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Mentre la guerra civile in Sudan entra nel suo terzo anno, la situazione sul campo si fa sempre più grave. Le due principali fazioni, le Forze Armate Sudanesi (SAF) e le Forze di Supporto Rapido (RSF), guidano coalizioni di gruppi armati che stanno diventando difficili da controllare. Parallelamente, le forze politiche sono ancora più divise, mentre il Paese affronta il rischio di partizione. Il conflitto è alimentato da attori esterni che perseguono i propri interessi strategici. Questa crisi prolungata sta generando ricadute sui Paesi limitrofi e sulla stabilità regionale, mentre gli sforzi internazionali di mediazione hanno finora prodotto risultati limitati.

Per l’ONU rimane “la più grande crisi umanitaria al mondo”, tuttavia oscurata dai conflitti in Ucraina e in Palestina. La presa, pochi giorni fa, da parte delle RSF della città di El-Fasher, ultima roccaforte nel Darfur dell’esercito regolare, ha segnato una grave escalation di violenza: si parla di oltre 2.000 morti, con esecuzioni sommarie e violenze diffuse contro i civili. La situazione umanitaria, già al collasso, avrebbe causato almeno 9 milioni di sfollati interni e oltre 4 milioni di rifugiati, spesso nel silenzio della comunità internazionale.

In un discorso televisivo, il generale Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, capo dell’esercito sudanese ed ex leader del Governo di transizione, ha confermato la disfatta, spiegando di aver approvato il ritiro in risposta alla “sistematica distruzione e uccisione di civili”. Le Nazioni Unite hanno chiesto un cessate il fuoco immediato dicendosi “profondamente allarmate” dalle segnalazioni di combattenti che bloccano le vie di fuga e l’accesso agli aiuti umanitari. Intanto, in rete e sulle piattaforme social si moltiplicano video di atrocità commesse dai paramilitari nei confronti delle popolazioni locali non-arabe, in particolare contro le comunità Fur, Zaghawa e Masalit, e denunce di violenze e stupri su base etnica in una regione già in passato teatro di massacri e pulizia etnica. Ad alimentare i timori anche un blackout delle telecomunicazioni e l’interruzione della connessione internet satellitare Starlink che stanno gravemente limitando l’accesso alle informazioni indipendenti su quanto accade a El-Fasher.

La conquista della città conferisce alle RSF – nate dalle milizie arabe Janjaweed – il controllo su tutti e cinque i capoluoghi del Darfur. Una svolta che consolida la presa del Governo parallelo istituito da Hemedti ad agosto nella città di Nyala, capitale del Darfur meridionale, e che secondo diversi osservatori potrebbe preannunciare di fatto la partizione del Sudan in due entità, sul modello libico. I paramilitari ribelli possono ora rivendicare il controllo di un territorio vasto quanto la Francia, al confine con Libia, Ciad, Repubblica Centrafricana e Sud Sudan. Secondo gli analisti, la RSF potrebbe sfruttare questo slancio per riconquistare terreno anche nella parte orientale del Paese, fino a rilanciare un’offensiva su Khartoum, riconquistata dalle forze armate regolari (SAF) lo scorso maggio. Nel fine settimana, le RSF hanno registrato progressi nella città strategica di Bara, nel Kordofan settentrionale, a poche ore dalla capitale sudanese. Se la presa di El Fasher dovesse rivelarsi un trampolino di lancio per una più ampia espansione territoriale, il quadro del conflitto potrebbe cambiare radicalmente.

Il Segretario Generale delle Nazioni Unite Antonio Guterres si è detto “gravemente preoccupato” per la situazione a El Fasher ed ha esortato “gli Stati influenti ad agire per impedire atrocità”, aggiungendo che “è giunto il momento che la comunità internazionale parli chiaramente a tutti i Paesi che stanno interferendo in questa guerra e fornendo armi alle parti in conflitto, affinché smettano di farlo”. Da tempo, ormai, quella che si combatte in Sudan è diventata una guerra per procura, con attori regionali in competizione per le risorse di un Paese ricco d’oro. L’Egitto e altri Stati confinanti sostengono il generale Al-Burhan e il suo Governo con sede a Port Sudan, mentre gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e Paesi sotto la loro influenza, come il Ciad, appoggiano Hemedti, già vice di Burhan nella precedente giunta militare. Lo scorso 12 settembre, Egitto, Arabia Saudita, Emirati Arabi Uniti e Stati Uniti hanno annunciato una roadmap congiunta per porre fine al conflitto, prevedendo una tregua umanitaria di tre mesi seguita da un cessate il fuoco e da un processo di transizione politica. Ma il piano, già in stallo, rischia di restare l’ennesimo tentativo diplomatico senza effetti sul terreno.

Non si tratta più di uno scontro ideologico; è una lotta per la sovranità economica: convogli d’oro si snodano dal Darfur per finanziare le armi a guardia delle miniere, i blocchi portuali gonfiano i prezzi, rendendo il contrabbando più redditizio della pace. La guerra civile sudanese si autoalimenta, un serpente che si morde la coda.

Finora, gli Stati Uniti hanno concentrato l’attenzione minima sul conflitto, nonostante i rischi che esso comporta per i loro vitali interessi strategici su diversi fronti, tra cui: l’ascesa di fazioni islamiste che potrebbero alla fine minacciare le basi militari statunitensi in Africa; l’espansione dell’influenza russa, cinese e iraniana nella regione del Mar Rosso; un’ulteriore instabilità in tutto il Continente.  Gli Stati Uniti potrebbero adottare una serie di misure efficaci e a basso costo per ridurre queste minacce, come la nomina di un inviato ufficiale in Sudan, l’ampliamento dei canali diplomatici con le SAF e le RSF e l’avvio di colloqui con gli Emirati Arabi Uniti per scoraggiare le loro spedizioni di armi alle RSF.

L’uso dei droni si è rivelato fondamentale per entrambe le parti in conflitto, consentendo di colpire infrastrutture critiche, obiettivi a lungo raggio e popolazioni civili. Russia e Iran hanno sfruttato questo supporto per espandere la loro influenza sul Mar Rosso; entrambi i Paesi sono fortemente interessati a stabilire una presenza navale a Port Sudan, ma al momento il Governo di Khartoum rimane esitante a consentirlo a causa delle pressioni occidentali. L’Egitto, che ha legami storici con il Sudan, ha fornito uno dei più ampi supporti esterni sotto forma di droni di fabbricazione turca, consultazioni militari e capacità di intelligence.

L’intervento più diretto del Governo statunitense in Sudan si è manifestato sotto forma di aiuti umanitari e sanzioni contro entrambe le parti per crimini contro i civili. A maggio, gli Stati Uniti hanno sanzionato il Governo sudanese per l’uso di armi chimiche nel 2024. Queste sanzioni includono restrizioni all’esportazione verso il Sudan e sanzioni contro i beni e i redditi di importanti funzionari delle SAF e delle RSF. Il conflitto è stato finora oggetto di dichiarazioni pubbliche da parte del Dipartimento di Stato e dei leader del Congresso U.S.A. Ad esempio, l’ex Segretario di Stato Antony Blinken ha stabilito che le RSF stavano commettendo un genocidio nel Sudan orientale. Anche diversi parlamentari hanno rilasciato dichiarazioni pubbliche o presentato proposte di legge in relazione al conflitto. Inoltre, il Sudan è costantemente menzionato nelle testimonianze del Congresso come una delle principali preoccupazioni per la sicurezza nel Corno d’Africa e nell’Africa nel suo complesso. Sebbene queste dichiarazioni sottolineino la preoccupazione per il conflitto tra i funzionari di alto rango, gli Stati Uniti hanno adottato solo misure minori per mitigare la crisi.

In passato, gli Stati Uniti hanno fornito ingenti aiuti umanitari al Sudan, classificandosi come il principale fornitore con una quota del 44% nel 2024. Gli aiuti sono stati destinati a programmi come il Programma Alimentare Mondiale delle Nazioni Unite, programmi per le comunità locali e percorsi di supporto. Tuttavia, dopo la conclusione delle operazioni dell’USAID, numerosi programmi di assistenza alimentare e centri sanitari in Sudan hanno cessato le attività e molti sudanesi hanno attestato che queste chiusure sono state una conseguenza diretta del blocco degli aiuti internazionali da parte degli Stati Uniti.

Durante il conflitto, gli Stati Uniti hanno tentato due volte di mediare la pace tra le parti. Ciò è stato fatto attraverso la piattaforma di Gedda in collaborazione con l’Arabia Saudita e tramite i colloqui di pace a Ginevra ma senza risultati concreti.

L’inazione degli Stati Uniti nella guerra in Sudan ha creato per Washington due rischi importanti con effetti di vasta portata: la perdita di un potenziale punto d’appoggio strategico nella regione del Mar Rosso e il rischio di ricadute regionali del conflitto e oltre. Essi hanno un impatto diretto sugli interessi statunitensi nella regione, nel resto dell’Africa continentale, in Europa e in Medio Oriente. La posizione geografica del Sudan potrebbe fornire un immenso valore strategico agli Stati Uniti: il Sudan ha oltre 800 chilometri di costa lungo il Mar Rosso, con il suo principale accesso al mare proveniente da Port Sudan. Poiché il Mar Rosso facilita quasi il 12% del commercio marittimo globale, l’accesso a tale bacino potrebbe potenzialmente conferire a un attore un’immediata influenza economica, politica e militare sul Medio Oriente e sul commercio globale.

La Cina ha investito molto nelle infrastrutture e ha espresso interesse nella creazione di una propria presenza a Port Sudan. La Russia si è impegnata ulteriormente per stabilire una base militare lì. A febbraio, il Ministro degli Esteri sudanese Ali Youssef ha dichiarato che non vi erano ostacoli alla creazione di una base navale russa a Port Sudan, preoccupando molti funzionari occidentali. In base all’accordo, Mosca potrebbe istituire una base navale con 300 uomini, oltre a navi da guerra e potenzialmente sottomarini, che le darebbe la possibilità di proiettare la sua potenza nella regione, contrastare gli interessi occidentali, minacciare le rotte commerciali marittime globali e persino destabilizzare il fianco meridionale della NATO. Tuttavia, l’accordo richiederebbe l’approvazione di un parlamento sudanese eletto, che attualmente non esiste.

L’Iran mira ad esercitare maggiore influenza in una regione già complicata dai ripetuti attacchi degli Houthi contro le navi occidentali che portano sostegno ad Israele. C’è il rischio che le SAF possano offrire in tempo l’accesso al porto all’Iran, poiché le loro esigenze di sicurezza impongono l’urgente necessità di importazioni di armi da attori esterni. Con una presenza navale a Port Sudan, Teheran sarebbe in grado di interrompere il commercio marittimo globale nel Mar Rosso, minacciare Israele e rappresentare un ulteriore ostacolo per le manovre militari navali occidentali nella regione, al di là del loro appoggio ad Ansarullah.

Il rischio di una ricaduta regionale del conflitto rappresenta un’altra forte motivazione per il coinvolgimento degli Stati Uniti. La regione del Corno d’Africa è diventata un focolaio di instabilità all’interno e tra diversi Paesi, e la sua destabilizzazione porterebbe a un aumento del commercio illecito e alla diffusione di gruppi ribelli. Oltre al Sudan, quattro Paesi della regione stanno attraversando disordini destabilizzanti o veri e propri conflitti. La Somalia sta combattendo una massiccia insurrezionale di al-Shabaab, in un contesto di divisioni tra gli Stati federali. Il Sud Sudan è in crisi politica e sull’orlo della guerra civile. L’Etiopia sta combattendo una guerra civile con le milizie di Fano, e una mortale instabilità politica ha attanagliato il Kenya. Al di fuori di quella regione, anche la Libia e la Repubblica Centrafricana, entrambe al confine con il Sudan, stanno attraversando conflitti interni attivi e il rischio di un’estensione della guerra sudanese ai Paesi limitrofi è immenso, con il potenziale di esacerbare l’instabilità in nazioni già fragili. Ad aprile 2025, oltre 3,9 milioni di rifugiati sudanesi erano fuggiti nei Paesi vicini: 1,1 milioni in Sud Sudan; 775.000 in Ciad; 256.000 in Libia; 72.000 in Etiopia; e 42.000 nella Repubblica Centrafricana. L’afflusso di rifugiati ha messo a dura prova le capacità dei servizi pubblici di quei Paesi, ha aumentato la diffusione di malattie e ha sovraccaricato i campi profughi.

Inoltre, il conflitto sudanese sta aumentando direttamente l’insicurezza tra i suoi vicini, in particolare Ciad, Libia e Sud Sudan. Ad esempio, il Ciad è diventato un hub di transito per le spedizioni di armi illecite e gli aiuti militari alle RSF. Nella Libia orientale, l’Esercito Nazionale Libico di Khalifa Haftar è stato accusato di sostenere direttamente le RSF con aiuti militari e supporto vicino al confine condiviso tra Sudan, Egitto e Libia. Alcune importanti milizie sud-sudanesi si sono alleate con le RSF, aumentando la disponibilità di rotte di contrabbando illecite e teatri operativi.

Secondo gli analisti di Washington, in assenza del pieno coinvolgimento degli Stati Uniti, il continuo deterioramento della situazione in Sudan aggraverebbe ulteriormente la crisi migratoria che affligge il proprio Paese e l’Europa. La guerra e le sue ripercussioni sul continente africano incidono direttamente sugli interessi politici e di sicurezza statunitensi.

Gli Stati Uniti, intervenendo direttamente, potrebbero mantenere la loro reputazione di pacificatori. Trump, che vuole essere percepito come un risolutore, e la sua Amministrazione hanno chiarito la loro priorità: porre fine ai conflitti globali, ovviamente in maniera favorevole agli interessi U.S.A. Le azioni e gli impegni della Casa Bianca con Ucraina, Iran e persino Ruanda esemplificano l’interesse personale di Trump in questo obiettivo. Queste mediazioni ribadiscono le capacità di soft power degli Stati Uniti e dimostrano la profondità dell’influenza statunitense, fondamentale per contrastare la crescente influenza cinese.

Trump sta mostrando un interesse unico per l’Africa rispetto alle precedenti amministrazioni, attraverso vertici e accordi di pace con diversi Paesi. Il Segretario di Stato Marco Rubio, fautore della linea interventista neoconservatrice, ha affermato che il Sudan sarà la prossima priorità degli Stati Uniti per la mediazione nel continente.

Di contorno alle questioni geopolitiche, ci sono due probabili fattori alla base di questo cambiamento nell’impegno degli Stati Uniti. Il primo è che Massad Boulos, suocero della figlia di Trump, Tiffany, si sia interessato al dossier Sudan. Boulos è un consigliere speciale dell’Amministrazione concentrato sull’Africa e sembra desideroso di utilizzare rapidamente il proprio capitale politico per accumulare successi. Quando ha annunciato l’accordo di pace dello scorso 27 giugno tra la Repubblica Democratica del Congo e il Ruanda, Boulos ha affermato che il Sudan sarebbe stato il prossimo sulla sua lista. Il suo ufficio afferma che il Sudan è ora la massima priorità, apparentemente in riconoscimento della portata e dell’urgenza della crisi, ma forse anche in ossequio all’evidente interesse di Trump a essere visto come un pacificatore globale.

Oltre al fattore Boulos, una seconda ragione della crescente attenzione dell’Amministrazione Trump al dossier Sudan potrebbe essere che Abu Dhabi, Il Cairo e Riad hanno fatto pressioni su Washington affinché intervenisse, sia per il desiderio di arruolare gli Stati Uniti nei rispettivi schieramenti sul Sudan, sia come riflesso del crescente disagio per il pantano in cui si è trasformata la guerra. Alti funzionari sauditi, emiratini ed egiziani hanno costantemente sollevato la questione del Sudan con le loro controparti statunitensi nei primi mesi dell’Amministrazione, esortando gli Stati Uniti ad impegnarsi. Ciò consentirebbe a Washington di ottenere un maggiore allineamento dei partner regionali e di salvaguardare la propria strategia in Medio Oriente.

Ecco perchè la guerra civile sudanese potrebbe presto trovarsi sotto i riflettori dei media mondiali.

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Il 17 febbraio 2025, il Ministro degli Esteri sudanese Ali Yussuf si è recato a Teheran dova ha incontrato i vertici politici della Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran; il Presidente Masoud Pezeshkian ed il suo corrispettivo Abbas Araghchi. Nel corso dell’incontro, Yussuf ha ottenuto pieno sostegno iraniano nella lotta contro le rivali Forze di Supporto Rapido, notevoli incentivi per ciò che concerne lo scambio di tecnologia militare, e la promessa di investimenti per la ricostruzione del Sudan da parte di diverse compagnie iraniane.

Sin dal 2023, l’Iran ha optato per scendere direttamente in campo a sostegno delle Forze Armate Sudanesi in quella che, da guerra civile, si è rapidamente trasformata in una “guerra per procura” in cui sono coinvolti diversi attori regionali ed extraregionali; dallo stesso Iran ad Israele, Egitto, Emirati Arabi Uniti, fino ad arrivare a Russia e Turchia.

L’obiettivo dell’Iran, in questo contesto, è mettere un piede sull’altra sponda del Mar Rosso, dove può già contare sulla presenza degli Houthi nel fondamentale porto di Hodeida nello Yemen. Da qui, i ribelli yemeniti non solo ottengono gran parte degli introiti che gli consentono di guidare la porzione di territorio sotto loro diretto controllo, ma sono stati anche capaci di guidare attacchi alla flotta mercantile diretta verso il porto israeliano di Eilat, creando di fatto notevoli danni economici al cosiddetto “Stato ebraico”. Una presenza iraniana a Port Sudan, inoltre, consentirebbe a Teheran di “limitare i danni” qualora le monarchie del Golfo (questa volta con un maggiore sostegno di USA e Israele) scelgano di attaccare nuovamente Hodeida, dopo il fallimentare tentativo a guida emiratina del 2018.

Dunque, la presenza iraniana su entrambe le sponde del Mar Rosso si presenterebbe come una pura forma di deterrenza, se si considera il fatto che l’Iran detiene già un controllo effettivo sullo Stretto di Hormuz (soprattutto grazie alla sovranità su alcune isole situate in prossimità dello sbocco del Golfo Persico sull’Oceano Indiano). Teheran, infatti, arriverebbe a porre sotto la sua supervisione diretta due tra le più importanti aree di transito di flussi energetico-commerciali a livello globale (con la possibilità, tra l’altro, di infliggere notevoli problemi, anche maggiori di quelli dati dagli Houthi, ad Israele). Dal Mar Rosso (ed attraverso il Canale di Suez), infatti, passa il 15% del commercio globale marittimo ed il 12% del petrolio; mentre la stessa area è fondamentale per la connessione tra Mediterraneo ed Oceano Indiano. Motivo per cui l’attuale amministrazione USA vede di buon occhio una presenza statunitense a Gaza: crocevia tra l’Asia e l’Europa, situata in prossimità di importanti riserve gassifere, dei futuristi piani sauditi relativi alla megalopoli Neom, e di diversi progetti di interconnessione eurasiatica.

Ora, i rapporti tra Iran e Sudan sono stati storicamente piuttosto ambigui, per non dire assai complicati. Prima di tutto è bene sottolineare che esiste una storia di penetrazione dell’Iran nell’Africa sahariana e subsahariana sostanzialmente ignorata in Occidente. Dopo la Rivoluzione islamica, l’università al-Mustafa (fondata dall’Imam Ruhollah Khomeini) ha lavorato per attirare studenti da tutte le regioni musulmane dell’Africa. A partire dai primi anni ‘2000, l’Iran ha pure costruito e finanziato diversi centri culturali e moschee sciite in tutto il continente. Per ciò che concerne il Sudan (Paese a grande maggioranza sunnita), i tentativi di fare proselitismo hanno avuto successo (limitato) solo nell’area di Khartoum, dove già esisteva una minoranza sciita di un certo rilievo.

Nonostante ciò, l’Iran ha avuto un certo rilievo nella salita al potere di Omar al-Bashir nel 1989 sotto la direzione della guida religiosa di Hassan al-Turabi (poi arrestato dallo stesso al-Bashir nel 2011), ed ha sostenuto a lungo il suo regime islamico-militare. Le idee di al-Turabi meritano un breve approfondimento, visto che si presentano in opposizione sia con alcuni principi del khomeinismo che con le idee del radicalismo sunnita salafi e wahhabita. Questi, infatti, incline al sufismo, col passare del tempo, ha costruito un’idea di “governo islamico” non privo di rimandi alla tradizione politica occidentale – di notevole rilievo l’utilizzo del concetto islamico di shura (consultazione) come sistema introduttivo di forme democratiche all’interno dell’Islam – che, di fatto, rifiutava l’idea di un predominio al potere della classe religiosa degli ulema.

Ad ogni modo, nel 2016, quando era ancora al potere al-Bashir (e dopo la secessione dell’area ricca di risorse petrolifere del Sud Sudan, patrocinata dall’Occidente), l’ambasciatore iraniano a Khartoum venne espulso a seguito dell’attacco all’ambasciata saudita a Teheran, esito, a sua volta, dell’esecuzione del sapiente sciita (ed esponente dell’opposizione alla casa reale saudita) Nimr al-Nimri. Esecuzione arrivata in un momento in cui le proteste nella regione a maggioranza sciita di al-Qatif stavano mettendo a dura prova il Regno sia per il fatto che tale area è una delle più ricche dal punto di vista petrolifero, sia per la pesante repressione totalmente silenziata dai mezzi di informazione occidentali (un’operazione simile a quella attuata in Bahrein nel 2011).

Quindi, dopo esser stato per alcuni decenni il terzo partner commerciale dell’Iran in Africa, le relazioni tra Sudan e Repubblica Islamica hanno conosciuto una brusca interruzione. Il Sudan, tra l’altro, ha partecipato attivamente alla coalizione a guida saudita nello Yemen (4000 uomini più 4 aerei da combattimento). In particolare, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti hanno utilizzato le milizie Janjaweed di Mohammad Hamdan Dagalo (noto Hemedti), reduci dalla guerra nel Darfour, come forze mercenarie contro gli Houthi.

Non solo, dopo la destituzione di al-Bashir a seguito di un colpo di Stato nel 2019, il Consiglio di Transizione Militare, al cui interno si trovavano sia Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (capo delle Forze Armate Sudenesi) che Hemedti, ha siglato i cosiddetti “accordi di Abramo” dopo un incontro tra lo stesso al-Burhan e Benjamin Netanyahu a Kampala, in Uganda, e dopo che gli Stati Uniti hanno rimosso il Sudan dalla lista dei Paesi sostenitori del terrorismo (il Sudan di al-Bashir è stato a lungo in ottimi rapporti con Hamas, al punto che Israele, a più riprese, ha proposto ai vertici politici del Movimento di Resistenza Islamico al potere nella Striscia di Gaza l’esilio a Khartoum in cambio di un cessate il fuoco permanente).

Nello scenario del conflitto di potere interno esploso nel 2023 tra le Forze Armate Sudanesi (FAS) e le Forze di Supporto Rapido (FSR) di Hemedti, paradossalmente, hanno giocato un ruolo decisivo le residue forze islamiche che avevano sostenuto il governo di al-Bashir. In primo luogo quelle facenti riferimento ad Ali Karti, legato sia ad Hamas che al Qatar. Dopo l’iniziale successo delle FSR, ampiamente sostenute sia da Israele che dagli Emirati Arabi Uniti (anche attraverso canali inaspettati, come il russo gruppo Wagner), le FAS, arroccate a Port Sudan, si sono dimostrate capaci di riconquistare progressivamente il territorio perduto, fino a rivendicare la nuova presa di Khartoum (28 marzo 2025). Un successo che sarebbe stato impossibile senza l’aiuto iraniano (armi, missili e droni Mohajer-4 e Mohajer-6) e russo.

Ad onor del vero, il sostegno russo è rimasto piuttosto ambiguo. Mosca, da potenza post-ideologica, infatti, almeno inizialmente, ha sostenuto entrambi le parti in conflitto in vista di massimizzare i vantaggi: ufficialmente le FAS e, non ufficialmente, le FSR attraverso il suddetto gruppo Wagner che ha fatto pervenire in Sudan armi emiratine via Repubblica Centraficana. Gli interessi russi in Sudan sono di lunga data. La presenza di una base navale russa sul Mar Rosso era stata discussa sin dai tempi di al-Bashir; mentre oggi il commercio di armi, carburante ed oro appare particolarmente utile per superare il regime sanzionatorio imposto dall’Occidente a Mosca.

Lo stesso discorso vale per l’Iran. La sua penetrazione commerciale-militare in Africa, dopo la fine dell’embargo sulla vendita della armi nel 2020, ha già ottenuto un certo successo in Etiopia. Ed oggi appare come una direttrice geopolitica fondamentale per superare il regime della “massima pressione” operato dagli Stati Uniti (che pure cercano di ripristinare un accordo sul nucleare proprio con Teheran). A ciò si aggiunga che: 1) un eventuale successo definitivo delle FAS rappresenterebbe una interessante vetrina di lancio per i prodotti militari iraniani (già internazionalmente conosciuti grazie al loro utilizzo nel teatro di conflitto ucraino dalla Russia); 2) la partecipazione (sebbene indiretta) al conflitto sudanese si presenta come un’ottima opportunità per disarticolare gli accordi di Abramo e pure il campo arabo sunnita, visto che l’Egitto ha scelto di appoggiare le FAS contro le FSR sotto influenza emiratina.

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The United Arab Emirates and Israel had hoped to extract strategic victories in Sudan, taking advantage of the fall of the nation’s former dictator and the descent into civil war. But newly released satellite images suggest that Tehran’s renewed ties with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) may be unraveling those ambitions.

Satellite images, initially reported by Russian state broadcaster RT, reveal an extensive underground tunnel complex under Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) control, allegedly constructed with assistance from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The facility, featuring 12 fortified entrances, is situated within mountainous terrain and mirrors Iranian missile bases designed to withstand aerial bombardments. This has heightened concerns in Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi regarding Iran’s expanding influence in Sudan.​

Hebrew sources: A huge underground tunnel complex in Sudan, presumably built by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is located at 16.251586° 32.646261°

The underground base has 12 different entrances. It is located deep underground and is heavily fortified, modeled… pic.twitter.com/jAUPQeu61l

— Middle East Observer (@ME_Observer_) April 12, 2025

Following al-Bashir’s removal in April 2019 via a military coup spurred by widespread popular protests, regional actors, notably the UAE and Israel, moved swiftly to take advantage of a nation undergoing a tumultuous political transformation.

Despite diplomatic efforts to prevent open conflict, Sudan slid into civil war. The SAF, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, faced off against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary faction rooted in the notorious Janjaweed militias that once fought on behalf of Bashir’s regime. The RSF is led by billionaire warlord Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti.

The UAE threw its weight behind Hemedti and the RSF—despite their well-documented war crimes—as part of Abu Dhabi’s broader push for influence in the Horn of Africa. The UAE’s support was so extensive that Hemedti’s official Facebook page was reportedly operated from inside the Emirates.

Israel, meanwhile, had worked closely with the Trump administration during his first term to pressure Sudan into normalizing ties with Tel Aviv. In exchange, Washington offered to remove Sudan from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, forgive debts and lift sanctions.

While normalization talks progressed, Israel deepened its political and intelligence footprint in Sudan. Hemedti signed a $6 million contract with a Canadian lobbying firm founded by ex-Israeli intelligence operative Ari Ben-Menashe. The RSF, in turn, positioned itself as an opponent of “radical Islamists” and openly advocated for normalization with Israel.

When the civil war erupted in 2023, Israel moved quickly to cast itself as a potential mediator—citing ties to both sides. The Israeli Foreign Ministry expressed early support for Gen. al-Burhan and the SAF. But in reality, the Mossad was said to favor Hemedti’s RSF and reportedly maintained close contact with him in Khartoum.

A 2022 investigative report by Haaretz alleged that “high-end surveillance technology, made in the European Union, with the potential to tip the balance of power in Sudan,” had been delivered to the RSF by private jet. The Predator spyware reportedly originated from the Intellexa consortium, whose parent company Cytrox was founded by former Israeli intelligence officer Tal Dilian.

According to Israel Hayom, the country’s most-read daily news outlet, Sudan was seen as Israel’s strategic gateway to Africa—and a possible solution to its domestic dilemma push to deport some 150,000 African asylum seekers. Israel and the UAE also occupy Yemen’s strategic Socotra Island, indicative of a joint agenda in the region.

In early 2023, a normalization deal between Sudan and Israel was said to be imminent. But by July 2024, Iran had officially reestablished ties with the SAF—the internationally recognized government—following calls for urgent military support from General al-Burhan, whose forces appeared to be losing the war. By October, the SAF had managed to turn the tide by capturing strategically significant routes and mountain ranges.

In September 2024, the Brussels International Center argued that Iran’s delivery of Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones may have changed the course of the war and could deeply affect Israeli-Sudanese relations. The report also noted that the SAF’s rhetoric had taken a sharply anti-Israel turn since the outbreak of Israel’s war on Gaza. Iran’s increasing engagement, it said, “could diversify Iranian security partnerships and promote its ‘drone diplomacy.’”

By December, the conservative U.S.-based Jamestown Foundation reported that Iran was aiming to establish a naval base in Sudan and claimed that its drone deliveries to the SAF had already shifted the balance in key battles.

In February, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Yusuf and his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi announced an agreement to boost trade, step up diplomatic coordination and involve Iran in post-war reconstruction efforts. In response, Israeli officials began expressing their concerns to local media.

Chief among Israel’s fears is that Sudan may again become a hub for weapons transfers by Iran’s IRGC to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. In the past, Sudan had served as a corridor for arms transfers to Palestinian militants. As recently as December 2023, Israel was reported to have carried out a failed intelligence operation to locate a former Sudanese general accused of supplying weapons to Hamas.

Following the release of satellite images showing a fortified underground base, new aerial footage surfaced suggesting that Sudan is operating Iranian “Malta AI Fajr-1” VHF radar systems along its Red Sea coast. If confirmed, these developments point to a broader regional realignment—one where Iran, even as it loses ground in Syria, continues building alliances at Israel’s expense.

After the discovery of IRGC underground bases in Sudan, new footage shows that Iran has set up ‘Matla Al Fajr-1’ radars near Sudan’s Red Sea coast.

These radars can detect aircraft up to 300 kms away at altitudevof up to 20 kms and can track around 100 targets at the same time. pic.twitter.com/f3qgVnJGe6

— Current Report (@Currentreport1) April 12, 2025

Original article: mintpressnews.com

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Il Sud Sudan non trova tregua

Nel Corno d’Africa, due fragili processi di pace sono seriamente minacciati: le lotte di potere interne in Sud Sudan e nella regione etiope del Tigray potrebbero trasformarsi in crisi regionali. In Sud Sudan, come già avvenuto nel 2013 all’inizio della guerra civile, è in corso una competizione per la successione dell’attuale presidente Salva Kiir, 73 anni. Quest’ultimo sembra favorire il proprio genero come potenziale successore. Nel frattempo, la regione dell’Alto Nilo è scossa da scontri tra l’Armata Bianca, una milizia Nuer, e le forze armate sud-sudanesi, con conseguenze drammatiche, tra cui l’abbattimento di un elicottero dell’ONU e l’uccisione di un generale di alto rango.

Durante la guerra civile tra il 2013 e il 2018, l’Armata Bianca ha combattuto a fianco dell’Esercito di Liberazione del Popolo Sudanese/Movimento di Opposizione (SPLA-IO), guidato dall’attuale Primo Vicepresidente Riek Machar. Oggi, le tensioni tra Kiir e Machar stanno nuovamente aumentando, facendo temere un ritorno alla violenza in un Paese già duramente provato da decenni di conflitto.

Il Sud Sudan è sull’orlo di una nuova guerra civile, ha avvertito lunedì il principale rappresentante delle Nazioni Unite nel paese più giovane del mondo, esprimendo preoccupazione per la decisione improvvisa del governo di rinviare l’ultimo tentativo di pace.

Definendo la situazione nel paese “grave”, Nicholas Haysom ha sottolineato che gli sforzi internazionali per raggiungere una soluzione pacifica potranno avere successo solo se il presidente Salva Kiir e il suo ex rivale divenuto vicepresidente, Riek Machar, saranno disposti a collaborare e a mettere gli interessi della popolazione al di sopra dei propri.

Quando il Sud Sudan, ricco di petrolio, ottenne l’indipendenza dal Sudan nel 2011 dopo un lungo conflitto, le aspettative erano alte. Tuttavia, il paese scivolò in una guerra civile nel dicembre 2013, alimentata da divisioni etniche, con le forze fedeli a Kiir, appartenente all’etnia Dinka, che combatterono contro quelle leali a Machar, della comunità Nuer.

Il conflitto ha causato oltre 400.000 vittime prima di concludersi con un accordo di pace nel 2018, che portò alla formazione di un governo di unità nazionale con Kiir e Machar. L’intesa prevedeva elezioni nel febbraio 2023, successivamente rinviate a dicembre 2024 e poi posticipate nuovamente fino al 2026.

Le attuali tensioni derivano dagli scontri nel nord del paese tra le forze governative e un gruppo ribelle noto come White Army, ritenuto vicino a Machar.

All’inizio di questo mese, un generale sud sudanese è stato ucciso insieme ad altre persone quando un elicottero delle Nazioni Unite, impegnato nell’evacuazione di soldati governativi dalla città di Nasir – teatro degli scontri nello stato dell’Alto Nilo – è stato colpito dal fuoco nemico. Qualche giorno prima, il 4 marzo, il White Army aveva preso il controllo della guarnigione militare di Nasir, spingendo le truppe governative a circondare la residenza di Machar nella capitale Juba e ad arrestare diversi suoi collaboratori.

Nicholas Haysom, addetto ONU per il Sudan, ha specificato che le tensioni e la violenza stanno aumentando, specialmente con l’avvicinarsi delle elezioni e l’inasprimento della competizione politica tra le figure chiave del paese. Secondo lui, la mancanza di fiducia tra Kiir e Machar impedisce loro di esercitare la leadership necessaria per attuare l’accordo di pace del 2018 e guidare il Sud Sudan verso un futuro stabile e democratico; ha inoltre sottolineato che la diffusione dilagante di disinformazione, propaganda e discorsi d’odio sta ulteriormente acuendo le divisioni etniche e alimentando la paura. «Di fronte a questa situazione preoccupante», ha affermato Haysom, «non possiamo che concludere che il Sud Sudan rischia seriamente di ricadere nella guerra civile».

A capo della missione di pace dell’ONU in Sud Sudan, che conta quasi 18.000 membri, Haysom ha avvertito che un ritorno al conflitto aperto porterebbe agli stessi orrori vissuti dal paese nel 2013 e nel 2016. Le Nazioni Unite considerano con estrema serietà il rischio che il conflitto assuma una connotazione sempre più etnica. Per scongiurare un nuovo conflitto civile, l’inviato speciale dell’ONU ha dichiarato che la missione di peacekeeping sta intensificando gli sforzi diplomatici, collaborando strettamente con partner internazionali e regionali, inclusa l’Unione Africana.

Il messaggio comune della comunità regionale e internazionale è un appello a Kiir e Machar affinché si incontrino per risolvere le loro divergenze, rispettino l’accordo di pace del 2018, mantengano il cessate il fuoco, rilascino i funzionari detenuti e affrontino le tensioni attraverso il dialogo anziché con la violenza militare.

In Etiopia continuano le divisioni nel TPLF e le tensioni con l’Eritrea

Pochi chilometri ad Est, in Etiopia, una crisi interna nella regione del Tigray rischia di alimentare un conflitto più ampio tra il governo federale di Addis Abeba e l’Eritrea. Il Fronte di Liberazione del Popolo del Tigray (TPLF), ex partito dominante in Etiopia e principale oppositore del governo nella guerra del 2020-2022, è oggi diviso tra due fazioni: una di tipo conservatore guidata dal presidente Debretsion Gebremichael, e l’altra, riformista, guidata da Getachew Reda, capo dell’Autorità regionale provvisoria del Tigray.

La fazione di Debretsion controlla una parte significativa delle forze armate del Tigray e ha progressivamente assunto il comando di strutture amministrative locali, spesso con metodi coercitivi. Inoltre, ha esteso la propria influenza sui media e su parte del governo della capitale regionale, Mekelle. Si ritiene che questa fazione abbia legami con l’Eritrea, mentre Getachew gode dell’appoggio del primo ministro etiope Abiy Ahmed.

Le relazioni tra Etiopia ed Eritrea si sono deteriorate dopo l’Accordo di Pretoria, che nel 2022 ha posto fine alla guerra tra il governo etiope e il TPLF. Entrambi i Paesi si accusano reciprocamente di sostenere i gruppi di opposizione, aumentando il rischio di un nuovo conflitto regionale.

Nel tentativo di placare le crescenti tensioni nella turbolenta regione del Tigray, il primo ministro etiope ha annunciato l’intenzione di nominare un nuovo leader per l’area, dopodiché è fuggito nella capitale Addis Abeba all’inizio del mese a seguito di una lotta di potere all’interno del TPLF.

In un’iniziativa inedita, il primo ministro Abiy Ahmed ha chiesto ai cittadini tigrini di proporre via email chi dovrebbe essere il nuovo leader della regione ed ha anche annunciato che il mandato dell’amministrazione ad interim, inizialmente previsto per due anni, sarà esteso di un ulteriore anno. Sebbene il Tigray abbia ora la possibilità di scegliere i propri leader, Abiy sta anche inviando un segnale: “Se il primo ministro può nominare un presidente nella regione del Tigray, può farlo anche altrove”.

Nonostante la firma dell’accordo di pace, il Tigray continua ad affrontare difficoltà, tra cui ritardi nel disarmo delle forze del TPLF e gravi esigenze umanitarie. Il conflitto in Tigray ha causato la morte di circa 500.000 persone. Tutte le parti coinvolte – compreso il vicino Eritrea, che ha sostenuto il governo – sono state accusate di gravi violazioni, tra cui massacri di civili e diffusi episodi di violenza sessuale.

Il coinvolgimento di altri Stati e la frammentazione dell’impegno internazionale

Il rischio di un’espansione del conflitto è concreto. L’Uganda ha già inviato truppe in supporto al governo sud-sudanese, come aveva fatto nel 2013, mentre le forze sudanesi sono intervenute in diverse aree strategiche. Durante il fine settimana, milizie della Operational Support Force in Sud Sudan si sono scontrate con unità dell’SPLA/M-LNL, apparentemente coinvolte in un’operazione per rifornirsi di armi dalle Forze Armate sudanesi.

La fragile implementazione degli accordi di pace è una delle cause principali della recente escalation. In Sud Sudan, il presidente Kiir ha rimosso diversi membri del governo e arrestato alti ufficiali dell’SPLA/M-LNL. D’altronde è già noto che in Etiopia molte disposizioni dell’Accordo di Pretoria non sono state attuate. Laddove non sta funzionando la diplomazia internazionale, prende il sopravvento la legge del più forte.

Il supporto alla stabilità della regione appare sempre più frammentato anche nella cooperazione internazionale, che non riesce a garantire interventi efficaci. In Etiopia, mancano attori credibili che possano garantire il rispetto degli accordi. Nel recente vertice di emergenza dell’Autorità Intergovernativa per lo Sviluppo (IGAD) sul Sud Sudan, solo due presidenti erano presenti. Un tempo gli Stati Uniti avevano un ruolo centrale nel processo di pace, ma oggi potenze come gli Emirati Arabi Uniti, l’Arabia Saudita e la Turchia esercitano maggiore influenza, spesso favorendo singoli schieramenti anziché fungere da mediatori neutrali.

Proprio la Turchia ha recentemente rafforzato i rapporti con l’Uganda, una mossa strategica nel contesto Africano che disegna una geometria diplomatica alquanto interessante.

La Turchia e l’Uganda intrattengono relazioni diplomatiche sin dal 1962, ma è stato solo a partire dai primi anni 2000 che il legame tra i due Paesi ha iniziato a rafforzarsi in modo significativo. Oggi, la cooperazione tra le due nazioni è solida e si estende a diversi settori, tra cui commercio, investimenti, sicurezza ed istruzione.

Il commercio e gli investimenti rappresentano un pilastro fondamentale della collaborazione tra Turchia e Uganda. La Turchia ha investito in modo consistente nei settori delle infrastrutture e dell’edilizia in Uganda, contribuendo alla realizzazione di importanti opere come ospedali, strade e ponti. I due Paesi hanno firmato diversi accordi per incentivare gli scambi commerciali e gli investimenti, tra cui un Trattato Bilaterale sugli Investimenti e un Accordo per evitare la doppia imposizione fiscale, entrambi volti a favorire il flusso di capitali e il commercio reciproco.

Anche nel settore educativo la Turchia ha dato un contributo significativo all’Uganda, offrendo borse di studio agli studenti ugandesi per proseguire gli studi in università turche. Questa iniziativa ha rafforzato i legami tra i due Paesi e ha dato agli studenti ugandesi l’opportunità di accedere a un’istruzione di qualità. Per di più, la Turchia ha aperto diverse scuole in Uganda attraverso la Fondazione Maarif, che forniscono istruzione sia a livello primario che secondario, con l’obiettivo di offrire un’educazione di alto livello agli studenti ugandesi.

La collaborazione tra Turchia e Uganda si estende anche al settore della sicurezza. La Turchia ha fornito formazione militare e addestramento alle forze di sicurezza ugandesi, e i due Paesi hanno siglato accordi per rafforzare la cooperazione in questo ambito. La Turchia ha supportato l’Uganda nella lotta al terrorismo, fornendo equipaggiamento e assistenza alle forze di sicurezza e ai servizi di intelligence ugandesi.

Serve una soluzione pacifica e diplomatica

Con la situazione che continua a peggiorare, è necessario un intervento diplomatico di alto livello per prevenire un’ulteriore escalation.

Un coordinamento internazionale più efficace potrebbe contenere la crisi. Una strategia possibile sarebbe una divisione informale dei compiti: attori influenti come la Turchia e l’Arabia Saudita potrebbero concentrarsi sulla riduzione delle tensioni tra governi, mentre i Paesi europei potrebbero sostenere IGAD e l’Unione Africana nei processi di mediazione locale.

C’è poi un’ulteriore strada ce deve essere valutata: una soluzione pienamente africana: la Confederazione degli Stati del Sahel potrebbe offrire una mediazione regionale autorevole e, soprattutto, lontana dallo spasmodico controllo occidentale.

Chissà se l’ONU e le altre agenzie internazionali valuteranno la possibilità di lasciare l’Africa agli africani.

Destabilizing the Horn of Africa is a strategy already known to the Anglo-American world to try to keep the region in a state of instability useful for commercial domination.

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South Sudan finds no respite

In the Horn of Africa, two fragile peace processes are seriously threatened: internal power struggles in South Sudan and in the Ethiopian region of Tigray could turn into regional crises. In South Sudan, as was the case in 2013 at the beginning of the civil war, a competition is underway for the succession of the current president Salva Kiir, 73 years old. The latter seems to favor his son-in-law as his potential successor. Meanwhile, the Upper Nile region is shaken by clashes between the White Army, a Nuer militia, and the South Sudanese armed forces, with dramatic consequences, including the shooting down of a UN helicopter and the killing of a high-ranking general.

During the civil war between 2013 and 2018, the Armata Bianca fought alongside the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Opposition Movement (SPLA-IO), led by the current First Vice-President Riek Machar. Today, tensions between Kiir and Machar are rising again, raising fears of a return to violence in a country already badly tried by decades of conflict.

South Sudan is on the brink of another civil war, the top United Nations official in the world’s youngest country warned on Monday, expressing concern over the government’s sudden decision to postpone the latest peace effort.

Describing the situation in the country as “grave”, Nicholas Haysom emphasized that international efforts to reach a peaceful solution can only be successful if President Salva Kiir and his former rival turned vice-president, Riek Machar, are willing to collaborate and put the interests of the population above their own.

When oil-rich South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011 after a long conflict, expectations were high. However, the country slipped into a civil war in December 2013, fueled by ethnic divisions, with forces loyal to Kiir, a Dinka, fighting those loyal to Machar, a Nuer.

The conflict caused over 400,000 casualties before ending with a peace agreement in 2018, which led to the formation of a government of national unity with Kiir and Machar. The agreement called for elections in February 2023, which were subsequently postponed to December 2024 and then again to 2026.

The current tensions stem from clashes in the north of the country between government forces and a rebel group known as the White Army, believed to be close to Machar.

Earlier this month, a South Sudanese general was killed along with others when a United Nations helicopter, engaged in the evacuation of government soldiers from the city of Nasir – the scene of fighting in Upper Nile State – was hit by enemy fire. A few days earlier, on March 4th, the White Army had taken control of the Nasir military garrison, forcing government troops to surround the residence of Machar in the capital Juba and arrest several of his associates.

Nicholas Haysom, the UN envoy for Sudan, has stated that tensions and violence are increasing, especially as the elections approach and the political competition between the country’s key figures intensifies. According to him, the lack of trust between Kiir and Machar prevents them from exercising the leadership necessary to implement the 2018 peace agreement and guide South Sudan towards a stable and democratic future; he also emphasized that the rampant spread of disinformation, propaganda and hate speech is further exacerbating ethnic divisions and fueling fear. “Faced with this worrying situation”, said Haysom, ‘we can only conclude that South Sudan is at serious risk of relapsing into civil war’.

Haysom, who heads the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, which has almost 18,000 members, warned that a return to open conflict would lead to the same horrors the country experienced in 2013 and 2016. The United Nations is taking the risk of the conflict becoming increasingly ethnic very seriously. To avert a new civil conflict, the UN special envoy has stated that the peacekeeping mission is intensifying diplomatic efforts, collaborating closely with international and regional partners, including the African Union.

The common message from the regional and international community is an appeal to Kiir and Machar to meet to resolve their differences, respect the 2018 peace agreement, maintain the ceasefire, release detained officials and address tensions through dialogue rather than military violence.

In Ethiopia, divisions within the TPLF and tensions with Eritrea continue

A few kilometers to the east, in Ethiopia, an internal crisis in the Tigray region risks fueling a wider conflict between the federal government in Addis Ababa and Eritrea. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), formerly the dominant party in Ethiopia and the main opponent of the government in the 2020-2022 war, is now divided into two factions: a conservative one led by President Debretsion Gebremichael, and a reformist one led by Getachew Reda, head of the Tigray Interim Regional Authority.

Debretsion’s faction controls a significant part of the Tigray armed forces and has progressively taken over local administrative structures, often by coercive means. It has also extended its influence over the media. Debretsion’s faction controls a significant part of the Tigray armed forces and has progressively taken over local administrative structures, often by coercive means. It has also extended its influence over the media and part of the government in the regional capital, Mekelle. This faction is believed to have links with Eritrea, while Getachew enjoys the support of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea deteriorated after the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the war between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF in 2022. Both countries accuse each other of supporting opposition groups, increasing the risk of a new regional conflict.

In an attempt to calm rising tensions in the turbulent Tigray region, Ethiopia’s prime minister announced his intention to appoint a new leader for the area, after which he fled to the capital Addis Ababa earlier this month following a power struggle within the TPLF.

In an unprecedented move, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed asked Tigrayans to propose via email who should be the new leader of the region and also announced that the mandate of the interim administration, initially planned for two years, will be extended for another year. Although Tigray now has the chance to choose its own leaders, Abiy is also sending a signal: “If the prime minister can appoint a president in the Tigray region, he can do so elsewhere too”.

Despite the signing of the peace agreement, Tigray continues to face difficulties, including delays in the disarmament of TPLF forces and serious humanitarian needs. The conflict in Tigray has caused the death of approximately 500,000 people. All parties involved – including neighboring Eritrea, which supported the government – have been accused of serious violations, including massacres of civilians and widespread sexual violence.

The involvement of other states and the fragmentation of international commitment

The risk of an expansion of the conflict is real. Uganda has already sent troops to support the South Sudanese government, as it did in 2013, while Sudanese forces have intervened in several strategic areas. Over the weekend, militias of the Operational Support Force in South Sudan clashed with units of the SPLA/M-LNL, apparently involved in an operation to obtain weapons from the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The fragile implementation of the peace agreements is one of the main causes of the recent escalation. In South Sudan, President Kiir has removed several members of the government and arrested senior SPLA/M-NLA officers. On the other hand, it is already known that in Ethiopia many provisions of the Pretoria Agreement have not been implemented. Where international diplomacy is not working, the law of the strongest takes over.

Support for stability in the region appears increasingly fragmented, even in international cooperation, which is unable to guarantee effective interventions. In Ethiopia, there is a lack of credible actors who can guarantee respect for the agreements. At the recent emergency summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan, only two presidents were present. The United States once played a central role in the peace process, but today powers such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are exerting greater influence, often favoring individual sides rather than acting as neutral mediators.

Turkey has recently strengthened its relations with Uganda, a strategic move in the African context that draws a rather interesting diplomatic geometry.

Turkey and Uganda have had diplomatic relations since 1962, but it was only in the early 2000s that the bond between the two countries began to strengthen significantly. Today, cooperation between the two nations is solid and extends to various sectors, including trade, investment, security and education.

Trade and investment represent a fundamental pillar of the collaboration between Turkey and Uganda. Turkey has invested heavily in the Ugandan infrastructure and construction sectors, contributing to the realization of important projects such as hospitals, roads and bridges. The two countries have signed several agreements to encourage trade and investment, including a Bilateral Investment Treaty and an Agreement to avoid double taxation, both aimed at promoting the flow of capital and reciprocal trade.

Turkey has also made a significant contribution to Uganda in the education sector, offering scholarships to Ugandan students to study at Turkish universities. This initiative has strengthened the ties between the two countries and given Ugandan students the opportunity to access quality education. Furthermore, Turkey has opened several schools in Uganda through the Maarif Foundation, which provide both primary and secondary education, with the aim of offering Ugandan students a high level of education.

The collaboration between Turkey and Uganda also extends to the security sector. Turkey has provided military training and instruction to the Ugandan security forces, and the two countries have signed agreements to strengthen cooperation in this area. Turkey has supported Uganda in the fight against terrorism, providing equipment and assistance to the Ugandan security forces and intelligence services.

A peaceful and diplomatic solution is needed

With the situation continuing to worsen, high-level diplomatic intervention is needed to prevent further escalation.

More effective international coordination could contain the crisis. One possible strategy would be an informal division of tasks: influential actors such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia could focus on reducing tensions between governments, while European countries could support IGAD and the African Union in local mediation processes.

Then there is another path that must be considered: a fully African solution. The Confederation of Sahel States could offer authoritative regional mediation, and above all, far from the spasmodic Western control.

Who knows if the UN and other international agencies will consider leaving Africa to Africans.

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 marked a significant milestone in the quest for global justice.

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The Rome Statute, adopted in 1998 by 120 states, created a permanent institution to prosecute individuals for the most serious crimes of international concern, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Despite the optimism surrounding its creation, the ICC’s relevance and credibility have been questioned in recent years, particularly as major global powers have opted out or actively opposed the Court’s actions.

To date, 125 countries are members of the ICC. However, several major powers, such as the United States, China, Russia, and India, have refused to join. While the Court has been instrumental in addressing crimes and holding individuals accountable, it has predominantly focused on cases in Africa, which has led to accusations of bias. Countries such as Burundi, Kenya, Sudan (Darfur), Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have been involved in ICC proceedings. Six of the ICC’s field offices are located in Africa, further emphasising its focus on the continent.

The ICC has pursued high-profile cases, including the prosecution of Thomas Lubanga, the former leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots, and the issuance of arrest warrants for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo.

However, the Court has faced criticism for focusing almost exclusively on African leaders, with some critics accusing it of being a tool for Western powers to exert influence over Africa.

This perception of bias has led to growing frustration in several African nations, with some leaders calling for their withdrawal from the Court.

Legitimacy

The absence of key global powers from the ICC’s jurisdiction has been a major challenge for the Court’s legitimacy.

The United States, for example, signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but withdrew its signature in 2002 under the Bush administration.

The U.S. has taken several steps to undermine the ICC’s authority in recent years. In 2019, the U.S. imposed visa restrictions on ICC staff, particularly in response to the Court’s decision to investigate potential war crimes committed by U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. U.S. Secretary of State, Michael Pompeo, denounced the ICC’s actions as a “political vendetta” and labelled the  Court as an “irresponsible political institution.” In 2020, the U.S. even threatened to impose economic sanctions against ICC officials.

On November 21, 2024, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in relation to Israel’s actions in Gaza, prompting further tensions.

The U.S. responded with legislative action, and in January 2025, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the “Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act,” which seeks to impose sanctions on any individual who investigates or prosecutes citizens of the U.S. or allied countries, including Israel.

The move is seen as a direct challenge to the ICC’s authority and a reflection of the ongoing tension between the Court and the world’s major powers.

Credibility

The controversy surrounding the ICC’s actions has raised questions about its effectiveness in delivering justice. Critics argue that the Court’s inability to hold powerful nations accountable, particularly those outside its jurisdiction, undermines its credibility.

The ICC has also been criticised for its perceived bias and inefficiency, with critics accusing it of focusing too heavily on African nations while turning a blind eye to human rights abuses elsewhere.

Russia’s position on the ICC is another example of the Court’s diminishing relevance. Russia signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but has never ratified it.

In 2016, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree officially rejecting membership, citing the ICC’s failure to live up to its expectations. Russian officials have consistently criticised the Court for its political bias and lack of professionalism. In 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reaffirmed Moscow’s stance, accusing the ICC of showing political bias and a lack of understanding of international law.

The ICC on March 17, 2023 also issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, and Ms Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russian commissioner for children’s rights, in the context of the situation in Ukraine. However, nothing came out of that threat just like that of Israel.

Enforcement

The ICC’s challenges are not only limited to the refusal of major powers to cooperate but also to the issue of enforcement. Many countries, including Russia, have openly defied ICC rulings, refusing to arrest individuals under its warrants.

The Court’s inability to enforce its decisions has raised doubts about its ability to effect real change in the global justice landscape.

The ICC’s future will likely depend on whether it can secure the cooperation of powerful states, address concerns about bias, and strengthen its enforcement mechanisms.

Without these changes, the Court risks becoming increasingly marginalised in a world where political considerations often trump the pursuit of justice.

Original article: Graphic Online

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Last week, United Nations (UN) relief agencies warned the Security Council that Sudan is suffering one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises in recent history, after nearly a year of gruesome fighting between rival factions of the Sudanese armed forces for control of the country.

Sudan faces a famine of biblical proportions because of the war, displacement, the breakdown of the economy and the almost total absence of international aid. Many buildings in the capital Khartoum have been destroyed. The government, virtually bankrupt, barely functions.

Fighting broke out in April 2023 between the army, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the Sovereign Council and de facto ruler of the country, and his deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, who heads the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The RSF, based in the western Darfur region, has taken control of the west of the country and most of the capital Khartoum, although it is struggling to hold onto these gains. Al-Burhan, despite backing from Egypt’s military regime, South Sudan and Saudi Arabia, has yet to win a major battle. He has retreated to the east and Port Sudan, on the Red Sea.

Both factions, composed of rival sub-ethnic groups with competing interests, have the support of various local militias, leading to fighting often along ethnic lines, as well as support from outside forces. They are mobilising for a long war in the east of the country.

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, there have been 13,900 reported fatalities across Sudan, while the Health Ministry has reported 27,700 people injured between 15 April 2023 and 26 January 2024.

The UN highlighted “mass graves, gang rapes, shockingly indiscriminate attacks in densely populated areas” and the displacement of 8.1 million of Sudan’s 45 million population, including at least 1.76 million who have fled to neighbouring countries also wracked by poverty and instability.

According to the UN, “at least 25 million people are struggling with soaring rates of hunger and malnutrition” and 3.8 million children under the age of five are malnourished. Aid agencies say that a child in refugee camps in Darfur dies of hunger about every two hours. Martin Griffiths, head of the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), warned that “almost five million people could slip into catastrophic food insecurity in some parts of the country in the coming months.”

Cholera has broken out. At least 292 people have been killed by the disease and there were over 10,700 suspected cases as of 17 February 2024.

Compounding the crisis is the disruption to farming by the fighting. The Middle East Eye cited the Sudanese organisation Fikra for Studies and Development as reporting, “Only 37 percent Sudan’s agricultural land has been cultivated in comparison to previous years. Also, Sudan’s national wheat production has reduced by 70 percent.”

With international attention focused on the US/NATO-led war against Russia in Ukraine and Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, Sudan’s war and its wider implications have been all but ignored. The UN relief agencies have called for $2.7 billion of assistance for this year, but they have received pledges for just $135 million. Last year, just 43 percent of the target was raised. The miserable funds testify to the prevailing view among the imperialist powers that Sudan’s impoverished people are surplus to requirements.

The two army leaders fighting to control Sudan rose to prominence during the war in Darfur, in which 300,000 people were killed and 2.5 million displaced in fighting from 2003 to 2008. Al-Burhan headed the army, while Dagalo led the notorious Janjaweed militias responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the conflict. Dagalo has since become enormously rich based off Darfur’s gold. Both men were implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Fighting between these two corrupt figures erupted in no small part due to longstanding efforts by US imperialism and other regional powers to exert control over Sudan and its resources—gold, minerals, oil and agricultural land—and cut off Khartoum’s relationships with China, Russia and Iran, which all have growing economic interests in the region.

The country saw its first military coup within three years of independence from Britain in 1956, aimed at suppressing the working class and tenant farmers whose struggles had rapidly politicised as key export prices fell, threatening the economy with collapse.

Since then, the country has been riven by secessionary wars, violence and intrigues, spread across its unstable neighbours. These conflicts testify to the multiple, competing interests in the conflict-ridden Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, strategically located on the Red Sea through which 20 percent of global container shipping passes.

The expansion of commercial, export-oriented agriculture, spurred on by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and Gulf investors, has been characterised by violent expropriation, rampant exploitation, deep inefficiencies, and ecological destruction, which in turn spurs more land grabs. This has torn apart traditional ways of life, created severe food insecurity in one of Africa’s most fertile regions and fuelled tensions between communities.

Apart from a few brief periods, Sudan has been subject to military rule or military-backed dictatorships that ruthlessly quashed all dissent on behalf of the country’s tiny elite.

Al-Burhan first came to prominence in April 2019, when, following months of mass protests across the country and with the support of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, he led the pre-emptive military coup that overthrew President Omar al-Bashir and his Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated military dictatorship.

The protests were fuelled by Sudan’s economic collapse, precipitated by the US-brokered secession of oil-rich South Sudan in 2011, poor harvests and floods that led to soaring food and fuel prices, widespread poverty, political instability, conflicts and the displacement of some 3 million people.

Just weeks afterwards, soldiers and paramilitaries massacred more than 1,000 unarmed protesters, chasing them through Khartoum, tying concrete blocks to their feet and throwing them into the Nile. In October 2021, Abdalla Hamdok’s transitional “technocratic” government, made up of “leftists” and serving as a front for the Sovereign Council headed by al-Burhan, threatened the military’s privileged commercial and political interests. Al-Burhan sacked it, resuming military rule alongside Islamists and other reliable allies of the al-Bashir regime.

Eighteen months later, war broke out between al-Burhan and Dagalo following mounting tensions over the planned integration of the RSF, and other former rebel militias involved in insurgencies in various parts of the country, into the Sudanese army.

Al-Burhan’s faction has supported the US/NATO war against Russia in Ukraine and was backed by Egypt until Cairo was forced to back off by its paymaster, the UAE, which has become increasingly entrenched in the region.

According to the New York Times, the UAE is covertly shipping weapons to the RSF, as well as to Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, who controls the Tobruk government in eastern Libya. Abu Dhabi has also supported neighbouring and landlocked Ethiopia’s controversial agreement with the internationally unrecognised breakaway Somaliland for access to the port of Berbera, developed by UAE’s DP World.

Somalia, along with its allies Qatar and Turkey, views this as an attack on its territorial integrity and has recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa.

Dagalo has courted support from Somaliland and Ethiopia, as well as Chad, all increasingly dependent on UAE investment, threatening more regional instability. Further afield, his control over the export of Sudanese gold has fostered close connections with Russia, which buys via the UAE, enabling the Putin government to bypass NATO sanctions.

Moscow, whose Wagner mercenaries operate in Sudan, eastern Libya and neighbouring Central African Republic, is trying to establish a base at Port Sudan. There have been rumours and unverified reports of Ukrainian forces active in the country, targeting Russian operatives.

With the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, North Africa and the Red Sea basin becoming key battlegrounds for competing interests, an infuriated Biden administration has been unable to broker any agreement either among its own regional allies or between Sudan’s rival gangsters, with its special envoys to the country each quitting after a few months in post.

Original article:Strategic Culture Foundation

Sudan’s capital Khartoum has turned into a war zone with a split in the military forces. The Sudanese army is battling the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) which is a paramilitary force, and the 10 million residents are taking cover to avoid the artillery exchanges, and air force operations against the RSF. Hospitals are reporting 80 injured, and three civilian deaths.

Al Sharek TV, based in the UAE, reporting from Sudan, claimed that an Eqyptian soldier was killed in Murwey military airbase in Khartoum today, with raging battles continuing from yesterday.

A large contingent from the army swooped into the RSF camps and took control on Saturday after the RSF had attacked army bases previously, according to Brigadier-General Nabil Abdallah, who characterized the army as performing their duty to safeguard the country.

The RSF claimed to have taken control of the capital airport, two other regional airports, and the presidential palace, while Sudan’s General Intelligence Service refuted the RSF claims as untrue.

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the ruling Sovereign Council, was reportedly safe. Sudan has struggled to return to civilian rule following a military takeover when the army and the RSF ousted the former president in 2019. A transition period, with elections to follow was planned, but never initiated.

General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, the commander of the RSF, called Burhan a ‘criminal’ and accused the army of carrying out a coup. Hemedti has been deputy leader of the ruling Sovereign Council headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan since 2019, and his RSF are 100,000 strong.

The tension between the army and the RSF began on Thursday when the army accused the RSF of movements which were independent of the army and were illegal. Under the still unsigned transition agreement, the RSF is to be integrated into the ranks of the army. The process of the merger and under which authority it should be conducted has opened the door to conflict.

The RSF grew out of the government of the autocratic President Omar al-Bashir, who was removed from office in 2019. During Bashir’s time in power, Hemedti carried out a brutal crackdown in Sudan’s Darfur region during the decades of conflict there. The struggle for power and control between the army and the RSF today dates back to the previous administration.

The RSF have been accused of war crimes in the Dafur conflict, and in June 2019 they raided a Khartoum pro-democracy camp and nearly 130 people died.

Foreign intervention

Like so many countries in the Middle East, Sudan has been split by sections of the society who follow the Muslim Brotherhood, and their political ideology of Radical Islam, and those who are against extremism. Qatar, Turkey and the U.S. have been allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, and especially the U.S. has used them as foot soldiers in Syria. However, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Russia have rejected the Muslim Brotherhood.

U.S. and Israel

Yesterday, the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan, John Godfrey, said the escalation of tensions to direct fighting was “extremely dangerous” and called urgently on the senior leadership to stop the clashes. Godfrey said he and embassy staff were sheltering in place.

In January 2021, Sudan agreed to normalize relations with Israel in order to have Sudan removed for the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. On February 2, 2023 Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen met with Burhan in Khartoum, and the two countries were planning to sign a peace treaty in Washington, DC. before the end of 2023, but first depending on the Sudan democratic elections result.

Burhan accepted the U.S. demands that Sudan stop its support of the Palestinian cause of freedom, and to cut off its relations with Iran.

However, Sudan was not the beneficiary of improvements in its infrastructure, and Sudan remains a broken, failed state with a population on the brink of starvation.

The current confrontation between the army and the RSF could acerbate the economic breakdown, and tribal violence across the vast country.

The Syrian opposition

Syrian opposition leader Fahad Almasri, founder of the National Salvation Front in Syria (NSF), has publically called for normalization between Syria and Israel. Almasri says Syrians have wasted their time on the Palestinian cause, and should look after their own interests instead.

During the armed conflict in Syria, injured Jibhat al-Nusra terrorists were taken to Israeli hospitals for treatment. Jibhat al-Nusra is designated as a terrorist group by the U.S. and the UN.

Members of the extinct Free Syrian Army sang songs and carried banners in Homs praising Israel and asking for their help in their participation in the attack on Syria.

The conflict in Syria began in 2011 and was a U.S.-NATO attack on Syria for regime change. The U.S. policy goal to change the government in Syria was formulated in Tel Aviv with the policy paper “A Clean Break” written in 1996.

The situation today in Sudan should be a wake-up call to the Syrian opposition calling for normalization with Israel. Looking at the case of Sudan, we can see that following the U.S. and Israel down the path of normalization has not benefitted Sudan, or its people.

The U.S. and Israel make promises, but fail to follow through with actions.

Documents shared with MintPress reveal that Valent Projects – a shadowy communications firm that advises social media platforms such as Facebook on alleged state-backed online influence campaigns – has itself received $1.2 million from U.S. intelligence front USAID, for “counter disinformation and communications support.”

This relationship has hitherto never been publicly acknowledged, and the resulting income is not reflected in the company’s published accounts.

On Valent’s direction, Facebook has purged huge numbers of Sudanese accounts and pages critical of the Western-backed government, helping to keep a controversial civilian and military administration in power. There are also suspicions the company may have played a role in the mass suppression of Ethiopian voices online supporting the government of Abiy Ahmed, and opposing U.S. attempts to overthrow him.

Valent Projects is the creation of Amil Khan, a veteran BBC and Reuters journalist turned British intelligence-adjacent information warfare professional. For many years, Khan worked on secret Foreign Office projects in Syria. There, he ran covert psyops campaigns targeting domestic and international audiences, trained ostensibly independent opposition journalists and activists to communicate effectively with the media, and provided propaganda support to numerous armed groups trained, funded, and armed by London and Washington.

Khan bills Valent Projects as “an integrated digital agency that works with clients who want to do good in the world.” But internal company documents passed to this journalist anonymously reveal that his disinformation busting efforts amount to a deeply sinister arm’s length state censorship mechanism.

By definition, this activity poses a grave, unseen, and wholly unaccountable threat to the ability of independent journalists, academics, activists, and regular citizens the world over to be heard online, if their perspectives contravene established Western narratives. And it represents yet another ominous example of how major social media platforms have been insidiously coopted and corrupted by national security interests.

PROPPING UP OUR MEN IN SUDAN

Valent’s active role in compelling major social media platforms to take action against “networks” of trolls and bots elsewhere has been well-publicized. In June 2021 for instance, 53 Facebook accounts, 51 pages, three groups, and 18 Instagram accounts in Sudan, with over 1.8 million followers “that targeted domestic audiences,” linked to individuals associated with a national opposition party, were summarily purged.

“We found this network after reviewing information about some of its activity shared by researchers at Valent Projects,” a Meta report on “inauthentic behavior” that month states.

This was one of many mass-defenestrations of social media users in Sudan carried out by Facebook in the period between the April 2019 coup that ousted long-time President Omar al-Bashir, and the military’s seizure of power in October 2021, to which Valent was either central or closely adjacent.

These accounts, usually associated with opposition elements in the country, were variously claimed to have engaged in “coordinated inauthentic behavior” by disseminating content critical of the country’s military and civilian power-sharing government, “[promoting] Russian interests,” and other malign activities.

While one would be forgiven for concluding from Meta’s “inauthentic behavior” report that Valent approached the social network in an independent capacity, the company was in fact acting on behalf of USAID’s Agency’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), which “provides fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition.”

This is an Orwellian euphemism for facilitating regime change. While never admitted in the mainstream, and strenuously denied by officials in Washington, USAID has since its 1961 inception served as a U.S. intelligence Trojan Horse, aiding the CIA and other agencies in undermining “enemy” governments.

The Agency’s penetration of Sudan following the 2019 coup was extensive. An official USAID explainer openly avows that the event represented a “historic” opportunity to “further U.S. interests” in the country and wider region, strongly hinting that the civilian and military power-sharing government was created by OTI.

The administration was then provided extensive financial and material support by USAID, its representatives coordinating closely with the Sudanese Prime Minister’s office to “counter mis- and disinformation.” The Agency also financed independent media outlets and NGOs, and supported “civilians advocating for democratic reforms,” in order to shore up its rule.

Numerous reports from leading human rights organizations published during the executive’s two years of operation documented rampant corruption and egregious abuses of power by authorities, including murderous crackdowns on protests, jailing of activists without charge or trial, and closure of opposition media outlets. By the time the administration disintegrated, it had failed to implement almost all of the institutional and legal reforms outlined in its founding constitutional charter.

To say the least, USAID had a significant vested interest in maintaining this grossly distorted fiction, and silencing detractors of the power-sharing executive. It was no doubt calculated that Washington becoming openly involved in compelling social networks to deplatform the disreputable administration’s denigrators would even further undermine its legitimacy at home and abroad though.

Hence, the need to employ Valent Projects to achieve that objective, and lend a legitimizing imprimatur of ostensibly independent “expertise” to insidious state censorship.

‘DISINFORMATION, DIVISION, AND WAR’

Questions also abound on Valent’s role in the Ethiopian Civil War, which has raged since November 2020, and the mass online censorship that has accompanied the bitter fighting.

What began as a limited regional skirmish in which government forces responded to attacks on military infrastructure and atrocities perpetrated against civilians by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) eventually came to engulf much of the country. A political movement-cum-party which ruled the country between 1991 and 2018, the new government in Addis Ababa has designated the TPLF a terrorist group.

During its period in power, the U.S.-backed TPLF made Ethiopia the country “one of the most inhospitable places in the world,” carrying out vicious actions “bearing the hallmark of crimes against humanity”, according to Human Rights Watch. Untold billions provided in financial aid was embezzled by state officials and spirited out the country, and Ethiopia became the second-worst jailer of journalists on the continent.

This egregious track record is reflected in the TPLF’s conduct in the civil war. The group has committed countless atrocities, including gang rapes and multiple massacres of civilians, and used children extensively as human shields. Yet these abuses have barely been acknowledged by Western journalists.

The elected government’s efforts to quell the bloodshed, and time in office more generally, have not been without fault. But the administration evidently represents a welcome change for Ethiopian voters, who re-elected it in an overwhelming landslide in mid-2021, even as the TPLF-instigated carnage continued apace. However, corporate news outlets have consistently framed authorities’ prosecution of the war as a murderous, unprovoked assault on the general population, with charges of artificially manufactured famine, mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, if not outright genocide repeatedly abounding – although never substantiated.

Officials in Washington have at regular intervals also openly and eagerly advocated for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ethiopia, if not U.S. boots on-the-ground. Such comments are commonplace in buildups to Western military intervention.

In response to this aggressive tubthumping, many Ethiopians, members of the country’s sizable diaspora, and independent reporters and researchers took to social media and began coordinating via messaging apps to counter the war propaganda perpetuated by Western politicians, journalists and think tanks, in furtherance of U.S. aggression and exploitation throughout the Horn of Africa.

Their collective struggle gave birth to the No More movement, its name a concise but powerful call to end “disinformation, division and war” in Addis Ababa and beyond – a corresponding hashtag spread like wildfire across social media platforms, and served as a rallying cry at many protests in key Western capitals, where Ethiopians and Eritreans defiantly marched side by side against conflict and imperial meddling.

This can only be considered a tremendous achievement for people power. But Valent Projects had very different ideas. Among the leaked papers reviewed by MintPress is a report on “inauthentic behavior” and “coordinated networks” online related to the Ethiopian civil war produced by the company in May 2022.

It frames the seismic upsurge of grassroots outcry over the past 18 months as a “complex and sophisticated online manipulation effort” on the part of Addis Ababa, with the Chinese and Russian governments “supporting if not directing” vast armies of troll and bot accounts to support that activity, and promulgating “anti-imperialist” narratives via social media to manipulate “specific audiences,” as part of an “orchestrated online influence campaign.”

The methods by which Valent reaches these sensational conclusions leave much to be desired. To put it bluntly, its report is a poorly woven patchwork of peculiar logical fallacies, paranoid conspiracy theorizing, dumbfounding non sequiturs, defamatory and false allegations, sweeping conspiratorial conjecture, unsupported and inexplicable value judgments, and amateurish analytical blunders.

For example, the company’s initial assumption – for reasons unstated – was the overwhelming majority of accounts tweeting #NoMore were automated. Its research team therefore analyzed 150 accounts that used the hashtag most frequently using Botometer to validate this hypothesis.

Just 20% were found to be “probable” bots, quite obviously indicating most of the users were real people. But Valent instead concluded that the Russian and Chinese “operation” was in fact quite so sophisticated, “many inauthentic accounts” simply escaped detection.

To reinforce this dubious, self-perpetuating conclusion, Valent “isolated” 49 of these accounts, which displayed location data, and found 30 had tweeted from six separate “identical locations, within and outside Ethiopia.” This is said to suggest they were all being run “by an individual or small group of actors,” in order to create the false impression that interactions between these accounts were “organic online conversation.”

One site purportedly linked to several accounts was the world famous Trafalgar Square. Valent cites this as “a clear sign of falsification,” although a far more logical explanation is that these users simply listed London as their location on their profiles.

Trafalgar Square marks the point from which all distances to Britain’s capital are measured, and thus represents the city’s epicenter. Searches for “London” via online maps invariably direct to the area as a result. As a native of the city and resident to this day, it is remarkable Khan was apparently unaware of this.

TARGETED SUPPRESSION

An accompanying Excel spreadsheet lists a large number of accounts that tweeted content related to the civil war, divided by Valent into “seeders” – “accounts that produce original content and introduce it into the discourse”; “superspreaders – “accounts that take that content and amplify it”; and “endorsers” – “accounts that interact with the content to give the appearance of organic engagement to the interactions.” Each user is also given a Botometer ranking out of five.

Among the accounts are dozens of Ethiopians, including academics and activists, and anti-imperialist Western journalists and researchers. Much of the Ethiopian contingent rate highly on the Botometer scale, although academic tests show the software to be “imprecise when it comes to estimating bots,” producing significant volumes of false positives and negatives alike, “especially” so when accounts tweet in a language other than English.

Underlining Botometer’s inaccuracy, the official account of independent media outlet Breakthrough News is ranked 3.3 on the inauthenticity scale, and highlighted in the spreadsheet in a menacing red.

Breakthrough and its founders Eugene Puryear and Rania Khalek crop up repeatedly in the report. In November 2021, they traveled to Addis Ababa to conduct on-the-ground reporting on the situation, which Valent outlandishly asserts was the start and core component of a dedicated “phase” of China and Russia’s “political influence operation” related to the civil war.

This is predicated on the bogus basis that the outlet – which receives no state or corporate funding, and is primarily financed via viewer donations and subscriptions – is in fact “Russia-backed”.

The existence of such a “phase” is buttressed by the observation that other figures bogusly accused of being “linked to Russian state interests” also became “more active in shaping discourse” on social media at this time, pushing an “anti-imperialist” narrative to “hard-left audiences.”

Again, an altogether saner explanation could be that the interest and output of anti-imperial, independent activists and journalists was spurred by ongoing developments in the crisis, and they reported on them accordingly. After all, November was when the aforementioned bombshell recording leaked and when the TPLF concurrently expressed a desire publicly to push on to Addis Ababa.

The “sophistication” of this “attack”, the report argues, “further reinforces the view” that Russia was managing a high-level “pro-Ethiopian operation” on social media, despite the tweets being completely unrelated to Ethiopia, and this journalist having not the slightest inkling the company was engaged in work related to the civil war at this time.

The report goes on to lament that despite Valent reporting these tweets to Twitter, the company took no action, which is said to suggest “a lack of commitment on the part of the platform to enforcing its stated policies.” In reality, Twitter’s failure to respond was likely due to the information included in the tweets being gleaned from internet search engines, and publicly-accessible resources such as LinkedIn, and therefore no rules actually being broken.

‘KEY POLITICAL TRANSITION’

Such irrationality, ineptitude and rank incompetence would be amusing, except Valent’s framing of legitimate, organic online activity by genuine civil society actors as malign, orchestrated, counterfeit, enemy state-directed and in breach of established platform rules could well have influenced social media platforms to suppress if not outright ban a large number of users, distorting public perspectives and damaging reputations and livelihoods in the process.

Independent journalists named in Valent documents, such as Sputnik contributor Wyatt Reed, have told MintPress that their online reach collapsed after they reported on the civil war. Many of the accounts flagged by Valent as bots – likely wrongly – have been permanently suspended. Other prominent pro-Ethiopian activists unnamed in the report, including No More cofounder Simon Tesfamariam, have likewise been banned without warning, explanation or recourse. Meanwhile, prominent figures have engaged in outright hate speech about Ethiopians and no action has been taken.

I’m volcanically pissed that Valent has the gall to smear myself and my colleagues as Kremlin assets, or part of some info op run by Moscow. It’s beyond ridiculous and insulting. I’ve publicly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on several occasions – you can watch a speech I made on the war earlier this year on my YouTube channel.”

“We’ve traveled to Ethiopia multiple times, interviewed witnesses, investigated massacres, seen hospitals, universities and museums vandalized and looted by the TPLF,” he added. “I’ve published documents proving UN officials ignored war crimes and did nothing to help their own staff when they were assaulted and kidnapped. You can make up what you like, but you can’t transform the reality of over 100 million people.”

COUNTER-DISINFORMATION AS COUP D’ÉTAT

Whether Valent’s work on Ethiopia was also conducted for USAID is an open question, but the parallels with its Sudanese operations are clear and cohering. It may be significant that Samantha Power was one of the most prominent voices agitating for U.S. intervention in the civil war, declaring in August 2021 that “every option is on the table” for dealing with the crisis.

Moreover, the Valent report on “inauthentic behavior” states the company has identified “information operations in the Middle East and Africa,” while other leaked documents refer to Valent helping “supporting newly democratising governments” deal with “disinformation” for USAID – suggesting several other countries, and their populations, in the Agency’s crosshairs have likewise been in the firing line of Khan’s warped insight.

There is quite clearly an urgent need for social media platforms to review any and all suspensions that have been motivated by information provided by Valent Projects. It is inevitable that untold numbers of journalists, activists, academics and authentic civil society voices will have been purged on the most preposterous, unjust grounds imaginable as a result of Khan’s interventions. The only question is who was targeted, and where.

UKRAINE ON THE BRAIN

On June 7, it was revealed that Khan was also working closely with British journalist Paul Mason in an effort to deplatform The Grayzone, as part of a wider personal crusade against the anti-war, anti-imperialist left over the matter of Ukraine.

Leaked emails between the pair exposed how Mason suggested subjecting The Grayzone – which he baselessly and bizarrely believed to be a Chinese and Russian intelligence operation – to “relentless deplatforming” via “full nuclear legal” attacks, official probes by government bodies, and cutting the website and its contributors off from online donation sources such as PayPal.

This was a fate MintPress News, its founder Mnar Adley and senior staff writer Alan MacLeod suffered in May this year – an egregious development Mason spoke of approvingly in the leaked emails. In reality, MintPress does not support the Russian government, and staff such as MacLeod have publicly condemned Vladimir Putin for his actions.

Nevertheless, the conflict in Ukraine has grown the power of Western governments to directly dictate what is and is not true, and what their populations are and are not allowed to know, exponentially. Yet, their ability to distort and censor overseas is limited, if not outright waning – and that’s where Valent Projects comes in.

As the New Cold War grows considerably hotter every day, Khan’s services will surely become ever-increasingly in demand. Neither he nor his state and quasi-state sponsors can be allowed to succeed.

mintpressnews.com