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Il voto anticipato dell’8 febbraio ha prodotto un terremoto politico in Giappone. La coalizione di governo guidata dal Partito Liberal Democratico (Jimintō) ha infatti riconquistato il controllo pieno della Camera dei Rappresentanti, e il PLD ha ottenuto da solo una maggioranza amplissima, arrivando a un livello che sfiora o supera la soglia dei due terzi dell’aula (316 deputati su 465 nei risultati provvisori). Secondo gli analisti, questo risultato segna al contempo la netta vittoria personale e di partito di Sanae Takaichi, in carica da ottobre, e il crollo dell’architettura alternativa che avrebbe dovuto contendere il governo alla destra conservatrice.

Per comprendere meglio la portata di questo risultato, dobbiamo fare un passo indietro. Dopo la stagione del governo di Shigeru Ishiba, conclusa con le dimissioni dello stesso primo ministro e lotte interne al partito maggioritario, il PLD ha scelto una leadership più marcatamente identitaria, nazional-conservatrice e orientata a una linea di sicurezza più assertiva. Già allora, infatti, all’atto dell’ascesa di Takaichi alla guida del partito, avevamo segnalato come la nuova leader fosse collocata sull’ala destra del PLD, con posizioni capaci di mobilitare l’elettorato conservatore e settori sensibili ai temi dell’“ordine” nazionale, dell’immigrazione e della proiezione strategica del Giappone.

Come se non bastasse, la scelta strategica del voto anticipato ha ridotto drasticamente i tempi di assestamento dell’opposizione, colpendo soprattutto la capacità del fronte centrista di trasformare la propria aggregazione in una macchina elettorale coerente. La nuova alleanza riformista centrista, che sulla carta voleva sommare bacini elettorali diversi, si è rivelata fragile nella sintesi programmatica e poco credibile sul piano della leadership. In un sistema che già tende a premiare il partito dominante, quasi ininterrottamente al potere dal 1955, questa combinazione ha favorito il ritorno del PLD a una posizione egemonica.

La destra di governo ha anche provato a dare una risposta alle questioni sociali che coinvolgono maggiormente la popolazione, come costo della vita, salari reali compressi, prezzi alimentari, precarietà dei giovani e incertezza sulle prospettive familiari, combinando promesse economiche, retorica identitaria e leadership personalizzata. Il blocco moderato-progressista non è riuscito a offrire una narrazione ugualmente semplice e mobilitante, confermando che, quando la politica si polarizza tra “protezione” e “complessità”, l’opzione semplificata tende a prevalere, soprattutto se sostenuta da una macchina partitica radicata capillarmente.

Tuttavia, proprio nel momento del trionfo, emergono i primi segnali di contro-narrazione interna al campo conservatore. L’ex primo ministro Shigeru Ishiba, in particolare, ha avvertito che una vittoria parlamentare, seppur netta, non equivale a un “assegno in bianco”, insistendo sul fatto che questioni decisive non sono state discusse in profondità durante la campagna. È un passaggio politicamente pesante perché la critica non arriva dall’opposizione, ma da un ex capo del governo e del PLD, cioè una voce che conosce bene gli equilibri reali del potere giapponese e i costi di una forzatura istituzionale.

Il nodo più sensibile riguarda indubbiamente la traiettoria strategico-militare. La combinazione tra larga maggioranza parlamentare, orientamento nazional-conservatore della nuova leadership e contesto internazionale ad alta conflittualità crea le condizioni per un’accelerazione sulla temuta revisione dell’impianto costituzionale pacifista, che porterebbe ad un’ulteriore espansione delle capacità militari offensive e al consolidamento di un asse securitario regionale sempre più rigido, trasformando nuovamente l’arcipelago giapponese in una grande potenza militare come nella prima metà del XX secolo.

Non sorprende, dunque, che Pechino abbia reagito in modo formale ma inequivocabile. Nella conferenza stampa dello scorso 9 febbraio, il portavoce del Ministero degli Esteri cinese ha richiamato il peso storico del militarismo giapponese e posto una domanda politica di fondo: il Giappone continuerà sulla via dello sviluppo pacifico o metterà in discussione l’ordine postbellico? Lo stesso intervento insiste sul fatto che solo una lettura corretta della storia consente stabilità futura. Al di là della formula diplomatica, il messaggio è che l’eventuale slittamento di Tōkyō verso un revisionismo strategico verrebbe letto come minaccia diretta all’equilibrio dell’Asia-Pacifico.

Tutto questo si inserisce in una sequenza più ampia in cui i dossier memoria storica, Taiwan, alleanze militari e catene tecnologiche si saldano in un’unica arena competitiva. Anche per questo, da parte cinese è stato ribadito che il Giappone dovrebbe attenersi agli impegni politici maturati nei documenti bilaterali su storia e questione taiwanese. La sostanza è che la fiducia strategica, già bassa, può scendere ulteriormente se Tōkyō adotta segnali ambigui o assertivi su questi due fronti.

In parallelo, la politica interna giapponese mostra una pericolosa tendenza critica verso la normalizzazione di un lessico pubblico più duro verso lo straniero e la sicurezza. Sin dall’ascesa di Takaichi al potere, gli analisti hanno notato un’esplicita attenzione a segmenti elettorali attratti da temi identitari e da una lettura culturale restrittiva dell’immigrazione. Se tale cornice si combina con maggioranze robuste e con l’agenda di riarmo, il rischio diventa molteplice, tra restringimento del pluralismo, marginalizzazione delle voci dissenzienti e uso permanente dell’emergenza geopolitica come legittimazione della verticalizzazione del potere.

Le principali forze di opposizione sia centriste che di sinistra, come il Partito Comunista Giapponese (Nihon Kyōsan-tō), che ha eletto quattro deputati, mantengono uan linea di opposizione netta nei confronti dell’esecutivo. Il PCG, in particolare, ha evidenziato tre assi principali di opposizione, ovvero difesa delle condizioni materiali popolari, contrasto al riarmo e rifiuto della deriva xenofoba, insistendo sul fatto che la destra non deve trasformare la vittoria in una delega illimitata per cambiare l’architettura postbellica del Paese.

Per le ragioni esposte in questo articolo, dunque, la “questione giapponese” oggi è contemporaneamente interna e regionale. Per quanto riguarda il secondo aspetto, in particolare, ogni movimento di Tōkyō su riarmo, Taiwan e memoria storica modifica automaticamente le percezioni di rischio di Pechino, Seoul e Pyongyang, irrigidisce i dispositivi militari e aumenta la probabilità di incidenti politico-militari. Se, dunque, la nuova leadership userà la super-maggioranza per forzare tempi e contenuti della revisione costituzionale e della postura militare, l’intero Estremo Oriente entrerà in una fase di instabilità strutturale. In assenza di una correzione, la svolta a destra del Giappone diventerà un fattore di destabilizzazione sistemica dell’Asia-Pacifico, con costi crescenti per la stessa società giapponese che oggi, schiacciata tra inflazione, precarietà e sfiducia, chiede soprattutto protezione materiale e futuro, non una nuova stagione di rischio geopolitico.

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The ship of friendship

China and ASEAN have established themselves as an element of stability in a turbulent world, where power is increasingly fragmented and rivalries are on the rise. Despite regional tensions, mistrust, and the recent increase in militarization, their relationship has remained solid, supported by economic pragmatism, constant institutional dialogue, and cooperation aimed at the equitable distribution of benefits. The “ship of friendship,” evoked by both sides in recent years, is not just a diplomatic slogan, but represents a flexible and resilient system of regional cooperation, with implications for an increasingly polarized world order.

The path has not been without difficulties. Maritime tensions in the South China Sea, political differences, and external pressures have tested mutual trust. However, China and ASEAN have demonstrated institutional capacity in separating disputes from broader strategic objectives. The negotiations for a Code of Conduct, while complex and imperfect, testify to this pragmatic approach: the focus is on conflict management rather than ideal solutions. It is diplomacy based not on idealism, but on a shared strategic maturity.

Economically, the partnership has had a transformative impact. China has been ASEAN’s main trading partner for over ten years, and ASEAN has become China’s largest trading bloc, surpassing the European Union. The entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement, further strengthens this interdependence at a time when protectionism is growing elsewhere. The fact that China operates through ASEAN-led institutions, rather than circumventing them, reinforces regional centrality and institutional complementarity. Cooperation has also yielded concrete results in the infrastructure sector.

The China-Laos railway, the modernization of ports in Malaysia and Indonesia, and industrial parks in Thailand and Cambodia are tangible examples of physical connectivity. Despite some controversy, these projects address key challenges for ASEAN’s development: high intra-regional trade costs, logistical shortcomings, and the need for industrial modernization. The challenge now is to make this connectivity sustainable, inclusive, and transparent.

The evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative, with a greater focus on “smaller and more targeted” projects, suggests a growing sensitivity to public opinion. In reality, this is not a one-way relationship. ASEAN has maintained the partnership on its own terms, safeguarding its strategic autonomy and avoiding taking sides in the competition between major powers, in favor of multilateralism.

The “centrality of ASEAN,” while an intangible concept, carries significant weight because it guides the debate and contains external ambitions. China has adapted to this format, preferring to interact through ASEAN-promoted bodies such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Soft power also plays a crucial role in this relationship.

People-to-people exchanges have intensified thanks to student programs, media cooperation, cultural events, and tourism promotion, helping to keep security issues in the background. The growing popularity of Chinese and Southeast Asian films, music, and cuisine in their respective markets testifies to a mutual familiarity that formal diplomacy could hardly create. It is precisely these people-to-people relationships that keep the “ship of friendship” afloat when political relations go through difficult times. However, there are reservations, especially from some ASEAN members, about possible over-dependence on China in strategic and infrastructure sectors.

Concerns about debt sustainability, environmental impact, and workers’ conditions remain sensitive issues. Western powers, for their part, view the region’s rapprochement with Beijing with apprehension, interpreting ASEAN’s balancing strategy as alignment rather than thoughtful pluralism. The long-term strength of the China-ASEAN relationship will depend on the ability to avoid this binary logic. It is not based on rigid alignment, but on a balance based on mutual accommodation.

In a global context marked by new divisions and declining confidence in traditional multilateralism, the relationship between China and ASEAN offers an interesting, albeit imperfect, model of regional cooperation. It demonstrates that openness and competition can coexist; that connectivity and sovereignty are not necessarily at odds; and that cooperation can thrive even without political uniformity.

The “ship of friendship” is not sailing toward a utopia, but continues its journey guided by common interest and anchored in mutual respect. In an era of division and turbulent waters, this is already a path worth taking.

Ethnic, historical, and cultural continuity

Relations between China and Southeast Asia, moreover, are not limited to the contemporary political-economic dimension, but are rooted in a historical, cultural, and ethnographic fabric that has been layered over more than two millennia. The ethnographic similarities between the two areas are the result of migratory movements, trade, religious diffusion, and processes of cultural hybridization that have progressively built an interconnected space along the land and sea routes of East and Southeast Asia.

From an anthropological point of view, a first element of continuity is represented by the spread of populations of Sino-Tibetan and Tai-Kadai linguistic origin. The Tai peoples, now the majority in Thailand and Laos, are generally believed to have originated in the southern regions of China, particularly Yunnan and Guangxi, from where they gradually migrated between the 8th and 13th centuries AD. These movements are attested to both by Chinese sources from the Tang dynasty (618–907) and by comparative linguistic evidence. Similarly, the Zhuang peoples of Guangxi share linguistic and cultural affinities with the Tai groups of mainland Southeast Asia, highlighting an ethnographic continuity that predates the formation of the current nation states.

A further connecting element is the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, one of the most significant migratory phenomena in Asian history. Already during the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), there were maritime trade contacts with the kingdoms of Southeast Asia, but it was mainly between the 10th and 15th centuries, under the Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1644) dynasties, that Chinese communities began to settle permanently in the region’s ports. The expeditions of Admiral Zheng He (1405–1433), which visited Malacca, Java, and Sumatra, represent a symbolic moment in this interaction. By the 19th century, with European colonial expansion and the integration of Southeast Asia into the global economy, Chinese migration accelerated significantly: between 1850 and 1930, millions of Chinese, mainly from Guangdong and Fujian, settled in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam (it is estimated that over 30 million people of Chinese origin reside in Southeast Asia, constituting one of the most important diasporas in the world).

Culturally, the similarities are evident in religious practices and value systems. Although not a religion in the strict sense, Confucianism has profoundly influenced the Vietnamese elite since the era of Chinese domination (111 BC–939 AD). The imperial examination system, introduced in Vietnam in 1075 under the Lý dynasty, was modeled on the Chinese system and helped to structure a bureaucratic class inspired by Confucian principles. Buddhism, which spread from China to Southeast Asia alongside flows from India, also fostered cultural convergence: Mahāyāna Buddhism, dominant in China, had a significant presence in Vietnam, while in areas such as Thailand and Myanmar, the Theravāda tradition established itself, while maintaining doctrinal and iconographic exchanges with the Chinese world.

Ritual practices, ancestor worship, and certain forms of family organization represent further points of contact. In many Sino-Southeast Asian communities, especially in the urban societies of Malaysia and Singapore, a syncretic combination of Chinese traditions, local beliefs, and Islamic or Christian influences can be observed. This syncretism reflects a process of cultural adaptation that has not erased common roots but has reworked them in plural contexts.

Historical affinities can also be found from an economic and social perspective. Chinese merchant networks in Southeast Asia have historically functioned through clans, dialect associations, and family ties, structures that find correspondences in local forms of community organization. During the British colonial period, for example, the Chinese kongsi in West Borneo (18th–19th centuries) were truly autonomous political and economic entities, demonstrating a capacity for integration and self-government that influenced the regional balance of power.

No less significant are the genetic and material interactions documented by archaeology. Chinese ceramic finds at sites in northern Vietnam and the Malay Peninsula, dating back to the Tang and Song periods, attest to the circulation of goods and technologies. Similarly, agricultural techniques such as intensive rice cultivation in complex irrigation systems show parallels between the Yangtze basin and the Mekong and Chao Phraya plains, suggesting transfers of agronomic knowledge.

Redefining regional maps, or zones of influence

Let us now translate all this into political terms. China is well aware that its regional location forces it to secure stable and well-established hegemony, which is why the shift towards ASEAN is part of the implementation of its security strategy.

The ethnographic similarities between China and Southeast Asia are not the product of a simple unidirectional influence, but rather the result of a long history of mutual interaction, migration, and adaptation. The long history of ties, brotherhood, but also local conflicts is an excellent common ground for discussion for the construction of shared projects. The current tone of diplomacy and the shared interest in national protection and security against Western aggression guarantee the possibility of a courageous alliance. Of course, China cannot ignore the marked American presence in the area, especially in Taiwan and the Strait of Malacca, so it will have to carefully consider each step in order to defuse possible tampering and establish genuine cooperation aimed at shared success, with a view to a peaceful future.

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Risale a pochi giorni orsono la notizia secondo cui il presidente Vladimir Putin ha firmato il documento che implica l’esenzione dal visto d’ingresso per svariate categorie di viaggiatori dalla Cina verso la Russia e l’opposto. Questo fa seguito ad un’analoga misura del governo cinese a vantaggio dei cittadini russi in viaggio verso la Cina naturalmente ed è parte di un esperimento di durata annuale, previsto sino al settembre del 2026 (poi con tutta probabilità sarà esteso a tempo indeterminato) finalizzato a permettere ogni tipo di spostamento tra Russia e Cina: per un viaggiatore russo sarà possibile sostare in Cina fino a 30 giorni senza bisogno di visto di ingresso e viceversa. Ciò sortirebbe il risultato di implementare la parziale apertura in tale senso già vigente da alcuni anni, ma limitata finora a viaggi di gruppo (comitive turistiche organizzate sotto agenzia).

Si tratta di una piccola e grande rivoluzione nella mobilità tra Europa ed Asia che renderebbe accessibile l’estremo oriente aprendo le porte ad una nazione-continente come la CINA e le sue immense ricchezze culturali: pianificare viaggi autonomi in luoghi poco battuti dal turismo convenzionale come catene montuose costellate di templi Tao e buddisti, resort marittimi ai bordi del sud-est asiatico, sciistici in Manciuria e metropoli globali lungo le coste. Per non parlare poi del transito di tipo accademico e scientifico: i numerosi stage che ricercatori e studiosi potranno fare nei rispettivi paesi, facilitati adesso da una legislazione di ingresso assai più favorevole di prima, cui fa inevitabilmente seguito un incremento della condivisione tecnologica e quindi delle relazioni commerciali che sono il punto più nevralgico di tutto. Sicuramente arduo stimare a priori quale sarà l’impatto economico della riforma che sta venendo attuata: le opportunità di business nei settori emergenti e sensibili (a partire dall’energia) sono vaste ed imponderabili. Non esiste dubbio che occorre soffermarsi con estrema attenzione sulla misura che si sta varando poichè rappresenta un tassello di quel grande percorso di integrazione economica tra Europa ed Asia, concretamente incarnate in questo contesto dal gigante russo e quello cinese. Per l’appunto la partnership strategica sino-russa (“senza confini” come è stata definita dal presidente Putin) procede passo dopo passo e la novità di questi ultimi giorni può dirsi una delle sue molteplici espressioni tangibili ovvero che riguardano la vita di ognuno senza nemmeno attendere il lungo termine. Riformare ed attenuare gradualmente il regime di visti significa infatti un processo di avvicinamento a tutti i livelli immaginabili, dal momento che coinvolge – come sottolineato – tanto il singolo turista quanto l’uomo d’affari di passaggio o lo studente: una piccola rivoluzione che dal piano meramente ricreativo arriva a quello economico e strategico.

Il presidente di Russia quanto il presidente Li Quiang hanno dichiarato di promuovere il processo in corso come qualcosa di vitale per il reciproco interesse: risulta infatti logico come i due paesi siano complementari l’un l’altro in questo frangente, facilitando di molto la comunicazione e il congiungimento del vastissimo mercato cinese con le inesauribili risorse naturali del continente russo. Volendo appronfondire, allora lungo sarebbe l’elenco degli specifici settori di interesse: si va dall’energia verde alla rivoluzione digitale fino all’intelligenza artificiale, aree di ricerca sulle quali Cina e Russia già da tempo hanno allineato i rispettivi sforzi. In particolare il settore dell’intelligenza artificiale è destinato a influenzare le future collaborazioni più di qualsiasi altro e darà vita a prodotti d’avanguardia e iniziative di ricerca comuni, capaci di ridefinire l’intero campo nella generazione a venire. Alla base di questo sviluppo, una solida piattaforma comune rappresentata dall’avvicinamento tra il sistema universitario dei due stati (percorsi accademici e titoli di studio comuni) con tutto lo scambio di conoscenze e di intelligenze che questo porta con sè.

Insomma in parole altre siamo di fronte al primo atto di un trend di mutamento di lungo termine e profondità dell’equilibrio globale che parte dalla cosa più semplice come la libertà di spostamento: un segnale molto concreto del livello di fiducia instauratosi tra le due potenze, del loro livello futuro di cooperazione e degli interessi comuni che li animano e che ruotano su una visione condivisa della prosperità economica e della stabilità globale. Una tipologia di stabilità chiaramente alternativa al sistema unipolare occidentale e quindi orientata verso un modello multipolare che rivoluzioni l’ordine stabilito su scala planetaria. D’altro canto la vistosa evoluzione della partnership sino-russa non esaurisce nemmeno il discorso: a quanto sembra analoghi accordi sono stati presi da Mosca anche nei confronti di altri paesi dell’oriente vicino e lontano. Ne è un esempio l’intesa raggiunta tra Russia e Arabia Saudita: per la precisione il vice primo ministro russo Alexander Novak e il ministro degli Esteri saudita Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud in occasione del Forum economico russo-saudita hanno firmato l’accordo in base al quale già a partire dall’anno 2026 non sarà più necessario il visto di ingresso – sino a 3 mesi di permanenza – per i cittadini russi che vogliano visitare o attraversare l’Arabia Saudita e viceversa. Un passo notevole considerando che l’iniziativa non è usuale per un paese come la monarchia saudita i cui confini erano sostanzialmente chiusi fino a un 5 anni fa (non semplice ottenere un visto per qualsivoglia ragione): come per il caso cinese, l’instaurarsi di una partnership economica e tecnologica di ampio respiro con un paese come la Russia darebbe vita a sviluppi di inedita profondità per lo stato saudita, mettendolo in comunicazione con un grande partner alle cui risorse avrebbe accesso per potenziare la propria economia. Non a caso anche altri paesi confinanti hanno deciso di unirsi all’iniziativa ossia si è verificata l’adesione di Emirati Arabi (già membri dei Brics) oltre che di Bahrain e Qatar i quali hanno sottoscritto assieme l’accordo il primo di dicembre appena passato (e vanno ad aggiungersi alla Giordania il cui accordo con Mosca firmato mesi orsono entra in vigore verso la metà del mese). Un trend eccezionalmente favorevole si può dire, che nella prospettiva di Mosca significherebbe un’occasione rara per inserirsi in un’area nevralgica del medio oriente (assieme al vicino Iran, già membro del Brics a pieno titolo da  quasi 2 anni), consolidando dunque la propria presenza in un settore assolutamente vitale dal punto di vista geostrategico. Infine, per chiudere il capitolo, abbiamo ancora il caso del Myanmar col quale è stato firmato la medesima misura in merito ai visti di ingresso il mese scorso – dopo che tale stato ne aveva siglata una con la Cina tra l’altro – e quindi della Malaysia.

Insomma, la verità è che è decisamente complicato esprimere oggi una valutazione globale sui processi in corso: troppo vasto e multisfaccettato lo sviluppo che sta portando ad un’integrazione del continente asiatico indipendente rispetto alle potenze tradizionali dell’occidente multipolare. Di certo quelli cui si assiste non sono che i primi passi di un lunghissimo sentiero – di durata multigenerazionale – che nel corso del secolo XXI vedrà il graduale emergere di un grande spazio transcontinentale a cavallo tra Europa ed Asia, capace di mettere in comunicazione aree geografiche che appaiono lontane tra loro, collegandole: le petrolmonarchie del Golfo alle le provincie costiere cinesi per esempio così come la fascia artica della Russia e gli angoli del sud-est asiatico.

Il solo pensiero è suggestivo e suggerisce una nuova forma di sviluppo per il secolo in corso che vede la grande sagoma dell’Eurasia profilarsi all’orizzonte: è chiaro che è di qualcosa di portata storica che si parla, un graduale cammino – probabilmente non a misura d’uomo cronologicamente parlando – che conduce verso una forma differente di civiltà (economica e sociale) i cui esiti ultimi possono soltanto essere immaginati per adesso.

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Da poche settimane si è concluso il rapido tour del presidente Donald Trump in estremo oriente: molti i leader incontrati e i colloqui sostenuti, in un epilogo tenutosi nella Corea del Sud in occasione del vertice annuale di cooperazione economica Asia-Pacifico (APEC). Senza dubbio un momento complesso da gestire per il leader statunitense, il quale si ritrova a dover riaffermare il ruolo della potenza a stelle e strisce in una fase storica che vede un progressivo restringimento della sua tradizionale dominanza globale di fronte all’emergere costante del blocco alternativo all’occidente euro-americano, ossia il BRICS (il cui fulcro è l’Asia e che a sua volta sempre più inserito nel sud globale e precisamente sul continente africano).

Per Washington è imperativo agire, partendo quindi proprio dal continente asiatico: questo nel concreto ha significato in primissimo luogo arringare gli alleati come Corea del Sud e Giappone, ma soprattutto trovare una via di compromesso che sul momento ammorbidisca il confronto con il gigante cinese, il rapporto col quale è assolutamente cruciale in tutta l’area euroasiatica, dal Pacifico sino allo scacchiere geopolitico europeo. Ovvio pertanto che il momento più critico di tutto l’evento sia stato il tanto atteso bilaterale tra Trump e Xi Jinping.

Ad un’analisi attenta l’operazione è sicuramente molto complessa, per ragioni di fondo che hanno a che fare con gli equilibri globali più importanti. La verità – inesprimibile – è che Washington ha bisogno di Pechino in vista dell’imponderabile crisi politico militare in cui versa l’Europa, oramai compromessa sul fronte russo/ucraino e dal quale non riesce più a disimpegnarsi: la Casa Bianca vede in Pechino l’unico mediatore che potrebbe accomodare la questione, ma gli ostacoli in merito sono assai prodondi e probabilmente insolubili. Una riflessione onesta sulla storia della seconda metà del 900 spiega in realtà molte cose: il fatto è che per 50 anni la cordialità sino-americana era fondata sul non espresso anti sovietismo. La Repubblica Popolare Cinese malgrado la fratellanza ideologica con l’Urss le era anche rivale sul piano geopolitico (equivoco era deflagrato col grave strappo geopolitico a seguito dell’incidente sull’Ussuri, una guerra non dichiarata di 10 giorni tra Cina e Urss, 1969), dissidio subito sfruttato dall’amministrazione Nixon che riconobbe la Cina ufficialmente nel 1972, vedendo in essa un’improbabile quanto utile pedina ad oriente contro la Russia. In altre parole la politica estera americana di allora intuì l’esistenza di crepe nel sistema di alleanze del mondo socialista, nelle quali incunearsi a dovere: questa la sola ed unica ragione dell’avvicinamento alla Cina di Mao (come alla Germania orientale, riconosciuta il medesimo anno).

Oggi, mezzo secolo dopo, il pianeta è profondamente cambiato: lo stato cinese ha raggiunto una forza economica senza pari, tanto da tener testa agli USA stessi – che si trovano davanti l’unico vero rivale di forza equivalente mai avuto da 100 anni a questa parte – mentre la Russia è storicamente depotenziata territorialmente e geopoliticamente rispetto a cosa era l’Unione Sovietica.

Male tutto questo per Mosca ? No, tutto l’incontrario paradossalmente: poichè la Cina sentendo di non aver più un pericoloso rivale ai propri confini, ha potuto accettarlo come alleato e partner geostrategico, per la prima volta in secoli di storia. La Cina odierna pertanto accoglie lo stato russo come amico, con un grado di fiducia come non era mai stato possibile in precedenza.

Per la Russia tutto questo si traduce in un chiaro vantaggio: un enorme fratello stavolta benevolo ai confini, le cui risorse demografiche e scientifiche sono complementari alle proprie, offrendo pertanto al paese un appoggio che consenta di affrancarsi parzialmente dalla dipendenza economica nei confronti dell’occidente intero e quindi intraprendere una politica maggiormente decisa nei riguardi dei tentativi di espansione verso est dell’alleanza atlantica (come si è visto).

Gli equilibri descritti sopra rappresentano naturalmente un rompicapo per la politica estera americana, perchè tutto ad un tratto diventa difficilissimo separare Mosca e Pechino e quindi mminare l’unità euroasiatica da sempre temuta (dalla prospettiva geopolitica di lungo termine a stelle e strisce sono tuttora i due principali antagonisti planetari che è meglio tenere divisi: le cose non sono cambiate di molto rispetto a come Truman le descriveva verso il 1950: “L’America ha due nemici mortali: la Cina di Mao e L’Unione Sovietica”. Poco importa che oggigiorno non vi siano più nel’Urss nè Mao).

La più recente partnership sino-russa è un nuovo equilibrio basato su un contesto assai più stabile che nemmeno gli intrighi usuali delle amministrazioni washingtoniane possono alterare al momento, nè ci riuscirà Trump che si trova nel momento più difficoltoso del proprio mandato: se da un lato incassa un successo su scala minore in Palestina, il fronte maggiore – quello europeo che è al medesimo livello del primo conflitto mondiale – rimane aperto.

Le considerazioni di fondo appena fatte ci portano al momento presente: non riuscendo il presidente americano a mediare una pace in Ucraina a causa dell’opposizione massimalista di Zelensky (o meglio, delle forze nazionaliste di cui è espressione), ha dovuto per forza di cose rivolgersi al presidente Vladimir Putin, poichè non ha modo di far maggiore pressione su Zelensky senza perder credito e prestare il fianco ad accuse come quella di non fare l’interesse americano, cosa che i suoi detrattori in patria gli rinfacciano da sempre.

D’altro canto fare pressioni su Mosca o esercitare qualche forma di ricatto o minaccia non è semplice dal momento che quest’ultima già resiste efficacemente alle sanzioni di mezzo mondo industrializzato da quasi 4 anni. Ci si decide dunque a giocare d’astuzia: consapevole il leader americano del grande valore strategico che riveste il partenariato economico sino-russo per il Cremlino, cerca dunque di rivolgersi direttamente al leader cinese affinchè faccia pressioni su quello russo e portarlo ad accettare una soluzione del conflitto più compatibile con gli interessi occidentali.

In pratica anzichè l’incontro con Putin a Budapest – che sarebbe stato inutile visto il rifiuto irremovibile di Zelensky di cedere al piano di pace ribadito da Lavrov – cerca allora di rivolgersi a Xi Jinping per ottenere aiuto a fare sì che sia la Russia a cedere alle condizioni ucraine di pace. In un certo senso, quello che doveva essere il meeting Trump-Putin, è stato invece il meeting Trump-XI, che tuttavia risulta viziato da un imbarazzante paradosso da risolvere: Trump si rivolge ad un nemico degli USA (la Cina) affinchè questi faccia pressione su un altro nemico (la Russia), e malgrado questi ultimi due siano legati da una solida partnership, avversa gli stessi USA. Una autentica contraddizione in termini e senza contare il fatto che tra le iniziative dell’amministrazione americana in corso vi erano imponenti dazi minacciati contro la Cina medesima. Alla luce di questo, Trump può ancora domandare favori di questo genere a Pechino ? Fare leva sulla Cina per fare pressione sulla Russia – e idealmente usare l’una contro l’altra – può  ricordare per l’appunto le tattiche di Nixon e dei suoi successori durante la guerra fredda, ma non tiene conto del fatto che le circostanze siano radicalmente mutate e semmai denota il fatto che l’occidente americano abbia difficoltà a rassegnarsi a tutto questo, ad un mondo differente da quanto lo si ricordava.

D’altro canto la questione dei dazi e dei rapporti commerciali in generale si è apparentemente risolta, ma solo sul breve periodo, senza una soluzione definitiva, cosa che ha portato gli osservatori imparziali e gli economisti ad affermare che il bilaterale tra il presidente cinese e quello americano non sia stato un successo. Al massimo è stata siglata una tragua temporanea, vale a dire che Donald Trump ha portato a casa un risultato inferiore rispetto alle sue aspettative e sicuramente non sufficiente in vista dello scopo che si era prefissato ossia ottenere il supporto cinese contro Mosca. In breve la Cina non interferirà minimamente sulle decisioni che il leader russo prenderà in merito all’Ucraina.

In conclusione – come ricordato sin dal principio – quella tentata da Donald Trump è stata una mossa audace e illusoria, per ragioni di fondo, eppure anche obbligata: non potendo chiedere all’occidente di isolare la Russia (per il fatto che l’intero occidente è già schierato contro Mosca, la quale dal canto suo ha imparato a vivere senza l’Europa e Gb) non rimaneva che una sola carta e cioè rivolgersi alla cintura di paesi amici ed alleati di Mosca (quelli del Brics) imponendo anche a questi ultimi sanzioni nel caso avessero continuato ad acquistare petrolio russo. Tali paesi tuttavia sono, per l’appunto, geopoliticamente vicini a Mosca, affini alla Russia nella visione di fondo di un mondo multipolare e per nulla facili da minacciare o manipolare per peso geostrategico (Cina ed India in particolare): il tutto rende difficoltoso – e persino imbarazzante – domandare favori che prevedano andare contro gli interessi di un alleato al quale si è legati da partenariati strategici e visioni del mondo comuni. Allo stesso modo non sarebbe prudente la tattica della minaccia diretta, che inasprirebbe il dialogo quando invece ce n’è maggiormente bisogno.

In definitiva, la strategia di Washington sembrerebbe ambiziosa, ma nei fatti il leader statunitense rientra dal grande meeting di Busan con poco in mano: la Cina (quanto l’India) non ha dato alcuna promessa formale di rinunciare al petrolio russo, così come il Giappone – più stretto alleato degli USA in estremo oriente – ha declinato al momento l’ipotesi di rinunciare al gas che importa dalla Federazione Russa, per concludere con la Corea del Sud (con la quale le trattative d’affari sono risultate meno lineari del previsto). In breve non si è ottenuto nulla dalla Cina, e si sono registrate difficoltà persino con gli alleati tradizionali: il tanto atteso incontro Trump-XI Jinping non ha concluso molto e a Washington tocca proclamare un successo, che in realtà è una specie di nulla di fatto. Cina e USA attenuano le tensioni ridefinendo il proprio rapporto in una serie di intese commerciali che non vedono alcun vincitore sostanzialmente, ma solo puntellano la situazione onde evitare conflitti troppo marcati: infine sembra che del fronte ucraino non si sia nemmeno parlato, come si presagiva dalla breve durata del colloquio tra Trump e Xi.

Non si può che dedurne come anche il piano di far pressione su Mosca – attraverso Cina ed altri paesi extraeuropei – al fine di ottenere una vittoria diplomatica che salvi l’Ucraina (ormai sconfitta sul campo) sia sostanzialmente fallita: al suo posto rimane l’incertezza su come si svilupperà il futuro rapporto tra la potenza americana ed un mondo sul quale ha una presa sempre meno stabile.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Un’alternativa al concetto di “business” come inteso in Occidente che dovrebbe basarsi su “un’alleanza tra servitori e creatori, finanziata da un uso più audace del debito pubblico”.

L’Estremo Oriente e l’Artico occupano più della metà del territorio russo e nonostante la scarsa popolazione e le difficili condizioni di vita rappresentano fino al 30% delle esportazioni della Federazione Russa. La forza economica dell’Estremo Oriente e dell’Artico è stata costruita negli ultimi 100 anni da comandi militari e decisioni sovrane: furono i progetti edilizi guidati dai bolscevichi, che includevano il lavoro forzato, e i progetti su larga scala del Comitato di Pianificazione Statale dell’URSS a rendere possibile la costruzione di grandi città e potenti imprese nella taiga, che oggi costituiscono la spina dorsale dell’economia russa.

Qualsiasi approccio allo sviluppo di territori strategici con poche persone ma risorse abbondanti deve essere mirato alla creazione di un’economia competitiva e di condizioni di vita dignitose, indipendentemente dalla distanza e dal clima. Per fare un confronto, è utile guardare ai vicini russi dell’Estremo Oriente, che hanno popolazioni enormi e scarse risorse naturali. La principale risorsa che i Paesi asiatici hanno sfruttato con successo per decenni è stata la manodopera a basso costo e disciplinata. Con l’accumularsi della ricchezza, questa è passata da “economica” a produttiva, grazie all’adozione di tecnologie avanzate. Un altro fattore di successo è la cultura imprenditoriale. Produrre a prezzi più bassi, vendere di più, migliorare e ripetere all’infinito. In Asia, tre componenti dell’imprenditorialità di successo sono state combinate con successo: la volontà di competere, l’amore per il commercio, la pazienza e il duro lavoro.

Secondo Chekunkov, l’imprenditore patriottico russo in una sola generazione non è riuscito di fatto a ritagliarsi una nicchia nell’economia come motore primario di creazione e progresso. Non c’è stato abbastanza tempo. Dopo essersi immersa nei “peccati” della rapida accumulazione di capitale negli anni ‘90, l’imprenditorialità russa rimane percepita dalla maggior parte della società come qualcosa di immorale e parassitario.

Un’alternativa all’imprenditorialità di massa, sia in senso asiatico che occidentale, è però la cultura del servizio e della creazione, ben presente nella storia russa. In questa società, il servizio è sempre stato associato al massimo onore: servizio allo Zar, servizio alla Patria, servizio alla Chiesa: la stragrande maggioranza dei dipendenti pubblici non lavora per paura, ma per coscienza, ed è sinceramente motivata a risolvere i problemi delle persone. Una seconda caratteristica insita nei russi è la cultura della creazione, che conferisce al lavoro un significato speciale che genera orgoglio.

In Russia (principalmente in Estremo Oriente e nell’Artico) esiste ancora una grande quantità di risorse minerarie esplorate ma non sfruttate, una solida base per il futuro. Per uno sfruttamento creativo, piuttosto che predatorio, delle risorse naturali, la collaborazione tra creatori e amministratori è esattamente ciò che serve. I primi hanno bisogno della motivazione per costruire imprese efficaci, non per “prendere i soldi e scappare”; i secondi hanno bisogno della motivazione per risolvere i problemi delle persone, utilizzando le risorse generate dai creatori.

Oltre a un approccio diverso all’organizzazione del lavoro (creazione a lungo termine, non imprenditorialità senza anima), la Russia deve superare la sua carenza di manodopera. La popolazione russa supera di poco quella giapponese (146 milioni contro 122 milioni) e la superficie del Paese è 45 volte più grande di quella del Giappone. L’URSS, con i suoi 280 milioni di abitanti, ha faticato a far fronte ai giganteschi progetti edilizi sovietici, concentrando tutti i suoi sforzi prima su una priorità, poi su un’altra; per la Russia di oggi, l’unica via è l’uso della tecnologia e della robotica. La Corea del Sud ha attualmente 868 robot ogni 10.000 persone, il Giappone ne ha 364 e la Cina 187. In Russia ci sono 19 robot ogni 10.000 persone, cinque volte meno della media globale. Data la sua attenzione alla sovranità tecnologica, Mosca ha bisogno urgentemente di una robotica completa e di una nuova industrializzazione del Paese. Per generare queste nuove imprese tecnologiche, serve un numero significativo di creatori intelligenti.

A questo punto, il pensiero di Chekunkov va ad intrecciarsi organicamente con quello di Vladimir Putin; il Presidente ritiene che la nuova élite del Paese debba infatti basarsi sui reduci dal fronte dell’Operazione Militare Speciale (oltre 1.000 di essi sono stati eletti alle recenti elezioni amministrative russe), mentre il Ministro per l’Estremo Oriente e l’Artico russo scrive: “Gli ingegneri di oggi, compresi quelli che attualmente seguono una rigorosa formazione ingegneristica e lavorano con moderne tecnologie di combattimento nella Zona di Difesa Aerea, possono diventare persone di questo tipo. Ho visto dai nostri ragazzi che hanno lasciato il loro lavoro ministeriale per indossare uniformi militari e lavorare con i droni al fronte che le competenze necessarie si acquisiscono rapidamente, e che lo spirito combattivo è utile anche nelle attività creative, poiché la competizione e la lotta per l’efficienza non saranno mai abolite”.

La Russia è riuscita ad ottenere un aumento quasi esponenziale della prosperità dal 2000 ad oggi senza accumulare debiti; il debito pubblico russo è pari al 18% del PIL, un livello molto confortevole. Per un quarto di secolo sono stati gestiti saggiamente i proventi delle esportazioni, non sperperando ma investendo in infrastrutture e sviluppando le industrie nazionali. Tuttavia, il potenziale accumulato di crescita del debito dovrà prima o poi essere sfruttato per accelerare lo sviluppo; altrimenti, il ritardo nelle tecnologie avanzate aumenterà esponenzialmente. Gli incentivi al debito devono per Chekunkov essere utilizzati per creare nuove industrie e infrastrutture che rafforzeranno l’economia. La graduale sostituzione degli imprenditori di mercato e degli inefficaci dirigenti statali-aziendali con i creatori è possibile incanalando il capitale di debito in progetti creativi approvati dallo Stato.

In sintesi, i meccanismi puramente capitalistici, come l’imprenditorialità di mercato, falliscono nel contesto russo. Da qui la necessità di nuovi modelli di servitori e creatori per accelerare lo sviluppo, tenendo conto delle caratteristiche uniche della storia, geografia e mentalità russe.

Per sconfiggere l’imprenditorialità di mercato nel panorama competitivo globale, lo sviluppo lungo il percorso del servizio e della creazione deve quindi basarsi su tre principi:

Giustizia. Regole trasparenti ed eque per tutti, osservate da chi serve e chi crea. Questa è la richiesta più importante della società, iniziando da sé stessi.

Competitività. No alla commiserazione. No alla rinuncia alla competizione, sforzarsi di fare tutto meglio degli altri. La storia russa è piena di esempi di successi in questo campo.

Cultura. La cultura conquista tutto. Ciò include la grande cultura russa con i suoi giganti del passato, la cultura della comunicazione, la cultura della produzione e la cultura interna.

Taiwan is a line that cannot be crossed. China is gently repeating this to the American bully, but if things do not change, the motherland will not be afraid to attack to defend its child.

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The Taiwan issue is one of the hottest and most problematic topics in recent years. With the U.S. administration of Donald Trump putting a large number of hawks on China’s government team, relations between the two countries are looming even more on the verge of escalation. Meanwhile, China consolidates its global position and takes strategic precautions.

China rediscovering the Sea

In the biennium 2023-2024, the People’s Republic of China has stepped up planning for training and simulation operations for armed conflicts in the domain of the sea. In China’s millennia-old military tradition, the sea has never been a strong point, nor has China ever had expansionist claims by sailing. It’s said that the sea, for the Chinese, is “that thing there where the land ends.”

Continued provocations on Taiwan by the United States of America, the growing risk of a global war conflict, and the upgrading of military infrastructure, have allowed the PRC to position itself with genuine authority over the sea, no longer able to avoid having to protect national interests and defend borders constantly threatened by Atlantic provocateurs.

On October 14 this year, the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army held a large-scale military exercise called United Sword-2024B, the second exercise of the year, following Joint Sword 2024 in May.

The objective finds its reasons in Taiwan’s existential story and its connection with Mother China: reunification. A doctrine of unity, of shared and constant participation, consistent with the organic political doctrine of contemporary China. The reunification of the motherland is the aspiration of the people, but since Lai Ching-te came to power, he has continued to provoke the mainland with his independence stance, with particular support from the U.S., which continues to press and create tensions and complications for the Chinese, attempting to trigger an anti-Chinese colored revolution.

Taiwan represents a historic opportunity for China to put itself at sea, exploring a domain that in classical geopolitics belongs to the Anglo-Saxon and American worlds, but is now being redistributed among new players and with new navigational maps, in the advent of a multipolar world.

United Sword, cleaving the enemy like a sword

The characteristics of this of the exercise were as follows.

1. For the first time, it was proposed to blockade key ports and areas and strike by sea and land: Taipei. Keelung, Taichung, Kaohsiung and Taiwan East and Hualien are the largest cities and ports in Taiwan. In other words, blockading Taiwan has become the main option to oppose independence and promote reunification.
2. The ultimate goal was the total seizure of power. Not just a part, not limited, not just a victory on the sea of battle, but something comprehensive, including all of Taiwan without distinction, including cultural, economic, and technological aspects.
3. The scope of joint military and coast guard operations has been further expanded (recall that several U.S. warships constantly patrol Taiwan’s vicinity, provocatively).
4. The results of the exercise were positive and consistent with the intent: having begun the process of military reunification, no problems and risks of failure should intersperse. China is ready for any eventuality.

If we take this exercise in isolation and out of its context, it was not a particularly significant event; but if we include it in recent Chinese planning-such as the successful launch of an intercontinental missile in Pacific waters on September 25, other joint exercises with Russia and India, and intense diplomatic activity to mediate escalation risks-then here the picture becomes clearer.

The implementation of this exercise stands as a preemptive study in understanding the international scenario. The United States and its allies are causing trouble in the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. In a world so full of turmoil, China has launched a high-profile precision-guided intercontinental missile, fully demonstrating its powerful strength of having a sharp sword in its hand and having the courage to act.

Foreign media have reported extensively on the matter. Many military experts have pointed out that this time China is demonstrating the Dongfeng-26 medium- and long-range missile with “both nuclear and conventional capabilities”, with a maximum range of 5,000 kilometers. and a flight speed of Mach 18. Also known as the “aircraft carrier killer” and “Guam Express,” it is difficult for the current U.S. anti-missile system to intercept. A real defense of what is called the “second world” in China, namely the territories in the adjacent sea.

There was also a coordinated firing exercise on October 22 on Niushan Island in Pingtan County, Fujian, just 165 kilometers from Taipei City. It is of great significance not only as a response to the U.S. and Canadian warships that crossed the Taiwan Strait on Oct. 20, but also as another deterrent against Taiwan independence forces. The Chinese Army’s ballistic missile system in place has firepower that cannot only cover the entire strait, but can also reach major targets on Taiwan Island.

Meanwhile, the provocative patrolling by American ships continues uninterrupted, along with other ships from vassal countries such as Canada. An annoying and constant presence, justifiable only from the perspective of low-level deterrence.

Politically, Lai Qingde is following the United States in leading Taiwan into an increasingly dangerous war situation. Having turned Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Ukraine and many other places around the globe upside down, having devastated countless lives and destroyed countless mountains and rivers, they are now preparing to use their “export of democracies” at home on Taiwan in order to contain the rise of mainland China.

China, however, is not ignorant. Any attempt to detach Taiwan from the Motherland will be answered with a step forward in reunification.

Taiwan is a line that cannot be crossed. China is gently repeating this to the American bully, but if things do not change, the motherland will not be afraid to attack to defend its child.

The Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok left its mark, much more than in previous years, and opened up the East to a series of economic and geopolitical opportunities that no one expected.

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The Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok left its mark, much more than in previous years, and opened up the East to a series of economic and geopolitical opportunities that no one expected. Or, rather, that no one in the West had been able to see, and perhaps now it may be too late. What matters is what has already been done and what will be achieved. Let us try to give an account of the event.

The South-East Asia goes to Multipolarity

The most important panel of the entire Forum was certainly the one organised by the Multipolarity Forum, devoted entirely to South-East Asia going to multipolarity. The speakers present, almost all from countries in the region mentioned, were coordinated by Prof. Aleksandr Dugin and his team, with the exceptional participation of Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Also present were the Ambassador of India and the Ambassador of North Korea.

For the first time, numerous experts from regional states came together to affirm the strong will their countries have to participate in the advent of a multipolar world. As Prof. Zhang Weiwei of Shanghai’s Fudan University explained, what is happening ‘in the East’ is a real change over a long period of time that we may one day call Pax Multipolaris, and which finds its cradle in Eurasia and its application in Asian Wisdom, which from the time of Confucius until today teaches one to plan over a long period of time, carefully coordinating all the details and working patiently so that each element is ordered in its proper place. A methodology that is alien to most Western countries, where instead an aggressive international policy based on high-speed transitions (and transactions) prevails.

But paradigms are changing, and indeed it is time to rethink the legitimacy of the paradigms that have hitherto dictated the law. The nephew of the South African leader Mandela, Nkosi Mandela, has emphasised that multipolarity is not and must not be a replica of western-centric models, nor the imposition of a stronger on a weaker: it is necessary for countries with greater polarity to help those who ask for it, so as to promote their integral development. And as the former Prime Minister of Nepal, Mudhar Nepal, added, the time has finally come for the tense small states of the East, of which there are many, to find the courage to emancipate themselves from the Anglo-American yoke and begin a path of true self-determination.

Precisely along these lines, journalist Pepe Escobar emphasised the need to control the pace of the multi-polar transition, which is a multi-speed process, and this must not become a reason for any of the countries involved to be overwhelmed. What is happening in Asia and what was seen at the EEF is an example of a development made to the measure of each country, with different times and modalities, because there is a new global trend being traced and it is up to the countries and peoples to define this trend, not the financial elites or transnational potentates.

Man is at the centre of the community and this shift must be understood and strongly reaffirmed, as Konstantin Malofeev specified. A passage of re-humanisation that is possible when the old paradigm of global control, imposed by the U.S. after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is now abandoned and replaced with a rediscovery of the different traditions of peoples. Because multipolarity must be, as Maria Zakharova stressed, a common good, a common work, a common victory, for which the Russian Federation has been striving for years, together with an increasing number of countries that are allies and friends.

Multipolarity is a given now, even for South East Asia, which is finally on the road to independence from the U.S. yoke.

Putin unplugged

The most awaited moment was the plenary session. And there something great happened. We saw Russia, China and South East Asia together. Boom!

President Putin was unplugged. In an extremely precise and posed speech, he got straight to the point: Russia’s Far East is the new frontier and for this reason, long-term expansion is planned, already achieving results in the short term. In fact, even ‘anticipating the needs of the future’, through new energy routes, world record infrastructure and transport, a new Northen Sea Route with a freight capacity that has already grown five times since last year, and then large investments in the technological and scientific sector, from research to construction sites. A programme already completed for the next 25 years, without forgetting one of the most reiterated points during the forum: the reaffirmation of local autonomies, indigenous cultures and traditions.

All this – and much more – paved the way for a process that has taken hold all over the world and which, Putin said, was not wanted by Russia, but was a consequence of American choices: de-dollarisation. The new arrangement of the international markets, which now dialogue with national currencies and are dropping the dollar-standard, is due to the fact that countries that were once subservient to the dollar are now stronger than the dollar itself and therefore have no reason to remain slaves to it. An entirely logical and legitimate reasoning.

Russia will stop at no provocation, no sanction, no Western threat, because, as Putin said, the stakes are global.

Ibrahim got the point

A great new leader, known to few, has entered the scene: Anwar Ibrahim, Prime Minister of Malaysia. A true outsider. Very few words, but all extremely powerful.

Why, Ibrahim asked, do so many people in the world respect and trust Russia? Because it has succeeded in transcending its borders and, as a result, has captivated other peoples, gaining global respect and admiration not with wars and take-away ‘democracy’, but with a solid and careful foreign policy, the proposition of multipolarism as a new paradigm, and a soft power that has motivated people to think differently about the whole international order.

Thanks to Russia’s commitment, the global south is now emerging. And so it is that Malaysia announced right during the plenary session that it will officially apply to join the BRICS+. This is a very clear message to the West: the pawns on the chessboard have changed, the game has changed, it is time to say goodbye and move on. This announcement had a huge impact on Western markets, with big drops the following day, while it benefited Eastern markets that found themselves suddenly strengthened. Why? Simple: because after Malaysia, other countries in the region will demand the same. It is only a matter of time, as long as it takes to end diplomatic and trade agreements and begin to disengage from military and strategic ones.

The words spent by Ibrahim regarding Palestine have a strong impact: it is time to stop acting with political hypocrisy, it is time to consider the Palestinians as human beings, not as animals or second-class people. He called for a common commitment and an outstretched hand towards Palestine, against the occupying Zionist entity. Because truth and freedom must always go together, otherwise they become a deception.

Zheng the Confucian

Finally, the out-of-class Han Zheng, young and promising Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China. Attention ladies and gentlemen, because the precision of his words and the depth of them will be remembered in the future.

China is Russia’s first ally and together they have developed a system of strategic development of relations for a new era, in which ‘multipolarity’ is increasingly meaning ‘peace’. Because that is the goal, Zheng said, and that is the new global trend. A world not controlled by the UK-U.S. is a world that is working towards a shared peace. What does the West do instead? It sanctions, it threatens, it attacks, it corrupts. A way of acting that cannot be accepted because it is bad for the whole world.

That is why a long-term, multilateral, multi-nodal, multipolar development agreement is the only way to open up humanity to a different vision of common life on this planet, with a security that will flourish the moment we are able to abandon the war-without-end mentality typical of the Cold War period, imposed by the USA. Only then will a peaceful world be possible.

The peace of Confucius, the wisdom of Asia, can only be understood by those who embrace its mystery and decide to put themselves in the school of this great master.

Here is the Pact of the East, here is another important building block for a multipolar world.

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El foro de San Petersburgo ofreció una gran cantidad de sesiones cruciales en las que se debatieron los corredores de conectividad. Una de las principales fue sobre la Northern Sea Route (NSR) (Ruta Marítima Septentrional) o, en terminología china, la Ruta de la Seda Ártica: la alternativa futura número uno al canal de Suez.

Con una serie de importantes actores empresariales en la sala -por ejemplo, de Rosneft, Novatek, Norilsk Nickel-, así como gobernadores y ministros, el escenario estaba preparado para un debate exhaustivo.

El principal asesor de Putin, Igor Levitin, marcó la pauta: para facilitar un transporte de contenedores sin fisuras, el gobierno federal tiene que invertir en puertos marítimos y rompehielos; se hizo una comparación –en términos de desafío tecnológico– con la construcción del ferrocarril transiberiano; y Levitin destacó también las infinitas posibilidades de expansión de centros urbanos como Murmansk, Archangelsk y Vladivostok.

Añádase que el NSR conectará con otro corredor de conectividad transeurasiático de rápido crecimiento: el International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) (Corredor Internacional de Transporte Norte-Sur), cuyos principales actores son los miembros del BRICS: Rusia, Irán e India.

Alexey Chekunkov, ministro de Desarrollo del Lejano Oriente y el Ártico, impulsó una prueba del NSR, que cuesta lo mismo que el transporte ferroviario sin los cuellos de botella. Elogió la NSR como un «servicio» y acuñó el lema definitivo: «¡Necesitamos rompehielos!«. Por supuesto, Rusia será el actor principal de todo el proyecto, que beneficiará a 2,5 millones de personas que viven en el Norte.

Sultan Sulayem, CEO de DP World, una potencia en servicios marítimos y logística de carga con sede en Dubái, confirmó que «las cadenas de suministro actuales ya no son confiables» y además son ineficientes; la Ruta del Mar del Norte (NSR) es «más rápida, más confiable y más barata». De Tokio a Londres, la ruta tradicional es de 24,000 km; a través de la NSR, son solo 13,000 km.

Sulayem es categórico: la NSR cambia las reglas del juego y «debe ponerse en marcha ya».

Vladimir Panov, representante especial para el Ártico de Rosatom, confirmó que el Ártico es «un cofre del tesoro«, y la NSR «lo abrirá«. Rosatom dispondrá de toda la infraestructura necesaria «en unos cinco años«. Atribuyó el rápido ritmo de los avances al diálogo estratégico de alto nivel entre Putin y Xi, completado con la creación de un grupo de trabajo Rusia-China.

Andrey Chibis, gobernador de Múrmansk, señaló que este puerto profundo y clave para la NSR -el principal centro de contenedores del Ártico- «no se congela«. Reconoció la enormidad de los retos logísticos, pero al mismo tiempo que atraerá a muchos trabajadores cualificados, teniendo en cuenta la alta calidad de vida de Múrmansk.

Un laberinto de corredores interconectados

La construcción de la NSR puede interpretarse como una versión acelerada del siglo XXI de la construcción del ferrocarril transiberiano a finales del siglo XIX y principios del XX. En el marco general de la integración de Eurasia, las interconexiones con otros corredores serán infinitas: desde el INSTC hasta los proyectos BRI que forman parte de las Nuevas Rutas de la Seda chinas, la Unión Económica de Eurasia (EAEU) y la ASEAN.

En una sesión centrada en la Greater Eurasia Partnership (GEP) (Asociación de la Gran Eurasia), el Viceministro ruso de Asuntos Exteriores, Alexander Pankin, elogió este concepto de Eurasia

sin líneas divisorias, uniendo civilizaciones antiguas, corredores de transporte y un espacio común unificado de 5.000 millones de personas.

Se trazaron conexiones inevitables: del GEP a la UEEA y la OCS, con la proliferación del transporte multimodal y los sistemas de pago alternativos. Khan Sohail, vicesecretario general de la OCS, señaló cómo prácticamente «todos los días hay nuevos anuncios de China», un largo camino «desde que se creó la OCS hace 21 años», entonces basada exclusivamente en la seguridad. Se esperan grandes avances en la cumbre de la OCS del mes que viene en Astana.

Sergey Glazyev, ministro de Macroeconomía de la Comisión Económica de Eurasia, que forma parte de la UEEA, elogió la progresiva integración UEEA-OCS y el rápido desarrollo de las transacciones en cestas de monedas nacionales, algo «que era incuestionable hace 10 años«.

Admitió que, aunque el GEP no se haya formalizado todavía, los hechos sobre el terreno están demostrando que Eurasia puede ser autosuficiente. Puede que el GEP esté en su fase inicial, pero está haciendo avanzar rápidamente el proceso para «armonizar el libre comercio«.

Otra sesión clave en San Petersburgo versó exactamente sobre la conexión EAEU-ASEAN. Los 10 de la ASEAN ya configuran el 4º bloque comercial del mundo, moviendo anualmente 3,8 billones de dólares y el 7,8% del comercio mundial. La UEEA ya tiene un acuerdo de libre comercio (ALC) con Vietnam y está cerrando otro con Indonesia.

Y luego está el Noreste Asiático. Lo que nos lleva a la innovadora visita del Presidente Putin a la RPDC.

Un nuevo concepto de seguridad en Eurasia

Fue un viaje de negocios épico. Rusia y la RPDC firmaron nada menos que un nuevo Acuerdo Integral de Asociación Estratégica.

En materia de comercio, eso permitirá un flujo renovado hacia Rusia de armas de la RPDC -desde proyectiles de artillería hasta balística-, mineral magnético, industria pesada e industria de máquinas-herramienta, así como el intercambio de un ejército de especialistas en tecnologías de la información megacualificados.

Kim Jong-un calificó el acuerdo de «pacífico» y «defensivo«. Y mucho más: se convertirá en

la fuerza motriz que acelere la creación de un nuevo mundo multipolar.

En lo que respecta al Noreste de Asia, el acuerdo no es ni más ni menos que un cambio total de paradigma.

Para empezar, se trata de dos actores de política exterior independientes y soberanos. No se dejarán chantajear. Se oponen totalmente a las sanciones como herramienta hegemónica. En consecuencia, acaban de determinar que no habrá más sanciones del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU contra la RPDC promulgadas por EEUU.

La cláusula clave que establece la asistencia mutua en caso de agresión extranjera contra Rusia o la RPDC significa, en la práctica, el establecimiento de una alianza político-militar, aunque Moscú, con cautela, prefiere afirmar que «no excluye la posibilidad de cooperación técnico-militar».

El acuerdo conmocionó por completo a Excepcionalistán porque supone un rápido contragolpe no sólo contra los designios globales de la OTAN, sino contra el propio Hegemón, que durante décadas ha mantenido una amplia alianza político-militar tanto con Japón como con Corea del Sur.

Traducción: a partir de ahora se acabó la Hegemonía político-militar en el Noreste de Asia, y en Asia-Pacífico en su conjunto. Pekín estará encantado. Hablando de un cambio de juego estratégico. Logrado sin disparar una sola bala.

Las repercusiones serán inmensas, porque un concepto más amplio de «seguridad» se aplicará ahora por igual a Europa y a Asia.

Así que bienvenido sea, en la práctica, Putin el estadista que promueve un nuevo concepto integrado y global de la seguridad euroasiática (la cursiva es mía). No es de extrañar que el Occidente colectivo con deficiencias mentales esté atónito.

Gilbert Doctorow observó acertadamente  cómo «Putin considera lo que la OTAN está a punto de hacer en sus fronteras occidentales como el acto de agresión que desencadenará la Asociación Estratégica de Rusia con Corea del Norte y presentará a Estados Unidos una amenaza real para sus bases militares» en Corea, en Japón y en toda Asia-Pacífico.

Y no importa en absoluto si la respuesta rusa será simétrica o asimétrica. El hecho crucial es que la «contención» estadounidense de la asociación estratégica Rusia-China ya se está deshaciendo en tiempo real.

En términos auspiciosos, al estilo de Eurasia, lo que importa ahora es centrarse en los corredores de conectividad. Esta es una historia que comenzó en ediciones anteriores del foro de San Petersburgo: cómo conectar la RPDC con el Lejano Oriente ruso, y más allá con Siberia y Eurasia en general. El concepto fundacional Juche («autosuficiencia», «autonomía») de la RPDC está a punto de entrar en una era totalmente nueva, en paralelo a la consolidación del NSR en el Ártico.

Todo el mundo necesita romper el hielo, en más de un sentido.

Publicado originalmente por Strategic Culture Foundation
Traducción: Observatorio de trabajadores en lucha

The U.S. “containment” of the Russia-China strategic partnership is already unravelling in real time.

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The St. Petersburg forum offered a wealth of crucial sessions discussing connectivity corridors. One of the key ones was on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – or, in Chinese terminology, the Arctic Silk Road: the number one future alternative to the Suez canal.

With an array of main corporate actors in the room – for instance, from Rosneft, Novatek, Norilsk Nickel – as well as governors and ministers, the stage was set for a comprehensive debate.

Top Putin adviser Igor Levitin set the tone: to facilitate seamless container transport, the federal government needs to invest in seaports and icebreakers; a comparison was made – in terms of technological challenge – to the building of the Trans-Siberian railway; and Levitin also stressed the endless expansion possibilities for city hubs such as Murmansk, Archangelsk and Vladivostok.

Add to it that the NSR will connect with another fast-growing trans-Eurasia connectivity corridor: the INSTC (International North South Transportation Corridor), whose main actors are BRICS members Russia, Iran and India.

Alexey Chekunkov, minister for development of the Far East and the Arctic, plugged a trial run of the NSR, which costs the same as railway shipping without the bottlenecks. He praised the NSR as a “service” and coined the ultimate motto: “We need icebreakers!” Russia of course will be the leading player in the whole project, benefitting 2.5 million people who live in the North.

Sultan Sulayem, CEO of Dubai-based cargo logistics and maritime services powerhouse DP World, confirmed that “the current supply chains are not reliable anymore”, as well as being inefficient; the NSR is “faster, more reliable and cheaper”. From Tokyo to London, the route runs for 24k km; via the NSR, it’s only 13k km.

Sulayem is adamant: the NSR is a game-changer and “needs to be implemented now”.

Vladimir Panov, the special representative for the Arctic from Rosatom, confirmed that the Arctic is “a treasure chest”, and the NSR “will unlock it”. Rosatom will have all the necessary infrastructure in place “in five years or so”. He credited the fast pace of developments to the high-level Putin-Xi strategic dialogue – complete with the creation of a Russia-China working group.

Andrey Chibis, the governor of Murmansk, noted that this deep, key port for the NSR – the main container hub in the Arctic – “does not freeze”. He acknowledged the enormity of the logistical challenges – but at the same time that will attract a lot of skilled workers, considering the high quality of life in Murmansk.

A maze of interconnected corridors

The building of the NSR indeed can be interpreted as a 21^st century, accelerated version of the building of the Trans-Siberian railway in the late 19^th/early 20^th century. Under the overarching framework of Eurasia integration, the interconnections with other corridors will be endless – from the INSTC to BRI projects part of the Chinese New Silk Roads, the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU) and ASEAN.

In a session focused on the Greater Eurasia Partnership (GEP) Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Pankin praised this concept of Eurasia “without dividing lines, uniting ancient civilizations, transportation corridors and a unified common space of 5 billion people”.

Inevitable connections were drawn – from GEP to the EAEU and the SCO, with the proliferation of multimodal transport and alternative payment systems. Khan Sohail, the deputy secretary-general of the SCO, remarked how virtually “everyday there are new announcements by China” – a long way “since the SCO was established 21 years ago”, then based exclusively on security. Big developments are expected at the SCO summit next month in Astana.

Sergey Glazyev, the minister of macroeconomics at the Eurasia Economic Commission, part of the EAEU, praised the EAEU-SCO progressive integration and fast-developing transactions in baskets of national currencies, something “that was unchallengeable 10 years ago”.

He admitted that even if GEP has not been formalized yet, facts on the ground are proving that Eurasia can be self-sufficient. GEP may be on the initial stage, but it’s fast advancing the process to “harmonize free trade”.

Another key session in St. Petersburg was exactly on the EAEU-ASEAN connection. The ASEAN 10 already configure the 4^th largest trading bloc in the world, moving $3.8 trillion and 7.8% of global trade annually. The EAEU already has a free trade agreement (FTA) with Vietnam and is clinching another with Indonesia.

And then there’s Northeast Asia. Which brings us to the ground-breaking visit by President Putin to the DPRK.

A new concept of Eurasia security

This was quite the epic business trip. Russia and the DPRK signed no less than a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement.

On trade, that will allow a renewed flux to Russia of DPRK weapons – artillery shells to ballistics -, magnetic ore, heavy industry and machine tool industry, as well as the back-and-forth of an army of mega-skilled IT specialists.

Kim Jong-un described the agreement as “peaceful” and “defensive”. And much more: it will become “the driving force accelerating the creation of a new multipolar world.”

When it comes to Northeast Asia, the agreement is nothing less than a total paradigm shift.

To start with, these are two independent, sovereign foreign policy actors. They will not blackmailed. They totally oppose sanctions as a hegemonic tool. In consequence, they have just determined there will be no more UN Security Council sanctions on the DPRK enacted by the U.S..

The key clause establishing mutual assistance in case of foreign aggression against either Russia or the DPRK means, in practice, the establishment of a military-political alliance – even as Moscow, cautiously, prefers to phrase that it “does not exclude the possibility of military-technical cooperation”.

The agreement completely shocked Exceptionalistan because it is a swift counterpunch not only against NATO’s global designs but against the Hegemon itself, which for decades has enforced a comprehensive military-political alliance with both Japan and South Korea.

Translation: from now on there is no more military-political Hegemony in Northeast Asia – and in Asia-Pacific as a whole. Beijing will be delighted. Talk about a strategic game-changer. Accomplished without a single bullet being fired.

The repercussions will be immense, because a broader concept of “security” will now apply equally to Europe and Asia.

So welcome, in practice, to Putin the statesman advancing a new integrated, comprehensive concept of Eurasian security (italics mine). No wonder the mentally-impaired collective West is stunned.

Gilbert Doctorow correctly observed how “Putin considers what NATO is about to do at its Western borders as the very act of aggression that will trigger Russia’s Strategic Partnership with North Korea and present the United States with a live threat to its military bases” in Korea, in Japan and in the wider Asia-Pacific.

And it doesn’t matter at all if the Russian response will be symmetric or asymmetric. The crucial fact is that the U.S. “containment” of the Russia-China strategic partnership is already unravelling in real time.

In auspicious terms, Eurasia-style, what matters now is to focus on connectivity corridors. This is a story that started in previous editions of the St. Petersburg forum: how to connect the DPRK to the Russian Far East, and beyond to Siberia and wider Eurasia. The DPRK’s founding concept of Juche (“self-reliance”, “autonomy”) is about to enter a whole new era – in parallel to the NSR consolidation in the Arctic.

Everyone indeed needs icebreakers – in more ways than one.

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With an ancient civilization, Korea has always been a country that has fought, throughout its history, against the domination of foreign forces. It had to face Mongol, Chinese and Japanese invasions until, in the 19th century, at the height of liberal capitalism that, from the West, imposed its dominance on the East, there was the beginning of the harshest invasion and subsequent submission of the Korean people. In a similar way to what happened with China in the same period, Korea was a victim of harassment from European, North American and Japanese imperialism who, in order to open the country to imperialist capital, imposed commercial treaties that completely subjugated the sovereignty of the peninsula. Hence the process of capitalist development that led to the emergence of the Korean proletariat, still small at the beginning of the 20th century but which, faced with internal contradictions, found itself impelled to the revolutionary enterprise in the 1920s.

The Korean Revolution dates back to the second half of the 19th century, with the birth of an embryonic nationalist movement against imperialist domination. However, from 1905 and, finally, from 1910, the Japanese Empire imposed official rule on Korea, completely conquering it as a colony. This dominance accentuated the contradictions of Korean capitalist development, combined with an extensive agrarian structure and the Asian mode of production, leading to an unprecedented spoliation of the country and enormous exploitation of the people, be they part of the salaried workers, the semi-peasants, enslaved people or even from bourgeois and petit-bourgeois sectors whose activities were harmed and/or suppressed by imperialist capital. For example, the Japanese monopolized industry and completely dominated land ownership, in addition to imposing a cultural dictatorship, prohibiting Koreans from speaking their own language. Thus, even some layers of the national bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie found themselves compelled to fight against such obstacles to their own development as a class.

The first major appearance of the working class occurred on March 1, 1919, when factories were occupied in a broad strike movement, followed by land occupations by peasants. The impact of the First World War is noticeable, with the defeat of Japanese imperialism opening a crisis in its empire and, on the other hand, the Russian Revolution influencing the working class of several countries (and Korea borders Russia) in a revolutionary sense.

The March 1st Popular Movement, as it became known, had important consequences. The main one was to insert the proletariat once and for all as a protagonist on the political scene, paving the way for a qualitative leap in the Korean revolutionary national-democratic movement.

In 1925, the Communist Party of Korea was founded, which lasted only three years. Guided by the policy of the Third International, already controlled by Stalinism and whose erratic policy had imposed harsh defeats on the British and Chinese workers, this party did not rise to the occasion.

The Stalinist bureaucracy of the Soviet Union had manufactured the infamous theory of “socialism in one country”, a complete distortion of Marxism which, even in the times of its founders, defended the thesis of permanent revolution.

From the 1920s to the present day, the Stalinists and their successors preach the trust of the popular masses in the national bourgeoisie, handing over to them the leadership of the people in the struggle against imperialism. But the national bourgeoisie, in times of imperialism, never tried – nor could it – fight imperialism to liberate its country. On the contrary: it prefers to hand over the country to imperialism rather than to its people. This “revolution in stages” is nothing more than a pretext to boycott the international workers’ revolution, in collusion with imperialism to limit the scope of the revolution to just one or a very few countries. As history has shown, this formula led to the total reflux and defeat of the revolution throughout the world.

The theory of Permanent Revolution was first outlined by Karl Marx and taken up by Leon Trotsky in 1905, being further developed from the 1920s onwards.

This theory is a blunt response to the theory of “socialism in one country”, created by the right wing of the Bolshevik Party in the early 1920s and then elevated to the most grotesque level by the Stalinist bureaucracy. According to Trotsky, in the imperialist phase of the development of society, the national bourgeoisie, even in countries where it does not completely dominate the economy, is not in a position to carry out a revolutionary struggle for democratic reforms, contrary to what it did in the previous period, leading the petit-bourgeois and popular masses to overthrow feudalism. This revolution, which can be delimited in the historical period that goes from the 18th to the 19th century, occurred in Western Europe and North America, while the rest of the world, colonized by these powers, was prevented from developing in a complete way in that same sense.

This democratic task, therefore, in backward countries, where there has not been a bourgeois revolution or this has not been taken to its ultimate consequences, can only be reversed by the revolution of the workers supported by the peasants. The Permanent Revolution, therefore, means a violent social transformation, which goes through the stage of democratic reforms of the bourgeois revolution but does not stop there, evolving into a socialist revolution. Always – contrary to what was proposed by the Stalinists – commanded by the working class in alliance with the peasantry, and never by the bourgeoisie.

In Trotsky’s words:

(…) the victory of the democratic revolution is only conceivable through the dictatorship of the proletariat supported by its alliance with the peasants and destined, first of all, to solve the tasks of the democratic revolution. (The Permanent Revolution, p. 206)

The Russian Revolution of October 1917 was the first proof of this theory. After it, many others came. A classic example is the Cuban Revolution of 1959, which was led by a movement (the M-26) with national-democratic aspirations, without initially expropriating the bourgeoisie. However, faced with the needs of the revolution and pressure from the masses, Fidel Castro completely broke with the bourgeois sectors that had supported him and decreed, in 1961, the socialist character of the revolution.

However, the other side of the world had already provided new proof of the theory of Permanent Revolution, with the Vietnamese, Chinese and Korean revolutions.

Still in his work The Permanent Revolution, written almost 20 years before these revolutions, Trotsky stated:

Given the acuteness of the agrarian problem and given the odious character of national oppression, the proletariat of colonial countries, despite its youth and relatively weak development, can come to power, placing itself on the ground of the national-democratic revolution, more sooner than the proletariat of an advanced country that places itself on a purely socialist terrain. (Idem, p. 180)

It was clear that the Korean revolutionary movement, to be successful, must be led by the working class, in alliance with the peasants and independent of bourgeois forces. A young man of just 14 years old would understand this and would take it upon himself to organize this independent movement in an armed struggle against imperialism.

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The Juche Idea and the meaning of independence for the Korean revolution

With the responsibility of organizing the vanguard of the Korean revolution, the young Kim Il Sung emerged, who would lead the process of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat in Korea over the next seven decades. Instead of adhering to the policy of the Communist Party of Korea – an instrument of the Stalinist bureaucracy -, Kim Il Sung founded the Union to Defeat Imperialism (UDI) in 1926, carrying out a policy independent of the Communist Party of the Third International.

At the UDI founding ceremony, Kim Il Sung gave a speech in which he stated that:

Because the UDI assumes, in name and in fact, the mission of overthrowing imperialism, its program must establish the immediate task of destroying Japanese imperialism, the sworn enemy of the Korean people, achieving the liberation and independence of Korea, and maintaining as future task the building of socialism and communism in Korea, overthrowing all forms of imperialism and building communism throughout the world. (Let us overthrow Imperialism, October 17, 1926)

The idea of independence of the popular masses to carry out the revolution arises from Korea’s own colonial situation and from the struggles against other sectors of the revolutionary movement (such as the nationalists and the Communist Party). The masses need to have class independence in relation to bourgeois nationalism, Stalinism and, obviously, imperialism. This idea will be further developed and will result in the official ideology of the North Korean Workers’ State, led by Kim Il Sung: the Juche philosophy. It is a concept that means that it is necessary to rely on one’s own strengths, thus being a demarcation of ground between the movement that would lead the revolution and take power in North Korea and other sectors such as Korean nationalists and Stalinists, as well as, at the international level, an ideological support point for the political independence of the North Korean regime in relation to the Soviet bureaucracy.

In 1930, the Kalun Conference of the Communist Youth League and the Anti-imperialist Youth League took place. On this occasion, Kim Il Sung makes new statements about the permanent nature of the Korean revolution:

(…) The main task of the Korean Revolution, therefore, is to overthrow the Japanese imperialists and win Korean independence and, at the same time, liquidate feudal relations and introduce democracy. (…) We will not stop halfway in completing the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution, but we will transform it into a revolution to also build the socialist and communist society and thus carry out the world revolution. Completing the Korean Revolution is a great service to accelerating the world revolution. (The way forward for the Korean Revolution, June/July 1930)

Such a policy went against the dictates of Stalin’s Third International, which preached the “revolution in stages”, in which the democratic revolution should be supported by the proletariat but led by the bourgeoisie, to form a bourgeois regime that would carry out democratic reforms and, only then the proletariat could finally take power.

In the wake of this conference, an armed national liberation movement was formed, the Korean Revolutionary Army, which would later be called the Anti-Japanese People’s Guerrilla Army and, later on, the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army. While Stalinism, at a global level, forced the communist movement that was under its influence to remain in the wake of the imperialist bourgeoisie in the infamous Popular Fronts, thus removing the class independence of the proletariat and adapting to bourgeois democracy, in Korea the revolutionaries took in arms to defeat imperialism and carry out the revolution. What Kim Il Sung did, as did Fidel Castro later, was to lead the proletariat to lead the revolutionary process, relying first on the peasants and then on other sectors oppressed by Japanese imperialism, including layers of the petit bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie whose interests contradicted those of the occupants. But he never put the workers movement behind these sectors. On the contrary: founded in 1936, the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland was a united front whose main objective and result was the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of Koreans into the ranks of the revolution, being an impetus for the armed struggle, which was never abandoned by Kim Il Sung, thus opposing the general policy of Stalinism.

Regarding this process, Kim Jong Il (son of Kim Il Sung and his successor as leader of North Korea) reflected as follows:

Due to the fact that in the past our country was a backward, semi-feudal and colonial society, the working class was not numerous, but being the contingent with the strongest aspiration for independence and revolutionary spirit, it constituted the core of the forces of the revolution. Since the democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal stage, the great Leader [referring to his father] considered the workers as members of the ruling class of the revolution and took their demands and those of the nation as the starting point of all his policies and guidelines. In our country, all processes of the revolution, from the anti-imperialist of national liberation and the democratic anti-feudal, to the socialist and its construction, were carried out successfully under the leadership of the working class. (Our socialism centered on the popular masses is invincible, May 5, 1991)

Thus, through this revolutionary process, which combined armed struggle in the mountains with the organization of the working class in the cities through Popular Committees, the communists led by Kim Il Sung took power in Korea in the wake of Japan’s defeat in World War II., in 1945.

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Liberation of Korea: from democratic revolution to socialist revolution

The post-war revolutionary wave was something predetermined by the development of the contradictions of the imperialist system. Like World War I, World War II triggered a new revolutionary crisis, which took place especially in colonial countries, due to the brutal decline of the imperialist colonial regime. Imperialist propaganda, to try to delegitimize the North Korean Workers’ State has always tried to say that the Korean Revolution was victorious because of the presence of the USSR Red Army, which entered the country in the final moments of the Japanese defeat in war. In fact, when this occurred, the entire Korean Peninsula was full of People’s Committees, which led to the establishment of a duality of powers with the occupying forces and, finally, emerged victorious through the revolutionary uprising of the Korean people.

Independence was victorious with the revolution in the north, where the soldiers of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army left. However, it was aborted in the south. The Potsdam Conference established that the Soviet Union, when intervening in the Pacific War to help the United States defeat Japan, shared military operational activities in Korea with the North American imperialists (Ho, H. J.; Hui, K. S.; Ho, P. T. The U.S. imperialists started the Korean War, p. 39). In practice, it was a capitulation by Stalin, since the U.S. clearly demonstrated that it intended to dominate Korea after defeating Japan, and the Soviets conciliated, allowing the military presence of the Americans in Korea, which opened the door to the subsequent intervention that occurred in South Korea, when General Douglas MacArthur imposed his puppet Syngman Rhee and, together with him and the Japanese collaborators who were pardoned, carried out a brutal suppression of the People’s Committees, preventing the revolution in south Korea and imposing a Fascist dictatorship over its people.

At the Yalta Conference, this agreement with Korea’s submission had already been indicated by the USSR, when Franklin Roosevelt stated that, “for Korea to become an independent country”, there would have to be a transition period of 40 years, which was ratified shortly afterwards (Idem, p. 67). All of this without a policy of confrontation on the part of the Soviets, who soon demonstrated that they were truly willing to reconcile with imperialism in Asia. If the USSR defended a revolutionary policy, upon seeing U.S. troops invade southern Korea to decimate the revolution, the Red Army should intervene to support the revolution and guarantee Korea’s independence.

Thus, while the revolution was drowned in blood by imperialism without Soviet intervention in South Korea, North Korea experienced the beginning of its national-democratic revolution. This had already been carried out gradually in some territories liberated by the revolutionary army and the People’s Committees (as had also occurred in the Chinese Revolution), but with the achievement of independence throughout the northern part and the seizure of power by the revolutionaries commanded by Kim Il Sung, this resulted in a gigantic leap.

In the chapter “The backward countries and the program of transitional demands” of the Transitional Program of the Fourth International, Trotsky analyzes that the central tasks of the democratic revolution in these countries are the agrarian revolution and national independence, which would directly result in the issues of the socialist revolution:

It is impossible to simply reject the democratic program: it is imperative that the masses themselves overcome it in the struggle. The slogan for a national (or constituent) assembly retains all its force in countries like India or China. This slogan must be inextricably linked to the problem of national emancipation and agrarian reform. The first step is to arm the workers with this democratic program. Only they can mobilize and unify the peasants. On the basis of the revolutionary democratic program, it is necessary to oppose the workers to the ‘national’ bourgeoisie. Thus, at a certain stage of mass mobilization under the slogans of revolutionary democracy, soviets can and must emerge. Their historical role, in each given period, in particular their relationship with the national assembly, will be determined by the political level of the proletariat, the link between it and the peasant class and the character of the policy of the proletarian party. Sooner or later, the soviets must overthrow bourgeois democracy. Only they are capable of leading the democratic revolution to a conclusion, thus opening an era of socialist revolution. (Transition Program, pp. 62-63)

Trotsky concludes that:

The dictatorship of the proletariat, which rises to power as the leading force of the democratic revolution, will inevitably and very quickly be faced with tasks that will lead it to make deep inroads into the bourgeois right to property. In the course of its development, the democratic revolution directly transforms into a socialist revolution, thus becoming a permanent revolution. (The Permanent Revolution, p. 208)

The democratic program consists of points such as the constituent assembly, the eight-hour working day, the confiscation of land, national independence from imperialism and the people’s right to dispose of themselves (Idem, p. 201).

The People’s Committees were the Korean equivalent of the soviets. If, in the south, they were violently crushed, in the north they were fundamental to the process that developed after independence. They formed the basis for the subsequent founding, in February 1946, of the Provisional People’s Committee of North Korea, the provisional revolutionary government. This body was responsible for the promulgation, in the same year, of the laws on agrarian reform (March), labor (June), gender equality (July) and the nationalization of industries (August). That is, tasks of the bourgeois revolution carried out through the leadership of the working class, already in power of the State.

On October 10, 1945, Kim Il Sung also founded the new Communist Party, which created mass organizations such as the Peasant Union, the Youth Democratic League and the Women’s Democratic Union, in addition to the workers’ unions. The National Democratic United Front was also founded with other parties supporting the revolution. This front was “based on the worker-peasant alliance led by the working class, and embracing the broad masses of people from all strata of social life” (Ho, H. J.; Hui, K. S.; Ho, P. T. The U.S. imperialists started the War of Korea, p. 85). In August of the following year, the New Democratic Party (one of those who supported the revolution) joined the Communist Party, which was then renamed the Worker’s Party of Korea.

Leading the democratic reforms of the national revolution, the Workers’ Party decided to carry out the process that would trigger the formation of the Constituent Assembly. First, elections for People’s Committees were held in the districts, municipalities and provinces at the end of 1946. Following this, the Congress of District, Municipal and Provincial People’s Committees was held in February 1947 in the capital Pyongyang, from which the North Korean People Committee was formed. “This committee, which was a powerful weapon for socialist construction and revolution, strived to carry out the tasks of the period of transition to socialism and develop the national economy in a planned way,” Ho Jong Ho, Kang Sok Hui and Pak Thae Ho write (Idem, pp. 89-90).

At the end of 1947 and beginning of 1948, the Worker’s Party prepared the proposal to found the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through democratic elections at national level. At the same time, the puppet regime in South Korea, which continued to decimate the People’s Committees and suppress all democratic rights, guided by imperialism, sought to organize separate elections, meeting the aspirations of the Korean people for reunification.

Expressing the need to complete the national-democratic revolution, Kim Il Sung declares:

We must immediately establish a supreme legislative body throughout Korea, which represents the will of all the Korean people, and organize the Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We should not establish it in a separate form, but in an all-Korea government consisting of representatives of political parties and social organizations from South and North Korea. (Idem, p. 94)

A first step towards these constituent elections was the Joint Conference of Representatives of South and North Korean Social Organizations and Political Parties, held in Pyongyang in April 1948, where 56 entities from across the country were represented. The Conference called on all Korean people to boycott the separate and undemocratic elections (since all popular political organizations and parties were being outlawed) called by Syngman Rhee in the South.

Even so, the South Korean regime held openly fraudulent elections, imposing the founding of the Republic of Korea in the south on August 15. This forced the revolutionaries to call general elections in the north and south to found a unified People’s Democratic Republic, in which 99.97% of North Korean voters and 77.52% of South Korean voters participated, despite strong repression from Seoul (Idem).

These elections gave rise to the Supreme People’s Assembly, the Korean constituent assembly, which promulgated a constitution and proclaimed the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on September 9, 1948. However, despite giving national political legitimacy to the regime born of the People’s Committees, the Democratic People’s Republic could not consolidate itself throughout Korea, due to the division imposed by imperialism.

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The Korean War and the mistakes of the Soviet government

Faced with growing threats of invasion of northern Korea by Syngman Rhee’s troops supported by the USA, in 1949 the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland realized that the national-democratic revolution was still pending and launched a set of proposals for the independent reunification of Korea. These proposals included reunification by Koreans themselves, the expulsion of imperialism, legalization of political parties and organizations in South Korea, and simultaneous general elections in the north and south that establish a supreme legislative body that promulgates a constitution, thus forming a unified government from all over Korea. The response of the Seoul regime was to prepare, guided by imperialism, the invasion of the north to destroy the revolution once and for all.

Thus, on June 25, 1950, after several incursions north of the 38th Parallel (division formalized by imperialism in 1945 between the north and south of the peninsula), the Korean War finally began. The Korean People’s Army, regularized in 1946, counterattacks and manages to push the South Korean army back to the 38th Parallel and beyond. If the war were only between North and South Korean forces, the Korean People’s Army would certainly win and liberate the entire Korean Peninsula, finally achieving reunification and the national-democratic revolution. This was precisely the policy of the North Korean government, given the new situation imposed.

However, imperialism intervened militarily. Intervention plans had already been drawn up years before and the increase in the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea, as well as the U.S. participation in the provocations of Syngman Rhee’s army, signaled that war was imminent. However, the USSR still maintained a belief in conciliation with imperialism in the East. Stalin himself was worried that the Chinese Revolution, victorious the previous year, would spark a revolution in neighboring countries that would displease imperialism (Marie, Jean-Jacques. Stalin, p. 842). This is why the Soviets were caught with their pants down when the U.S. called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to approve the deployment of a joint military force to support South Korea against “aggression” from the North.

And that’s exactly what happened. The U.S. and 15 other armies invaded Korea to quell the revolution, this time also in the north. Among these 15 armies were those of France, Belgium and Greece, countries where, at the end of World War II, the working class was about to take power but was betrayed by Stalinism. The Korean War showed the extent of the damage resulting from the Soviet bureaucracy’s policies to the international proletariat.

As stated above, if it were not for imperialist intervention, the North Korean government would have taken the revolution to the south and liberated the entire nation. It was about to do that. Even in the first months of the war, the KPA occupied 90% of South Korea, where 92% of South Koreans lived, and there the northern revolutionaries restored the People’s Committees, founded Worker’s Party cells and carried out democratic reforms that had already been made in North Korea.

However, the landing of imperialist troops in September 1950 completely leveled the war and forced the KPA to retreat, demolishing the revolutionary structure that had been resumed, this time in an even more bloody manner. The advance of 17 troops (South Korea, USA and the other 15 countries) reaches the 38th Parallel and surpasses it, invading North Korea and occupying almost all of its territory, with the exception of the northernmost mountains. When imperialism was already showing signs of attempting an invasion of China itself, the revolutionary government that had taken power a year earlier in Beijing decided to organize the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, with one million men, to support the North Koreans and force the imperialists to return to the 38th Parallel again.

In turn, the Soviet Union did little to support the Korean revolutionaries. The Stalinist bureaucracy, in addition to governing the largest country in the world, bordering Korea and with a heightened prestige due to victory in World War II, controlled the governments of Eastern Europe and the communist parties of the West, many of them large mass parties. It could have done many things, from sending the Red Army to organizing international brigades as he had done in Spain just over ten years earlier (which had already been an extremely bureaucratic, conservative and even reactionary undertaking in terms of results). The USSR had already developed the atomic bomb in 1949 and could have used this power as a form of deterrence just when imperialism was already planning an attack against Korea. But he never did.

Thus, the North Koreans managed to force imperialism to sign a ceasefire in 1953, resuming the division of the peninsula from the 38th Parallel. If they had been helped by the Soviets, the revolution could have triumphed throughout Korea. But the Stalinist bureaucracy, decades ago, already showed total counter-revolutionary decadence.

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North Korean foreign policy: a call for the union against imperialism

Despite the contradictions in the development of the revolution and the Korean Workers’ State, the North Koreans demonstrated countless times, throughout the second half of the 20th century, the validity of the theory of permanent revolution.

While the Soviet bureaucracy deepened the failed policy of “socialism in one country” with the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” with imperialism and the continued boycott of the world revolution, the North Koreans preached an open struggle to abolish the imperialist system, starting with the domination of their own country by the vassal bourgeoisie.

They participated in the Tricontinental Conference which, in 1966 in Havana, founded the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAAL) with the aim of expanding the revolution to the entire globe. Backward countries, whose revolutionary movements had greater independence from the Soviet bureaucracy (unlike Europe) were encouraged to take up arms to wage the struggle for national liberation, democratic revolution and socialism.

In an article for Tricontinental Magazine, Kim Il Sung expresses such a policy that is completely opposed to Moscow’s dictates, stating:

It is a mistake to try to avoid the fight against imperialism by claiming that, although independence and revolution are good, peace is more precious. Is it not a real fact that the line of an unprincipled compromise with imperialism only encourages its aggressive maneuvers and increases the danger of war? A peace that leads to slave submission is not peace. True peace cannot be achieved if we do not fight against those who disturb it and if we do not destroy the domination of the oppressors by opposing this slave-owning peace. In the same way that we oppose the line of compromise with imperialism, we cannot admit the fear of fighting against imperialism with practical actions, limiting ourselves only to loudly proclaiming that we are against imperialism. This is nothing but the opposite of the compromise line. Both have no resemblance to the true anti-imperialist struggle and only serve as an aid to imperialism’s policy of aggression and war. (Let us strengthen the anti-imperialist and anti-Yankee struggle, August 12, 1967)

The North Korean leader also writes, in the same article:

The anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America is a sacred struggle for the liberation of hundreds of millions of oppressed and exploited human beings and, at the same time, a great struggle aimed at cutting off this lifeline from world imperialism. This struggle constitutes, together with the revolutionary struggle of the working class for socialism, the two great revolutionary forces of our time, which have come together to form a single current that buries imperialism. (Idem)

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the North Koreans sought to put this thought into practice, providing military training and sending troops and weapons to revolutionaries in several backward countries, including Angola, Mozambique and Brazil. This support was much greater than that of the Soviet bureaucracy, which was not concerned with the revolution, but rather with controlling the governments resulting from these revolutions so that they, instead of deepening the revolutionary process, served as satellites to serve political and economic interests of the USSR.

Contrary to the Stalinist theory of the camps, the North Koreans understood that the class struggle at a global level is not synthesized in the struggle of the “socialist camp” against the “capitalist camp”, but rather in the struggle of oppressed peoples against imperialism.

The fight against imperialism within Korea, to this day, is also fought following these same principles. Correctly, North Korea’s demands for reunification with the South are based on the needs of the national-democratic revolution, since, despite having established the dictatorship of the proletariat in the North, the South continues to be controlled by imperialism and a dictatorship against the working class. Therefore, the struggle for national liberation is still ongoing, which, in essence, has a national-democratic character in the South.

Learning from their own experience of the national-democratic revolution and the anti-imperialist war, the North Koreans came to that conclusion eternalized in the words of Che Guevara: “You can’t trust imperialism, but that’s it, nothing!” On the other hand, decades of struggle against erroneous tendencies within his own country, from the founding of the UDI in opposition to the Stalinist communist party, through the national liberation revolution that contradicted the Soviet bureaucracy’s policy of conciliation with imperialism and reaching during the Korean War in which they did not receive the necessary support from the USSR, the North Koreans learned that it was necessary to maintain political independence in relation to the Stalinist clique.

They even openly criticized the Soviet bureaucracy, denouncing it for boycotting the world revolution, as in this statement by Kim Jong Il:

The socialist cause of a people is national and, at the same time, international. The communist party or the workers of each nation have the right to defend their independence and, at the same time, the obligation to respect that of the parties of other States, and to unite and collaborate based on comradeship for the cause of socialist victory. (Historical lessons in the construction of socialism and the general line of our Party, January 3, 1992)

Still in this speech, Kim Jong Il makes a scathing criticism of the rigging of Eastern European communist parties by the Soviet bureaucracy:

There had long been a center in the international communist movement, and each country’s party acted as its branch. The natural thing would have been for the parties of the socialist countries to cooperate on the basis of complete equality and independence, but some, by not having freed themselves from the customs contracted in the midst of their old relations, during the time of the Communist International, caused great damage to the advancement of the international communist movement. One, calling himself the ‘center’, had shamelessly perpetrated acts of transmitting orders to others and pressuring and intervening in the internal affairs of those who did not follow his mistaken line. (Idem)

Certainly, the fact that it was carried out independently of Stalinism and that it maintained this independence is one of the causes of the permanence of the North Korean Workers’ State, even after the fall of the USSR and the Eastern European regimes and the capitalist restoration in Asia. Perhaps the greatest merit of Kim Il Sung, who passed away in 1994, was taking the revolution forward at the exact moment it was being boycotted by the Stalinist bureaucracy worldwide.

Contrary to what bar Stalinists may think, North Korea is not proof of the theory of “socialism in one country”, but rather of the need for permanent revolution. Socialism, as a superior form of organization of society and as a political and economic system, can only be fully achieved when the imperialist system has been overcome. In a world controlled by imperialism, where all social relations are dominated or at least influenced by this regime, it is not possible to achieve complete independence, as the North Korean example itself demonstrates. The post-USSR isolation with the cruel imperialist economic blockade produced more than a decade of hunger for millions of Koreans and even today, when this situation is better controlled, the country still suffers from numerous difficulties caused by economic sanctions and constant military threats.

Furthermore, the semi-colonial rule of imperialism over South Korea stopped the national-democratic revolution of the Korean people. It will only conclude with the liberation of South Korea and the reunification of the entire peninsula independently of imperialism.