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Il recente viaggio del Segretario Generale del Partito Comunista Tô Lâm tra Helsinki e Sofia ha offerto una radiografia aggiornata dell’ambizione internazionale del Việt Nam, che punta a consolidare fiducia politica con partner affidabili, integrare le proprie catene del valore con quelle europee, connettere gli ecosistemi dell’innovazione e tradurre l’ampio capitale diplomatico accumulato negli ultimi anni in progetti concreti. In entrambe le capitali, l’agenda è stata esplicita e finalizzata a trasformare una lunga consuetudine di amicizia in un’architettura operativa di cooperazione che, nella grammatica diplomatica contemporanea, prende il nome di “partenariato strategico”, una formula indica un salto di qualità che investe la totalità dei canali – Partito, Stato, Governo, Parlamenti, sistemi territoriali – e che definisce, a monte, un metodo fatto di consultazioni regolari, allineamento su questioni regionali e globali, obiettivi misurabili in materia economica, scientifica, educativa, culturale e di sicurezza.

In Finlandia, la cornice è stata tracciata da un documento congiunto che istituisce il Partenariato Strategico e che individua i capisaldi del rapporto: politica e diplomazia, commercio e investimenti, scienza e tecnologia, trasformazione digitale, educazione e capitale umano, transizione verde, infrastrutture e connettività. L’incontro tra Tô Lâm e il Presidente Alexander Stubb ha messo in chiaro una scommessa reciproca. Da un lato, il Việt Nam offre un mercato dinamico, un posizionamento cardine all’interno dell’ASEAN, una politica estera di diversificazione e multilateralismo, e un’agenda di trasformazione digitale e industriale che richiede partner con know-how avanzato; dall’altro, la Finlandia porta in dote filiere tecnologiche d’eccellenza, dall’ICT alle energie pulite, dalla cybersecurity alla gestione idrica, fino alla tecnologia medica e all’economia circolare. Non a caso, il dialogo ha richiamato esempi concreti – dalla tradizione di Nokia nell’ICT alla capacità di Wärtsilä di alimentare impianti su combustibili flessibili, dalla collaborazione UE-UNIDO su progetti di circolarità nelle zone industriali del Việt Nam al sostegno finlandese a programmi di innovazione e transizione verde.

La dimensione economica, per entrambi, è un pilastro delle relazioni bilaterali. Non a caso, le parti hanno rimarcato il pieno utilizzo dell’EVFTA, l’accordo di libero scambio tra Unione Europea e Việt Nam, per fluidificare accessi di mercato e promozione commerciale, con un’attenzione specifica a beni agricoli e di consumo, mentre il Việt Nam ha sollecitato Helsinki a sostenere l’iter di ratifica dell’EVIPA presso i sette Stati membri dell’UE che ancora mancano all’appello e a incoraggiare la Commissione europea a rimuovere il “cartellino giallo” sulla pesca che grava sull’export ittico vietnamita. È un passaggio di politica commerciale che intreccia regole, reputazione e competitività delle filiere, e che si affianca a un’agenda d’investimenti dove il Việt Nam sollecita capitale e tecnologia finlandese in settori ad alto valore – tecnologie verdi, logistica, transizione energetica, trasformazione e automazione – mentre si impegna a fare da ponte verso ASEAN per le aziende nordiche, offrendo un hub regionale affidabile e connesso.

Il capitolo scientifico-tecnologico e digitale è l’altro asse del partenariato con Helsinki. L’elenco delle priorità – e-government, servizi pubblici digitali, AI, semiconduttori, 5G/6G, cybersecurity, piattaforme per l’open innovation – descrive l’ambizione del Việt Nam di accelerare lo spostamento della frontiera tecnologica. La logica non è solo trasferimento di soluzioni, ma co-sviluppo di standard, formazione di capacità regolatorie e manageriali, e crescita di ecosistemi imprenditoriali. Da qui anche l’enfasi su scambi accademici, borse, programmi congiunti e riqualificazione professionale, in un’ottica di rafforzamento del capitale umano che sostenga la traiettoria al 2045. La diplomazia climatica fa da cornice orizzontale: la Finlandia si è detta pronta a collaborare per il traguardo “emissioni nette zero” del Việt Nam entro il 2050, puntando su efficienza, rinnovabili, reti e tecnologie abilitanti.

Il partenariato strategico con la Bulgaria, annunciato a Sofia dallo stesso Tô Lâm insieme al Presidente Rumen Radev, presenta caratteristiche complementari: alla componente tecnologica e industriale si affianca un forte ancoraggio politico-storico, alimentato da 75 anni di relazioni diplomatiche e da una memoria condivisa che comprende l’assistenza materiale e formativa bulgara nei decenni scorsi e la presenza, ieri come oggi, di una comunità vietnamita integrata nel tessuto locale. La visita – la prima di un Segretario Generale del PCV dalla transizione politica bulgara del 1990 – ha assunto il valore di un messaggio di fiducia e gratitudine, ma soprattutto di una piattaforma operativa per la prossima fase.

Anche qui, i due leader hanno fatto del coordinamento politico e del meccanismo di consultazione regolare un tratto distintivo del nuovo livello di relazione. Sul piano della sicurezza, la cooperazione abbraccia ambiti mirati, che comprendono la formazione congiunta tra accademie, le operazioni di peacekeeping dell’ONU, la cybersicurezza e la medicina militare. Sono segmenti coerenti con la postura del Việt Nam – “quattro no” in difesa, multilateralismo attivo e rispetto del diritto internazionale – e con le esigenze di resilienza che la Bulgaria, ponte tra UE e Mar Nero, condivide. In economia, l’obiettivo dichiarato è raddoppiare in pochi anni l’interscambio, sfruttando appieno l’EVFTA e predisponendo condizioni favorevoli per imprese e investitori di entrambe le parti. È qui che la formula dei “due gateway” acquista sostanza: la Bulgaria come porta d’accesso del Việt Nam al mercato UE, il Việt Nam come piattaforma per l’ingresso dei prodotti e dei capitali bulgari nell’ASEAN.

La centralità della scienza e della tecnologia come “pilastro” – così l’hanno definita i due leader – rispecchia sia la domanda del Việt Nam di accelerare su digitale, economia dei dati, e-government, farmacia e biomedicina, IA ed energia verde, sia l’offerta bulgara di competenze e capacità industriali in rinnovabili, trasformazione agro-alimentare, logistica e settori high-tech emergenti. La cooperazione culturale, turistica ed educativa, con un’attenzione alla mobilità studentesca e alla connettività aerea, completa il quadro, insieme a una possibile espansione della collaborazione sul lavoro, in risposta all’esigenza di manodopera della Bulgaria e al potenziale del Việt Nam di offrire una forza lavoro giovane e qualificata.

Dal punto di vista geopolitico, i due partenariati iscritti in pochi giorni nello spazio UE orientale e nordico riflettono una strategia del Việt Nam di diversificazione delle interdipendenze. Attraverso Helsinki, il Việt Nam intercetta le filiere nordiche dell’innovazione verde e digitale; con Sofia, connette le infrastrutture e i mercati dell’Europa sud-orientale, rafforzando la proiezione industriale e commerciale verso l’Unione e moltiplicando i canali politico-diplomatici nel sistema europeo. Infine, l’allineamento su principi cardine – centralità dell’ONU, rispetto dell’UNCLOS 1982 in materia marittima, risoluzione pacifica delle controversie, sostegno all’ordine internazionale basato su regole – conferma la coerenza della postura del Việt Nam e la sua attrattività come partner affidabile, capace di coniugare autonomia strategica e integrazione.

Il messaggio che il Việt Nam invia all’Europa con la doppia intesa è, in ultima analisi, quello di un Paese che si propone non solo come mercato, ma come co-progettista di soluzioni per transizione verde, sicurezza economica, digitalizzazione e resilienza istituzionale. La diplomazia economica – ormai asse portante della politica estera vietnamita – si intreccia qui con la diplomazia normativa: EVFTA, EVIPA, standard sulla sostenibilità delle catene dia approvvigionamento, rispetto delle regole internazionali nel settore pesca. Il tutto dentro una cornice di sicurezza cooperativa che valorizza l’esperienza del Việt Nam nelle operazioni di peacekeeping e il suo impegno per un Indo-Pacifico stabile, aperto e regolato dal diritto.

In controluce, resta la cifra di lungo periodo della politica estera del Việt Nam, caratterizzata da principî costanti e strumenti adattivi, in cui l’indipendenza e l’autonomia decisionale si accompagnano alla volontà di essere ponte tra regioni, culture e mercati. Helsinki e Sofia, pur molto diverse per geografia e sistemi produttivi, diventano così due cerniere europee di una strategia eurasiatica che guarda al 2030 e al 2045 con la convinzione che modernizzazione industriale, inclusione sociale e proiezione internazionale siano tre facce della stessa moneta. Il doppio partenariato strategico, se tradotto in risultati, può essere una leva potente di questa traiettoria.

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While following Finland’s example and accepting the loss of territory and giving up NATO aspirations are inevitable, and painful, choices, the problems for Ukraine run much deeper.

The term ‘Finlandisation’ has cropped up more frequently in recent weeks as pundits think about an exit ramp for Ukraine from this devastating war. It is a clumsy shorthand, that actually emerged during 1960s German political discourse, to deride then Chancellor Willy Brandt’s ‘Ostpolitik’ policy of rapprochement with communist East Germany.

Some commentators reach further back to 1940, and Finland’s decision to cede parts of Karelia to sign a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. They easily forget that Finland allied with Nazi Germany in the Continuation War from 1941 to 1944, participating in the siege of Leningrad, before aligning with the British and the Soviets in 1944, after Leningrad was liberated. It was from this point, the signing of the Moscow Armistice on 19 September 1944, that the current eastern border of modern Finland was largely fixed.

So, in the present day ‘Finlandisation’, as it is applied to Ukraine, underlines the point that the fiercely independent Ukrainians may need to accept the loss of part of their territory in the interests of a longer-term, more durable settlement with their neighbour, Russia.

It has always been impossible to imagine that Ukraine will ever credibly be able to retake the Donbas without dragging western powers into a general war with Russia, which looks no more likely today than it ever has. Trump’s bizarre remark that Ukraine can retake all of its lands from Russia must be seen for what it is, a jibe as much against Zelensky as against Putin.

The uncomfortable truth remains that, like Finland, Ukraine will de facto have lost a chunk of its land when the war ends.

That point is easy to understand and, in fact, has always been clear. Right at the start of the war, veteran BBC correspondent John Simpson made the connection with Finland’s historical experience. On 16 March 2022, he wrote that after its war with the Soviet Union ended, ‘Finland kept the most important, most imperishable thing: its full independence as a free, self-determining nation.’ With Russia Ukraine peace talks in Turkey gathering steam, he saw the Finland analogy as suitable for Ukraine, which had mounted a stout defence after the war started.

Of course, views like Simpson’s were sidelined by the western mainstream media until the idea of ‘Finlandisation’ came back into prominence, including following Finnish President Alexander Stubb’s remarks to the Economist at the start of September.

Stubb’s about face is remarkable in many ways, as he has consistently been an arch Russia hawk, fully behind the continuation of a war that has come at a punishing cost to Ukraine of over one million killed or injured. Yet, the truth is that the war has fallen into a dull, predictable rhythm from which Ukraine cannot escape without a peace settlement.

With cold weather on the not too distant horizon, Russia’s battlefield gains have slowed somewhat, although it continues to nudge further into Dnipro province and slowly swallow up the towns of Kupiansk and Siversk.

That doesn’t signal respite for Ukraine though. Men are still dying on the frontline and as we get into the winter, Russia’s attention will undoubtedly shift to an aerial bombardment of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, crippling the nation’s heating and electricity supplies.

So, an end to the war is desperately needed and it would, at least in theory, finally allow Ukraine to draw a line in the sand, as Finland did, and start the long and painful process of rebuilding and integration into Europe. Even if that process started today, it would take at least a decade, not least because some European States won’t want to hurry to lose their generous subsidies to fund Ukrainian reconstruction, as I have said often.

Yet from day one, Ukraine would emerge independent and sovereign, with the freedom to chart its course into the future. But that is the point at which the Finlandisation analogy will become difficult to sustain.

For a start, Ukraine will also need to make formal commitment never to join NATO, something which Donald Trump has signalled, but which Zelensky and his European sponsors still refuse to sign up to. Like the de facto loss of territory, neutrality has always been one of the uncomfortable truths about how the war will end. That truth is not going to change.

And the problem for Ukraine’s leadership in particular runs deeper still.

In a Washington Post article of 5 March 2014, shortly after the Ukraine crisis started, Henry Kissinger cut straight to the core of the problem. He said that since independence. Ukraine’s ‘leaders have not learned the art of compromise, even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other… A wise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.’

Ukraine’s future independence depends largely on efforts internally within that country to reconcile the now Ukrainian speaking majority, and those unoccupied parts of the country that remain Russian speaking. While Zelensky is putatively Russian speaking, his government represents a Ukrainian nationalism that will remain problematic to many citizens in the future. And I’ve seen no evidence that the current Ukrainian government will let up on the now decade-long campaign to demonise Russianness, even if the war did end.

And there is another problem. At around the same time as Kissinger’s article, the Brookings Institute made the following striking observation: ‘Unfortunately, Ukraine is not and cannot be a Finland. It’s far too weak, poor, unstable, and corrupt. Finland’s per capita GDP is over $47,000. Ukraine’s is less than $4,000. Finland is the third least corrupt country in the world; Ukraine is 144th (out of 177).’

It would be impossible, I think, to argue that war hasn’t made the problem of corruption much worse in Ukraine. The July protests against the crackdown on Ukraine’s independent anti-corruption bodies suggested that Zelensky’s administration is only different to those of his predecessors by having access to a vastly larger pool of rents to divvy out among his cronies.

That that pool of easy western money will largely evaporate when the war ends is, for too many in Kiev, a reason to keep the war rumbling on at a snail’s pace, I’m afraid.

So, I hope that Ukraine can emerge from the war as Finland did in 1944 and look confidently towards the future. I worry, however, that unlike Finland, an absence of war may not usher in a stable peace, but rather a renewal of the feudal scramble for control and money that has characterised Ukraine’s unstable politics since 1991.

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Turkey’s position in the new war preparations dubbed as the “European security architecture” is growing stronger both economically and strategically. More and more Turkish companies are developing projects with European partners, filling gunpowder, and selling equipment. All, of course, “under NATO’s watch”…

The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) – formed by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden – is taking new steps to “strengthen national defense capacities.”

Within this framework, a facility will be established particularly at the Elling plant in Denmark to fill explosives, primarily for 155mm artillery shells. At this site, both conventional and new-generation high-explosive materials such as TNT, IMX-101, and IMX-104 will be filled. The facility will operate with “high automation” and use advanced technology in ammunition production.

However, the main driver behind this need for “advanced technology” is not innovation per se, but the increasing demand for military support and ammunition supply to Ukraine.

To revive its domestic ammunition production at the Elling plant, the Danish government partnered with the Norway-based defense company Nammo.

This is exactly where Turkey comes into play. Nammo, tasked with handling the production processes of this mission, turned its eyes to Turkey and signed a contract with Turkish defense company Repkon.

According to the agreement, the facility that will carry out the ammunition filling will be established by Repkon. Its ‘operating principle’ is minimal human labor, high automation.

A lesser-known Turkish company

Although not as well-known as Baykar, Repkon has recently signed contracts to establish ammunition production lines with countries such as the U.S., Germany, Spain, Ukraine, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan. It is one of the leading firms particularly in explosive filling technologies. The company has also recently acquired Bowas, a firm active in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland.

Bowas is also one of the expert firms in high-precision metal forming technologies. It operates not only in defense but also in the automotive, aerospace, and oil industries.

What sets the company apart is that despite operating for many years and making significant international investments – especially in the U.S. – as a “private company,” it has rarely come under the spotlight.

Despite its low-profile status, Repkon is one of the rare companies in the world capable of managing the entire process – from metal part production to explosive manufacturing and filling operations – under one roof.

To understand the scale of Repkon’s “successes,” let’s go back to last year. Following a global surge in demand for 155mm artillery shells due to the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. Department of Defense decided to establish a new production line in Texas – and awarded the contract to Repkon.

Repkon USA is expected to meet 30% of the U.S. demand for 155mm artillery shells. Additionally, reports have emerged that Repkon will build a TNT production plant in Kentucky with an investment of $435 million.

In other words, a significant portion of the ammunition used in U.S. military operations around the world – particularly in shipments to Ukraine – is being prepared by the Turkish company Repkon.

Where do we know Nammo from?

Back to the beginning. Nammo (Nordic Ammunition Company), which signed the deal with Repkon, is a Norway-Finland defense and aerospace firm established in 1998 through the merger of Norway’s Raufoss, Finland’s Patria, and Sweden’s Celsius AB ammunition operations. The company is 50% owned by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, and the remaining 50% by Patria, which is itself 50.1% owned by the Finnish state.

This multinational company based in the Baltics and Northern Europe produces small, medium, and large caliber military ammunition, rocket motors, shoulder-launched weapon systems, demilitarization services, and mobile munitions destruction tools.

Nammo CEO Morten Brandtzæg is a defense industry boss who has publicly criticized European politicians for “still having a peacetime mentality,” advocating more openly for war readiness.

Brandtzæg even went further by calling for a European version of the U.S. Defense Production Act – which gives the president authority to prioritize defense-related contracts:

“In times of crisis, should defense producers in Europe have the right to priority in acquiring production equipment? In the U.S., this is legally possible – but in Europe, it’s not regulated.”

Close ties with Israel

Naturally, this type of arms dealing also intersects with Israel. Nammo’s ties with the Israeli military were first revealed during Operation Cast Lead in 2008.

In the attacks that killed 1,133 people, injured more than 4,000, and displaced tens of thousands in Gaza, it was revealed that Nammo Talley, Nammo’s U.S. subsidiary based in Arizona, sold 28,000 M72 LAW (light anti-tank weapons) to the Israeli military. The deal, which included weapon parts and training missiles, amounted to 600 million Norwegian kroner.

Nammo-manufactured ammunition frequently resurfaces in discussions of Israel’s current attacks on Gaza.

“We didn’t sell it – those we sold to did”

Regarding the use of its ammunition in Gaza, the company defends itself by saying, “We didn’t sell it – those we sold to did.” Although Nammo is partly owned by the Norwegian government, it operates through numerous subsidiaries that are subject to the laws of various countries.

Nammo’s communications director Thorstein Korsvold told the Norwegian press:

“The weapons in question were produced in the U.S. and are subject to American law. Nammo sold these weapons to the U.S. military about 10 to 15 years ago.”

Production in line with NATO standards

This indirect path in arms sales also applies to the company’s relations with NATO. Although Nammo has no official ties with NATO, its products are manufactured to NATO standards. This is directly linked to its active role in Ukraine.

Last year, the Norwegian government approved a technology transfer to allow Nammo to produce 155mm NATO-standard howitzer ammunition in Ukraine. In continuation of this agreement, another deal signed four months ago (March 2025) marked the first time that ammunition produced in Ukraine was registered with a NATO NSN (NATO Stock Number).

Why is Europe suddenly praising Turkey?

In recent months, European officials have made notable remarks about Turkey’s potential role in European defense.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized deep cooperation with Turkey.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called on Turkey to “take on the highest level of joint responsibility for peace in Ukraine and regional stability,” adding, “We are ready for defense cooperation.”

The Financial Times wrote that Turkey’s defense industry “could become a central player in European defense.”

Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna described Turkey as a “decisive partner for European security” at a NATO meeting in Antalya.

There are concrete reasons behind these and similar statements emphasizing Turkey’s role in European defense:

1. The U.S. and Europe are experiencing serious difficulties in supplying ammunition to Ukraine; the need for “fresh blood” in military terms is more pressing than ever.
2. The wavering stance of the Donald Trump administration in the U.S. regarding Ukraine is forcing European politicians to seek defense alternatives – naturally elevating Turkey’s prominence.

The region most emphasized in the European defense discourse is the Baltics and Northern Europe. Expecting that Russia may “attempt to invade Europe” after Ukraine, European leaders are preparing their armies and citizens for a “long-awaited great war.”

Thus, in the context of urgent challenges like ammunition supply and production – seen as a priority in the fight against Russia – Repkon’s selection is due not only to the company’s “industry-leading” expertise and “long-standing” experience, but also to the increasing role of Turkey and Turkish companies.

Although Turkey pursues a policy of balance in the Russia-Ukraine war and has taken on a mediating role diplomatically, it’s clear that many Turkish firms – especially Baykar – are striving to secure a significant position both during the war and in Ukraine’s anticipated post-war “reconstruction” process.

Turkey’s place in the new war preparations called the “European security architecture” is strengthening economically and strategically. Every day, more Turkish companies are developing projects with European partners, filling gunpowder, and selling equipment. All, of course, “under NATO’s watch”…

As for those turning to “democratic Europe” for a solution to Turkey’s domestic political crises – they face a painful period of waiting for much longer.

Glenn DIESEN

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La militarización de Escandinavia socavará drásticamente la seguridad de la región e invitará a nuevos conflictos, ya que Rusia se verá obligada a responder a lo que podría convertirse en una amenaza existencial. Noruega ha decidido albergar al menos 12 bases militares estadounidenses en su suelo, mientras que Finlandia y Suecia siguen su ejemplo transfiriendo el control soberano sobre partes de su territorio tras convertirse recientemente en miembros de la OTAN. Se construirán infraestructuras para acercar más rápidamente las tropas estadounidenses a las fronteras rusas, mientras que el Mar Báltico y el Ártico se convertirán en mares de la OTAN.

Escandinavia como región clave para la seguridad rusa

Desde que la Rus de Kiev se desintegró en el siglo XIII y los rusos perdieron su presencia en el río Dniéper, un reto clave para la seguridad de Rusia ha sido su falta de acceso fiable a los mares del mundo. Además, el desarrollo económico también depende de un acceso fiable a los mares, ya que son las arterias del comercio internacional. Del mismo modo, las potencias hegemónicas siempre han necesitado dominar los mares, mientras que Rusia puede ser contenida, debilitada y derrotada restringiendo su acceso.

Suecia fue inicialmente una de esas grandes potencias. En los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII, Suecia trató de restringir el acceso de Rusia en el mar Báltico, al tiempo que intentaba invadir el puerto ruso de Arjanguelsk, en el Ártico. Durante los «tiempos turbulentos» (?????) que supuso la ocupación sueca de Rusia, murió aproximadamente una tercera parte de la población rusa. El conflicto terminó con el Tratado de Stolbova en 1617, que implicaba concesiones territoriales que cortaban el acceso de Rusia al mar Báltico. El aislamiento de Rusia duró hasta la época de Pedro el Grande, que acabó derrotando a Suecia en la Gran Guerra del Norte de 1721. La guerra puso fin a la era de Suecia como gran potencia, mientras que Rusia se convirtió en una gran potencia y en una potencia europea gracias a su acceso sin restricciones al mar Báltico.

Sin embargo, las potencias marítimas dominantes, Gran Bretaña y luego Estados Unidos, llevaron a cabo intentos similares para limitar el acceso de Rusia a los océanos del mundo durante los tres siglos siguientes. Durante la Guerra de Crimea (1853-56), los diplomáticos europeos fueron explícitos al afirmar que el objetivo era hacer retroceder a Rusia hacia Asia y excluirla de los asuntos europeos. Esto explica la feroz respuesta de Rusia al golpe de Estado respaldado por Occidente en Ucrania en 2014, ya que Rusia respondió apoderándose de Crimea por temor a perder su estratégica Flota del Mar Negro en Sebastopol a manos de la OTAN. El sabotaje estadounidense del acuerdo de Minsk (2015-2022) y del acuerdo de paz de Estambul (2022) estuvo igualmente motivado por el objetivo de armar a Ucrania para recuperar Crimea y convertir Sebastopol en una base naval de la OTAN. El vicesecretario general de la OTAN reconoció en julio de 2022 que la guerra en Ucrania tiene que ver sobre todo con el control del Mar Negro.

La militarización y vasallización de Escandinavia son importantes para desafiar el acceso de Rusia a los otros dos mares en las fronteras occidentales de Rusia: el mar Báltico y el Ártico. El ex secretario general de la OTAN, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, anunció con optimismo que la expansión de la OTAN en Escandinavia permitiría a la Alianza bloquear el acceso de Rusia al mar Báltico en caso de conflicto: «Tras la adhesión de Finlandia y Suecia a la OTAN, el mar Báltico será ahora un mar de la OTAN… si queremos, podemos bloquear toda entrada y salida a Rusia a través de San Petersburgo». Polonia y los Estados bálticos también han empezado a referirse casualmente al mar Báltico como un «mar de la OTAN». El Financial Times afirma que «Dinamarca podría bloquear el acceso de los petroleros rusos a los mercados» como parte de las sanciones. Un coronel de la OTAN también argumentó que el enclave ruso de Kaliningrado se vería sometido a una presión mucho mayor y se convertiría en un «problema» para Rusia: «La ascensión de Finlandia y la próxima ascensión de Suecia cambiarán totalmente la configuración en la región del Mar Báltico. Rusia se verá rodeada por Kaliningrado».

La adhesión de Suecia a la OTAN amenaza ahora con revertir el resultado de la Gran Guerra del Norte de 1721, lo que por implicación destruiría los cimientos de la seguridad rusa. Se reconoce que la batalla de Poltava fue la mayor y más decisiva de la Gran Guerra del Norte, que se saldó con la derrota de Suecia. Los vídeos que han aparecido de las bajas suecas en el reciente ataque ruso con misiles contra Poltava son, por tanto, muy simbólicos de la militarización de Escandinavia.

El ataque estadounidense a Nord Stream demostró la importancia del control del mar Báltico para cortar la conectividad económica ruso-alemana. Estados Unidos ha intentado culpar a los ucranianos del ataque, sugiriendo que «la CIA advirtió a la oficina de Zelenski para que detuviera la operación». La admisión de conocer el ataque antes de que se produjera no deja de ser interesante, ya que EE.UU. y la OTAN culparon a Rusia del ataque y lo utilizaron como motivo para intensificar el control naval sobre el mar Báltico e intensificar la guerra de Ucrania. Esto es una admisión de que los EE.UU. mintieron a su propio público y al mundo, y utilizaron la mentira para intensificar su guerra más amplia contra Rusia. El ataque también demuestra que los estadounidenses tratarán a los europeos como apoderados al igual que utilizaron a los ucranianos, mientras que los europeos no defenderían sus intereses sino que aceptarían en silencio que un aliado destruyera su propia infraestructura energética vital. La revelación también demostró que la gente a la que generosamente nos referimos como periodistas no hará ninguna pregunta crítica ni discutirá la realidad objetiva si desafía la narrativa de la guerra.

Finlandia fue quizás la mayor historia de éxito de la neutralidad, y sin embargo se convirtió en la línea de frente más larga de la OTAN contra Rusia. No había ninguna amenaza para Finlandia, y sin embargo la expansión se enmarcó como un golpe a Putin como un objetivo en sí mismo. Es previsible que pronto surjan despliegues militares extranjeros en el norte de Finlandia para amenazar a la Flota del Norte de Rusia en Arjanguelsk. El pretexto más probable será la preocupación de que Rusia quiera apoderarse de parte de Laponia, en el norte de Finlandia. No tendrá ningún sentido, pero los medios de comunicación obedientes infundirán el miedo necesario.

La militarización de Noruega ha seguido un incremento gradual. Al principio, las tropas estadounidenses estaban estacionadas en Noruega de forma rotatoria, lo que permitía al gobierno afirmar que no estaban desplegadas permanentemente. En 2021, Noruega y EEUU acordaron unas cuantas bases militares, pero las denominaron «áreas dedicadas», ya que Noruega no permite oficialmente bases extranjeras en su suelo. EE.UU. tiene pleno control y jurisdicción sobre estos territorios y los medios de comunicación estadounidenses se refieren a ellos como bases militares que permitirán a EE.UU. enfrentarse a Rusia en el Ártico, pero las élites político-mediáticas noruegas deben seguir refiriéndose a ellos como «áreas dedicadas» y descartar que tengan fines ofensivos. La rana hierve lentamente, creyendo tener intereses idénticos a los de sus amos en Washington.

Ignorar la competencia de seguridad al interpretar la guerra de Ucrania

A medida que Escandinavia pasa de ser una región de paz a una línea de frente estadounidense, cabría esperar un mayor debate sobre este cambio histórico. Sin embargo, las élites político-mediáticas ya han llegado al consenso de que la ampliación de la OTAN mejora nuestra seguridad debido a una mayor fuerza militar y disuasión. Más armas raramente se traducen en más paz, aunque ésta sea la lógica de la paz hegemónica con la que se ha comprometido esta generación de políticos.

El punto de partida de la política de seguridad es la competencia en materia de seguridad. Si el aumento de la seguridad del país A disminuye la seguridad del país B, entonces es probable que el país B se vea obligado a mejorar su seguridad de manera que reduzca la seguridad del país A. La competición de seguridad puede mitigarse disuadiendo al adversario sin provocar una respuesta, lo que idealmente se organiza mediante una arquitectura de seguridad integradora.

La capacidad de Escandinavia para ser una región de paz dependía de dominar el equilibrio entre disuasión y seguridad. Finlandia y Suecia eran Estados neutrales y formaban una parte importante del cinturón de Estados neutrales del norte al sur de Europa durante la Guerra Fría, lo que contribuyó a reducir las tensiones. Noruega era miembro de la OTAN, pero se impuso restricciones al no albergar bases militares extranjeras en su suelo y limitar las actividades militares de sus aliados en la región ártica. Era de sentido común que la seguridad derivaba de disuadir a los soviéticos sin provocarlos, este sentido común hace tiempo que desapareció.

La invasión rusa de Ucrania se cita como la principal razón por la que Finlandia y Suecia tuvieron que abandonar su neutralidad y unirse a la OTAN. Esta lógica tiene sentido cuando se ignora la competencia en materia de seguridad, ya que entonces las acciones de Rusia se producen en el vacío. Las discusiones aceptables sobre la guerra de Ucrania están limitadas por la premisa de que la invasión rusa fue «no provocada», y cualquier esfuerzo por ampliar el debate abordando el papel de la OTAN puede ser cerrado con acusaciones de «legitimar» la invasión rusa.

La expansión de la OTAN causó la guerra de Ucrania, y la solución a la inseguridad fue una mayor expansión de la OTAN incluyendo a Finlandia y Suecia. Esta lógica retorcida prevalece, ya que la narrativa de una invasión «no provocada» se ha vuelto inmune a los hechos. La canciller alemana, Angela Merkel, explicó que se había opuesto a ofrecer a Ucrania el Plan de Acción para la Adhesión a la OTAN en 2008, ya que habría sido interpretado por Moscú como «una declaración de guerra». WikiLeaks también reveló que los alemanes creían que impulsar el expansionismo de la OTAN podría «romper el país». William Burns, embajador de Estados Unidos en Moscú y actual director de la CIA, advirtió de que «la entrada de Ucrania en la OTAN es la más brillante de todas las líneas rojas para la élite rusa». Burns advirtió de las consecuencias:

«Rusia no sólo percibe el cerco y los esfuerzos por socavar la influencia de Rusia en la región, sino que también teme consecuencias impredecibles e incontroladas que afectarían gravemente a los intereses de seguridad rusos… A Rusia le preocupa especialmente que las fuertes divisiones existentes en Ucrania sobre la entrada en la OTAN, con gran parte de la comunidad étnico-rusa en contra de la adhesión, puedan provocar una gran división, con violencia o, en el peor de los casos, una guerra civil. En esa eventualidad, Rusia tendría que decidir si interviene; una decisión a la que Rusia no quiere tener que enfrentarse».

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretario General de la OTAN en 2008, reconoció que la OTAN debería haber respetado las líneas rojas de Rusia y, por tanto, no debería haber prometido la adhesión de Ucrania y Georgia en 2008. El ex secretario de Defensa estadounidense y director de la CIA, Robert Gates, también reconoció el error: «Intentar incorporar a Georgia y Ucrania a la OTAN fue realmente extralimitarse». Incluso el apoyo a la incorporación de Ucrania a la OTAN tenía dudosas intenciones. A finales de marzo de 2008, una semana antes de la Cumbre de la OTAN en Bucarest en la que se prometió a Ucrania su futura adhesión, Tony Blair explicó a los líderes políticos estadounidenses cómo debían gestionar a Rusia. Blair argumentó que la estrategia «debía consistir en desesperar un poco a Rusia con nuestras actividades en las zonas limítrofes de lo que Rusia considera su esfera de interés y a lo largo de sus fronteras reales. Había que mostrar firmeza a Rusia y sembrar en ella semillas de confusión».

En septiembre de 2023, el Secretario General de la OTAN, Jens Stoltenberg, argumentó alegremente que las acciones de Rusia para impedir la expansión de la OTAN darían lugar ahora a más expansión de la OTAN:

«El presidente Putin declaró en otoño de 2021, y de hecho envió un borrador de tratado que querían que firmara la OTAN, prometer no más ampliaciones de la OTAN. Eso fue lo que nos envió. Y [era] una condición previa para no invadir Ucrania. Por supuesto que no lo firmamos. Ocurrió lo contrario. Quería que firmáramos esa promesa, que no ampliáramos nunca la OTAN… Lo rechazamos. Así que fue a la guerra para evitar que la OTAN, más OTAN, se acercara a sus fronteras. Ha conseguido exactamente lo contrario. Ha conseguido más presencia de la OTAN en la parte oriental de la Alianza y también ha visto que Finlandia ya se ha unido a la Alianza y Suecia pronto será miembro de pleno derecho».

Stoltenberg no especificó por qué pensaba que una mayor expansión de la OTAN aumentaría la seguridad si la expansión de la OTAN fue la causa de la guerra. Sin embargo, la OTAN también insiste en que Ucrania debe formar parte de la OTAN, ya que Rusia no se atrevería a atacar a un país de la OTAN, al tiempo que argumenta que hay que detener a Rusia en Ucrania, ya que Rusia atacará después a los países de la OTAN. Al igual que el reconocimiento de la competencia en materia de seguridad, la lógica también está ausente.

Cegados por el fundamentalismo ideológico

El reconocimiento escandinavo de la competencia en materia de seguridad ha adolecido de lo que en la literatura se denomina «fundamentalismo ideológico». Los actores son considerados buenos o malos en función de las identidades políticas que les ha asignado la ideología. El fundamentalismo ideológico reduce la capacidad de reconocer que las propias políticas y acciones pueden constituir una amenaza para los demás, porque la propia identidad política se considera indiscutiblemente positiva y disociada de cualquier comportamiento amenazador. No se entiende por qué Rusia se sentiría amenazada por la expansión de la OTAN, incluso después de Yugoslavia, Afganistán, Irak, Libia, Siria, Yemen y la guerra por poderes en Ucrania. La OTAN es simplemente una «alianza defensiva», incluso mientras bombardea países que nunca la amenazaron. El fundamentalismo ideológico puede explicarse mejor por la reacción del presidente Reagan a cómo Able Archer, un ejercicio militar de la OTAN en 1983 que casi desencadena una guerra nuclear. Convencido de que EEUU era una fuerza del bien que luchaba contra un imperio del mal, Reagan se quedó perplejo al ver que los soviéticos no lo veían de la misma manera:

«Tres años me habían enseñado algo sorprendente sobre los rusos: Mucha gente en lo más alto de la jerarquía soviética tenía verdadero miedo de EEUU y de los estadounidenses… Siempre había pensado que, por nuestros actos, debía quedar claro para cualquiera que los estadounidenses éramos un pueblo moral que, desde el nacimiento de nuestra nación, siempre habíamos utilizado nuestro poder sólo como una fuerza del bien en el mundo».

Atrapados en la mentalidad tribal de «nosotros» contra «ellos», los escandinavos exageran lo que «nosotros» tenemos en común y descartan cualquier coincidencia con «ellos». Se da por sentado que EEUU comparte los intereses de Escandinavia, y que está construyendo desinteresadamente una presencia militar allí para proporcionar seguridad. EEUU tiene una estrategia de seguridad basada en la hegemonía, que depende del debilitamiento de todos los rivales emergentes. La Estrategia de Seguridad estadounidense de 2002 vinculaba explícitamente la seguridad nacional al dominio mundial, ya que el objetivo de «disuadir la futura competencia militar» debía lograrse mediante el avance de «la fuerza sin parangón de las fuerzas armadas de EEUU, y su presencia avanzada». Mientras que Escandinavia tiene interés en mantener fronteras pacíficas con Rusia, EEUU ha definido sus intereses en desestabilizar las fronteras rusas. Las alianzas en tiempos de paz se basan en perpetuar los conflictos en lugar de resolverlos, ya que el conflicto garantiza la lealtad del protectorado y la contención del adversario. En su famosa obra sobre cómo hacer avanzar y perpetuar la hegemonía global estadounidense, Brzezinski escribió que EEUU debe «impedir la colusión y mantener la dependencia de seguridad entre los vasallos, para mantener a los tributarios dóciles y protegidos, y evitar que los bárbaros se unan».

Falta de imaginación política para ir más allá de la política de bloques

Los escandinavos han dependido de EEUU para su seguridad desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y sencillamente no tienen imaginación política para otros acuerdos de seguridad. Si funcionó entonces, ¿por qué no iba a funcionar ahora? Como la competencia en materia de seguridad ya no es una consideración, los escandinavos olvidan convenientemente que la OTAN fue un actor del estatus quo durante la Guerra Fría, mientras que después de ésta se convirtió en un actor revisionista al expandirse y atacar a otros países en lo que la OTAN denomina operaciones «fuera del área».

La falta de alternativas a la OTAN permite a EEUU exigir simplemente la «solidaridad de la alianza» como palabra clave para la disciplina de bloque. Por ejemplo, en la década de 2000 Noruega criticó el sistema de defensa antimisiles estadounidense que amenazaba el equilibrio nuclear, ya que podría permitir un primer ataque estadounidense. Esto era profundamente problemático, ya que la geografía de Noruega la convertía en un país estratégico para la vigilancia de Rusia y para interceptar un ataque de represalia ruso. WikiLeaks reveló que el embajador de EE.UU. informó de que EE.UU. estaba presionando al gobierno noruego, a figuras políticas, periodistas e investigadores de think tanks para superar la firme oposición de Noruega a la defensa antimisiles, o al menos «como mínimo contrarrestar las declaraciones erróneas rusas y distinguir la posición de Noruega de la de Rusia para evitar dañar la solidaridad de la alianza». Se afirmaba que «gracias a nuestros visitantes de alto nivel», Noruega había empezado a «seguir trabajando discretamente en la OTAN sobre la defensa antimisiles y a criticar públicamente a Rusia por sus declaraciones provocadoras» (WikiLeaks, 2007b). En palabras del embajador estadounidense Whitney, Noruega tenía que «ajustarse a las realidades actuales», ya que le resultaría «difícil defender su posición si la cuestión se desplaza hacia la solidaridad de la alianza”. Tras el giro de 180 grados de Noruega sobre la defensa antimisiles, en el Parlamento noruego se declaró que «es importante para la cohesión política de la alianza no dejar que la oposición, quizá especialmente de Rusia, obstaculice el progreso y las soluciones viables».

El mundo está experimentando de nuevo un cambio dramático al pasar de un orden mundial unipolar a uno multipolar. EEUU desplazará cada vez más su atención y sus recursos hacia Asia, lo que cambiará la relación transatlántica. EEUU podrá ofrecer menos a los europeos, pero les exigirá más lealtad en términos económicos y de seguridad. Los europeos tendrán que romper sus lazos económicos con los rivales estadounidenses, lo que se traducirá en menos prosperidad y más dependencia. EEUU también esperará que los europeos militaricen la competencia económica con China, y la OTAN ya se ha convertido en el vehículo más obvio para este fin. En lugar de adaptarse a la multipolaridad diversificando sus vínculos y buscando oportunidades en el ascenso de Asia, los europeos están haciendo lo contrario, subordinándose aún más a EEUU con la esperanza de que aumente el valor de la OTAN.

Escandinavia era una región de paz mientras intentaba mitigar la competencia en materia de seguridad. A medida que Escandinavia ceda su soberanía a EEUU para protegerse de una amenaza imaginaria, la región se convertirá en una línea de frente que desencadenará inevitablemente nuevos conflictos. Lo único seguro es que cuando Rusia reaccione a estas provocaciones, todos corearemos al unísono “¡no ha sido provocado!” y haremos alguna oscura referencia a la democracia.

Publicado originalmente por Fundación de Cultura Estratégica

This article will show you how much the Baltic states and Finland have been radicalized not realizing that they are fascist and follow the principles of Hitler’s National Socialism.

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This article will survey how much the Baltic states and Finland have been radicalized, that they are fascists and follow the principles of Hitler’s National Socialism. The sinister development has serious implications for the entire European Union in its relations with Russia.

Ironically, the Baltic states and Finland proclaim to be democracies, not realizing that they conform to the principles of National Socialism as was preached by the German political party NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) led by Adolf Hitler in the 1930s and 1940s.

Recently, there was yet another incident, one of many, this time in Estonia, where in the town of Johvi, the monument of two SS veterans from the Second World War was taken out of the cellars of the museum, cleaned up, and put on display again.

Georg Sooden was a volunteer in the SS 20th Estonian Division (the Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS). About 70,000 mostly volunteers fought in this battalion, mainly against the Soviet Red Army, notably in the battle of Krivasoo. Georg Sooden was killed in this battle as was his comrade Raul Jüriado also mentioned on the monument. A member of the Johvi council inaugurated the commemoration.

In the Western news media, there is hardly any talk about these kinds of incidents. Nor is there any criticism of the Baltic states’ routine apologetic argument that they were “forced” to fight for the Nazis.

However, the Germans are known for their accuracy in documenting everything. The archives attest that the SS battalions in the Baltic States (as in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France) consisted of volunteers.

In Estonia, around 70,000 men voluntarily joined the SS.

In Latvia, the 1st Latvia 15th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS together with the 2nd Latvia 19th Waffen Grenadier Division consisted of 87,500 men.

Lithuania did not officially have a Waffen SS battalion but called itself the Lithuanian Territorial Defense Force. But most of them collaborated as policemen and carried out raids on Jews, Communists and dissidents. Almost all Jews of Lithuania were killed in the Second World War by Lithuanians, who carried out the executions. Lithuania is the southernmost of the Baltic states. During the Holocaust, about 90 percent of all Lithuanian Jews were murdered, one of the highest victim rates in Eastern Europe. The Netherlands had the highest victim rate of Western Europe.

In 2023, a BBC investigation on Lithuania (Dailymotion) found that almost all Lithuanians were involved in the Holocaust, and to this day it is not allowed to be talked about in public. Also, all the SS battalions mentioned were perpetrators in the siege of Leningrad (St Petersburg) and Operation Barbarossa in Russia, killing and murdering Russians, Jews, Communists and other Slavs.

Sinisterly, though, history is being rewritten to erase this horrific European complicity in the Nazi genocide. Latvia (and the other states as well) is trying to do this historical whitewash with the help of all kinds of European Union funds. Meanwhile, Latvia and the other Baltic states continue spewing anti-Russian hatred and concealing the horrendous genocidal crimes committed by their citizens during the Second World War in collaboration with the Nazi Third Reich.

The revisionism of historical crimes by the Baltic states took on urgency after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and these gained nominal independence, later joining the European Union and NATO.

Finland is a different story. The Finns didn’t have such a big SS battalion during WWII, but since WWII the national politics have increasingly acquired a fascist attitude. Finnish politicians and citizens have adopted a hostile view toward Russia.

Recently, Finnish President Alexander Stubb spoke on CNN and stated: “I felt that there was a potential existential threat coming from Russia.” He provocatively said the “road to peace goes through the battlefield” and bragged that Finland has the highest population percentage in Europe who are willing to die for their fatherland.

Stubb also claims that Finland tried to cooperate with Russia after the Cold War (1991) but it didn’t work because Russia is not a “normal” state that respects international law.

In June 2023, Finland’s Minister for Economic Affairs apologized for appearing at a rally organized by NeoNazi groups; apologized too for making a joke about the number 88 which can mean “Heil Hitler” to right-wing extremists, and said that he condemns the Holocaust.

The NeoNazi party in Finland is called the Nordic Resistance Movement, which has many followers also in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland.

Furthermore, remarkably enough, Wikipedia states that their allies are the Ukrainian Azov battalion, which was associated with NeoNazism until 2022. The Western media and politicians airbrushed away Azov’s Nazi affiliation, and the group was given a new image falsely claiming the group had “rejected their Nazi ideology”.

A major player in the European Union is the biggest Russophobe Kaja Kallas, who recently was the prime minister of Estonia. She is due to become the EU’s foreign minister. It is alarming to think that a politician from Estonia, the country that recently erected a monument to SS Georg Sooden and his comrade, is now responsible for European foreign policy at a dangerous time of geopolitical conflict with Russia.

Kallas is notorious for her Russophobia and grew up with an immense hatred for Russia. Her mother was deported to Siberia, according to her Wikipedia page. She has German roots on her paternal side. Her father was prime minister of Estonia in the 1990s and an EU commissioner. She is not interested in striving for good neighborliness with Russia.

Thus, a toxic cocktail of hatred and revenge now imbues the European Union, amplifying the influence of fascism and belligerence in the Baltic states and Finland.

Also, the era of communism has never been closed in their minds, which is why such great traumas have arisen and this trauma has inflamed the rest of the European countries and infected them with hatred against Russia.

Shamelessly and without scruples, Kaja Kallas writes in the American magazine Foreign Affairs that there can only be peace when Putin is in jail. That is how far the hatred goes, and the so-called democracies in the European Union, such as the Netherlands, France and Germany, who speak of antisemitism at every opportunity, tolerate this woman and the Baltic states and call them democracies without regard to the terrible past and the present.

NeoNazis are once again marching through the streets, not only in the Baltic states and Finland, but through the streets of Kiev, Odessa and Lvov with burning torches spewing their hatred towards Russians, Jews, Arabs, Africans and all other foreigners. Just like in the Second World War, maybe even a degree worse.

The politicians and many civilians of the Baltic states and Finland are glorifying the Azov battalion that has thousands of deaths on their hands, killing the Russian population in Mariupol and other Donbass cities, towns and villages. They are supported by European politicians who now claim that they have been de-Nazified.

The truth is that de-Nazification only began in 2022 when Russia launched the Special Military Operation to save the Russian-speaking population in the Donbass from these fascist Nazi monsters who started a full-blown pogrom against them in 2014, supported by the U.S. and Europe.

The European Union sponsors NeoNazi legions such as the recently emerged Georgian Legion or the so-called Russian Liberation Army, all of which are probably deployed in the attack on the Kursk region. The head of the Russian Liberation Army is Denis Kapustin, promoted by Western media as a tough German NeoNazi who also had a Russian passport (revoked), a Russian-German who is considered influential in the right-wing extremist scene and radicalized in Germany. Years ago, he founded the NeoNazi fashion label “White Rex”, which, according to the German media, helped professionalize the NeoNazi martial arts scene throughout Europe. He was also a role model for the Azov battalion, whose tour was recently canceled in Europe after some media outrage.

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Killing off a bureaucracy — whether civilian or military — is nigh impossible. But the impending defeat of Ukraine on the battlefield by Russia presents one of those watershed moments in history where the raison d’etre of NATO will be exposed as a fraud. Much has been made in recent months about NATO’s supposed growing strength by citing the addition of Sweden and Finland as new NATO members. But this is illusory.

The Swedish Armed Forces are made up of 24,400 active personnel, 11,400 military reserves, 21,500 Home Guard and 5,200 additional conscripts yearly into the Reserves (set to increase to 8,000 conscripts yearly by 2024) as of 2022.

Finland, with an annual defense budget of 68 billion dollars, has 24,000 active duty soldiers but claims reserves of 870,000.

In other words, Sweden and Finland could provide a total of 10 brigades (assuming their current active duty personnel are activated and fully deployed under NATO’s command). This is a “nothing burger.”

The once mighty British Army and Navy have been transformed from a lion into a toothless, nasty chihuahua. The U.K. is failing to meet recruitment goals and its current strength — roughly 75,000 soldiers — would barely fill the Manchester United football stadium. When you consider that 50,000 Brits fought in America during the Revolution of 1776 and were defeated by a threadbare group of Colonial rebels, you get some perspective on the impotence of the current British force.

To make matters worse the U.K. is pleading poverty with respect to its ability to supply more tanks, storm shadow missiles and artillery shells to Ukraine. In fact, all of NATO’s major European members have stripped their warehouses bare in the futile effort to supply Ukraine. If NATO decided to enter the fray in Ukraine the Brits would be hard pressed to send 6 combat ready brigades.

NATO’s problems go beyond its inadequate military resources. The very political consensus binding NATO together is coming apart. The recent verbal sniping between the French and the Germans over whether to commit NATO troops to Ukraine is emblematic of a much deeper rift. Based on a recent meeting in Germany, hosted by Scholz and attended by France’s Macron and Poland’s Tusk, Macron was compelled to walk back his insistence on sending more NATO troops to Ukraine. NATO is a mess yet Western leaders and NATO commanders continue to indulge the fantasy that they are ready and capable of carrying out a combined arms military conflict with Russia. They are not.

Russia sent a deadly reminder of this fact in the form of an Iskander missile that hit a site in Odessa filled with French, Poles and Georgians. U.K. Defense Secretary Grant Shapps cancelled a planned visit to Odessa in the wake of this strike. He probably needed an underwear change and decided it was better to stay home rather than risk becoming cannon fodder.

The following video is a compilation of Russia destroying NATO equipment delivered to Ukraine. The stuff burns well.

Original article: sonar21.com

By Anatol LIEVEN, Alex LITTLE

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As public support for Ukraine has waned over time, and Washington’s policy elites are shifting their focus more toward the conflict in Gaza, an endgame for Ukraine is desperately needed. U.S. and European officials have reportedly broached the issue of possible peace negotiations with their Ukrainian counterparts. This begs the question: What could a peace treaty between Kyiv and Moscow look like? One historical instance stands out among many as a potential model for how the Russo-Ukrainian War could end.

The “Winter War,” or the Soviet-Finnish War that took place from November 1939 to March 1940 (and was renewed by the Finns as allies of Germany between June 1941 and September 1944), has drawn some comparisons with the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia. After Finland rejected an ultimatum to concede a considerable portion of its territory and the Soviet signing of the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, Joseph Stalin’s Red Army invaded Finland to install a puppet Communist Finnish government and eliminate a potentially hostile presence near the Soviet Union’s second city and only Baltic port of Leningrad.

Similar to the initial phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Soviet officials predicted that Helsinki would fall to Soviet troops in as little as three days. However, despite the Soviets outnumbering the Finns in soldiers by three to one, Helsinki succeeded in holding off the Red Army for more than three months, inflicting extremely heavy casualties on the invading forces.

Though Finland was eventually defeated and forced to concede about 11 percent of its territory, the Finns scored a moral victory. It is widely considered that the grit and courage of Finland’s resistance convinced Stalin that incorporating Finland into the Soviet Union or turning it into a Communist client state like Poland would be more trouble than it was worth. This also contributed to Stalin’s eventual agreement to sign a peace treaty with Finland in 1944 in return for a small amount of additional territory and a commitment on Helsinki’s part to neutrality. Finland thus became the only part of the former Russian Empire that was not reincorporated into the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin.

Thereafter, Finland implemented the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine, which aimed to preserve Finland’s survival as an independent country by maintaining a neutral foreign policy stance, while Finnish nationalism became a central ideological and political driving force in Finnish society. The Soviet Union stuck to the terms of the treaty with Finland, and during the Cold War, Finland developed as a remarkably prosperous and successful Western democracy. On this basis, after the Cold War ended, Finland was able to join the European Union in 1995 and then NATO in 2023.

While “Finlandization” was considered a pejorative suggestive of accommodation, if not appeasement among Western geopoliticians during the Cold War, it turned out to be a diplomatic triumph. Finland has long had one of the world’s highest per capita GDPs, scores 100% on Freedom House’s Democracy Index (the United States scores 83), and Finns have long ranked as the world’s happiest people. The Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which guaranteed Austrian neutrality, by which Soviet and NATO troops withdrew from the country, also ensured that Austria developed as a successful and prosperous Western democracy.

Kyiv might learn from the Finnish example that surrendering some territory, though deeply painful, is still worth it if the greater part of the country thereby secures its independence and capacity for economic and political development. Hopefully, the strength of Ukrainian nationalism and the tough and united resistance of Ukrainians to Russia’s invasion have also persuaded Putin, as Stalin was persuaded by Finnish resistance, that his goal of turning the whole of Ukraine into a Russian client state is impossible.

This is already a great victory for Ukraine, not just in terms of Russia’s initial goals but the history of the past 300 years during which Russia has dominated Ukraine.

The government of Ukraine currently remains steadfast in its maximalist aims of recovering all of its internationally recognized territory, including Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014. Military reality, however, suggests that this goal is extremely unlikely to be achieved and that an agreement freezing the existing battle lines may well be the best that Kyiv can hope for, at least for the present.

On the other hand, if the war continues, Russia’s massive advantages in manpower, industry, and weapons production could lead to far more significant Ukrainian losses — just as Finland would likely have suffered complete disaster if it had continued to fight after March 1940 or September 1944.

Washington can do its part by not encouraging unrealistic war goals and thereby possibly exposing Ukraine to future disaster.

Ukraine has already won in key respects. Vladimir Putin has no hope of subjugating the whole of Ukraine as a vassal state in the foreseeable future. Kyiv is moving closer to the West and could be integrated into the European Union (EU) in the future. Moreover, Moscow’s actions have actually reinforced Ukrainian nationalism.

As with Finland, this national unity presents the best hope for Ukrainian independence.

Ukraine should take a page out of Finland’s fight with Stalin | Responsible Statecraft

By Tyler DURDEN

A top Finnish politician in the running to replace former Prime Minister Sanna Marin as leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) has sought to explain how he came to be photographed stark naked, save a balaclava and Santa hat, with a group of friends giving Hitler salutes.

Antti Lindtman, the current chairman of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group and a member of parliament for the Finnish district of Uusimaa, has admitted to being one of the individuals in a number of resurfaced photos taken when the 40-year-old politician was 18 years old.

The photographs, which show Lindtman and four other individuals posing in Santa hats and full face masks, equipped with replica firearms, and giving the Sieg Heil salute, have been circulated on social media and among the Finnish media since Tuesday. The SDP politician has now commented on the scandal via the Iltalehti tabloid newspaper.

“I am in the picture in the back with a plastic bullet gun in my hand,” Lindtman admitted.

“These pictures were not meant to be made public, mainly because we are scantily clad,” he told the newspaper, adding that the photographs had been uploaded to a private website more than a decade ago and that Lindtman had asked the site’s administrator to remove the images years ago.

The Finn said of those giving Nazi salutes that they had “obviously gone too far with posing,” and insisted the photographs were taken at a Christmas party for his high school film group when he was still a teenager.

“The pictures were taken as a thank you to those who helped us make a short film,” Lindtman told the Finnish tabloid newspaper.

“I wasn’t a Nazi sympathizer then, and I’m not now,” he insisted. “Even then, I could not have been in favor of the neo-Nazis because of my opinions.”

Lindtman took to Twitter on Wednesday accusing saboteurs of manipulating the photographs; however, there is no evidence the photograph has been doctored in any way, and the politician himself has admitted he participated in the photo shoot.

The SDP politician is considered the favorite to take over the chair of his party from outgoing leader Sanna Marin at the party congress in early September.

It is too soon to say whether this scandal will prove fatal for his political ambitions, but it’s safe to assume it won’t help.

Lindtman has been particularly outspoken in his criticism of the newly formed coalition government between the center-right National Coalition Party and the right-wing populist Finns Party.

He condemned Vilhelm Junnila, a member of the Finns Party who has already resigned as a minister of the coalition government after it was revealed he made Hitler jokes and spoke at an event attended by neo-Nazis.

“A country that sends a person known for Nazi sympathies to market Finland to international companies can cause itself genuine reputational harm and damage,” Lindtman tweeted last week.

zerohedge.com

By Medea BENJAMIN, Nicolas J.S. DAVIES

On April 4, 2023, Finland officially became the 31st member of the NATO military alliance. The 830-mile border between Finland and Russia is now by far the longest border between any NATO country and Russia, which otherwise borders only Norway, Latvia, Estonia, and short stretches of the Polish and Lithuanian borders where they encircle Kaliningrad.

In the context of the not-so-cold war between the US, NATO and Russia, any of these borders is a potentially dangerous flashpoint that could trigger a new crisis, or even a world war. But a key difference with the Finnish border is that it comes within about 100 miles of Severomorsk, where Russia’s Northern Fleet and 13 of its 23 nuclear-armed submarines are based. This could well be where World War III will begin, if it has not already started in Ukraine.

In Europe today, only Switzerland, Austria, Ireland and a handful of other small countries remain outside NATO. For 75 years, Finland was a model of successful neutrality, but it is far from demilitarized. Like Switzerland, it has a large military, and young Finns are required to perform at least six months of military training after they turn 18. Its active and reserve military forces make up over 4% of the population – compared with only 0.6% in the US and 83% of Finns say they would take part in armed resistance if Finland were invaded.

Russian invasion made Finland more pro-NATO

Only 20-30% of Finns have historically supported joining NATO, while the majority have consistently and proudly supported its policy of neutrality. In late 2021, a Finnish opinion poll measured popular support for NATO membership at 26%. But after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that jumped to 60% within weeks and, by November 2022, 78% of Finns said they supported joining NATO.

As in the US and other NATO countries, Finland’s political leaders have been more pro-NATO than the general public. Despite long-standing public support for neutrality, Finland joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1997. Its government sent 200 troops to Afghanistan as part of the UN-authorized International Security Assistance Force after the 2001 US invasion, and they remained there after NATO took command of this force in 2003. Finnish troops did not leave Afghanistan until all Western forces withdrew in 2021, after a total of 2,500 Finnish troops and 140 civilian officials had been deployed there, and two Finns had been killed.

A December 2022 review of Finland’s role in Afghanistan by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs found that the Finnish troops “repeatedly engaged in combat as part of the military operation that was now led by NATO and had become a party in the conflict,” and that Finland’s proclaimed objective, which was “to stabilize and support Afghanistan to enhance international peace and security” was outweighed by “its desire to maintain and strengthen its foreign and security policy relations with the US and other international partners, as well as its effort to deepen its collaboration with NATO.”

In other words, like other small NATO-allied countries, Finland was unable, in the midst of an escalating war, to uphold its own priorities and values, and instead allowed its desire “to deepen its collaboration” with the US and NATO to take precedence over its original aim of trying to help the people of Afghanistan to recover peace and stability. As a result of these confused and conflicting priorities, Finnish forces were drawn into the pattern of reflexive escalation and use of overwhelming destructive force that have characterized US military operations in all its recent wars.

As a small new NATO member, Finland will be just as impotent as it was in Afghanistan to affect the momentum of the NATO war machine’s rising conflict with Russia. Finland will find that its tragic choice to abandon a policy of neutrality that brought it 75 years of peace and look to NATO for protection will leave it, like Ukraine, dangerously exposed on the front lines of a war directed from Moscow, Washington and Brussels that it can neither win, nor independently resolve, nor prevent from escalating into World War III.

Finland’s success as a neutral and liberal democratic country during and since the Cold War has created a popular culture in which the public are more trusting of their leaders and representatives than people in most Western countries, and less likely to question the wisdom of their decisions. So the near unanimity of the political class to join NATO in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine faced little public opposition. In May 2022, Finland’s parliament approved joining NATO by an overwhelming 188 votes to eight.

The problematic nature of NATO membership

But why have Finland’s political leaders been so keen to “strengthen its foreign and security policy relations with the US and other international partners,” as the Finland in Afghanistan report said? As an independent, neutral, but strongly armed military nation, Finland already meets the NATO goal of spending 2% of its GDP on the military. It also has a substantial arms industry, which builds its own modern warships, artillery, assault rifles and other weapons.

NATO membership will integrate Finland’s arms industry into NATO’s lucrative arms market, boosting sales of Finnish weapons, while also providing a context to buy more of the latest US and allied weaponry for its own military and to collaborate on joint weapons projects with firms in larger NATO countries. With NATO military budgets increasing, and likely to keep increasing, Finland’s government clearly faces pressures from the arms industry and other interests. In effect, its own small military-industrial complex doesn’t want to be left out.

Since it began its NATO accession, Finland has already committed $10 billion to buy American F-35 fighters to replace its three squadrons of F-18s. It has also been taking bids for new missile defense systems, and is reportedly trying to choose between the Indian-Israeli Barak 8 surface-to-air missile system and the US-Israeli David’s Sling system, built by Israel’s Raphael and the US’s Raytheon.

Finnish law prohibits the country from possessing nuclear weapons or allowing them in the country, unlike the five NATO countries that store stockpiles of US nuclear weapons on their soil – Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Turkey. But Finland submitted its NATO accession documents without the exceptions that Denmark and Norway have insisted on to allow them to prohibit nuclear weapons. This leaves Finland’s nuclear posture uniquely ambiguous, despite President Sauli Niinistö’s promise that “Finland has no intention of bringing nuclear weapons onto our soil.”

The lack of discussion about the implications of Finland joining an explicitly nuclear military alliance is troubling, and has been attributed to an overly hasty accession process in the context of the war in Ukraine, as well as to Finland’s tradition of unquestioning popular trust in its national government.

Perhaps most regrettable is that Finland’s membership in NATO marks the end of the nation’s admirable tradition as a global peacemaker. Former Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, an architect of the policy of cooperation with the neighboring Soviet Union and a champion of world peace, helped craft the Helsinki Accords, a historic agreement signed in 1975 by the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada and every European nation (except Albania) to improve detente between the Soviet Union and the West.

Speaking at the UN in September 2021, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö seemed anxious to follow this legacy. “A willingness of adversaries and competitors to engage in dialogue, to build trust, and to seek common denominators – that was the essence of the Helsinki Spirit. It is precisely that kind of a spirit that the entire world, and the United Nations, urgently needs,” he said. “I am convinced that the more we speak about the Helsinki Spirit, the closer we get to rekindling it – and to making it come true.“

Of course, it was Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine that drove Finland to abandon the “Helsinki Spirit” in favor of joining NATO. But if Finland had resisted the pressures on it to rush into NATO membership, it could instead now be joining the “Peace Club” being formed by Brazilian President Lula to revive negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Sadly for Finland and the world, it looks like the Helsinki Spirit will have to move forward without Helsinki.

fairobserver.com