identify mass graves in Serbia and relocate the remains of victims).

On the economic level, the American presence plays a favourable role: cooperation is promoted with the American International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) to finance bilateral infrastructure projects. A curious proposal that goes hand in hand with the request for the intervention of the US Department of Energy to manage hydroelectric power plant projects on border lakes.

Last but not least, the religious issue, which is very sensitive throughout the region: the document states to promote religious freedom and to fulfil court decisions concerning the Serbian Orthodox Church, with the restoration of unclaimed Jewish property related to the Holocaust, but also a series of guarantees for Serbian Christians living in Kosovo and the restitution of some property forcibly confiscated after the war.

After the Washington Accord, US interference in 2023 delivered another blow: a memorandum of understanding between Washington and Belgrade. Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic promoted the visit of US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, calling for a partnership between the two countries and in the region, with increased economic and military engagement. The memorandum itself aims at improving the skills of the Serbs and gaining new knowledge within the State Department. It is known that there has been talk of assigning a liaison officer from the Serbian Foreign Ministry to the US State Department. It is likely that there may be a wider engagement of Serbian diplomats to ‘retrain’ them to think according to the American model, and this means a risk for relations between Russia and Serbia, a real ‘inside job’ planned from a distance.

The possible escalation of the conflict

As early as November 2021, the political representatives of Kosovo and Albania confirmed their desire to build ‘Greater Albania’, increasing diplomatic tensions. Shortly afterwards, an incident occurred that briefly hinted at an outbreak of a wider conflict, but actually served as a dress rehearsal for possible later attempts. The event saw a shootout at the border with Hungary between illegal migrants, which ended with 600 arrests, many weapons seized and the indictment of the terrorist organisation known as the ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’. The intervention of the EU postponed the coercive measures. In the summer of 2022, there was again evidence of escalation, with various disturbances on the border with Serbia by the Albanian authorities. Again, 2023 began with new localised conflicts of spite and ad hoc created problems, as in the case of banned car number plates, restrictions on goods transport and subsequent protests by Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. It is indicative that in this case, the KFOR accomplices of the occupiers sided with Belgrade, but without an official request from either the government or the mayors of the cities involved.

On 27 February 2023, a meeting took place in Brussels between Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and the ‘head of government’ of Kosovo Albin Kurti, organised by the EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell and the EU’s special representative for dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina Miroslav Lajcak. In an atmosphere of positivity – in the American sense – the officials discussed an EU-mediated document, initially supported by France and Germany and later by all member states. The drafted document lists 11 points, and states that neither side will resort to violence to resolve the dispute or attempt to prevent the other from joining international bodies.

Belgrade will refrain from recognising Kosovo as an independent state, but pledges to recognise official documents such as passports, diplomas and number plates and not to block Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation, including the EU. A step, this, that represents a victory for Kosovo and a defeat – at least temporary – for Serbia, because without this international opening, Kosovo can achieve nothing.

Bear in mind that Serbia has pushed for the creation of an association of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo to protect the rights of Serbs, but Kosovo Albanians argue that such a body would give Belgrade enormous influence in their country, so much so that the Kosovo High Court ruled in 2015 that the latest association plan violates the Constitution.

The plan also includes a direct reference to the EU enlargement process, stipulating that neither country should hinder the other in its relations with the EU and accession. Now, the EU being a political prosthesis of the US in Europe, it is clear that joining it automatically means excluding oneself from a whole other wide range of international relations (e.g. with Russia).

At the end of 2023, relations between Serbia and Kosovo seemed to have returned to their original tension: Vucic reiterated on several occasions that Serbia’s interests were protected, but remained in an American orbit. Even during 2024, the choices made were at alternating times in favour of EU policies – as when support was provided to Ukraine – and at other times in favour of Russia and the multipolar transition, as in the case of the application for BRICS membership made in the autumn, shortly before the Kazan summit. It is unclear how Serbia will win if it continues to move further and further away from Russia, which provides it with diplomatic, economic, military-technical and political support.

The West’s plan is, therefore, very clear: to place Serbia in a situation of blackmail or, at any rate, with no other choice, manipulating the direction of the government from within through pro-American and suitably corrupt politicians, even pushing the country to cede all the sovereignty and institutional regularisation it wants to Kosovo. In the event of failure, the military tensions kept under control would escalate again – and anyway there is always the option of a coloured revolution.

The pro-Western polarisation of Serbia’s current leadership is a danger not only for the country and the entire region, but also for Europe’s relations with the East, especially Russia. It is through Serbia that Russia can maintain a balancing presence in the Balkans, prevent destabilisation in a military sense, and control access to the eastern regions. The advantage is certainly mutual, because Russia is the only country with a European presence that has real support for Serbia.

This risk of escalation and this political ambiguity will have to be resolved as soon as possible if Serbia wants to join the new multipolar partnerships, which are perhaps the last chance to emancipate itself from Washington’s orbit and restore its territorial integrity.

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Britain Needs a Thatcheresque Approach to Getting Tough on Macron Over Albanian ‘Invasion’ https://strategic-culture.su/news/2022/11/06/britain-needs-thatcheresque-approach-to-getting-tough-on-macron-over-albanian-invasion/ Sun, 06 Nov 2022 19:48:20 +0000 https://strategic-culture.org/?post_type=article&p=872879 Could the wholesale arrival of Albanians into the UK be manipulated by a foreign power to send its agents there?

Could the wholesale arrival of Albanians into the UK be manipulated by a foreign power to send its agents there?

The legacy of Margaret Thatcher, particularly among conservatives today, is legendary as it is divisive. Even today’s prime minister, Rushi Sunak, is said to be inspired by the late conservative leader. So why doesn’t Sunak take some of her ardour to resolve Britain’s “invasion” of Albanian immigrants who are without doubt fraudsters claiming “asylum”? Why does our present government play such a pusillanimous role and not fight the problem head on? And why haven’t Sunak, Truss, Boris and even Theresa May stood up to the French and taken their president head on?

Remarkably, during Liz Truss’s 44 days in power, the one comment she made which broke the house rules — of saying that the “jury was still out” when talking about relations with France’s Emmanuel Macron — actually showed true grit when dealing with Macron.

Let’s be clear about Macron. The French president is dumping human garbage onto Britain’s shores each day — garbage because these Albanians are not only not genuine asylum seekers but are arriving to milk the benefits system while becoming commercial criminals into the bargain. The French don’t want these people who would drain the French coffers if they stayed in the Republic. The French, who are paid over 50 million pounds a year from the government to beef up police numbers along its shoreline are cheating the British hand over fist. It is the British who are paying — literally — money into the French national coffers by giving free accommodation, food, heating and cash to Albanians. It is the British who are subsidising France’s failing economy which is forcing Macron to not only take a harder line with immigrants in general but also to actually assist the Albanians. How does a country with a first world economy with a defence budget of 40 billion pounds — which includes an impressive Navy — fail to stop the wholesale industrialised illegal migration of thousands of Albanians to cross the channel each day? The answer is that they chose to.

And this is the remarkable thing about British leaders who all habitually fail to challenge Macron about this appalling scam which is threatening to destroy the British economy, its welfare and health system and the safety of many of its citizens as Albanians set up criminal gangs at an alarming rate. The absolute cowardice of Sunak to face Macron head on is not surprising, given that he is following a theme. But what are British leaders afraid of? What does Macron have over them?

For us to look at this crisis in a more lucid light and to attribute blame fairly we need to ask what would our most charismatic modern-day leader, Mrs Thatcher, do under the circumstances? Of course, she would face Macron head on and threaten him that if he doesn’t keep his side of the bargain then Britain would have to take more radical measures. But we can’t disrespect international laws, people will no doubt cry, which is the heart of the matter in many respects as Britain is trapped by them which make almost all responses in the Channel unworkable. Britain has a right to protect its borders, after all.

Thatcher would argue that this is indeed an “invasion” and that the Albanians will destroy British society and so therefore the influx of them should be treated as an attack and therefore a state of war. An emergency, which needs tackling head on. And as for international laws, aren’t the French breaking them by actually assisting the Albanians make the crossings? Wouldn’t Thatcher say to hell with international law, let’s get the Navy to prevent these boats leaving French waters! Why can’t the British navy deploy its frigates and destroyers to make sure that these boats do not leave French waters and, in the process of being in trouble in the Channel will be forced to turn to the French to assist them safely back to shores. French shores. This only needs to happen for a week before the French learn the lesson. We also need to start charging — or debiting — the French for each Albanian who arrives. This could be something very modest, like say, 10,000 pounds per head. This should be deducted each year, or even each month, from the money that the British pay Macron. For each Albanian who arrives, this is a patent example of the deal with the French failing, so therefore there should be compensation. Why isn’t Sunak proposing this now with his home office minister who in so many respects has all of the narrative which Conservative members like, but none of the zeal to carry off the ‘get tough’ on illegal immigrants policy. Suella Braverman will soon prove in the coming weeks to be as fabulously useless at pulling off anything remotely close to what is needed and will have to be replaced. Britain needs a Thatcher type home office minister who is prepared to break rules, get tough, mobilise the British military and put Macron’s nose out of joint.

The issue will soon become a military and defence issue, which is what makes the Albanian invasion even more serious that Sunak probably realises. If Albanians, who do nothing remarkable more than buy a cheap budget airline ticket to Brussels, then take public transport to Calais — are to show the world how weak, stupid and cowardly the present British government is at protecting its own civilians and their state then it won’t be long before Russia will see how easy it is to send spies there as part of the Albanian deluge? And who could blame Putin for taking advantage of such an opportunity when Britain is playing such a fervent role in the attacks against Russian military? If the British military is responsible for the recent Black Sea attacks on Russian naval ships, then why is it not able to deploy its warships in the Channel to block the dinghies when the British are being attacked by the French who dump their social and financial debt on British shores every day? The British are suffering from a new gruelling tax regime, sky high fuel costs, food costs going out of control and a recession which has not been seen since 2008. There will be a social price to pay for this in terms of casualties from people who can’t afford to heat their homes this winter or find themselves homeless as Albanians will be given hotel rooms and take priority on housing lists. If this madness doesn’t stop, many will simply make a protest vote at the next general election and the Tories will be plunged into a darkness which might last for many years to come. Where is the Thatcherite leadership to prevent the inevitable abyss?

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NATO to Set Up Its First Air Base in Western Balkans https://strategic-culture.su/news/2018/08/06/nato-set-up-its-first-air-base-western-balkans/ Mon, 06 Aug 2018 09:55:00 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2018/08/06/nato-set-up-its-first-air-base-western-balkans/ NATO believes that the Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance. The summit that was held July 11-12 specifically expressed support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Balkan countries. Macedonia was officially invited to join the alliance.

On the eve of the summit, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Rose Gottemoeller stressed that NATO supported the process of reform in Kosovo, including the creation of its own regular armed forces. That idea has strong support in Washington, although by establishing its own military, Kosovo would be in gross violation of the existing international agreements. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 states explicitly that no other military presence, with the exception of KFOR and the Serbian army, shall be permitted without the mandate of the UN Security Council. The Florence Agreement (Article IV of the 1996 Dayton Peace Accords) affirms that regional stability should be maintained with the assistance of the OSCE, not NATO. The creation of a Kosovo military would mean that a regular force was being established within the territory of Serbia, which is a party to the Florence agreement. 

NATO has already allowed Kosovo to set up a professional security force, which is to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and then develop into a regular armed forces that is able to meet NATO standards. This idea is being floated at a time in which the concept of the creation of Greater Albania is gradually taking shape, which would include Kosovo, parts of Macedonia such as Tetovo, the Presevo Valley in Serbia, and parts of Montenegro such as Malesija.

The EU has also gone on the offensive. Croatia joined it in 2013. Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are EU candidate states. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are signatories to Stabilization and Association Agreements with the bloc. In 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina formally submitted an EU membership application.

Efforts to reduce the region’s energy “dependence” on Russia are underway, as an element of the policy of “squeezing Moscow out.” The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) project is in the construction phase and will eventually stretch from the Caspian Sea to Albania and northward to other Western Balkan countries, as well as Italy. The next step is the building of a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal on Krk, a Croatian island, thus making the countries of the region pay much more for American sea-transported energy than Russia’s natural gas that is supplied by pipeline. The Krk project is to include Slovenia, Hungary, Bosnia, and Serbia.

The NATO-EU Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration envisages close cooperation between the two groups, which will increase Western influence in the region. That’s what Russia opposes. It rejects the wisdom of an approach in which the region is viewed as a battlefield between the West and Russia (which is supposedly vying for influence), forcing the nations of the region to take sides. The truth is, they don’t have to. For instance, Serbia can derive significant benefits by promoting complementary relationships with the EU and the Russian-led EAEU.

The Atlantic Council’s report, titled “Balkans Forward: A New US Strategy for the Region,” which was released in late 2017, attracted a lot of attention. It calls on the West to double down on countering Russia’s influence in the region, including by means of a permanent American military presence in the Balkans that would "anchor the United States’ ability to influence developments." Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, which was built on Serbian soil without consulting that country’s own government, is not enough. The Heritage Foundation echoes this view, offering guidelines to spur US diplomatic, economic, and military efforts to drive Russia out while bringing the US in. The think tanks from the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the East-West Institute chimed in with their joint report, titled “Time for Action in the Western Balkans,” which was published in May.

The think tanks’ recommendations are followed by suggestions from governments. Here is the latest example. On Aug. 4, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama announced that NATO plans to build its first air base in the Western Balkans near the municipality of Kucove in south-central Albania. Construction is to start this year. The new facility will be used for air supply, logistic support, air patrolling, and training. The base will also be used by the Albanian air forces. The US Army’s Bondsteel base in Kosovo is used by KFOR but it lacks an airstrip for planes.

On Aug. 2, Kosovo's President Hashim Thaci said in an interview with VOA's Albanian Service, "Kosovo's border with Serbia needs to be redefined, or corrected." Whatever he meant, no mention was made of any need for Serbia’s consent or United Nations-approved procedures. Mr. Thaci feels free to make such statements because he senses the West’s support behind him.

Meanwhile, tensions in northern Kosovo are rising after the Aug. 4 deadline to establish Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo with limited autonomous powers was missed. The Kosovo provincial government has not kept its promises. Such a move is necessary in order meet the provisions of the EU-brokered 2013 Brussels Agreement, which is intended to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

The Kosovo Serbs say they would declare autonomy if Kosovo’s rulers’ fail to produce a draft statute of the Community of Serb Municipalities (ZSO). That agreement provides for the merger of the four Serb municipalities in the north (North Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic), which are subject to Kosovo law. This urban district would have powers over economic development, education, healthcare, and town planning.

On Aug. 4, Kosovo PM Ramush Haradinaj warned Serbs in the northern section of the province that their potential "attempt to proclaim autonomy" would be met with a response, obviously meaning the use of force. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic vowed action to protect his compatriots residing in Kosovo. KFOR is in a state of combat readiness, because NATO has failed to prevent a conflict between Kosovo and Serbia.

KFOR entered Kosovo in 1999. The Albanian government of the Serbian province fully depends on the West. As recent events convincingly illustrate, after all these years, nothing has been done to solve the problems of the Serb minority or even to get closer to a solution. The ethnic divisions in Macedonia and Montenegro remain. Bosnia Herzegovina is still a divided country on the brink of armed conflict. The Western Balkans has not become a second Hong Kong or Singapore, even after some of the regional countries joined the EU. Neither the ethnic nor the religious divisions were successfully addressed after several Balkan nations joined NATO. If there is any outside security threat, it comes from the North Atlantic Alliance, which has proven its readiness to use force to reach its goals in the region. A NATO air force base in Albania will hardly make the life of ordinary people living in the Western Balkans better or more secure, but it will certainly bring the concept of Greater Albania closer to reality.

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NATO’s Terrorist Bases in Europe https://strategic-culture.su/news/2018/06/13/nato-terrorist-bases-in-europe/ Wed, 13 Jun 2018 07:55:00 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2018/06/13/nato-terrorist-bases-in-europe/ NATO and the United States, which, together, claim to be fighting some sort of amorphous “global war on terrorism,” have enabled a terrorist group to establish bases in two NATO member states – France and Albania – and one NATO protectorate, Kosovo. After evacuating forces of the anti-Iranian terrorist group Mojahedin-e-Khalq from their former bases in Iraq, the United States and NATO facilitated the group’s establishment of a well-guarded military base in Manez, Albania, near Tirana. In addition to hosting MEK members, NATO has convinced Albania to accept members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), who surrendered to Western special forces in Syria and Iraq.

The MEK was founded in 1965 and it has the unusual distinction of taking action to overthrow both the former government of the Shah of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran by relying on terrorist actions. In the early 1970s, the MEK embarked on a program of assassinating Iranian officials and U.S. personnel in Iran. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 saw the MEK's program of bombings and shootings increase in intensity. The MEK is led by the husband-wife team of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, who opponents and ex-members of the MEK describe as leaders of what has become known as the "Rajavi Cult." The Rajavis abhor criticism and have been known to silence former MEK members-turned-critics by having them constantly harassed or worse, assassinated.

The MEK’s most notable terrorist actions included:

  • the attempted kidnapping in 1970 of the U.S. ambassador to Iran, Douglas MacArthur II, the nephew of the famed World War II general.
  • the attempted assassination in 1972 of U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Harold Price with an improvised explosive device (IED).
  • the assassination in 1973 of U.S. Army officer Louis Lee Hawkins in Tehran. That same year, the MEK assassinated U.S. Air Force officers Col. Paul Shaffer and Lt. Col. Jack Turner.
  • the 1973 bombings of Pan-American World Airlines and Shell Oil offices in Tehran.
  • the assassination in Tehran in 1976 of three American employees of Rockwell International — William Cottrell, Donald Smith, and Robert Krongard. U.S. President Gerald Ford said he hoped that “the murderers will be brought to justice.” Instead, they are treated as heroes and the future government of Iran by bi-partisan leaders in Washington.
  • MEK threats to kill Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter during their respective May 1972 and December 1977 visits to Iran.
  • the 1978 assassination of Texaco oil executive Paul Grimm in Ahwaz, Iran.
  • assisting in the 1979 takeover by Iranian militants of the U.S. embassy in Tehran.
  • the 1979 bombing in Tehran that killed the democratically-elected Iranian President, Mohammad Ali-Rajai, and Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar.

During the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein permitted the MEK, also known as the “People’s Mojahedin,” to establish bases inside Iraq. Saddam armed the MEK and provided them with financial and logistical support to carry out terrorist attacks inside Iran. In 1988, the MEK, with Saddam’s assistance, launched a ground invasion of Iran.

In Operation Mersad, Iranian forces defeated the MEK, which had hoped to establish control over Iranian territory to establish a rival Iranian government. Had the MEK succeeded, the Middle East would have seen its first genuine terrorist state. Establishment of a terrorist state would have to wait until the Syrian civil war, when ISIL proclaimed an independent caliphate in occupied territory in Syria and Iraq.

After the United States ousted Saddam in the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, the MEK forces were confined to U.S.-protected compounds in Iraq, the most prominent being Camp Ashraf, the former U.S. military's Camp Liberty. The new Iraqi government demanded the MEK forces leave Iraq. Acceding to Iraqi demands, the United States re-located 3,000 MEK members to the Manez base in Albania, which the MEK calls “Ashraf 3.” The MEK, which reportedly receives support from Israel’s Mossad, is said to be involved in money laundering and sex trafficking through the intensive use of crypto-currencies like Bitcoin.

Not surprisingly, MEK forces joined with ISIL forces in battling against Syrian and Iraqi government forces. The MEK saw ISIL as a natural ally in fighting pro-Iranian governments in Baghdad and Damascus. It was well-known to Western intelligence agencies that the MEK and ISIL had established an alliance, but, nevertheless, the Barack Obama administration removed the MEK from the U.S. State Department’s terrorist list in 2012. From 1997 to 2012, the United States officially designated the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization.

After ISIL forces were routed in Syria and Iraq, the United States pressured Albania to allow the Islamist terrorists to join their MEK allies in Albania. ISIL terrorists and their families have reportedly been housed in buildings in Tirana that were formerly occupied by MEK members prior to their transfer to the Manez base.  From their Albanian base, MEK operatives have easily entered Kosovo, the location of another major NATO military base at Camp Bondsteel, near Ferizaj in eastern Kosovo. MEK terrorists, allied with sympathizers in Albania and Kosovo, have targeted Shi’a and Sufi Islamic institutions. It is also believed by some Albanian journalists, who have been intimidated by the Albanian government and MEK, that Ashraf 3 and Camp Bondsteel are being used to train MEK and other Middle Eastern mercenaries for a war against Iran to effect a NATO-led regime change operation.

The Albanian and Kosovo governments enjoy top-level access to the Trump administration. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and Kosovo President Hashim Thaci, himself a one-time terrorist leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, are represented in Washington by Brian Ballard, a former Trump presidential campaign official who runs Ballard Partners, a lobbying firm based in Tallahassee, Florida.

Thanks to the political influence of the Rajavis, Rama, and Thaci, an unholy troika of the MEK, Albania, and Kosovo has blossomed under NATO’s nose in the Balkans. This troika’s tentacles extend throughout the Balkans and into Western Europe, particularly France, Italy, and Germany.

In June 2003, the Rajavi-operated MEK compound in the Paris suburb of Auvers-sur-Oise was raided by French police on the orders of anti-terrorist magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière. Maryam Rajavi was arrested, along with over 100 other MEK members. Intense political pressure from Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress resulted in criminal charges, including those involving money laundering, being dropped by the French government.

The Office for the Protection of the German Constitution (DPA) has accused the MEK of not only money laundering but receiving charitable donations in return for "assisting" refugees. The Germans charges that the MEK’s charitable donations were spent on terrorist operations.

In 2004, a U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation report stated that the MEK financed its operations "through a complex international money laundering operation that uses accounts in Turkey, Germany, France, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates."

The MEK enjoys widespread support in the Trump White House, as well as in the U.S. Congress. One of the MEK's biggest boosters is Trump's National Security Adviser John Bolton. On April 1, 2017, Bolton addressed an MEK Nowruz (Persian New Year) conference in Albania and declared that the MEK would be celebrating taking power in Tehran before 2019. Bolton added, "I have believed for over a decade now that the declared policy of the United States should be regime change in Iran. And the sooner the better, for the sake of international peace and security." Over many years, Bolton has repeatedly spoken at MEK events in Paris and New York and has reportedly accepted a total of $180,000 in speaker’s fees from the organization. The MEK primarily receives financial backing from Saudi Arabia and Israel. Some of the funds are funneled to Western politicians as honoraria in return for their speeches at MEK events in venues like Paris, Tirana, and New York.

In addition to Bolton, a frequent recipient of MEK speakers’ honoraria is former New York Mayor and Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, a person who is so corrupt, the Italian mafia wanted to have him “eliminated.” Two former CIA directors, James Woolsey and Porter Goss, have spoken at MEK events, along with one former FBI director, Louis Freeh, Jr.

The MEK is represented in Washington by the law firm of Joseph diGenova and his wife, Victoria Toensing. DiGenova almost became Trump's personal attorney. However, diGenova took his name out of consideration due to conflicts of interest and Giuliani accepted the job.

In June 2017, the MEK and ISIL coordinated a terrorist attack on the Iranian parliament in Tehran and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The terrorists were armed with AK-47s, hand grenades, and explosive-laden suicide vests. At least 12 people were killed in the attacks. The Trump White House defended the MEK/ISIL attack in stating, "We underscore that states that sponsor terrorism risk falling victim to the evil they promote." Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called the White House statement "repugnant."

The Trump administration’s neocons, notably Bolton and Giuliani, are hell-bent on regime change in Iran. They are ramping up their terrorist army in the Balkans for such a future war.

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Prior to 9/11: US Covert Support to Al Qaeda in Macedonia, “Financing Both Sides” https://strategic-culture.su/news/2015/06/15/prior-9-11-us-covert-support-al-qaeda-macedonia-financing-both-sides/ Sun, 14 Jun 2015 20:00:32 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2015/06/15/prior-9-11-us-covert-support-al-qaeda-macedonia-financing-both-sides/ This essay was first published by antiwar.com in April 2001, barely 5 months before the September 11, 2001 attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon.

It was subsequently published by Global Research when the site was launched in September 2001. 

What is of utmost significance is that US military operatives on contract the Pentagon were involved in providing support to separatist forces with links to al Qaeda. 

US Finances Ethnic Warfare in the Balkans

by Michel Chossudovsky

Antiwar.com, April 2001,

Global Research, September 2001

INTRODUCTION

While Washington supports the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it is at the same time – behind the scenes – funneling money and military hardware to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) now engaged in a border war with the Macedonian Security Forces. In a cruel irony, Washington is arming and advising both the KLA attackers and the Macedonian defenders under military and intelligence authorization acts approved by the US Congress. Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), a mercenary outfit on contract to the Pentagon, is helping Macedonia – as part of a US military aid package – “to deter armed aggression and defend Macedonian territory.” But MPRI is also advising and equipping the KLA, which is responsible for the terrorist assaults. In this war, the American military-intelligence apparatus is pulling strings “on both sides of the fence.” What is the hidden agenda?

“[The] United States of America and the Kosovo Liberation Army stand for the same human values and principles … Fighting for the KLA is fighting for human rights and American values.”(Senator Joseph Lieberman, quoted in the Washington Post, 28 April 1999)

THE KLA IS TRANSFORMED

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – transformed in September 1999 into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) under UN auspices – is behind the terrorist attacks in the Tetovo region of Macedonia as well as in Southern Serbia. In Macedonia, these assaults are waged by the KLA’s proxy: the Ushtira Clirimtare Komtare (UCK) or National Liberation Army (NLA). The terrorists operate from KLA bases inside Kosovo under KFOR protection.

Supported by the US, the KLA and its various proxies are well equipped. According to Carl Bildt (special UN coordinator for the Balkans), the Macedonian Security Forces “are no match” for the rebels: “the guerrillas are a competent military organization… They have a core of very experienced fighters. They are well fortified, evidently well prepared, and in all probability they control substantial parts of the hinterland.”

But where did they get the money? The Western media conveys the impression that the National Liberation Army (NLA) developed into a modern rebel force overnight, spontaneously “out of thin air” and that NATO leaders have no contacts with the KLA.

UN PEACE-KEEPING FINANCES TERRORISM

According to the (London) Sunday Times,

“American intelligence agents have admitted they helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army before NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia.” (1)

A review of US Congressional documents would suggest that CIA support was not discontinued after the war.2 Moreover, while the KLA maintains its links both to the CIA and criminal syndicates involved in the Balkans narcotics trade, the paramilitary organisation -renamed the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) has been elevated to UN status, implying the granting of legitimate sources of funding through UN as well as through bilateral channels.

Procurement of military supplies, training of the KLA and military advisers has been entrusted to Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), a US based mercenary outfit linked to the Pentagon. The pattern is similar to that followed in Croatia and in the Bosnian Muslim-Croatian Federation where so-called “equip and train” programmes were put together by the Pentagon.

MPRI’s training concepts – which had already been tested in Croatia and Bosnia – are based on imparting “offensive tactics… as the best form of defence.”3 In the Kosovar context, this so-called “defensive doctrine” applied in terrorist assaults in Southern Serbia and Macedonia is intent upon transforming the KLA paramilitary into a modern military force which serves the Alliance’s strategic objectives. MPRI listed in 1999 “ninety-one highly experienced, former military professionals working in Bosnia & Herzegovina.”4 The number of military officers working on contract with the KLA has not been disclosed.

There is, however, a consistent thread: KLA Chief of Staff Agim Ceku (previously with the Croatian Armed Forces) has been involved in a long-term relationship with the MPRI. Ceku started working with MPRI in 1995 in the planning of “Operation Storm” in Croatia, which led to ethnic massacres and the expulsion of more than 200.000 Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia. The fact that Ceku is “an alleged war criminal” – according to the files of the Hague Tribunal (a body reporting to the UN Secretary General) – does not, however, seem to bother anybody in the “international community.”5

Ceku holds a UN passport (Laissez-Passer) which provides him with diplomatic immunity within Kosovo. According to ICTY prosecutor Carla del Ponte, Ceku’s reputation and integrity, however, are unstained because the Hague tribunal’s “inquiries … relate to atrocities committed [by Ceku] in Krajina … between 1993 and 1995. Ceku’s record in Kosovo itself is not thought to be in question.” (6)

Behind to polite façade of international diplomacy, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has – on Washington’s instructions – knowingly and willfully approved the appointment of “an alleged war criminal” to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation. In other words, the UN system is “financing terrorism,” creating an ugly precedent in the history of a respected international body: “The United Nations is paying the salaries of many of the gangsters,” who are now involved in the terrorist assaults into Macedonia.7

RECYCLING NARCO-DOLLARS

US support to the KLA is only one among several sources of KLA financing. Various Islamic organisations have channeled money and military equipment to the KLA. Prior to the 1999 war,

“German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were reported to be training the KLA in guerilla and diversion tactics.”8

Mujehadeen mercenaries recruited in a number of countries fought against Serb Security forces alongside the KLA in Kosovo. According to the ‘Sunday Times,’ the recent assaults by the KLA’s proxy in the Tetovo region of Macedonia have been “encouraged by mercenaries from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.”9

Amply documented, the Balkans drug trade is used to finance ethnic warfare with the complicity of the US and NATO. The pattern of covert support – through the recycling of narco-dollars – has been an integral part of CIA covert operations since the Soviet-Afghan war. According to documents of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), “members of the notorious Albanian mafia have links to a drug smuggling cartel” based in Kosovo’s capital, Pristina. This cartel is allegedly manned by ethnic Albanians who are members of the Kosovo National Front (KNF) whose armed wing is the KLA. The DEA documents apparently show it is one of the “most powerful heroin smuggling organisations in the world” with its profits being diverted to the KLA to buy weapons.10

In the words of former DEA agent and author Michael Levine:

“Ten years ago we were arming and equipping the worst elements of the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan – drug traffickers, arms smugglers, anti-American terrorists…Now we’re doing the same thing with the KLA, which is tied in with every known middle and far eastern drug cartel. Interpol, Europol, and nearly every European intelligence and counter-narcotics agency has files open on drug syndicates that lead right to the KLA, and right to Albanian gangs in this country.”11

While US aid – combined with drug money – is channeled to the KLA, Washington and Brussels perfunctorily condemn the NLA-Tetovo instigated terrorist assaults while casually denying the links of the attackers to the KLA. In the words of former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana: “‘it would be a mistake to negotiate,… the terrorists have to be isolated. All of us have to condemn and isolate them. Nothing can be achieved through violence” …

NATO has pledged to ”starve” the rebels by cutting supply lines from neighboring Kosovo.”12 While condemning the terrorists, NATO – through the UN – has also been “raising the urgent need for restraint by the Macedonian forces.”13

This double talk is of course a form of political camouflage: you say that you are against the terrorists and then support them via the KLA with guns, ammo and military advisers paid by the US public purse.

FINANCING BOTH SIDES

But there is something else even more terrifying which has not been revealed to public opinion. The guerilla war in the Tetovo region of Macedonia is being financed and therefore controlled by Washington “on both sides” of the border. While Washington pumps money into the KLA, the FYR of Macedonia – which has been an obedient client state – is also the recipient of US military aid and training. Macedonia is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and aspires to acquire full NATO membership.

The same group of US military advisers on contract with the KLA is also “helping” the Macedonian Armed Forces. The MPRI – while assisting the KLA in its terrorist assaults – is also present behind enemy lines in Macedonia under a so-called “Stability and Deterrence Program.” The later is intent upon “assisting the Macedonian Armed Forces… to deter armed aggression and, should deterrence fail, defend Macedonian territory….”14 What is happening is that the US mercenary company with a mandate “to defend the border” is also advising the KLA on how best “to attack the border.”

Is this not crystal clear: The military-intelligence ploy is to finance both sides of the conflict, provide military aid to one side and finance the other side. And then “make them fight.” It’s a sinister military-intelligence game, an “insider operation” with US military advisers on both sides from the same mercenary outfit (the MPRI). Macedonia’s “Stability and Deterrence Program” is in fact largely supported by US foreign military sales (FMS), namely MPRI is in charge of delivering (i.e. dumping) to the Macedonian Armed Forces obsolete weapons and hardware which the US Department of Defense wants to get rid of.

Moreover, with its various sources of financing (drugs, Islamic organisations, US military aid, contributions from the US-Albanian community), the KLA and its Macedonian proxy the Ushtira Clirimtare Komtare have the upper edge. The money channeled from various sources including the drug trade far exceeds the meager FMS allocations granted in the form of surplus military equipment to the Macedonian Ministry of Defence.15

The friendly and cordial meetings held in Skopje (July 2000) between General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Macedonian counterpart, General Jovan Andrevski, constitute an obvious smoke screen. While America’s top brass pays lip service to its PfP partner and ally, the KLA – with the support of the Albanian American community – is actively recruiting US citizens to fight as volunteers against the Macedonian Security Forces.16 Bear in mind that this pattern of “financing both sides” is not limited to the Balkans: since the end of the Cold War, Washington has been involved in channeling covert financing and triggering civil conflicts in different parts of the World including Central Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia. By financing both sides of the conflict, the US controls the outcome of the war.

MPRI OVERSEES THE SHOW

While recruiting a wide range of military and intelligence expertise from its data bank of former military personnel, MPRI is controlled by a handful of former generals and ex-CIA officers. MPRI General (retired) Rich Griffitts – responsible for MPRI’s program in Macedonia – is talking to the Macedonian Chief of Staff. He also talks to KLA Commander Agim Ceku – with whom he has established a longstanding relationship since Operation Storm in Croatia in 1995. Ceku is part of the MPRI’s “old boys network”; in collaboration with MPRI, he was one of the main architects of “Operation Storm.” In this capacity, he also acted as Commander of the Artillery division, which ruthlessly shelled Krajina Serb civilians!17

Whether MPRI personnel stationed in Kosovo is in direct contact or communication with their colleagues in Macedonia is not the issue: all MPRI military staff in the field report back to Rich Griffitt, Crosbie Saint and Carl Vuono (President of MPRI) at the company’s headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. Crosbie Saint – in charge of the company’s “International Group” – coordinates MPRI’s various operations in Kosovo and Macedonia as well as in Croatia and Bosnia. In turn, Saint – who is a former director of military intelligence – is in permanent contact with the Pentagon, KFOR and the CIA.18

HIDDEN AGENDA

So what kind of war is this? Both sides in the Macedonia border war are controlled by the US. American military personnel from the same private mercenary company are stationed on “both sides of the fence” assisting their local counterparts to fight a war on Washington’s behest.

If this war is allowed to continue, it will inevitably lead to the escalation of ethnic hatred, civilian casualties and refugees. This in turn will result in political destabilization and social unrest in both Macedonia and Yugoslavia, thereby providing a pretext to Washington and NATO to directly intervene under the disguise of “peace-keeping” and “confidence building.” The hidden agenda also consists in the mobilization of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia to support or become part of the KLA’S structure.

In other words, Washington is “financing ethnic warfare” as a means to achieving broad geopolitical, strategic and economic objectives using the KLA as proxy force. Meanwhile, the ‘international community” – warning of an impending “humanitarian disaster” – has sent in an army of observers and human rights experts, with a mandate to protect the political and social rights of ethnic Albanians. This brokered “reconciliation” – imposed by NATO under UN auspices – is based on the premise that ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are an oppressed social minority. It not only fosters socio-ethnic divisions within Macedonia; it also provides legitimacy to the KLA sponsored “freedom fighters” as well as international media sympathy. It tends to discredit the Macedonian Security Forces, thereby weakening their ability to fight the KLA.

While Washington continues to support the terrorists behind the scenes, the military alliance presents itself as an impartial mediator. In turn, NATO’s informal mouthpiece, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is placing the blame on the Skopje government, calling upon:

“the legal authorities in the FYR of Macedonia, Presevo and Kosovo to act to restore peace and security, … all sectors of the Macedonian society [should] co-operate peacefully and … build inter-ethnic confidence.”19

The dispatching of Bulgarian troops into Macedonia (under NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” Program) to fight the rebels could (if implemented) contribute to triggering a much broader conflagration in the region. Similarly, ethnic clashes – also engineered by Washington – have been triggered in Montenegro, which has a sizeable Albanian ethnic minority. And in Montenegro, the MUP, Montenegro’s highly partisan police force is being assisted by the Croatian Armed Forces, which in turn are being trained by the MPRI under the so-called Croatian Armed Forces Readiness and Training System (CARTS). Similarly, demanding “autonomy” for ethnic Hungarians in the North of Vojvodina is part of NATO’s ploy with large numbers of NATO troops stationed on the Hungarian side of the border. More generally, the various military aid packages provided to Croatia, Bosnia and the KLA are ultimately directed against Serbia.20

Despite the compliance of the Belgrade and Skopje governments to Washington’s demands, US foreign policy purports to eventually dismantle political institutions and get rid of political parties which resist US-NATO domination. Their objective is to eventually break up what remains of Yugoslavia into what UN Balkans envoy Carl Bildt has called a “patchwork of protectorates” on the “Kosovo-Bosnia model under UN “peace-keeping,” namely under military occupation.21

A Dayton-style agreement is the chosen framework for displacing and destroying existing State institutions including a fragile yet functioning parliamentary system. With regard to Macedonia, the OSCE has appointed Ambassador Robert Frowick to work with the Skopje government. His terms of reference are clear. In 1996, Frowick was put in charge of implementing “democracy” in Bosnia-Hercegovina under the Dayton agreement: the Bosnian “Constitution” – previously drafted by American lawyers at the US Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio – was appended to the 1995 US brokered “General Framework Agreement.”22

DISARMING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The terrorist assaults in Macedonia and Southern Serbia are serving Washington’s strategic goals in blatant violation of international law. NATO is increasingly discredited in the eyes of World public opinion. The lies and falsehoods are surfacing and the people of Yugoslavia are determined to preserve their sovereignty in the face of American aggression.

US foreign policy directed against so-called “rogue states” lacks credibility both in the US and internationally. Around the World, citizens are looking to Yugoslavia and the courage of its people who have resisted the imposition of the New World Order. The lies concerning the war against Yugoslavia have been uncovered and revealed to millions of people.

NOTES

  1. Tom Walker and Aiden Laverty, ‘CIA Aided Kosovo Guerrilla Army’, Sunday Times, 12 March 2000).
  2. See “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.” HR 1555, Section 308 “Report on Kosova Liberation Army.”
  3. See Tammy Arbucki, “Building a Bosnian Army,” Jane’s International Defence Review, August 1997.
  4. See Military Professional Resources, Inc, “Personnel Needs,” MPRI web page.
  5. See Michel Chossudovsky, “United Nations Appoints Alleged War Criminal,” Emperors Clothes, March 2000.
  6. See Tom Walker, “Kosovo Defense Chief Accused of War Crimes,”Sunday Times, London, 10 October 1999.
  7. Quoted in John Sweeney and Jen Holsoe, “Kosovo Disaster Response Service Stands Accused of Murder and Torture,” The Observer, London, 12 March 2000.
  8. Michel Chossudovsky, “Kosovo Freedom Fighters Financed by Organized Crime,” Covert Action Quarterly, Fall 1999, also published by Emperors Clothes.
  9. Tom Walker, “NATO Troops caught in a Balkan Ulster,” Sunday Times, London, 18 March 2001.
  10. According to DEA documents reviewed and quoted in R. Chandran, “US-backed KLA linked to Heroin Network.
  11. Quoted in the New American Magazine, May 24, 1999)
  12. Quoted in the New York Times, 20 March 2001)
  13. United Nations Interim Administration Mission In Kosovo (UNMIK), Press Release, 29 March 2001.
  14. See MPRI.
  15. US military aid under the FMS program for Macedonia was $4 million in FY 2000, 7.9 million was appropriated for 2001. More recently, the US announced a $13.5 million military aid package, See Government of Macedonia, Ministry of Defence, Communique, 21 March 2001; Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001, Released by the Office of the Secretary of State, Resources, Plans and Policy, U.S. Department of State, March 15, 2000.
  16. New York Times, 19 March 2001.
  17. See Michel Chossudovsky, “NATO has Installed a Reign of Terror in Kosovo,” July 1999.
  18. See MPRI.
  19. Statement by OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Severin on former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo, 23 March 2001.
  20. See Michel Chossudovsky, “The War Against Yugoslavia Is Not Over,” June 2000.
  21. See Carl Bildt’s statement. Bildt was formerly the High Representative in Bosnia following the adoption of the Dayton Agreement in 1995).
  22. For a discussion see Michel Chossudovsky, “Dismantling Yugoslavia, Recolonizing Bosnia,” Covert Action Quarterly,Spring 1996, also published by Emperors Clothes. Also, see text of the Bosnian Constitution.

Prof Michel Chossudovsky, globalresearch.ca


 
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The idea of a ‘Greater Albania’, then and now (II) https://strategic-culture.su/news/2015/06/15/the-idea-greater-albania-then-and-now-ii/ Sun, 14 Jun 2015 20:00:03 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2015/06/15/the-idea-greater-albania-then-and-now-ii/ Part I

The bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia orchestrated by global centres of power opened up new possibilities to the ideologists and practitioners of a ‘Greater Albania’. A key role in realising the plan now passed to military and political structures, first and foremost the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and its ‘affiliates’ in neighbouring Balkan regions. 

The issue of establishing Albanian armed units in Kosovo numbering 40,000 people was first raised in Germany in 1992 with the active participation of the Albanian authorities. Among others, the Albanian defence minister at that time, Safet Zhulali, and his Kosovo colleague Heizer Heizerai took part in the talks held between 1992 and 1993 (1). Then the issue was ‘frozen’ for two years due to the defeat of underground Albanian paramilitary organisations in Kosovo. In 1996, however, evidence came to light that the Albanian government had started financing underground armed groups «centred in one of the European countries» through its embassy in Belgrade (2). The first armed KLA operations were noted at the end of 1997. Then in 1998, the International Crisis Group recorded the presence of KLA paramilitary training camps in the north and northeast of Albania operating under the control of the special services of NATO member countries.

The KLA initially set itself two key goals: to gain independence for Kosovo (including through the use of terrorist methods) and to transform the area into a military and political centre for the ‘gathering’ of Albanian lands in accordance with the provisions of the 1878-1881 League of Prizren (the League of Prizren was a national organisation of Albania established on 10 June 1878 as part of the Albanian National Awakening. It was founded in the city of Prizren to oppose the implementation of decisions of the Berlin Congress, according to which certain border areas of the then Ottoman Empire were transferred to Montenegro and Greece). To this end, a branched structure of military and political organisations of Albanians who closely coordinated their armed actions and attracted funds from the Albanian diaspora around the world as well as from international institutions, including those with a Euro-Atlantic focus, was established around the cusp of the 1990s-2000s.

In this regard, the biography of Ali Ahmeti, the current head of the Democratic Union for Integration (of Macedonian Albanians) is typical. He became active in the Albanian separatist movement immediately after graduating from the University of Pristina in 1983. In 1986, Ahmeti was elected as a member of the Main Council of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo, in which he was responsible for cooperating with European countries. In 1988, he became one of the movement’s few leaders and became the head of its military sector in 1993. In 1996, Ali Ahmeti was one of the main founders of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and when violent fighting broke out in the region between Albanian units and the Yugoslav army and Serbian police, he was already a member of the high command of the KLA.

It was in 1998 that Western circles finally decided in favour of ethnic Albanian extremists as their main military and political allies in the Balkan region. Thus, the statement made several months before by the then US envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, that the KLA was a «terrorist organisation» was actually disavowed. As Jerry Seper, a leading US expert in international terrorism and drug trafficking, pointed out in May 1999, Albanian separatists «were terrorists in 1998 and now, because of politics, they’re freedom fighters», despite the fact that the KLA «financed much of its war effort with profits from the sale of heroin» (3).

After the NATO bombing campaign of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the deployment of international contingents to Kosovo, Ali Ahmeti was transferred to the Macedonian theatre of fighting for a ‘Greater Albania’, where he became one of the leaders of the anti-government uprising of Albanians in Macedonia, supported by relevant Kosovo institutions. In 2001, Ali Ahmeti was elected Commander-in-Chief of the National Liberation Army of Macedonian Albanians. In June 2001, Ali Ahmeti was temporarily included on a US blacklist of people associated with terrorist activities and was denied entry into Switzerland and a number of other European countries. This did not prevent him from signing the Ohrid Peace Agreement, which was developed and championed by NATO and the European Union, in the name of Macedonian Albanians, however. (The Ohrid Agreement is a document signed by the Macedonian government and Albanian political representatives on 13 August 2001 under pressure from the international community).

At present, the leaders of the Macedonian Albanians, referring to the spirit and letter of this document and accusing the authorities in Skopje of non-compliance, are already calling for the country’s authorities to agree to turn the state into a Macedonian-Albanian confederation called the «Republic of Macedonia-Illirida», failing which they are threatening to achieve it through force.

An armed uprising of Albanians similar to the one in Macedonia broke out in 2000-2001 in the south Serbian municipalities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac and were suppressed by Yugoslav army and police forces. However, a scenario involving the gradual Albanianisation of the region is currently being successfully implemented there and is allowing Albanians to establish control over local government institutions. According to Serbian experts in national and regional security, «the actions of Albanian extremists in Kosovo, Macedonia, South Serbia and Montenegro are being coordinated from a single centre». In particular, the former head of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija under the Serbian government, Nenad Popovic, says that «the actions of Albanian extremists and terrorists in different areas of the Balkans are well organised and coordinated» (4).

Two key sources make up the financial basis for realising the ‘Greater Albania’ idea. First are the ‘voluntary-compulsory’ contributions from the Albanian diaspora. According to the International Crisis Group, «the large Kosovo Albanian diaspora communities living in the United States, Germany and Switzerland have played – and will continue to play – a key role in the current and future economic, social and political development of Kosovo, as well as dictating military events on the ground. They could easily open up new fronts if they wish to keep up the pressure on the numerous unresolved Albanian-related issues» (5).

The second important source of income for realising the ‘Greater Albania’ idea is money from drug trafficking and other cross-border criminal activities controlled by Albanians. The money made by Albanian groups through controlling the drug flows from the Near and Middle East and Southwest Asia (primarily from Afghanistan) to Europe is estimated to be at least $30-50 million a year.

As well as the military and political developments and the multi-billion dollar financial support, the ‘Greater Albania’ idea also relies on relevant historical and ethnographic theories. The latter aim to prove the autochthony of Albanians in the Balkans as direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians (as opposed to the ‘newly-arrived’ Slavs) and substantiate the autonomy of the ‘Greater Albanian’ state by means of historiography so that it will be «proven with respect to antiquity and to all subsequent periods» (6). Using the vivid words of Serbian academic Spasoje Djakovic, the Albanian irredentist «has incorporated a historical past, an ancestry and an ‘authentic’ culture into continuous ideological and political propaganda with deafening force and enormous persistence» (7).

Even the Albanian experts themselves have to recognise the fact that right up to the start of the 20th century, the Albanian ethnos was lacking a number of key characteristics traditionally inherent in a single nationality. Among other things, the first government of ‘independent’ Albania established in Vlorë in 1912 had to prepare its declaration of independence in Turkish and write its directives using the Turkish alphabet, since there was not a single member of Ismail Qemali’s cabinet who knew the Albanian Latin alphabet that had been developed just a few years before.

In fact, there is historical and philological evidence that suggests the ancestors of Albanians lived much further east of present-day Albania and Kosovo. In particular, the similarity of the early Albanian and Thracian languages suggests that the ancestral home of Albanians, who engaged in distant-pasture cattle breeding, should be regarded as the Carpathians, from where they crossed the Danube together with the Slavs and moved through Macedonia to the west of the Balkan Peninsula. This theory is a good explanation of the lexical similarity of the Albanian and Romanian languages, as well as the fact that the first mention of Albanians in written sources is not until the 11th century as inhabitants of ‘Arbanon’ in present-day central Albania.

The violent expulsion of other nations and their Islamisation actively carried out during the Ottoman yoke between the 14th and 19th centuries is also another important factor in the formation and wide-spread distribution of the Albanian ethnos across the Balkans. According to Serbian sources, between the 18th and 19th centuries alone, a total of nearly half a million Serbs were resettled in the Kingdom of Serbia from Kosovo and Metohija. The peak of the migrations took place in the periods following the Serbian uprisings of 1804-1813 and the Serbo-Turkish wars of 1876-1878.

The remaining Serbs were subjected to forced Islamisation, as a result of which a significant amount of Kosovo Albanians are of Serbian origin, according to Serbian academic Jovan Cvijić. The same has been said by Russian academics and diplomats, including the consul in Vlorë and delegate to the International Commission of Control in Albania, Aleksandr Petrjaev. He stressed that the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia «should, in the vast majority of cases, be regarded as Turkicised and Albanianised Slavs» (8).

An attempt to create a Balkan state within its widest possible ethnic borders was undertaken at the European level at the end of the 1870s. This refers to the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, signed in 1878 by Russia and the Ottoman Empire that determined the territorial and state structure of Bulgaria. The idea was not realised at that time because of the anti-Russian position of the other great powers and concerns within the Russian government itself regarding the emergence of a «regional heavyweight» and the subsequent chain reaction among the other Balkan nations. The ‘Greater Albania’ model of the 21st century, however, looks much more dangerous and, more importantly, much more realistic than the hypothetical ‘Greater Albania’ of the late 19th century. The fact that the Albanian nationalists have a single military and political centre and command and staff structures that have established close ties with the higher echelons of the US, NATO and the European Union, as well as considerable financial resources, means that the prospect of an Albanian state with a population of around 10 million appearing on the map of the Balkans can be regarded as completely realistic.

References:
[1] Lopušina M. OVK protiv Jugoslavije, kako smo izgubili Kosovo i Metohiju. Čačak 1999, p343.
[2] Smirnova N. Konflikt v Kosovo kak chast’ ‘albanskogo voprosa’ // Kosovo: mezhdunarodnye aspekty krizisa (‘The conflict in Kosovo as part of the ‘Albanian question’ // Kosovo: international aspects of the crisis’). Moscow 1999, pp108-109.
[3] The Washington Times, 03.05.1999
[4] Vremya novostei, 13.11.2007.
[5] Pan-Albanianism: How big a threat to Balkan stability? Tirana/Brussels, p31.
[6] Jakupi A. Two Albanian States and National Unification. Prishtina 2004, p47.
[7] Djakovich S. Sukobi na Kosovu. Belgrade 1986, p13.
[8] Albanskii faktor v razvitii krizisa na territorii byvshei IUgoslavii (‘The Albanian factor in the development of the crisis in former Yugoslavia’). Dokumenty. Volume One (1878-1997). Moscow 2006, p.57.
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The idea of a ‘Greater Albania’, then and now (I) https://strategic-culture.su/news/2015/06/14/the-idea-greater-albania-then-and-now-i/ Sat, 13 Jun 2015 20:00:02 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2015/06/14/the-idea-greater-albania-then-and-now-i/ The Albanian factor, an integral part of which involves the formation of a ‘Greater Albania’ in the region – a state uniting every area with an Albanian population – is playing an increasingly active role in developments in the Balkans and surrounding areas. 

According to a poll by the Gallup Balkan Monitor, at least 75 per cent of respondents in Kosovo and 70 per cent in Albania support the idea of a ‘Greater Albania’, although in 2006 just 2.5 per cent of Kosovo Albanians considered unification with Albania the best way of solving Kosovo’s problems (1).

International institutions and influential global powers are ignoring the threat posed by the intensification of the Albanian factor in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole. They are trying to present the actions of Kosovo separatists, the anti-government uprising of Macedonian Albanians, the extremism of Albanians in south Serbia’s Presevo Valley and the underground activities of Albanian nationalists in Montenegro and Greece as isolated events caused by specific social and economic or cultural and ethnic reasons.

The Albanian elite prefer not to use the terms ‘Greater Albania’ and ‘Pan-Albanianism’, using instead the term «Albanian national question», interpreted as «the movement for the liberation of the Albanian lands from foreign occupation and their unification into one single national state» (2). According to prominent Albanian intellectual Fatos Lubonja, «the Albanians’ dream of being united one day has been a part of their collective consciousness» without becoming a political programme because «Albanians have always been very weak» (3).

On maps of ‘Greater Albania’ widely circulated in Albania, Kosovo and other Balkan regions, this entity, with Skopje in present-day Macedonia as its capital, is labelled as ‘Ethnic Albania’. It includes within its borders Albania itself, Kosovo, the south Serbian municipalities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac with mixed Serbian-Albanian populations, significant parts of Macedonia and Montenegro, including its capital Podgorica, and the Greek region of Epirus.

The idea of forming a ‘Greater Albania’ was first developed by delegates of the Albanian League, which gathered in the Kosovo town of Prizren in 1878. They adopted a programme that contained items such as «fighting to the last drop of blood against any annexation of Albanian territories» and «the unification of all territories populated by Albanians into a single province» (4). One of the ideologists of the Albanian movement, Pashko Vasa Shkodrani (a Catholic who served as the governor of Lebanon in the Ottoman Empire), stated back in the 19th century that «the religion of Albanians is Albanianism».

At a meeting of the League of Prizren in July 1879, the then leader of the Albanian national movement’s radical wing, Abdyl Frashëri, published a manifesto on the formation of a provisional government of autonomous Albania, the territory of which was to include Albania, Kosovo, the Macedonian regions of Debar and Skopje, and the Greek city of Ioannina. «Let us all be Albanians and create Albania», Abdyl Frashëri stated (5).

The suppression of the Prizren League by the Ottoman authorities in 1881 moved the fight for a ‘Greater Albania’ into the mainstream of cultural and ethnic propaganda for a time, but at the turn of the 20th century, the Albanian movement received a fresh impetus. Its leaders regarded all the vilayets of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by Albanians as its base. In June 1911 in Podgorica, members of a local Albanian committee prepared a memorandum called ‘The Red Book’, which provided for the establishment of an autonomous Albania within the Balkans made up of every region inhabited by Albanians. At that time, one of Albania’s leaders, Ismail Qemali, openly called for Albanians to drive out «Christian Slavs» using rifles. Later, when he was head of the provisional Albanian government proclaimed in 1912, he demanded that the great powers cleanse «Albanian land» of Slavs and Greeks. (6)

Russian diplomatic representatives in the Balkans confirmed the growing influence of the Albanian factor and warned of the threat it posed. As the Russian consul in Vlorë, Alexander Petryaev, reported in 1912, «the Albanian people, who have never before played a political role, are acquiring such force under Turkish rule that they are leaving their region, expanding their borders, and taking up a different national character with a glorious historical past» (7).

The Albanian Declaration of Independence, prepared together with representatives from a number of great powers, was passed on 28 November 1912 at an Albanian national assembly in Vlorë. Beforehand, Ismail Qemali visited Vienna, where he discussed his plans with the leaders of Austro-Hungary and specified the borders of Albania, which included, along with Albania itself, the Macedonian cities of Bitola and Skopje, the Greek city of Ioannina, and the Kosovo cities of Pristina and Prizren. The Conference of Ambassadors of the great powers that opened in December 1912 in London did not recognise the Albanian Declaration of Independence and decided to hand over many of the territories being claimed by the leaders of the Albanian movement to neighbouring Balkan countries. In return, however, activists of the ‘Greater Albanian’ movement obtained grounds for demanding that «the will of all Albanians» be realised. Leaving the London conference in anger after its participants refused to unite Kosovo with Albania, one of the leaders of the Albanian national movement, Isa Boletini, promised: «When the spring comes, we will manure the plains of Kosovo with the bones of Serbs, for we Albanians have suffered too much to forget».

At the end of the First World War, the great powers as a whole kept the principles of Albania’s division among its Balkan neighbours unchanged, allowing Albanian nationalists to maintain ever since that «nearly half» of those whose identities could be defined as «Albanian» remain outside the Albanian state.

The idea of a ‘Greater Albania’ experienced a renaissance during the Second World War when, in 1939, Germany and Italy united Italian-occupied Albania with the vast territory of its neighbouring Balkan states. In May 1941, the ruling Albanian Fascist Party triumphantly announced that nearly all Balkan lands inhabited by Albanians were now united with Albania (9). The only partial exception was the Greek region of Epirus (‘Chameria’ in Albanian toponymy). There, the Italian occupying authorities appointed an Albanian High Commissioner, Xhemil Dino, but the region itself remained under the control of the Italian military command based in Athens. This situation continued right up until these territories were liberated first from Italian and then German occupation. As part of the post-war settlement, the anti-Hitler coalition decided to restore Albania to its former borders, which largely corresponded to the decisions of the 1912-1913 Conference of Ambassadors of the great powers in London.

After the end of the Second World War, ideas regarding a ‘Greater Albania’ were pushed to the background for a while, including in the priorities of Albania, which at that time was keen on the idea of creating a Balkan federation.

The idea of a Balkan federation was, in principle, shared by the leaders of the three main states concerned – Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. One scenario envisaged the supranational union of Albania not just with Yugoslavia (and therefore Kosovo) and Bulgaria, but also Romania and even Greece (despite the complexity of Albanian-Greek relations). This large-scale project was primarily supported by Bulgaria’s communist leader, Georgi Dimitrov. In contrast, Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito was in favour of creating the South Slavic Union (the Union of South Slavic People’s Republics) as the second phase of the unification. The first phase was to be the unification of Albania with Yugoslavia. Belgrade was convinced – and in this was met with understanding from Tirana – that an Albanian-Yugoslav union would not only become the core of the Balkan federation, but would also be the best possible solution to the Kosovo problem by including Kosovo «in an Albanian Federal unit».9.

According to the memoirs of Milovan Djilas, an ally of Tito, Belgrade and Tirana were already, in the last few months of the Second World War, «more or less of the viewpoint that Albania should unite with Yugoslavia», which would resolve the Albanian question in Yugoslavia since «it would make it possible to unite a considerable and compact Albanian minority with Albania as a separate republic in the Yugoslavian-Albanian federation» (10). Commenting on a conversation with Enver Hoxha following his visit to Belgrade, the Soviet envoy to Albania, D.S. Chuvakhin, noted in his diary on 3 July 1946 that the Yugoslavian leader, according to Hoxha, «believes it necessary to make every effort to join the population of Kosovo and Metohija with the population of Albania» (11).

The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav conflict buried the idea of a Balkan federation, but did not affect the development of the ‘Greater Albania’ idea. In the subsequent period of Hoxha’s rule, ‘Greater Albanian’ sentiment was actively disseminated among the population of Kosovo through publishing and propaganda activities, including through Pristina University. Participants of the National Conference of Ethnographic Sciences that took place in Tirana in 1976 pointedly noted that «nearly five million Albanians» continue to remain outside of Albania itself (12). And in 1981, when the situation in Kosovo intensified as a result of anti-government demonstrations by local Albanians, Albania’s leaders developed plans for Albanian army units to be brought into the region.

(To be concluded..)
 
References:
 
[1] UNDP: Early warning report. March 2007, p16.
[2] Platform for the Solution of the National Albanian Question, Albanian Academy of Sciences. Tirana 1998, p5.
[3] Pan-Albanianism: How big a threat to Balkan stability? Tirana-Brussels 2004, p2.
[4] Reuter J. Die Albaner in Jugoslawien. Munich 1982, p18.
[5] Kratkaya istoriya Albanii (‘A brief history of Albania’). Moscow 1992, p194.
[6] Ekrem Bey Vlora, Lebenserinnerungen. Band I, (1885-1912). Munich 1968, p275.
[7] Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii (‘Archive of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire’). Fond Politarkhiv. Opis’ 482. Delo 5296. List 52.
[8] Zolo D. Invoking humanity: War, law, and global order. London 2002, p24.
[9] Vickers M. The Albanians. A modern history. London – New York 1995, p165.
[10] Djilas M. Litso totalitarizma (‘The face of totalitarianism’). Moscow 1992, p96.
[11] Vostochnaya Evropa v dokumentakh rossiyskikh arkhivov (‘Eastern Europe in documents of the Russian archives’). Moscow 1998, p477.
[12] Castellan G. L’Albanie. Paris 1980, p19.
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