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Quello del Sahara Occidentale è un territorio desertico e costiero piuttosto vasto (252.120 km quadrati). É composto da due regioni, il Rio de Oro e la Saguia el-Hamra, e la sua popolazione è di circa 700.000 persone. Poco si conosce della sua storia nelle età precedenti al Medioevo. L’area era sicuramente occupata da tribù nomadi, praticanti l’allevamento e la caccia, che vennero a contatto sia con i Fenici (che si spinsero sulle coste dell’Africa nord-occidentale) che con i Romani. Nel primo Medioevo la regione venne occupata da genti berbere successivamente arabizzate e convertite all’Islam. Mentre, nel 1476, venne creata dagli Spagnoli una prima colonia (Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña) che fungeva da scalo per le rotte che successivamente si spingeranno oltre il Capo di Buona Speranza. La colonia, fondata da Diego Garcia de Herrera (già signore delle Isole Canarie), ebbe comunque vita piuttosto breve. Solo intorno alla metà del XIX secolo gli Spagnoli inizieranno una vera e propria penetrazione nel territorio che il porterà dapprima a prendere alcuni accordi con i popoli costieri, poi ad imporre loro un forma di protettorato. È sicuramente curioso il fatto che l’espansione spagnola nella regione arrivò in un momento in cui l’Impero iberico, dall’America Latina (si pensi alla “Dottrina Monroe” ed al ruolo britannico nell’indipendenza e parcellizzazione dello stesso continente iberoamericano) all’Asia (il caso filippino) stava venendo smantellato pezzo per pezzo.

Ad ogni modo, l’ulteriore espansione spagnola venne frenata/limitata dal fatto che la regione era accerchiata dalla presenza francese su tutti i lati. A ciò si aggiungano anche le prime tensioni con la popolazione locale che si ribella guidata dallo Sheikh Ma al-Aynan, fondatore della città di Smara (ancora oggi una dei centri più importanti del Sahara Occidentale). Questi, figlio del fondatore della confraternita sufi Fadiliyya (una sorta di sottordine della più nota Qadiriyya, diffusa in tutto il mondo islamico), proclamò il gihad contro le potenze colonizzatrici, ottenendo in ciò il benestare del Sultano marocchino Abdelaziz bin Hassan della dinastia alawita (regnante sin dal XVII secolo). Sebbene quest’ultimo non avesse comunque alcun reale potere di controllo sullo Sheikh.

La rivolta, nonostante il sostegno tedesco (in chiave antifrancese) non ebbe comunque vita  particolarmente lunga. Nel 1906, lo stesso Sultano venne costretto, con la Conferenza di Algeciras, a garantire sostanziose concessioni a Francia e Spagna. Tuttavia, gli uomini legati alla fratellanza militare-religiosa Gudfiyya di al-Aynan continuarono ad operare almeno fino al 1910, arrivando a rallentare la penetrazione francese verso la Mauritania. Interessante anche il fatto che in questo periodo al-Aynan subì una vera e propria criminalizzazione nei quotidiani spagnoli e francesi che lo indicavano come contrabbandiere di armi, ladro, e avanzavano dubbi sulla sua fede religiosa sunnita, sostenendo che si fosse convertito allo sciismo.

Di sicuro, il mito della rivolta di al-Aynan è ancora oggi fonte di dibattito e la sua figura viene utilizzata sia dal governo marocchino come esempio di lotta unitaria tra Marocco e Sahara, sia dai miliziani del Fronte Polisario come prima manifestazione del carattere ribelle del popolo della regione.

Come nel caso della Libia, occupata dall’Italia nel 1912 ma “sottomessa” solo nei primi anni ’30 con la repressione della ribellione della confraternita della Senussia, anche il Sahara Occidentale resisterà a lungo. Smara venne occupata a tutti gli effetti solo nel 1934, in un periodo in cui iniziano a farsi sentire anche i primi sintomi di quel conflitto civile spagnolo che farà da preludio alla guerra mondiale.

Nel 1956, con l’indipendenza marocchina, ha inizio un nuovo ciclo di tensioni. L’anno successivo le truppe spagnole stanziate nella regione respingono diverse incursioni marocchine. Mentre, nel 1958, le due regioni del Rio de Oro e della Saguia el-Hamra vengono unificate nella provincia del Sahara spagnolo. Ai primi anni ’60, invece, si deve la scoperta dell’enorme ricchezza mineraria della regione (importanti riserve di fosfato scoperte a Bu Craa nel nord). Ancora oggi, tuttavia, tale ricchezza rimane difficilmente estraibile a causa della scarsità d’acqua e della sostanziale impraticabilità delle strade. Nonostante ciò, in questi anni, lo sfruttamento intensivo del territorio e la sua militarizzazione favoriscono una nuova presa di coscienza anticoloniale e nazionale per il popolo Saharawi (un processo comunque complicato dal carattere nomadico di queste genti).

Il Fronte Polisario (Fronte di Liberazione Popolare di Saguia el-Hamra e Rio de Oro) nasce nei primi anni ’70 (l’aperta ribellione contro le forze coloniali spagnole inizia ufficialmente nel 1973) come erede del Movimento di Liberazione del Sahara, represso dal regime franchista nel corso degli anni ’60. Tra i suoi fondatori spicca El Ouali Mustapha Sayed, ex membro del Partito comunista marocchino. Inizialmente, la sua base era situata in Mauritania, Tuttavia, le cose cambiano rapidamente con la fine della presenza coloniale spagnola.

A questo proposito sarebbe opportuno ricordare che questo evento si lega in modo indissolubile alla seconda fase del processo di decolonizzazione, quello in cui a venire liberati sono soprattutto i territori africani appartenenti a Portogallo e Spagna. La Spagna, in particolar modo, a cavallo della fine del regime franchista stava subendo una duplice pressione interna (la presenza del gruppo terroristico ETA, sostenuto silenziosamente anche da strutture clandestine legate alla NATO) ed esterna in favore di una sua “democratizzazione” e di un suo ingresso proprio nell’Alleanza Atlantica.

Nel 1975, il governo marocchino e l’esercito organizzano la cosiddetta “marcia verde” (350.000 marocchino oltrepassano il confine) per fare ulteriori pressioni alla Spagna affinché abbandoni la presa sul territorio saharawi. Questo, di fatto, avviene nel medesimo anno a seguito di un accordo che prevedeva la sua spartizione tra lo stesso Marocco (2/3 della regione, con le importanti riserve minerarie del nord) e la Mauritania (1/3 del suo territorio meridionale).

Con l’invasione congiunta marocchino-mauritana, la guerriglia del Fronte Polisario si attiva su più fronti anche a seguito dello spostamento della sua base in Algeria, nella strategica città di confine di Tindouf (ancora oggi sede del governo in esilio della Repubblica Democratica Araba Saharawi e di numerosi campi profughi). Nel 1979, questo arriva ad un accordo di pace con la Mauritania. Tuttavia, il Marocco si annette automaticamente la parte di territorio che l’accordo del 1975 aveva attribuito a Nouakchott ed inizia la costruzione di un triangolo di fortificazioni (Bu Craa – Laayoune – Smara) che avrebbe dovuto favorire la difesa del territorio ed il suo sfruttamento minerario in sicurezza.

Gli anni ’80 sono il periodo di maggiore recrudescenza del conflitto, con il Fronte Polisario che riesce ad organizzare un piccolo esercito di 15.000 miliziani ben armati (addirittura motorizzati) grazie all’aiuto algerino. Ma proprio con il conflitto civile algerino degli anni ’90 iniziano i primi seri problemi interni al movimento.

Nonostante ciò, a partire dalla fine degli anni ’80, l’intervento dell’ONU riesce a favorire un cessate il fuoco, l’invio di una missione di pace periodicamente rinnovata (il nuovo voto è previsto per il 31 ottobre 2025) ed un accordo di massima per un referendum attraverso il quale il popolo saharawi avrebbe dovuto decidere il suo destino. In modo da ottenere un esito favorevole, tuttavia, il Marocco favorisce in questo periodo una vera e propria colonizzazione della regione, inviandovi decine di migliaia di cittadini marocchini e rivendicando il loro diritto a partecipare al voto referendario. Fattore che, insieme alla costruzione di infrastrutture fisiche a tutto vantaggio di Rabat, ha contribuito ad inquinare il clima di preparazione ad un voto che non si è mai tenuto. Con il cambio del monarca, da Hassan II a Mohammed VI, inoltre, Rabat ha cambiato e radicalizzato la sua posizione, rigettando l’idea del voto (rifiutando una nuova proposta ONU che prevedeva cinque anni di autonomia per il Sahara Occidentale e successivamente il referendum) e sostenendo quella di un’autonomia sotto diretta sovranità marocchina. Un piano che ha incontrato, tra gli, il favore di Spagna, Francia e Regno Unito (decise soprattutto ad ottenere la cooperazione di Rabat per il controllo dei flussi migratori dal Nord Africa verso l’Europa) e che rimane comunque una delle soluzioni ad oggi più realistiche.

Lo stallo della situazione è stato interrotto dai cosiddetti accordi di Abramo nel 2020, con i quali il Re marocchino ha ottenuto il riconoscimento della sovranità sul Sahara Occidentale da parte di Stati Uniti e Israele in cambio della piena normalizzazione delle sue relazioni con Tel Aviv. E proprio al 2020 si deve il nuovo inasprimento di un conflitto che, tra bassa e alta intensità, dura da cinquantanni. In particolare, il Fronte Polisario ha colpito in modo continuato le rotte che collegano il Marocco alla Mauritania. Ma a questa nuova fase si lega anche un più complesso gioco geopolitico che coinvolge anche attori extraregionali.

Almeno dal 2018, il sovrano marocchino propone la tesi che il Fronte Polisario sia stato sostenuto dalla Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran. Ad onor del vero, pur presentando alcune caratteristiche che storicamente hanno caratterizzato operazioni di penetrazione iraniana in altri contesti (confini porosi, evidente oppressione di una minoranza etnica e/o religiosa), come sostenuto anche dai servizi segreti britannici, non vi è alcuna prova concreta che dimostri una reale influenza iraniana tra le fila del Polisario o nell’area di Tindouf. Anche se rimane probabile che alcuni suoi membri, recatisi a combattere in Siria in sostegno di Bashar al-Assad, abbiano ottenuto addestramento militare da miliziani di Hezbollah. Dopotutto, quello dello spauracchio iraniano è un vecchio stratagemma utilizzato dai governi arabi (monarchici  o repubblicani) per ottenere maggiori aiuti economici e sostegno militare dagli USA e dall’Occidente più in generale. Si pensi al caso emblematico del fu presidente yemenita Saleh che, a questo scopo, nel primo decennio del XXI secolo, denunciò un sostegno iraniano ai ribelli Houthi che, tuttavia, può essere considerato reale solo a partire dal 2011 ed effettivo solo dal 2014 in poi.

Non stupisce, inoltre, il fatto che a rilanciare tali “notizie” sia stata la nordamericana Foundations for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Questa altro non è che un “Think Tank” neocon con sede a Washington e fondato nel 2001 con il nome ebraico “Emet” (verità). Ha avuto un ruolo di primo piano nel sostenere la destabilizzazione della Siria e la sua struttura organizzativa prevede un “Programma Cina” ed un “Programma Iran”. Il primo è rivolto al contrasto delle attività del Partito comunista cinese in ambito economico, tecnologico e militare. Nel 2023, una delegazione della FDD si è recata a Taiwan per discutere sulla necessità di una strategia di guerra asimmetrica contro la Cina. Il secondo, invece, è rivolto a garantire sostegno al cambio di regime in Iran e ad indicare le aree nelle quali la la Repubblica Islamica potrebbe rappresentare una potenziale minaccia per gli interessi di USA e Israele nella più ampia area MENA (Medio Oriente e Africa del Nord). Tra i principali finanziatori della FDD figurano la famiglia Arnall, legata alla setta ebraica Chabad Lubavitch (vicina anche alla famiglia Kushner-Trump), Bernard Marcus (deceduto nel 2020 ed a lungo sostenitore di Elnet, la lobby sionista in Europa) e la famiglia Abramson, con interessi nel settore farmaceutico, che ha dato il nome al “Centro per la Vita Ebraica Madlyn e Leonard Abramson”.

Al contrario, sarebbe opportuno stigmatizzare ben altri tipi di penetrazione all’interno del Polisario. Uno dei suoi membri più influenti, ad esempio, Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi, si è unito al sedicente Stato Islamico del Sahel: organizzazione terroristica e criminale al centro dei traffici regionali (droga, armi, esseri umani) responsabile, insieme ad altri gruppi (anche legati ad al-Qaeda) di una nuova destabilizzazione dell’area saheliana e delle crescenti tensioni tra Mali e Algeria. Non solo, queste tensioni si stanno ripercuotendo anche nelle storiche ottime relazioni tra Algeria e Russia, sempre più legata alla “cintura dei colpi di Stato” (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso) e che, recentemente, ha migliorato i suoi rapporti con il Marocco attraverso importanti accordi commerciali (soprattutto in campo agricolo e di pesca). Con i mezzi di informazioni di Mosca che sono addirittura arrivati ad accusare apertamente Algeri di voler prolungare inutilmente la questione del Sahara Occidentale per una controproducente destabilizzazione di Rabat.

In un contesto di notevole espansione e crescita di influenza russa e cinese (e sotto certi aspetti pure iraniana) nella regione del Sahel ed in quella subsahariana, con il potenziale di raggiungere la costa atlantica dell’Africa, appare chiaro che uno degli obiettivi primari dell’Occidente possa rimanere quello di una destabilizzazione più o meno controllata che comunque impedisca il pieno sfruttamento di riserve minerarie fondamentali tanto per il mercato dei fertilizzanti (si vedano gli accordi russo-marocchini), quanto per quello dei semiconduttori (sempre più importanti per l’industria tecnologica).

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Finally, as we head towards Christmas during the first year of Trump’s second term, it would seem that the Moroccan elite can sleep well at night knowing for sure that there is no risk whatsoever of Trump turning the clock back on his position of Western Sahara. But they know this not through Trump’s actions or statements, or even those of Israel (which is de facto paid lobbyist for the Moroccans in DC) but through Russia. Yes, that’s right, you read correctly. Finally, Russia has pulled a rabbit out of the hat and offered the Moroccans a supporting vote on the Sahara, hedging their bets in the region, given their strong ties to Algeria. It was as though there was a race on between Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and Steve Witkoff, Trump’s envoy of sorts, to get an unofficial peace deal in place between Rabat and Algiers. And despite Algiers rejecting Morocco’s own proposal on how both countries could cool down their military spending, Putin’s move to bring Morocco closer was a stroke of genius as it calms tensions and creates an environment of dialogue.

During a press briefing in mid-October, Lavrov said Russia is ready to support Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara if all members of the United Nations Security Council agree.

“The Sahara issue, which has been on the table for 50 years, was initially heading toward a referendum, but the situation later changed,” Lavrov said. “The Moroccan proposal for autonomy falls within the framework of self-determination. This option can be a solution as long as it is provided for by the United Nations and in line with [UN] resolutions.”

He added, “If it is acceptable to everyone, it is acceptable to us as well.”

And so, quite suddenly, all the ambiguity about relations between Morocco and Russia disappears. Relations are back to pre-Ukraine war where both sides hammered out an association agreement in 2018 – with talk which followed that of Russia building water desalination plants and nuclear power stations. At the drop of a hat, Trump’s man in the region, has been outfoxed by Russia with Morocco now standing to gain on a grand scale in the years to come. Russia is a hugely important ally for Morocco as Rabat’s ‘non-aligned’ status just got an upgrade. Now, you could call Morocco ‘super non-aligned’ while it plays both dutiful wife or willing mistress to both U.S. and Russia concurrently. Quite a feat of diplomacy which Nasser Bourita should be congratulated for.

And yet, in many ways, it could be argued that Morocco has better relations with Moscow than with Washington and much of its ambitions will be linked to this relationship and what fruits it can provide. Secondly, with Russia behind Rabat, Morocco will be able to play the Russia card when it sees fit for whatever benefits which present themselves. It’s not quite the same thing with the Americans as, arguably, Rabat has no real, tangible working relationship with Washington, but choses to use Israel as its chief lobbyist there through the powerful AIPAC. The steadfastness of this ephemeral ménage à trois is hard to predict and certainly, the Moroccans feel short changed by what Israel has produced for them to date.

But being closer now to Russia can only be a good thing and a smart move as Trump now has two superpowers facing him when Morocco is discussed, both Israel and Russia. Much has recently been made of Russia’s move, with one media outlet pointing out that Moscow now will have a balancing act in the region as it struggles to keep good relations with Algeria, one of its top customers for Russian-made weapons, it should be noted. But those same pundits fail to see the irony of the statement as it is Morocco now who is the champion of manipulating its non-aligned status with the US which surely can only last as long as Trump remains in office – or might be shattered if he has a mega tantrum as he did with China recently. This is truly the definition of a ‘special relationship’ when one partner allows the other to fraternize, flirt and even share the duvet with one’s adversaries without the row in the morning back home.

Russia also made a smart move though. It showed that it’s a superpower and such powers can switch countries aggressive policies on and off at the drop of a hat, but it is also worth noting that Russia’s influence in the continent just grows and grows. When Lavrov tours Africa, it’s like you are witnessing a mega star in front of the continent’s leaders. When Witkoff arrives, it reminds people of that video footage of Germany’ former foreign minister arriving in an Asian capital, coming out of the plane and looking hard for even one dignitary to meet her. Russia moving closer to Morocco is a win-win as both countries profit from one another’s global relations and Morocco for many is seen as a good platform to reach out to francophone African countries. But if Morocco says to the Americans “we do love you, but we won’t accept you telling us who we can make friends with” then one has to wonder what impact that has on the continent itself. Who’s next? Perhaps this was Lavrov’s thinking. What a cunning old fox!

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Trump’s threats to punish countries like India who buy Russian oil is starting to spook Rabat, as Morocco has more to lose than just trade if it upsets the Donald.

Have you ever wondered about couples who renew their marriage vows? Personally I have always found it odd, as, if a couple’s marriage is so rock solid, then surely the whole spectacle of the renewal isn’t necessary?

Just recently it was announced by Morocco’s own state media that Donald Trump had assured Rabat, once again, that he recognizes Western Sahara as Morocco’s. This message of assurance to the King, followed one earlier made by his own foreign minister Marco Rubio back in April. Why are these messages needed, you might ask? It is simply that Trump’s own erratic style has caused concerns around the world as many leaders have lost confidence in him and in America following his own controversial tariffs strategy which seems to be showing no signs at all of benefiting American businesses or addressing blue colour workers’ concerns over keeping their jobs. World leaders simply cannot keep up with the madness of the Donald for the simple reason that there is no real, long-term strategy in anything he does on the foreign policy circuit. Most is feral experimentation based on his foibles, whims and guidance by others who are blowing smoke in his eyes while working on their own agenda, like Israel.

The recent campaign in Iran has failed entirely in its objectives and made Israel weaker and more vulnerable; the tariffs hike is not showing any signs at all in what it set out to do – devalue the dollar, attract inbound investment in the U.S. economy, create jobs and enamel U.S. hegemony around the world. Recent figures just out show that the U.S. economy is floundering at best, while heading towards a recession at worse. And Trump’s handling of Putin, over Ukraine, also calls into question not only his judgement, his ability to work with heavyweight world leaders but also his lack of consistency in almost all foreign policies. Trump promised voters that he was for peace and wanted to end the killing, but just this week the Senate has approved 1bn USD funding for Ukraine.

His latest strategy to become more of an enemy with Russia by trying to directly undermine its economy through secondary sanctions is so dangerous, as is the recent childish threats made on social media, that it makes the possibility of a war with Russia more realistic by the day. It’s also another classic example of him doing a U-turn on his own initiatives, or at least those of his office, given that it was the U.S. who initially pushed India to buy Russian oil.

And so threatening India, Brazil and China that if they don’t stop buying Russian oil, there will be massive tariffs – some say 100 percent – on their goods entering the U.S. market is stupid on a scale that we haven’t seen before.

But it also worries a number of Global South countries who fear him changing his mind on other pledges that he’s made.

Trump’s second term in office has unshackled him from the cabal of advisers who often held him back from being entirely free to do what he wants at any given moment, simply based on the latest tantrum and insecurity attack. Trump 2.0 has none of these people and we can see it with how he is handling Russia.

It’s unlikely that India will kowtow to these latest threats, despite some reports indicating that they’re already looking for new oil suppliers. In the case of China, it is simply laughable that Trump can even float the idea that the U.S. is even in a position to threaten Beijing when so many U.S. companies are dependent on rare earths and minerals China has in abundance. We will have to see if Brazil responds to the threats recently made by one of Trump’s closest confidents Lindsey Graham, yet it’s unlikely going to change its policies. All that the foolish new strategy by Trump’s will achieve is that the BRICS projects moves forward at a more concerted pace, acquiring sooner rather than later its own currency and bank clearing system to challenge SWIFT.

But you can understand why the messages from Trump were recently sent to Morocco. Rabat must have been getting increasingly skittish about the secondary sanctions threats against those who buy Russian oil and wondering whether Trump will withdraw his earlier move which gave Western Sahara’s sovereignty bid to Morocco – made in the last days of his first term. Clearly these messages from him to Rabat are aimed at calming tensions in the ministry of foreign affairs in Rabat as well as the palace.

It’s important to remember though that Trump’s seemingly good relations with Morocco and his support for its sovereignty of Western Sahara is entirely down to the power Israel has over him and his administration. Trump probably couldn’t find Morocco on a world map but probably knows that Hilary Clinton’s campaign against him in 2016 received considerable backing from the King of Morocco. And so it’s this key relationship – not with Rabat but with Israel – which determines the Sahara deal. Morocco buys all its oil from Russia yet has been obliged since the start of the Ukraine war to give an impression, to media at least, that Moscow is persona non grata.

This was certainly the case during the Biden administration yet once Trump came to power again some analysts and commentators (including myself) made the erroneous assumption that relations between Rabat and Moscow would blossom again. Who could forget the photo of Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov having a cosy meeting with Morocco’s FM Bourita while both at a UN assembly just weeks before Trump won the U.S. elections a second time around? Most thought that with a Trump win, previous mega projects announced by both sides involving Russia building nuclear power and water desalination plants would take off where they left off.

But it never happened. The strategy of Mr Bourita, no doubt under instruction from the palace, was to continue to keep an impression going that Moscow was still a ‘frenemy’ until we know for sure that relations between Trump and Putin are going to remain good – given all the positive vibes at the very beginning of Trump’s second term. It was a wise move. If the relationship turned sour, then Trump may well, out of petulance, wind back his Sahara deal with Morocco if Rabat had openly good relations with Moscow. Since Rabat has kept it cool, it would seem that Trump has little reason to play this card.

And so Rabat continues the charade of pretending to have poor relations with Russia when in fact it doesn’t. The situation is very delicate and Mr Bourita has gone to great lengths to make sure there are no signs that full diplomatic status has been restored, despite the somewhat comical scenario of Russia having a fully functioning embassy in Rabat. Mr Bourita’s own officials have even blocked my own press accreditation application, as a correspondent for RT, such is the palpable tension over the matter, despite Russia’s own diplomatic corps talking with their opposite number in MOFA to allow me to have a press card. All to no avail as, despite me working in Morocco since 2007 for Euronews, CNN and many other media giants like the Daily Mail, Rabat deems it unwise to give me a press card with RT as such a move might upset the apple cart – a vehicle so dexterously yet delicately held together that one miniscule pot hole might send the wheels flying off, such is the tightrope that Morocco walks between Russia’s oil deal and Trump’s capricious relationship with both Morocco and Israel. Of course my blocked press card can’t be anything to do with Rabat’s new tougher measures which are designed to deter senior journalists settling here and breaking away from the offered narrative to go rogue and report on facts. Perish the thought!

Levity aside though, can the Moroccans trust Trump? Of course not, as why all this kafuffle of late and the reassurances that keep coming? Surely the more times you assure your wife you won’t cheat on her when you go on your latest oversees business trip, the more she will assume that you will do precisely that. And she’d be right.

The real worry for Rabat is that they and the Sahara endorsement are used as a card against Israel if Trump ever needs to demonstrate his perceived supremacy over Netanyahu and Putin simultaneously. Given Trump’s declining foreign policy conduits, the demise of the domestic economy, the Epstein affair and the failure of him to secure peace in Ukraine, there is no telling what Trump will do when the U.S. media start to turn on him. It’s starting with Epstein as the questions won’t go away but it is more worrying for him that the business press are going to have a field day with numbers in the coming months.

Trump may well seek solace in foreign policy and doing his trick – constantly changing policies to bedazzle a public who can’t keep up with it all in the press – while he struggles to grasp the rudimentary requirements of leadership. We cannot rule out U.S. troops being sent to Ukraine if for nothing else to boost his confidence and to distract U.S. media. And we certainly cannot rule out a major falling out with Netanyahu which could have calamitous implications for Morocco which has no defensive measures in place to defer the impact – no international media presence, no strong lobbying neither in London or Washington – leaving it vulnerable. Morocco always thinks of international diplomacy in bite sizes and hides behind the ‘neutrality’ stance. If Morocco ever needed its own billion dollar Al Jazeera type channel in three languages, it is now. Rabat always thinks small but there can be no better example of how this goes against national interests than the present crisis that Morocco currently has with Trump.

It might be time for Rabat to hedge its bets and improve relations with Moscow. But I’m not counting on getting my press card any day soon. America’s marriage vows with Morocco are due to be renewed again any day soon offered to a country that understands more than anyone how fake marriages work.

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En diversas publicaciones ya he advertido del peligro que corre España (y con ella Europa entera) siguiendo con la política de sumisión y apaciguamiento ante Marruecos que hace tiempo estamos llevando a cabo. La llegada del R78 supuso, ante el sultanato magrebí, la exhibición española de numerosos signos de debilidad.

Como he mostrado, por ejemplo, en el artículo “El Gran Marruecos”, el régimen de este país norteafricano nunca ha dejado de mostrar ambiciones expansionistas. Estas ambiciones incluyen la apropiación del Sahara Occidental, antigua colonia (primero) y provincia (después, hasta la invasión marroquí, 1975) y el exterminio y asimilación del pueblo saharaui, un pueblo cuyos miembros –de facto– pasaron de ser ciudadanos españoles de pleno derecho hasta 1975 a ser súbditos forzosos del sultán marroquí, cuando no apátridas. Probablemente el caso del Sahara ex español sea único en la historia del “imperialismo”: un estado africano neofeudal conquista territorio de un estado europeo capitalista, y somete con ello a una parte de su población nativa.

El pueblo saharaui no se rinde, como sí lo hicieron los gobernantes españoles de entonces y de ahora; aunque los más lúcidos de los polisarios deberían revisar, como tantos hispanófobos de Iberoamérica, si la lucha por su independencia y sus atentados contra el Estado Español les han traído beneficios. Dentro de España se está mal, fuera, peor. Al contrario de lo que Clío nos enseña, de nuevo la gente se empecina y así se repite la historia: los independentistas (como ahora en Cataluña) se prestan a manejos de la Anglósfera, y consiguen victorias pírricas ante una España envilecida y decadente desde hace siglos. Al pretender defender a un pueblo, lo desligan de su matriz y lo arruinan, aunque en el caso saharaui, ni siquiera han logrado una independencia formal, como la lograda por los criollos (españoles traidores aunque muchos legítimamente descontentos en su día). No obstante, no será este mi centro de atención en el presente artículo.

En estas breves líneas prefiero llamar la atención sobre la colonización del relato, que corre paralela con el hecho que Marruecos está empezando a colonizar demográficamente España. Es lógico que una potencia expansionista e imperialista, como es el país magrebí, una vez consolidada su conquista (territorial en el caso del Sahara y demográfica en el caso de Canarias, Ceuta, Melilla, gran parte de Andalucía, el Mediterráneo, etc.) emprenda una conquista “narrativa”.

Como escribe Ahmed Baba:

“Hace años que el régimen marroquí comprendió que la batalla del relato en España es fundamental para normalizar en la opinión pública española la ocupación que ejerce sobre el Sáhara Occidental, además de tapar la represión interna y vender una supuesta estabilidad y apertura política y económica.”

Hoy, con el gobierno de Pedro Sánchez, la política española ha dado un giro histórica y geopolíticamente inexplicable. Históricamente, porque el Reino de España ha cambiado de la noche a la mañana su postura contraria a la anexión del Sahara Occidental por parte del sultanato marroquí. De acuerdo con sus responsabilidades como antigua potencia colonialista, y detentadora de soberanía después (la provincia del Sahara fue creada en 1958), España no podía aceptar –como ahora acepta- esta anexión.

Dado que el ejército español salió huyendo, por orden del rey Juan Carlos, de una provincia bajo soberanía española, y sin disparar un solo tiro, lo mínimo exigible al gobierno español dada una anexión de facto sería acatar las resoluciones de la ONU y preocuparse por el derecho de autodeterminación del pueblo saharaui.

España ha protagonizado un caso único, repito. Creo que es el único país europeo que ha permitido que un país africano (Marruecos) invada una provincia suya (pues el Sahara Occidental, en el momento de la invasión ya no era colonia, vuelvo a repetir, sino provincia española), y además permite que el sultanato marroquí controle las políticas, afectando a sus intereses en materia de seguridad, economía y geopolítica.

Geopolíticamente, la llave de dos mares (Atlántico y Mediterráneo) y de dos continentes-mundo (África islamizada y Europa ex cristiana) está en manos de Marruecos por decisión yanqui e israelí. En esta situación, los españoles nos quedamos como reses en el matadero. Solo cabe esperar la hora del sacrificio.

Primero invadieron el Sahara Español y ahora el poderoso lobby marroquí ha convertido a toda España en una colonia suya. Ahí está el caso del trato de favor que recibe Marruecos por parte de Bruselas y de Washington, en detrimento de los intereses españoles.

En la propia España, los marroquíes están creando sus órganos de propaganda, con la colaboración de políticos y periodistas españoles. El “síndrome de don Julián” se repite. Cuenta la leyenda que el gobernador ceutí, teóricamente a las órdenes del rey godo de Hispania, don Rodrigo, pactó el muy traidor con los musulmanes en 711 a los cuales les facilitó embarcaciones para pasar a la península y así consumar la invasión, en connivencia con la facción witiziana. La progresiva sumisión de España a Marruecos no sería posible sin estos personajes de la calaña de Pedro Sánchez, sucesores de don Julián, así como sus ministros y muchos miembros de la “élite” empresarial, periodística, etc. Como sigue relatando Ahmed Baba, la potencia invasora de Marruecos tiene permiso para expandir su “narrativa”:

“En 2013 [el régimen marroquí] abrió en España el diario Atalayar, sus fundadores y actuales subdirector y director adjunto, son Mohamed Auchan y Mustafá Amadjar, y de director pusieron a Javier Ribas, un rebotado de la COPE que utilizan como cara visible y así camuflar quienes realmente están detrás.

Antes de fundar Atalayar, Mohamed y Mustafá trabajaban como periodistas en la oficina en Madrid de la agencia MAP (agencia oficial de noticias marroquí), en 2009 fue señalada en una sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid como una tapadera de la DGED (espionaje exterior marroquí) a raíz de una denuncia por un artículo en el diario El Mundo del periodista marroquí exiliado en España Alí Lmrabt, donde les señaló como “un nido de espías”, el tribunal dio la razón al periodista y dictaminó que MAP y sus supuestos periodistas, entre los cuales estaban los fundadores de Atalayar, eran «elementos del espionaje marroquí en España».

El espionaje de los marroquís en España es el pan de cada día. El régimen despótico y abominable de Mohamed VI ha modernizado sus sistemas gracias a la ayuda de los sionistas, tanto estadounidenses como israelitas. Los políticos de todas las tendencias, derecha e izquierda, están siendo rastreados de continuo. Deben recordarse escándalos como el del móvil de Pedro Sánchez (software Pegasus), así como la nunca esclarecida relación de Pablo Iglesias con una señorita vinculada a Marruecos y a un partido político (el PAM, Partido Autenticidad y Modernidad) del país norteafricano, muy vinculado al sultán Mohamed VI. Ya de por sí es preocupante que los partidos políticos españoles contraten o recluten a asesores de origen marroquí y con vínculos con esa dictadura. Si encima hay escándalos de espionaje de por medio, podemos decir que don Julián, de nuevo, hace de las suyas.

La Dirección General de Estudios y Documentación (DGED, Los espías marroquís) están bajo sospecha desde que se descubrió que al menos 200 móviles de figuras principales de nuestro gobierno han sido atacados por el software Pegasus (de origen israelí): Sánchez, Grande-Marlaska, Margarita Robles…así como activistas saharauis y periodistas españoles que investigan las extrañas relaciones con el país magrebí así como el contencioso del Sahara. De manera inaudita, España no toma medidas contra el sultanato, a quien sigue llamando “aliado y amigo”. Seguramente el gobierno español y sus fuerzas armadas no dan ni un solo paso, en caso de que trataran de defender la soberanía española (caso dudoso) sin que su “aliado y amigo” se entere. El Reino de España vive bajo una continua presión y chantaje. Una vez que invadieron la provincia (ex colonia) del Sahara, la consigna de “lo volveremos a hacer” está presente en las autoridades marroquís. El 17 y 18 de mayo de 2021 varios miles de marroquís –se habla incluso de 12.000 o más- (y algunos subsaharianos también) protagonizaron una nueva “Marcha Verde” en Ceuta. Tenga en cuenta el lector que si se fueron, o “fueron devueltos”, ha sido porque quisieron. El jefe de toda esa tropa, que no es otro que Mohamed VI y su majzén, conseguiría lo suyo por medio de un repliegue. Pero a muchos de los españoles no nos cabe ninguna duda: “lo volverán a hacer”.

Eso explica que se dé un trato de favor a gran parte del millón de marroquís que viven en España (un millón, según cifras oficiales, lo cual puede indicar que la cifra real es muy superior). Varias docenas de miles de jóvenes marroquís tienen estudios gratis desde primaria hasta universidad, a pesar de la escasa motivación y “fracaso” escolar de buena parte de ellos (cercano al 70% en muchas provincias, en la etapa de ESO). Las ayudas sociales a esta población succionan una parte importante de nuestros recursos. Los problemas de desórdenes públicos, delincuencia, gastos en manutención e internamiento en prisiones, tienen marcado sabor marroquí en buena medida.

Los españoles no estamos comiendo este cuscús, nos guste o no.Que se dejen de tonterías sobre “islamofobia” o “xenofobia”. Un país extranjero y con afanes expansionistas está perjudicando gravemente los intereses de España, poniéndolo en serio peligro. Este “vecino y aliado” que tan poco favorecedor nos resulta, pese a la retórica gubernamental, a la de Caritas y mil y una ONGs, y el discurso especialmente socialista y sumatorio-podemista, es un estado que ya nos ha invadido y, sin embargo, posee sus propios órganos de agitación y de narrativa imperialista magrebí, radicados en nuestra casa. Grandes caballos de Troya han penetrado nuestras murallas tiempo ha. De nuevo cito a Ahmed Baba:

“También cabe señalar la intensidad de los artículos (casi diarios) que publican entre otras El Huffpost y La Razón, por supuesto bien remunerados, son cortes y pegas de la prensa marroquí en francés que el régimen se empeña en exportar a España, en ellos los ataques al Polisario y el lavado de imagen del régimen es tan descarado como evidente.

Un ejemplo de este descaro y colaboracionismo es el diario que dirige Paco Marhuenda, conocido enemigo de la causa saharaui, y que llegó incluso a negar la existencia de este pueblo en una intervención en La Sexta Noche, un vídeo ampliamente difundido por marroquíes en redes sociales.”

No nos extrañe que nieguen la existencia misma de los saharauis como pueblo con identidad propia. Muchos maurófilos de las universidades españolas niegan la existencia de España y de los españoles. Apenas cuenta que vengamos de los celtas, iberos, romanos, godos, suevos, etc. Somos para ellos una especie de moriscos camuflados. Para combatir esto, el profesor Armando Besga ha tenido que escribir en los tiempos recientes toda una serie de volúmenes para demostrar que España existió y existe, frente a esta caterva de académicos pagados (como los imanes y las mezquitas) por Rabat, si bien hay otros pagadores de países mahometanos que compiten con Mohamed VI (Emiratos, Arabia Saudí, etc.). Dice el señor Baba:

“La Razón tiene como colaborador a Ahmed Charai, un periodista y empresario y colaborador de los servicios secretos marroquíes, en 2007 fue detenido en el aeropuerto JF Kennedy de Nuevo York por intentar sacar 50 mil dólares en una maleta, tres días después pudo salir del país tras la intervención del director de la DGED, Yassine El Mansouri.

En el diario de Marhuenda, Charai da rienda suelta a la propaganda alauí habitual sobre el conflicto del Sáhara Occidental, también destacan sus artículos de exaltación de la figura de Mohamed VI.”

Para (re)conquistar territorios de soberanía española la “narrativa” ideada desde Rabat no elude falsear la historia de España, pues nada mejor que intoxicar a un pueblo enseñándole una historia falsa y desvirtuada. Que España es una prolongación de Marruecos, y un terreno (re)conquistable para el Islam es un objetivo manifiesto para estos lobbies y “tanques de pensamiento”. Para ello, por ejemplo, la web pro-marroquí “Atalayar” recoge los tópicos de la pseudo historiografía maurófila: que la Batalla de Covadonga fue una “simple escaramuza”, que la convivencia de civilizaciones en Al-andalus era buena, que los musulmanes no estaban obsesionados con expandir su fe y que eran tolerantes, que los hispanos del tiempo de la conquista mora casi deseaban unos nuevos amos, a quienes acogieron con agrado. Por ejemplo, leemos:

“Los habitantes de la península se adaptaron al gobierno musulmán de manera similar a los de otras regiones antiguamente cristianas, como Siria o Egipto. Las elites musulmanas no alentaban la conversión al islam, en gran medida porque los dhimmi-s (minorías protegidas) debían pagar tributos de los que los musulmanes estaban exentos (la idea de conquista con el fin de propagar la verdadera religión es esencialmente propaganda de la historiografía musulmana adoptada por aquellos que quieren ver el islam como intrínsecamente violento).

Las comunidades mozárabes, cristiana y judía, gozaban de libertad de culto y se gobernaban por sus propias leyes, y los casos de persecución religiosa fueron relativamente raros, sobre todo en comparación con la Europa cristiana. Sin embargo, la mayoría de la población terminó convirtiéndose al islam, empezando por la nobleza, que deseaba mantener sus privilegios, y los esclavos, ansiosos de mejorar su situación. Y la lengua y cultura árabes eran comunes a todos los residentes en Al-Ándalus.

Los mitos fundadores de lo que ahora denominaríamos el “bando cristiano” son en realidad creaciones posteriores que pretenden establecer una continuidad histórica entre la Hispania visigoda y la España que surgió en el siglo XV. La Batalla de Covadonga que supuestamente inició la Reconquista fue poco más que una escaramuza tras la cual los musulmanes decidieron retirarse de una región montañosa pobre y aislada, mientras que los descendientes de Don Pelayo estaban demasiado ocupados intrigando los unos contra los otros y combatiendo contra otros caudillos locales para interesarse por lo que pasaba más al sur.

Falsear y reescribir la historia al gusto e interés de potencias extranjeras que nos son hostiles lo llaman “desmitificar”.Estos párrafos pseudocientíficos los escribe Ana Belén Soage en la web pro-marroquí “Atalayar”.

El pueblo español, infectado por este tipo de ideas falsas, que le desarraigan de su verdadera raíz (celtogermánica, ibérica, romana, etc.) y vendido por sus élites políticas (desde los borbones hasta Sánchez y el resto de la partitocracia) así como económicas (todos los inversionistas españoles que explotan a la gente en el Magreb y deslocalizan en España), es un pueblo tiene los días contados. Sus invasores, venidos desde África, serán recibidos como hermanos porque el terreno ya está preparado para ellos. Pero antes de consumarse la invasión, ya somos actualmente  dhimmi, y ya pagamos nuestro impuesto de “protegidos” cuando compramos productos marroquís en el súper, o cuando dejamos que nuestro agro y nuestra natalidad mueran.

Los genocidios de sangre empiezan con traiciones de papel, traiciones de despacho y circulación de maletas repletas de dinero.

Publicado originalmente por infoposta.com.ar

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Desde a retirada das forças espanholas do território do Saara Ocidental, os saarauis se veem em um conflito permanente e ruinoso com o Reino do Marrocos, o qual reivindica o território apesar da inexistência de vínculos históricos ou etnoculturais com a região.

Esse conflito, que tem alternado entre períodos de luta armada e períodos de cessar-fogo, gira em torno do reconhecimento ou não da independência da República Árabe Saaraui Democrática, ou do pertencimento do seu território ao Marrocos.

Apesar desse conflito parecer obscuro (pelo menos em comparação como causas nacionais mais famosas, como a palestina), já são 82 os países que reconhecem a soberania da RASD, que é também membro da União Africana. Nesse sentido, de fato, existe uma razoabilidade na reivindicação saaraui que torna plausível a conquista de seu objetivo no longo prazo – especialmente após a reestruturação planetária em um sentido multipolar.

Essa “razoabilidade” tem sido reconhecida no âmbito jurídico-internacional desde praticamente o começo da luta pela independência, a qual se deu no contexto internacional dos processos de descolonização. Já em 1975, antes mesmo da retirada espanhola, a ONU exigia a realização de um referendo para decidir o destino do território; e quando o Marrocos solicitou o encaminhamento para o Tribunal de Haia da questão do Saara Ocidental e seus supostos “vínculos” com o Marrocos, o veredito de Haia foi que o Saara Ocidental tinha as suas próprias autoridades legítimas tribais as quais teriam acordado com o Rei da Espanha no século XIX a sua anexação, excluindo a tese marroquina de que a região era “terra de ninguém”, negando também a existência de qualquer vínculo jurídico com o Marrocos que pudesse negar o princípio da livre autodeterminação do povo saaraui.

Não obstante, por oportunismo, aproveitando-se do vácuo de poder, o Marrocos invadiu o Saara Ocidental logo após a decisão do Tribunal de Haia. Trata-se de uma invasão peculiar porque o consenso em relação à legitimidade da pretensão soberanista saaraui era elevado, o que fica evidenciado especialmente no que concerne as relações diplomáticas africanas, onde a RASD desfruta de um amplo consenso, a ponto de por um longo tempo o Marrocos estar excluído das fileiras da União Africana pela inclusão da RASD.

Apesar de promessas de realização de um referendo já no início dos anos 90 e da construção ilegal de um muro dividindo a região entre uma zona dominada pelo Marrocos e uma zona livre, a realidade é que a solução definitiva do conflito permanece pendente, sem referendo de independência, com uma missão da ONU (a MINURSO) pequena e tímida em comparação com outras, e com o conflito reativado nos últimos anos.

Os EUA, hegemon na ordem unipolar, já demonstrou que não está interessado em uma solução definitiva para o conflito – pelo menos uma que seja satisfatória para os saarauis – e apoia as reivindicações marroquinas (como o faz Israel).

Não obstante, no esteio das transformações geopolíticas que acompanham a transição de um momento unipolar para uma ordem multipolar, talvez seja possível encontrar uma solução – aquela já demandada no âmbito da ONU – para o conflito no Saara Ocidental.

Quanto a isso, recordemos que países como Rússia e China tem tido experiência com a resolução de conflitos e com a aproximação de adversários geopolíticos, com muitos casos concretos nos últimos anos. Basta recordarmos a reaproximação entre Irã e Arábia Saudita, bem como a renovação dos diálogos entre Síria e Turquia.

Assim, em um primeiro lugar, é necessário apontar que as próprias alterações estruturais no plano internacional dificultarão a continuidade das pretensões marroquinas. É que os EUA estão perdendo uma capacidade de projetar a sua influência de forma efetiva graças à multiplicação dos seus engajamentos internacionais e ao próprio processo interno de decadência pelo qual o país passa.

Por sua vez, apesar de obstáculos representados pelas sanções, após um eventual encerramento (favorável à Rússia) da operação militar especial, Moscou estará em uma posição internacional tão elevado quanto aquele de que desfrutava durante a Guerra Fria.

O mesmo deve ser dito do outro grande aliado de Marrocos, Israel, que passa por uma crise sem precedentes por causa de sua campanha militar desastrosa contra Gaza e contra o Líbano. O país sofre com um êxodo, um colapso econômico e uma devastação diplomática, com poucas chances de recuperação breve mesmo em caso de fim repentino do conflito.

Marrocos tende a se ver em uma situação na qual não poderá mais se apoiar em seus principais aliados. E isso enquanto o principal rival regional do Marrocos, a Argélia (que constitui o principal país apoiador da causa saaraui) desfruta de relações internacionais mais favoráveis nesse contexto, sustentando uma relação mais próxima com as potências contra-hegemônicas. No mesmo sentido, analisando as relações de poder, mais ao sul da região, no Sahel, emerge uma confederação de Estados aliados da Rússia (Mali, Burkina Faso e Níger), reforçando a percepção de que Moscou terá um papel crescente como mediador nos conflitos regionais.

Ainda assim é importante reiterar que a Rússia possui boas relações com o Marrocos e busca aprimorar essas relações, especialmente na economia – tal como tem sustentado o direito à autodeterminação dos saarauis. Dessa forma, Moscou representa um polo neutro, apto a ajudar na mediação deste conflito.

Quanto a isso, apontamos também para a experiência russa com o próprio problema do leste ucraniano, que se arrastou desde o Maidan em 2013 até a operação militar especial. Apesar de inúmeras diferenças e particularidades, ali estamos também diante de uma querela envolvendo os direitos de autonomia de uma “identidade étnica local” frente a um poder central repressor.

Durante os 8 anos de conflito assimétrico que precederam a operação militar especial, discutiu-se o destino do Donbass entre uma pletora de possibilidades: reintegração forçada na Ucrânia sem autonomia, reintegração consensual na Ucrânia com autonomia, independência ou integração na Rússia. A Rússia favorecia a reintegração consensual na Ucrânia com autonomia, pauta que se refletia nos (fracassados) Acordos de Minsk.

Mas considerando que o Saara Ocidental apenas esteve submetido a governo marroquino pelo (historicamente) curto período da dinastia almorávida e que em outros períodos históricos apenas intermitentemente, parcialmente e superficialmente houve vínculos de pertencimento entre as tribos nômades do norte do atual Saara Ocidental e a autoridade instaurada nos centros de poder magrebinos – diferentemente das profundas e permanentes relações entre os territórios ucranianos e a estatalidade russa – um integração a Marrocos aparece como imediatamente desarrazoada.

Mas com a sua experiência na Crimeia e no leste ucraniano, a Rússia pode ajudar a organizar o referendo necessário para que se possa de fato dar uma solução definitiva para este conflito – e pode ajudar a convencer o Marrocos a aceitar os resultados.

Para a Rússia, essa solução é a única que pode permitir uma integração harmoniosa entre o Magrebe e a África Ocidental, restaurando laços entre Marrocos e Argélia, e facilitando a realização de inúmeros projetos logísticos, não apenas russos como chineses, que vão de rodovias e ferrovias a gasodutos.

Structural changes in the international arena will make it difficult for Morocco’s claims to continue, Eduardo Vasco writes.

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Since the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Western Sahara, the Sahrawis have found themselves in a permanent and ruinous conflict with the Kingdom of Morocco, which claims the territory despite the lack of historical or ethnocultural ties to the region. This conflict, which has alternated between periods of armed struggle and ceasefire, revolves around the recognition or rejection of the independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), or the territory’s belonging to Morocco.

Despite the obscurity of this conflict (at least in comparison to more well-known national causes like the Palestinian one), 82 countries already recognize the sovereignty of the SADR, which is also a member of the African Union. In this regard, there is indeed reasonableness in the Sahrawi claim, making their goal plausible in the long term—especially after the global restructuring towards a multipolar order.

This “reasonableness” has been recognized in the international legal sphere since the very beginning of the independence struggle, which took place in the context of decolonization processes. As early as 1975, even before the Spanish withdrawal, the UN demanded the holding of a referendum to decide the fate of the territory. When Morocco referred the issue of Western Sahara and its alleged “ties” to the kingdom to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the verdict concluded that Western Sahara had its own legitimate tribal authorities who had agreed with the King of Spain in the 19th century for annexation, dismissing Morocco’s thesis that the region was “no man’s land” and also denying the existence of any legal ties with Morocco that could override the principle of the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination.

Nevertheless, taking advantage of the power vacuum, Morocco invaded Western Sahara immediately after the ICJ’s ruling. It was a peculiar invasion because there was a strong consensus on the legitimacy of the Sahrawi sovereignty claim, as evidenced particularly in African diplomatic relations, where the SADR enjoys broad support. Morocco was even excluded from the African Union for a long time due to the inclusion of the SADR.

Despite promises of a referendum in the early 1990s and the illegal construction of a wall dividing the region into a Morocco-controlled area and a free zone, the reality is that a definitive solution to the conflict remains pending, without an independence referendum, with a small and timid UN mission (MINURSO) compared to others, and with the conflict reignited in recent years.

The United States, as the hegemon in the unipolar order, has already shown it is not interested in a definitive solution to the conflict—at least not one that satisfies the Sahrawis—and supports Morocco’s claims (as does Israel). However, amid the geopolitical transformations accompanying the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order, a solution—one already demanded by the UN—may be found for the Western Sahara conflict. In this regard, it is worth noting that countries like Russia and China have experience in resolving conflicts and bringing together geopolitical adversaries, as seen in recent years with the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the renewal of dialogue between Syria and Turkey.

First and foremost, it is necessary to point out that structural changes in the international arena will make it difficult for Morocco’s claims to continue. The U.S. is losing the ability to project its influence effectively due to the multiplication of its international engagements and the internal process of decline it is undergoing.

Meanwhile, despite the obstacles represented by sanctions, following a possible (favorable to Russia) conclusion of the special military operation, Moscow will be in a position of global influence as high as it enjoyed during the Cold War. The same can be said of Morocco’s other major ally, Israel, which is facing an unprecedented crisis due to its disastrous military campaigns against Gaza and Lebanon. The country is suffering from an exodus, an economic collapse, and diplomatic devastation, with little chance of a quick recovery, even if the conflict ends abruptly.

Morocco is likely to find itself in a situation where it can no longer rely on its main allies. Meanwhile, its main regional rival, Algeria (the principal supporter of the Sahrawi cause), enjoys more favorable international relations in this context, maintaining closer ties with counter-hegemonic powers. Similarly, examining the balance of power further south, in the Sahel, a confederation of states allied with Russia (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) is emerging, reinforcing the perception that Moscow will have an increasing role as a mediator in regional conflicts.

Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that Russia has good relations with Morocco and seeks to enhance them, especially in economic terms, while simultaneously supporting the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination. Thus, Moscow represents a neutral pole, capable of helping mediate this conflict.

In this regard, we can also point to Russia’s experience with the problem of eastern Ukraine, which dragged on from the Maidan in 2013 to the special military operation. Despite numerous differences and peculiarities, both situations involve disputes over the autonomy rights of a “local ethnic identity” against a repressive central power.

During the eight years of asymmetric conflict that preceded the special military operation, the fate of Donbass was debated among various possibilities: forced reintegration into Ukraine without autonomy, consensual reintegration with autonomy, independence, or integration into Russia. Russia favored consensual reintegration with autonomy, a stance reflected in the (failed) Minsk Agreements.

However, considering that Western Sahara was only under Moroccan rule during the (historically) brief Almoravid dynasty and that in other historical periods, the ties between the nomadic tribes of northern present-day Western Sahara and the Maghreb power centers were intermittent, partial, and superficial—unlike the deep and permanent relations between Ukrainian territories and Russian statehood—integration into Morocco appears immediately unreasonable.

With its experience in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Russia can help organize the necessary referendum to definitively resolve this conflict—and it can help convince Morocco to accept the results. For Russia, this solution is the only one that can enable harmonious integration between the Maghreb and West Africa, restoring ties between Morocco and Algeria, and facilitating the realization of numerous logistical projects, not only Russian but also Chinese, ranging from highways and railways to gas pipelines.

As Britain races towards the poles with a general election almost certain to topple the Conservative party in power, regional analysts will be speculating what impact, if any, a Labour party in Downing Street will have in the MENA region.

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As Britain races towards the poles with a general election almost certain to topple the Conservative party in power, regional analysts will be speculating what impact, if any, a Labour party in Downing Street will have in the MENA region.

For North Africa, the apple cart is probably going to be upset, in particular, when Algeria and Morocco are put under the microscope. A Labour government in Downing Street is almost certainly not going to be a supporter of Morocco’s sovereignty claims over Western Sahara as Labour have friends in Algeria and some of its figures even openly support the Polisario. Without any doubt, within days of being in power Labour will want to make some token statement to Rabat which the latter is not going to take very well and so a recalibration of diplomatic relations will follow. To be fair, the so-called special relationship between Rabat and London wasn’t really what it was hyped to be by both sides. It was a special relationship which both sides aspired to, dreamed about and hoped for in the future.

In reality, the UK was hoping for Morocco to buy UK arms while Morocco was hoping for mega investments in Western Sahara. The latter did happen but only once, in the form of a UK solar company which claims that it is investing 100 bn dollars in the disputed region. Due to the opaqueness of the deal and the odd nature of its British CEO who has been told by the Moroccan side that he can’t speak to the press, one has to wonder if the investment is all from the UK side – or in fact from the Moroccan side from an individual with very deep pockets. But fake or real, those kind of deals the Moroccans were hoping for in abundance and now that once good relations are about to be ruined, there is a pause for reflection which the Rabat elite might capitalise on.

Of course, no one is expecting anyone in Rabat to take responsibility for any gaffes or lost opportunities. That’s just not part of the elite’s élan. It doesn’t do mea culpa.

Will the Moroccans ever take any responsibility though for their diplomatic tentacles not being as dynamic enough to develop new relations with EU countries or the UK? And while we reflect on the limited scope of Moroccan diplomats we might as well consider Morocco’s zero public relations machine around the world. Working with the press for their own advantage is not something that Rabat is able to do, largely because for the last ten years at least it has been doing everything it can to break off all relations with journalists, ensure that foreign correspondents leave the country – in ten years the number of registered foreign correspondents has more than halved – and not have any one-to-one relations with hacks in London, Washington or Brussels. Public relations worldwide is something that Morocco simply doesn’t even try to do and so when failures happen, few Rabat big thinkers ever ask themselves could things be different if we changed our attitudes towards the press?

Morocco doesn’t have one single strategic relationship with a London-based journalist working on a national newspaper save for a couple of business hacks who recently did puff pieces on Morocco’s investment opportunities – which we should be cynical about, without going into too many details.

Rabat will of course blame the UK for the conservative party leaving office and will not reflect on its diplomatic failures or, worse, its wholesale reluctance to embrace international journalists. Yet when we delve deeper we see that Morocco is a big loser as it failed on many levels to get more out of a relationship with the conservatives while they were in office.

It is little known that a free trade agreement with the UK and Morocco could have easily been extended to Western Sahara in the early part of this year but was left at the bottom of the pile in Kemi Badenoch’s ministry due to the British consultant who was dropped by Morocco’s ministry of foreign affairs having no incentive to fast track it. He was dumped, so he dumped the dossier. Morocco’s feeble diplomatic machine lost a huge opportunity to not only get Western Sahara investment ramped up ten times, but to have netted the UK as a full-on supporter of Morocco’s bid at the UN to legitimize its claims. Rabat’s ability to shoot itself in the foot on the international stage is breath-taking. It’s a similar story with the journalists in Morocco who find themselves locked up on trumped-up charges and are now, it is claimed, being tortured. Those who are behind this obviously can’t see the harm it does not only to relations around the world with the big movers and shakers but also the message it sends to humble Moroccans who ask themselves how stable can the regime be if it needs to stoop so low with such desperate measures? Morocco can’t get the dream deal it wants with its UN proposal to give Western Sahara semi-autonomy. It can only dream of it. But even if it came close, who would have the difficult task of standing up at the UNGA assembly at the UN and preach about human rights – the core of the debate on the Sahara – when journalists in Morocco are dying in jail?

One such dream, before October 7^th of last year, was that special relations with Israel would push the US to not only adopt the paper but also corral a vast number of Global South countries to support it as well. One foot, one bullet. Bang. Another idea would have been to develop relations with the UK so Britain would not only lobby Washington on Rabat’s behalf but also usher in a new era of British companies investing in the Sahara and taking advantage of tax breaks. Second foot, second bullet. Bang. If Morocco had a third foot, add to the mix white-washing Rabat’s human rights record within the EU by bribing MEPs to do the dirty work in the European Parliament – and then make a speech condemning the EU! Third bullet. Third foot. Bang. The list is quite long of diplomatic catastrophes which have put Morocco’s hopes of achieving anything in the Sahara back decades, giving the Algerians plenty to laugh about. But the central theme is always the same: bad diplomacy, zero PR strategy.

Just how many decades need to pass before someone in Rabat realises that Morocco needs a whole new international PR strategy so that it can punch above its weight and be taken seriously on the world’s stage? The lost opportunities are as great in number as the number of journalists dying in prison. Morocco, it would appear, has a joined-up thinking crisis and a power vacuum which has been taken up by the security services who are now telling the business elite who once ran them how things are going to be. How’s that working out?

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August is a month which found most government officials in Rabat on holiday away from the capital and its woes. But for those who had to man the ministries, much confusion hung in the air within the foreign affairs ministry itself when it pondered Morocco’s relations with its oldest ally America.

The pinnacle moment of excitement came between Israel and Morocco when the former finally acknowledged Rabat’s claim to Western Sahara, the disputed region in the south of Morocco which was originally a colony of Spain until 1975 when Madrid effectively abandoned it.

And yet there were no fireworks, no great jubilation from Rabat despite the huge significance of the move. Morocco’s elite are sceptical about Israel’s move, especially given that Israel has still yet to set up a consulate in Western Sahara itself. The reason why they have stalled is not clear but we have to take a look at the bigger picture of what the recognition was all about in the first place and the reasons behind it. According to the leading analyst Sami Hamdi, writing for Maghrebi.org, all along the Moroccans believed that if they ramped up relations with Israel, their payback would be access to Congress in the U.S. via Israeli leading figures. That access, they hoped, would fast track a new initiative with the UN for Western Sahara to be given its official recognition – a dream of the King of Morocco and many people in the country itself. But the Israelis knew that this wouldn’t work and so dragged their feet, hoping a new turn of events could be exploited. In the event, according to Hamdi, the Israelis sensed that the Moroccans were growing tired of the games and were even considering pulling out of the normalisation deal altogether – prompting Tel Aviv to go ahead with the recognition just to keep Rabat happy.

But the Moroccans are not stupid. They know they have been tricked by Israel and now the best Rabat can hope for is that if Israel goes ahead and builds a consulate in Western Sahara its significance will only mean something if the Biden administration follows the initiative itself.

However, this is looking unlikely. When we examine Biden’s movements and ideas about Morocco and Algeria – with the Sahara at the heart of it all – we see that his views about how to reduce tensions are based on his obsession with Trump. He cannot go ahead with supporting any hardball initiative that Rabat and Israel might have been hoping for in terms of beefing up Morocco’s military; instead, we have seen in recent weeks, him gravitate towards a much more softly-softly approach in dealing with Algeria. Recent visits by Anthony Blinken, which resulted in Algiers saying it was “satisfied” with the U.S. position on Western Sahara and where Morocco has found itself leave no doubt that Algeria is being wooed as a new ally in the region both for its energy reserves and geopolitics. The old adage of bringing your enemies closer, seems to be the Biden administration’s view on how to tackle Algiers.

For the Rabat elite, this is extremely frustrating as it doesn’t advance the Sahara dossier and only creates an atmosphere of resentment towards the Biden camp, leaving the Moroccans in the same boat as most GCC countries who are literally counting the days before they hope Trump will come back and some sort of order can be restored.

But it’s not all bad news. A certain high testosterone attitude from Rabat is some concern with even some of its acolytes calling for the palace to consider buying 90 million dollar F-35 jets as a counter measure to Algiers’ wild spending spree on military hardware. The idea, a somewhat ludicrous one which hasn’t been thought out at all, would only up the stakes in an arms race if it were ever to get off the drawing board and make Biden’s balancing act between Rabat and Algiers even harder to pull off. The Moroccans may not like Biden’s diplomacy with their arch foe, but it’s one which is reducing tensions between the two countries and keeping the peace. The Algerians, on their part, aren’t going to jump through hoops though to show they are a serious player through diplomacy, as the Moroccan King recently found when he offered an olive branch in a recent speech. Nothing came back. But as long as the Americans have a respectful and fortuitous dialogue with Algiers, peace rather than conflict on the continent can be assured whether it be in Western Sahara or in Niger where Algiers has hinted it would involve itself if western-aligned African countries decide to intervene. With the two-year anniversary of the fiasco of America’s retreat from Afghanistan still fresh in the minds of many analysts, it’s hard to find too many initiatives by Biden on the foreign policy circuit which can be deemed smart moves. The Moroccans should be more grateful for small mercies.

After the dust is starting to settle on the biggest corruption scandal the EU has ever had, it seems that it was not created by Qatar, but by Morocco which had a network of corrupt MEPs on the books for almost 20 years. But who else got the whitewashing service?

It has shaken both the foundations and the highest echelons of the EU elite in Brussels. But the Eva Kaili corruption case, which has so far jailed three MEPs, is not quite what it seems. Much as it would be desirable to pin the blame on cash-rich Qataris swanning about Brussels with suitcases of cash, recent investigations from Belgian authorities have unearthed that a Qatari minister came to Brussels recently and only had to go to a “one stop shop” – a cabal of cash-hungry MEPs who had been on the Moroccan payroll for at least 15 years to whitewash the kingdom’s human rights record and get the best deal for Western Sahara in terms of trade deal breaks and status.

This group of corrupt MEPs had been taking cash and gifts for at least 15 years and were well known on the Brussels circuit for their ‘pay-as-you-go’ services within the European parliament whose ‘foreign affairs committee’ – once considered prestigious and certainly important on the EU circuit – has now been left in tatters.

For decades Morocco got a free ride in Brussels. The question of sovereignty of its annexed Western Sahara was never raised. The rights of the citizens of this disputed region never put under the spotlight, while the territory itself benefited from an EU trade deal covering fish and minerals to name but a few. Even the human rights record, in general, of Morocco within its own country has been bypassed for so long as the EU once considered it the darling of the MENA region for its reforms on women’s rights, for example.

The whitewashing in general came from the European Parliament which the other EU institutions, to some extent, had to respect (although the EU courts refused ultimately to accept that Western Sahara could or should be included with Morocco in terms of benefiting from a trade deal with the EU).

So now, three key questions emerge which the Moroccan press, stalwart champions of self-censorship, will certainly not ask. How much does the cash-for-whitewashing scandal effect Morocco’s current claims on Western Sahara, both at the UN and at EU level? Secondly, does the EU now begin to look at Morocco without the rose-tinted specs and start to examine the bevy of arrests from anyone who questions decisions made on a high level – from journalists on trumped-up charges in jail to former ministers who have dared to criticise how the government and the powerful business elite go about running the country – and act accordingly?

And lastly, perhaps more importantly, is the unedifying subject of who else benefited from these dirty MEPs and their services? Anyone who follows the EU’s pathetic attempts at acting as a world player with a papier-mâché hegemony which it hilariously conjures up for Global South countries in particular will ask the obvious question about Israel. The abysmal dehumanisation of rights of the Palestinians who every day on social media we see having their land stolen, their olive trees uprooted or in many cases their homes destroyed by Israelis, who do so in the full knowledge that there will be no hue and cry from the West and in particular the EU itself. When just recently a Palestinian in the West Bank was shot dead at point blank range by an Israeli security officer who was wrestling with him, it didn’t make MSM channels and it certainly didn’t create any ripple of shockwaves among MEPs. How is that possible, one might ask, from an institution whose raison d’être is to protect human rights both within the EU and with those it interacts and trades with?

The last time the EU even feigned to threaten Israel over its draw-dropping human rights atrocities was in 2014 when a somewhat idealist and ‘Arabist’ Federica Mogherini entered office and just for a few weeks suggested that the EU should enforce a labelling system for goods made in occupied Palestine which make their way to European supermarkets. The idea quickly fizzled away, within a few weeks, and was never heard of again. Given what we know about the Moroccan network of MEPs on the baksheesh payroll, not to mention the date of Mogherini’s proposal, is it inconceivable that these same parliamentarians were taking cash to lobby their colleagues in committees to give Israel a break? The deafening and spooky silence from the EU on Israel’s daily genocide of the Palestinians is worrying, but now we know how the European Parliament operates when it comes to atrocities committed by MENA region countries – and how they are airbrushed out of the curriculum – it is hardly surprising that the brutality of the Israeli regime has intensified. The real story about corruption though in the European parliament is not the three MEPs taking cash but how the 702 other MEPs will want to now prevent any real investigation going on internally, all simply to save their jobs and preserve their cosy lifestyles.

Morocco’s border with Spain is beginning to emerge as Europe’s new soft underbelly with new flows of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa expected to head for its border fence with two Spanish enclaves dotted along Morocco’s Mediterranean coast, experts are indicating.

The warning, after two recent assaults to climb flimsy fences, which allowed a total of 12,000 immigrants into the EU, that such crossings will become more of a common event, coincides with the EU admitting that a “huge” migration wave from the Middle East and Africa is expected “soon” because of the food crisis aggravated by the war in Ukraine.

Experts claim that a recent stunt in June was due to a spat between Morocco and the EU over Brussels’ new push to cosy up to Algeria, due to the energy crisis sparked by the Ukraine war – and will be repeated by Rabat, Strategic Culture Foundation can reveal.

Recently, African immigrants camping on the Moroccan side of a Spanish enclave perched on the Moroccan coastline scaled fences and entered the Spanish territory, in a chaotic, violent scramble which resulted in 23 deaths.

The horrific scenes, with bodies piled up on one another has caused an international hue and cry.

Yet the move has also raised some questions as to whether they were encouraged to go ahead with the operation or were manoeuvred there through violence, while Moroccan authorities were condemned by human rights organisations and Spain for swiftly burying the victims, without even autopsy or any identity.

The unprecedented flow of migrants is seen by some as part of a long-running campaign by the Moroccan government to deliver political messages both to the EU and to the French and Spanish governments, according to geopolitical experts who monitor the tumultuous relations between Rabat and its neighbours.

And it’s not the first time.

Western Sahara row

Previously, in May 2021, Rabat allowed a staggering 10,000 African refugees to enter the Spanish enclave in one day, as part of a game it was then playing with Madrid to get Madrid to support its Western Sahara policy at the UN. “Morocco is more inclined to threaten the Spanish state – and Europe indirectly – with security and migration issues when it does not achieve its objectives,” Leticia Rodriguez, a researcher at Granada University, explained.

Since then Madrid caved in, which gave Rabat the green light to continue such an unconventional strategy to achieve its geopolitical goals – this time beating and harassing the migrants in their own makeshift camps along the northern coast of Morocco, provoking them, many believe, to make their way to the fenced border.

Rabat’s more recent anger at the EU and towards France for restricting the number of visas it issues Moroccans, while also noting its refusal to intervene in a long-going row with Algeria – fuelled by the war in Ukraine – has pushed the Moroccan elite to play the same card again, sparked this time by the EU trying to curry favour with Algeria as a new energy supplier, according to a leading geopolitical expert.

“Rabat is likely trying to let Spain know about the perceived benefits of firmly siding with Morocco against Algeria at a time in which European powers are now looking at Algeria as a gas-rich country to turn to in order to decrease their reliance on Russian hydrocarbons as the war in Ukraine rages on” explains geopolitical doyen Giorgio Cafiero to the author.

“Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine these tensions cooling any time soon” he warned.

Consequently, thousands more refugees could make their way into the EU in the coming weeks and months, due to Rabat losing its cool and panicking – with neither a mediation set between Morocco and Algiers, nor the immigration ban annulled by France in place – and a power game with Spain still being played out.

This is causing further concerns in the UK, where it is believed many will attempt to head. Immigration experts there are quick to point to the EU’s lack of control of its own borders.

Alp Mehmet of Migration Watch UK condemns the poor treatment of the African migrants but adds it’s inevitable that they – mostly from English speaking Sudan the last time in June – will now try to attempt the channel crossing, which he says is as a result of an inept EU.

“Most people in the UK have to be concerned about the growing numbers of people crossing the Channel” he explains. “My view is that the EU should be doing more to plug their porous borders”.

UK-Morocco special relations?

In the meantime, while Morocco’s economy continues to head towards the abyss with skyrocketing diesel and petrol prices, ambassadors of both the UK and Morocco continue to talk up the new so-called special relationship which has amounted to little since it was launched days after Brexit was signed.

Presently, the EU is keeping tight lipped about the most recent exodus. But back in May last year however, its vice president spoke candidly of the ruse being played by Morocco.

“Europe will not be intimidated by anyone,” added Margaritis Schinas, the vice-president of the European Commission in support of Spain. He also said, about Morocco, that Europe would “not be a victim of these tactics” without using the word “blackmail” as such.

Yet his salient words have not rung true.

Since September last year France has restricted the number of Moroccan immigrants it takes which is angering the elite in Rabat who feel betrayed by an EU agreement signed in 2008 which gave Morocco “special status”.

A number of analysts claim that Rabat is using the build-up of African immigrants in its northern enclave which borders the Spanish one as a game of blackmail – showing the EU, France and Spain that it has the power to create real problems, if not helped – while mercilessly beating the migrants before they scale the fences to make it look like they are genuinely escaping.

The most recent crossing of June was followed by just a couple of days before Madrid decided to reconnect Morocco with a vital gas supply.

This is not expected however to put a halt to Morocco’s game of blackmail.

The two Moroccan-Spanish border crossings – Melilla and Ceuta – will almost certainly be seen by new waves of African migrants as key points to cross, following the recent incidents which made international headlines.

Yet neither France, Spain, nor the European Commission is taking the crisis seriously, leaving the UK vulnerable to new flows of immigrants making the crossings from Calais to the south coast. Some experts have blamed the European Commission itself which has the powers to contain the immigration threat from the two Spanish enclaves on Morocco’s Mediterranean coastline by simply opening the frontier to migrants wishing to enter the EU.

“It is the policy of the European Union which leads to these tragedies”, the president of Amnesty international France Jean-Claude Samouiller told the French press after the death of at least 23 migrants at the gates of the Spanish enclave of Melilla , Morocco.

“Each time human traffickers and smugglers are singled out, but the European Union also bears a great responsibility in these tragedies”.

At least six human rights organizations in both Morocco and Spain have called for an inquiry into the events, as there is still a lack of clarity over the actual details which led to 23 dead and at least 100 police officers on the Moroccan side injured. Some reports have speculated that the immigrants were allowed to enter the Moroccan side of the enclave, which was seen as an indication that they were being signalled to scale the fences.

Amnesty International expressed its “deep concern” over the events, and the Spanish Commission for Refugees criticized what it called “the indiscriminate use of violence to manage migration and control borders.”

“Morocco says they were armed and dangerous, that there were leaders who organized the masses.” Bea Talegón, a Spanish media personality told SCF. “What evidence exists to make these claims? Does this justify death without a judicial process?” she asks.

The EU is also championing a war effort to support Ukraine, with just recently the country being granted candidacy. The support Kiev receives, along with that of the U.S., has only worsened relations between Morocco and Algeria, the latter being seen as a satellite state for Russia creating heightened tensions and an arms race as they square off over the disputed region of Western Sahara.

The minister of communications in Morocco declined to comment.