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La crisi del Mali è un fattore che da diverso tempo sta inquinando la situazione geopolitica del Sahel. La sua origine risale ai primi anni ’10 del XXI secolo e, sotto certi aspetti, è collegabile a quel fenomeno che è stato erroneamente definito come “primavere arabe”, se si considera l’influsso che ha avuto sul Sahel lo smantellamento della Libia di Gheddafi (apripista di una unione dell’Africa che spaventò non poco le cancellerie occidentali).

In questo senso, non è errato affermare che la crisi maliana del 2012 sia stata il prodotto di fattori esogeni (flusso di miliziani gihadisti nell’area del Sahel, interessi economici per lo sfruttamento semicoloniale delle risorse di potenze extra-regionali) che endogeni (intrinseca fragilità dello Stato).

Indubbiamente, colpisce il fatto che tale fragilità si rifletta in uno dei pochi Stati-nazione africani con una storia ricca, complessa e articolata, precedente al processo di colonizzazione europea. Il Mali, infatti, si vuole erede di quell’impero medievale, fondato dal cosiddetto “Leone del Mali” Sundiata Keita (1217-1255), che dall’attuale Sahel si spingeva fino al Golfo di Guinea ed all’Oceano Atlantico. Al centro del mito creatore dello Stato vi è la Battaglia di Kirina (1235), nei pressi dell’odierna Bamako, e proprio la figura di Keita, avvolta da aspetti semi-leggendari, come la sua presunta discendenza da uno dei primi compagni del Profeta Muhammad (sebbene non vi siano prove particolari del suo essere musulmano). Nonostante ciò, le sue gesta vennero “verificate” sia dal viaggiatore marocchino Ibn Battuta che dal celebre storico e antropologo ante litteram Ibn Khaldun. Alcune tradizioni, inoltre, affermano che Keita usasse identificarsi come il successore del personaggio coranico di Dhu al-Qarnayn, che molti associano alla figura di Alessandro il Macedone.

Ad ogni modo, quello maliano si presenta come l’ennesimo caso in cui un Paese con una storia plurisecolare di convivenza multietnica e tolleranza religiosa si sta rapidamente evolvendo in un buco nero in cui il radicalismo anti-tradizionale di stampo wahhabita dei gruppi terroristici legati ad al-Qaeda ed ISIS sta violentemente prendendo il sopravvento, aiutato dalle sue connessioni con le reti criminali transnazionali che imperversano nella regione. Un qualcosa ben raccontato anche nella pellicola del cineasta Abderahmane Sissako “Timbuctu” del 2014, in cui si mostra con evidenza l’enfasi desacralizzante del gihadismo wahhabita nei confronti della vita tradizionale e di uno de centri sacri più importanti per l’Islam sahariano.

Quella del Sahel è sicuramente una regione particolarmente sensibile per la sicurezza internazionale (soprattutto per quella europea in materia di controllo delle rotte migratorie). Cosa che ha trasformato l’area in una scacchiera geopolitica in cui si scontrano attori regionali e non. La crisi maliana inizia come una rivolta separatista Tuareg nel nord del Paese (a guidarla è stato il Movimento Nazionale di Liberazione dell’Azawad – MNLA). Tuttavia, questa “ribellione” si è rapidamente trasformata in un conflitto multilaterale in cui i gruppi terroristi (spinti verso il sud ed oltre confine dai militari algerini) hanno trovato ampio spazio di manovra, favoriti anche dalla porosità dei confini tra gli Stati della regione.

La Francia – che storicamente ha giocato un ruolo di un certo rilievo nell’area – ha lanciato due diverse operazioni militari per contrastare il gihadismo: l’operazione “Serval” (2013) e quella “Barkhane” (2014). L’obiettivo della prima operazione era quello di frenare l’avanzata dell’alleanza Tuareg-gruppi terroristi verso la città di Sévaré (obiettivo parzialmente raggiunto). Quello della seconda, invece, era contrastare l’espansione degli stessi gruppi in tutta la più ampia regione saheliana (obiettivo decisamente fallito). L’azione francese, inoltre, è stata accompagnata dall’attività dell’Unione Europea tramite l’European Union External Action Service (EEAS), legato a  sua volta alla Sahel Strategy del 2011 (di fatto, la prima strategia geograficamente incentrata su una precisa regione prodotta dall’UE). Questa era articolata in quattro punti: a) favorire sicurezza e sviluppo; b) incentivo alla cooperazione regionale; c) rafforzamento della capacità dei governi locali; d) garantire investimenti per l’economia locale. Nel 2015, il Consiglio UE ha pure approvato un Sahel Regional Action Plan. Tuttavia, i piani UE hanno subito le conseguenze della decadente potenza francese (il politologo russo Sergej Karaganov ha spesso indicato nella Francia odierna un esempio di ciò che avviene quando una grande Nazione non è guidata da un “grande idea”) e del diffuso sentimento anti-occidentale prodotto dalla fallimentare missione “Barkhane”. Un sentimento che ha indubbiamente favorito la penetrazione russa (e cinese) nella regione, a discapito anche delle posizioni di Stati Uniti e Regno Unito.

La Russia, in particolare, ha individuato nella regione uno spazio sul quale proiettare la propria influenza con due obiettivi precisi: a) avviare un commercio bilaterale con i Paesi del Sahel nel campo della difesa, vero fiore all’occhiello dell’export russo verso l’estero (dal 2013 al 2025, il budget russo destinato alla regione è più che raddoppiato); accerchiare la NATO da sud, mettendo piede in tutta la fascia di Paesi sahariani, dal Mar Rosso all’Atlantico. A questo scopo, Mosca ha utilizzato anche compagnie militari private (il noto Gruppo Wagner, oggi Africa Corps) per creare basi in loco, addestrare le forze di sicurezza locali ed ottenere dividendi economici come la partecipazione ad importanti contratti minerari. Non bisogna infatti dimenticare che il Mali vanta cospicue riserve di oro, litio, ferro, bauxite e fosfati (senza considerare la ricchezza in termini di fonti energetiche rinnovabili ed una demografia incentrata su una popolazione estremamente giovane e forte).

Ora, è bene tenere a mente che i militari hanno un ruolo centrale nel Paese. Già nel 2012, a seguito della ribellione Tuareg, vi fu un primo colpo di Stato con il quale l’esercito rivendicava maggiore spazio d’azione contro la debolezza manifestata dal governo centrale. Una debolezza che aveva portato l’intero Mali settentrionale sotto il controllo del MNLA. Nuovi colpi di Stato sono arrivati nel 2020 e nel 2021, ed hanno portato al potere il colonnello Assimi Goita che ha annunciato una “rifondazione” del Mali. Su queste basi, l’esercito ha di fatto smantellato le fondamenta istituzionali dello Stato (e pure le sue relazioni con l’estero) per ricostruirle ex novo. Hanno optato per abbandonare l’ECOWAS (la comunità economica degli Stati dell’Africa occidentale, ritenuta un’emanazione di forme neocoloniali occidentali, soprattutto francesi) dopo che questa aveva sanzionato il governo di Bamako). E, allo stesso tempo, si è arrivati ad un netto peggioramento  dei rapporti con l’Algeria, accusata dai militari maliani di fornire sostegno ai ribelli (una relazione ulteriormente deteriorata con il recente incidente del drone maliano abbattuto dall’esercito di Algeri). È sicuramente complesso stabilire chi ha ragione e chi torto. È comunque un fatto che il sostegno algerino al Fronte Polisario nel Sahara occidentale (movimento largamente infiltrato da gruppi terroristi qaidisti o legati all’ISIS) ha a più riprese destabilizzato l’intera regione, rendendo le rotte stradali che collegano i diversi Stati profondamente insicure (motivo alla base della crisi e della mancanza di carburante nel Mali). E motivo per cui Russia e Algeri (nonostante i tradizionali più che ottimi rapporti) sono arrivati a delle frizioni diplomatiche, con la prima che ha sostenuto il piano di autonomia marocchino per il Sahara occidentale e rafforzato le sue relazioni con Rabat.

Nel gennaio del 2024, inoltre, sono stati abrogati gli accordi di Algeri del 2015 che, in linea teorica, avrebbero dovuto congelare il conflitto tra governo centrale ed i ribelli Tuareg. E, con la fine della UN Multidimensional Integrated Mission, è scattata una nuova offensiva congiunta tra forze ribelli e milizie gihadiste (luglio 2025) che è arrivata fino alle porte di Bamako, accerchiando addirittura la città.

A questo proposito bisogna considerare due fattori. In primo luogo, lo sforzo di rifondazione del governo militare non ha riscosso particolare successo sia per le spinte all’isolamento, sia per il fatto che l’esercito si è concentrato soprattutto sulle purghe interne ed assai poco sulle operazioni di antiterrorismo (tra l’altro i privilegi dell’élite militare hanno aumentato non poco le diserzioni alla base della gerarchia; ovvero, tra i soldati inviati al fronte). E non sorprende il fatto che i mercenari russi presenti in loco si siano spesso scontrati anche in modo “violento” con questa casta di intoccabili (e spesso incompetenti) ufficiali dell’esercito.

La fragilità istituzionale, a cui l’esercito non ha saputo dare risposta, e la sostanziale impossibilità di controllare i confini e le strade (gli attacchi contro i convogli che trasportano carburante sono sempre più frequenti) sono le reali ragioni dell’attuale crisi. A ciò si aggiunga una notizia (confermata anche da fonti senegalesi) che vederebbe l’Ucraina sempre più coinvolta nella destabilizzazione del Paese. L’addetto stampa dei servizi segreti di militari di Kiev, Andriy Yusov, ha infatti candidamente ammesso che l’Ucraina ha fornito assistenza militare e logistica (inviando anche dati sulle posizioni delle truppe governative) per il lancio dell’offensiva dello scorso luglio.

Dunque, ancora una volta, l’Ucraina fa il lavoro sporco per la NATO, cercando di evitare quello che in precedenza è stato definito come il tentativo russo di accerchiare l’Alleanza Atlantica dal fronte meridionale.

In questo contesto, Russia e Cina (e magari pure Iran, sottotraccia) dovrebbero lavorare diplomaticamente per favorire una rotta atlantica per i Paesi del Sahel, cooperando con gli Stati dell’Africa occidentale (Senegal in primo luogo) per impedire il loro isolamento regionale.

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Alla guida di un futuro migliore

Un consiglio: non bisogna togliere gli occhi da ciò che sta avvenendo nel Sahel. E, soprattutto, non bisogna ignorare le ragioni profonde e le modalità con cui oggi l’Africa sta risorgendo proprio grazie alla Alleanza degli Stati del Sahel.

Burkina Faso, Mali e Niger costituiscono tre stati contigui, privi di sbocchi al mare, che occupano un’enorme fascia di territorio a cavallo fra il Sahara meridionale e la regione sudano-saheliana. Insieme rappresentano quasi la metà della superficie complessiva dell’Africa occidentale – circa il 45% – e circa il 17% della sua popolazione, pari a oltre 73 milioni di abitanti sommando i tre Paesi (26,2 milioni in Niger, 23,8 milioni in Mali e 23 milioni in Burkina Faso). Questi numeri da soli mostrano il peso demografico e geografico della triade saheliana.

Le società di questi Paesi presentano forti tratti comuni, frutto di secoli di scambi culturali e commerciali e di una vicinanza geografica che ha favorito la condivisione di norme e pratiche sociali, culture ancora in gran parte fondate su valori comunitari, sull’oralità come mezzo privilegiato di trasmissione del sapere, su economie prevalentemente agricole e su strutture sociali fortemente influenzate dalla religione che plasma la vita delle persone in un’apertura verticale all’esistenza.

Come il resto dell’Africa occidentale, anche Niger, Mali e Burkina Faso hanno conosciuto nel Novecento tutte le contraddizioni del dominio coloniale francese, contraddizioni che esplosero in modo evidente durante la Seconda guerra mondiale. Nella narrazione ufficiale europea raramente si ricorda che una parte significativa dei soldati e dei corpi di lavoro impiegati per liberare l’Europa dal nazismo proveniva dalle colonie francesi dell’Africa occidentale, comprese le odierne Burkina Faso, Mali e Niger. Migliaia di africani combatterono e morirono su suolo europeo, e la loro esperienza bellica alimentò una nuova coscienza politica che preparò il terreno alle rivendicazioni di eguaglianza e autodeterminazione.

Le prime organizzazioni anticoloniali

È dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, in un contesto di tentativi di affermazione del socialismo in Africa, che i movimenti anti-coloniali prendono piede e ottengono successi significativi.

Procediamo per tappe storiche. In Niger già nel 1946 nacque il Partito Progressista Nigerino, affiliato al Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, grande coalizione panafricana e anticoloniale guidata da figure come Modibo Keïta in Mali e Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea. L’RDA iniziò chiedendo l’uguaglianza di diritti con i cittadini francesi, ma in pochi anni passò a posizioni di rottura totale con il sistema coloniale.

In Burkina Faso, l’Unione Voltaica si unì all’RDA per costruire un fronte comune di liberazione su scala regionale. Il socialismo in Burkina Faso ha assunto una connotazione particolare durante la presidenza di Thomas Sankara, che trasformò l’allora Alto Volta in Burkina Faso, “Paese degli uomini integri”. La sua visione, ispirata al marxismo-leninismo ma profondamente adattata al contesto africano, puntava a un modello di sviluppo autonomo, fondato sulla giustizia sociale, la partecipazione popolare e l’indipendenza economica dalle potenze coloniali e dalle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali.

Sankara avviò infatti un vasto programma di riforme che includeva la redistribuzione delle terre, la promozione dell’agricoltura di sussistenza e l’alfabetizzazione di massa. Furono costruiti migliaia di scuole, pozzi e centri sanitari nelle aree rurali, con l’obiettivo di ridurre le disuguaglianze tra città e campagne. La sua politica incoraggiava il ruolo delle donne, abolendo pratiche tradizionali oppressive e promuovendone l’integrazione attiva nella vita economica e politica del Paese.

Il socialismo burkinabé si distingueva dal modello sovietico per il suo forte radicamento comunitario e per l’attenzione all’autosufficienza, criticava apertamente il debito estero, considerandolo un meccanismo di sottomissione neocoloniale, e rifiutava l’arricchimento personale dei dirigenti. La leadership di Sankare fu austera e carismatica, poiché cercava di costruire un senso di identità nazionale e solidarietà tra i cittadini in un momento di grande difficoltà per i popoli africani del Sahel.

Nonostante i risultati significativi in termini di sviluppo sociale e infrastrutturale, il progetto socialista del Burkina Faso incontrò resistenze interne ed esterne. La carenza di risorse, l’isolamento internazionale e i contrasti con le élite locali portarono a tensioni crescenti, culminate nel colpo di Stato del 1987 in cui Sankara fu assassinato.

Subito dopo, Blaise Compaoré prese il potere inaugurando un periodo di trent’anni caratterizzato da un progressivo abbandono delle politiche socialiste. Il nuovo regime cercò di normalizzare i rapporti con le potenze occidentali e con le istituzioni finanziarie internazionali, liberalizzando l’economia e riducendo la portata delle riforme popolari di Sankara. Questa transizione generò una crescente disillusione tra i cittadini, poiché le promesse di sviluppo inclusivo e giustizia sociale lasciarono spazio a corruzione, diseguaglianze e instabilità.

Nel 2014 un movimento popolare costrinse Compaoré alle dimissioni, aprendo una fase politica incerta con governi civili deboli e incapaci di rispondere all’aumento dell’insicurezza, aggravata dalla diffusione di gruppi jihadisti nel Sahel. I successivi presidenti, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré e Paul-Henri Damiba, non riuscirono a stabilizzare il Paese né a riprendere il cammino di sviluppo sociale, alimentando il malcontento.

In questo contesto di crisi, il militare Ibrahim Traoré prese il potere con un colpo di Stato nel settembre 2022, riportando in auge il sogno socialista e indipendentista di Sankara, e diventando un faro per tutti i popoli oppressi del mondo.

Il quadro internazionale aveva accelerato questo processo, soprattutto per la presenza politica di Francia e UK. La grave sconfitta francese in Indocina del 1954 e l’intensificarsi della guerra in Algeria che durò fino al 1962 ridussero la capacità di Parigi di mantenere il controllo sulle colonie. Charles de Gaulle tentò di preservare almeno parte dell’impero offrendo un compromesso: nel 1958 indisse un referendum legato alla nuova Costituzione della Quinta Repubblica. Ai territori africani furono proposte due opzioni: votare “sì” per restare nella Comunità franco-africana, mantenendo sotto influenza francese i centri nevralgici del potere, oppure votare “no” per l’indipendenza immediata, rischiando però rottura politica e isolamento economico.

Djibo Bakary – fondatore del partito Sawaba (che significa “libertà” in lingua hausa) e capo del governo dopo le elezioni del 1957 – guidò la campagna per il “no”. Solo la Guinea di Sékou Touré riuscì realmente a respingere l’offerta di De Gaulle, conquistando nel 1958 l’indipendenza immediata come prima colonia francese dell’Africa occidentale.

I leader favorevoli alla rottura furono spesso colpiti da repressione interna, alimentata dalla cooperazione tra funzionari coloniali, capi tradizionali e la nuova élite africana “évoluée” formata nelle scuole francesi e destinata a perpetuare l’ordine esistente. De Gaulle inviò un nuovo governatore, Don Jean Colombani, che mobilitò l’intero apparato amministrativo e di sicurezza per sabotare il referendum e indebolire il Sawaba, contrario anche allo sfruttamento dell’uranio nigerino da parte francese. Il “sì” prevalse ufficialmente grazie a massicce manipolazioni elettorali.

Ciononostante, la vittoria della Guinea nel 1958, dopo l’indipendenza del Ghana britannico nel 1957, costrinse Parigi a cedere progressivamente terreno. Nel 1960 ben 17 Stati africani – 14 dei quali ex colonie francesi – proclamarono l’indipendenza. Si trattò però in larga misura di una “indipendenza con bandiera”: cambiava il simbolo nazionale ma non la struttura economica. L’influenza francese restò intatta grazie a una fitta rete di accordi di “cooperazione” che, attraverso protocolli di assistenza tecnica, intese di difesa e soprattutto il sistema del franco CFA, assicuravano a Parigi un controllo sostanziale. Tali accordi obbligavano gli Stati africani a rimborsare le infrastrutture costruite nel periodo coloniale (spesso con lavoro forzato), concedevano alla Francia diritti di prelazione sulle esportazioni strategiche – in particolare uranio – garantivano alle imprese francesi esenzioni fiscali grazie al principio della non doppia imposizione, imponevano l’uso del franco CFA controllato dal Tesoro francese limitando così la sovranità monetaria e fiscale, e mantenevano basi militari francesi con libero utilizzo delle infrastrutture, incluse comunicazioni e trasmissioni.

Emblematico è il caso del Niger. Un accordo di difesa del 1961 con Costa d’Avorio e Dahomey (oggi Benin) concedeva alla Francia l’uso illimitato di infrastrutture e beni militari e definiva esplicitamente il ruolo delle forze armate francesi come garante degli interessi economici, elencando le materie prime strategiche (idrocarburi, uranio, torio, litio, berillio) e obbligando i Paesi firmatari a informare Parigi su ogni progetto di esportazione e a facilitare lo stoccaggio di tali risorse per le esigenze della difesa francese. In questo modo l’apparato militare diventava un vero e proprio strumento di tutela degli interessi commerciali e geopolitici di Parigi, che non voleva lasciare l’Africa, troppo importante per mantenere il proprio potere finanziario coloniale e gestire la propria ricchezza interna nel continente europeo.

Autonomia e ritorsioni

Il Mali di Modibo Keïta, dopo l’indipendenza del 1960, cercò di imboccare una via autonoma ispirata al socialismo: creazione di imprese statali, nazionalizzazione di settori chiave e soprattutto introduzione nel 1962 di una moneta nazionale fuori dall’area del franco CFA. La reazione francese fu immediata: isolamento diplomatico, restrizioni commerciali e sospensione dell’assistenza tecnica e finanziaria. La crisi economica conseguente aprì la strada al colpo di Stato del 1968 del tenente Moussa Traoré, sostenuto dalla Francia, che riportò il Mali nell’orbita del franco CFA nel 1984.

Negli anni Ottanta e Novanta, con la fine della Guerra fredda, Parigi riformulò la sua politica africana introducendo la “condizionalità politica”: al vertice di La Baule del 1990 François Mitterrand dichiarò che gli aiuti sarebbero stati legati a riforme democratiche come il multipartitismo. In parallelo, FMI e Banca Mondiale imposero i Programmi di Aggiustamento Strutturale (SAP): austerità, tagli al settore pubblico, liberalizzazione del commercio. In Mali questi pacchetti accompagnarono il ritorno al franco CFA nel 1984.

La devalutazione del franco CFA del 1994 rappresentò un secondo shock: ufficialmente serviva a rilanciare le esportazioni e stabilizzare le finanze, ma in realtà provocò rincari, erosione dei salari e proteste diffuse. Questa nuova fase combinava liberalizzazione economica e riforme di governance imposte dall’esterno: una “democratizzazione” di facciata che consolidava il controllo neocoloniale attraverso debito, privatizzazioni e ristrutturazioni statali guidate dai donatori.

A questi strumenti di dominio si aggiunse progressivamente la presenza militare occidentale, in particolare statunitense, quando nell 2002 gli USA lanciarono la Pan-Sahel Initiative, che segnò l’inizio di una presenza militare duratura in Mali, Niger, Ciad e Mauritania, poi estesa al Burkina Faso con la Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership del 2005.

Dal 2011 le operazioni francesi e statunitensi si intensificarono: droni USA, missioni di addestramento guidate da AFRICOM, basi militari a Gao, N’Djamena, Niamey, Ouagadougou, l’Operazione Barkhane della Francia, la forza congiunta del G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Ciad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger). Molte cose sono cambiate. Non è mancato anche il terrorismo religioso, che ha mantenuto la regione in una condizione di precarietà e insicurezza, diventando una piaga difficile da combattere in molte zone.

Proprio in quell’anno, 2011, avvenne anche la programmata distruzione del Libia di Gheddafi, che aprì le porte al traffico incontrollato di armi e alla proliferazione di gruppi jihadisti. Libia che rappresentava un pilastro regionale, ma che una volta bombardata distrusse anche le iniziative di mediazione dell’Unione Africana. L’Occidente prima o dopo dovrà pagare per l’enorme male compiuto alla Libia.

Verso una sempre maggiore indipendenza

Mentre le ingerenze militari erodevano la sovranità, le corporation transnazionali continuavano a estrarre ricchezza dal Sahel a condizioni fortemente inique.

Questa dipendenza economica cronica ha consolidato il sottosviluppo strutturale, limitando la capacità degli Stati di diversificare l’economia e negoziare termini commerciali più favorevoli. Ne è derivata una fragilità permanente che espone a pressioni esterne e alimenta crisi politiche, sociali e di sicurezza, laddove non è possibile, oggi, avere soltanto l’indipendenza politica, ma è necessario possedere anche quella economica.

Dagli anni Novanta, i colpi di Stato e i cambi di regime sono diventati fenomeni ricorrenti, espressione di élite che competono per il potere in contesti istituzionali deboli. Corruzione, servizi pubblici insufficienti e l’esclusione di gruppi marginalizzati hanno minato la legittimità statale e accresciuto la sfiducia della popolazione in molti Paesi africani.

La storia recente di Burkina Faso, Mali e Niger dimostra come l’indipendenza formale ottenuta negli anni Sessanta non abbia significato sovranità effettiva. Dai meccanismi economici del “debito coloniale” e del franco CFA agli accordi di difesa che integravano interessi strategici francesi, fino alle “condizionalità” imposte negli anni Ottanta e Novanta e alle missioni militari occidentali del XXI secolo, le vecchie forme di dominio si sono in molti casi trasformate piuttosto che dissolversi, e i leader attuali, che vogliono veramente cambiare la situazione, si trovano davanti ad una complicata struttura statale che deve essere rinnovata completamente. E, di più, è una struttura occidentale, europea, che deve essere riadattata al mondo africano.

Comprendere questa traiettoria è essenziale per leggere l’attuale fase politica nel Sahel: solo inserendo le crisi contemporanee in questa cornice storica si può cogliere il senso delle rivendicazioni di sovranità e delle scelte radicali compiute da governi e società civili della regione.

L’indipendenza piena ed effettiva, con sovranità e autonomia, è possibile, ma è ancora un processo in atto, non è già completa, ed è soprattutto un procedimento che parte da un consolidamento ideologico di “chi” e “cosa” sono quei popoli. Segue poi la scelta di quali forma politiche adottare, secondo la propria sensibilità e tradizione, anche declinando il socialismo in modi sconosciuti all’esperienza europea. Cacciare ciò che resta dei colonialisti, smantellare ogni loro struttura e rifondare con spirito africano le loro terre, è una missione che richiederà coraggio e sacrificio.

Non si può non concludere con una citazione del Presidente Capitano Ibrahim Traoré: “Insieme e in solidarietà, trionferemo sull’imperialismo e il neocolonialismo per un’Africa libera, dignitosa e sovrana”.

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Leading the way to a better future

A word of advice: keep your eyes on what is happening in the Sahel. And, above all, do not ignore the underlying reasons and the ways in which Africa is now rising again thanks to the Alliance of Sahel States.

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are three contiguous, landlocked states that occupy a huge swath of territory straddling the southern Sahara and the Sudano-Sahelian region. Together, they account for almost half of West Africa’s total area—about 45%—and about 17% of its population, with a combined total of over 73 million inhabitants (26.2 million in Niger, 23.8 million in Mali, and 23 million in Burkina Faso). These figures alone demonstrate the demographic and geographic weight of the Sahelian triad.

The societies of these countries share strong common traits, the result of centuries of cultural and commercial exchanges and geographical proximity that has fostered the sharing of social norms and practices, cultures still largely based on community values, oral tradition as the preferred means of transmitting knowledge, predominantly agricultural economies, and social structures strongly influenced by religion, which shapes people’s lives in a vertical openness to existence.

Like the rest of West Africa, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso experienced all the contradictions of French colonial rule in the 20th century, contradictions that exploded in a dramatic fashion during World War II. The official European narrative rarely mentions that a significant proportion of the soldiers and laborers employed to liberate Europe from Nazism came from the French colonies in West Africa, including present-day Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Thousands of Africans fought and died on European soil, and their war experience fueled a new political consciousness that paved the way for demands for equality and self-determination.

The first anti-colonial organizations

It was after World War II, in a context of attempts to establish socialism in Africa, that anti-colonial movements took hold and achieved significant successes.

Let’s proceed in historical stages. In Niger, the Nigerien Progressive Party was founded in 1946, affiliated with the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, a large pan-African and anti-colonial coalition led by figures such as Modibo Keïta in Mali and Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea. The RDA began by demanding equal rights with French citizens, but within a few years it moved to a position of total break with the colonial system.

In Burkina Faso, the Voltaic Union joined the RDA to build a common front for liberation on a regional scale. Socialism in Burkina Faso took on a particular connotation during the presidency of Thomas Sankara, who transformed the then Upper Volta into Burkina Faso, ‘the land of honest men’. His vision, inspired by Marxism-Leninism but deeply adapted to the African context, aimed at a model of autonomous development based on social justice, popular participation, and economic independence from colonial powers and international financial institutions.

Sankara launched a vast program of reforms that included land redistribution, the promotion of subsistence agriculture, and mass literacy. Thousands of schools, wells, and health centers were built in rural areas with the aim of reducing inequalities between cities and the countryside. His policy encouraged the role of women, abolishing oppressive traditional practices and promoting their active integration into the economic and political life of the country.

Burkinabe socialism differed from the Soviet model in its strong community roots and focus on self-sufficiency. It openly criticized foreign debt, considering it a mechanism of neocolonial subjugation, and rejected the personal enrichment of leaders. Sankare’s leadership was austere and charismatic, as he sought to build a sense of national identity and solidarity among citizens at a time of great difficulty for the African peoples of the Sahel.

Despite significant achievements in terms of social and infrastructural development, Burkina Faso’s socialist project met with internal and external resistance. A lack of resources, international isolation, and conflicts with local elites led to growing tensions, culminating in the 1987 coup d’état in which Sankara was assassinated.

Immediately afterwards, Blaise Compaoré took power, ushering in a thirty-year period characterized by a gradual abandonment of socialist policies. The new regime sought to normalize relations with Western powers and international financial institutions, liberalizing the economy and reducing the scope of Sankara’s popular reforms. This transition generated growing disillusionment among citizens, as promises of inclusive development and social justice gave way to corruption, inequality, and instability.

In 2014, a popular movement forced Compaoré to resign, ushering in a period of political uncertainty with weak civilian governments unable to respond to rising insecurity, exacerbated by the spread of jihadist groups in the Sahel. Subsequent presidents, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré and Paul-Henri Damiba, failed to stabilize the country or resume the path of social development, fueling discontent.

In this context of crisis, the military leader Ibrahim Traoré seized power in a coup d’état in September 2022, reviving Sankara’s socialist and independence dream and becoming a beacon for all oppressed peoples around the world.

The international situation had accelerated this process, especially due to the political presence of France and the UK. France’s heavy defeat in Indochina in 1954 and the intensification of the war in Algeria, which lasted until 1962, reduced Paris’s ability to maintain control over its colonies. Charles de Gaulle attempted to preserve at least part of the empire by offering a compromise: in 1958, he called a referendum on the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic. The African territories were offered two options: vote ‘yes’ to remain in the French-African Community, keeping the centers of power under French influence, or vote ‘no’ for immediate independence, but risking political rupture and economic isolation.

Djibo Bakary—founder of the Sawaba party (which means “freedom” in the Hausa language) and head of government after the 1957 elections—led the “no” campaign. Only Sékou Touré’s Guinea really managed to reject De Gaulle’s offer, gaining immediate independence in 1958 as the first French colony in West Africa.

Leaders in favor of breaking away were often subjected to internal repression, fueled by cooperation between colonial officials, traditional leaders, and the new African “évoluée” elite educated in French schools and destined to perpetuate the existing order. De Gaulle sent a new governor, Don Jean Colombani, who mobilized the entire administrative and security apparatus to sabotage the referendum and weaken the Sawaba, which was also opposed to French exploitation of Nigerien uranium. The “yes” vote officially prevailed thanks to massive electoral manipulation.

Nevertheless, Guinea’s victory in 1958, following the independence of British Ghana in 1957, forced Paris to gradually give ground. In 1960, as many as 17 African states—14 of which were former French colonies—proclaimed independence. However, this was largely a case of “independence with a flag”: the national symbol changed, but not the economic structure. French influence remained intact thanks to a dense network of ‘cooperation’ agreements which, through technical assistance protocols, defense agreements and, above all, the CFA franc system, ensured Paris substantial control. These agreements obliged African states to repay the infrastructure built during the colonial period (often with forced labor), granted France preemptive rights on strategic exports—particularly uranium—guaranteed French companies tax exemptions thanks to the principle of non-double taxation, imposed the use of the CFA franc controlled by the French Treasury, thus limiting monetary and fiscal sovereignty, and maintained French military bases with free use of infrastructure, including communications and transmissions.

The case of Niger is emblematic. A 1961 defense agreement with Côte d’Ivoire and Dahomey (now Benin) granted France unlimited use of military infrastructure and assets and explicitly defined the role of the French armed forces as guarantor of economic interests, listing strategic raw materials (hydrocarbons, uranium, thorium, lithium, beryllium) and obliging the signatory countries to inform Paris of any export projects and to facilitate the storage of these resources for French defense needs. In this way, the military apparatus became a real instrument for protecting the commercial and geopolitical interests of Paris, which did not want to leave Africa, too important to maintain its colonial financial power and manage its internal wealth on the European continent.

Autonomy and retaliation

After independence in 1960, Modibo Keïta’s Mali sought to embark on an autonomous path inspired by socialism: the creation of state-owned enterprises, the nationalization of key sectors, and, above all, the introduction in 1962 of a national currency outside the CFA franc area. The French reaction was immediate: diplomatic isolation, trade restrictions, and suspension of technical and financial assistance. The resulting economic crisis paved the way for the 1968 coup d’état by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, supported by France, which brought Mali back into the CFA franc zone in 1984.

In the 1980s and 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, Paris reformulated its African policy by introducing ‘political conditionality’: at the 1990 La Baule summit, François Mitterrand declared that aid would be linked to democratic reforms such as multipartyism. At the same time, the IMF and the World Bank imposed Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs): austerity, public sector cuts, trade liberalization. In Mali, these packages accompanied the return to the CFA franc in 1984.

The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was a second shock: officially, it was intended to boost exports and stabilize finances, but in reality it led to price increases, wage erosion, and widespread protests. This new phase combined economic liberalization and externally imposed governance reforms: a facade of “democratization” that consolidated neocolonial control through debt, privatization, and donor-led state restructuring.

These instruments of domination were gradually joined by a Western military presence, particularly from the U.S., when in 2002 the U.S. launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which marked the beginning of a lasting military presence in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania, later extended to Burkina Faso with the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership of 2005.

Since 2011, French and U.S. operations have intensified: U.S. drones, training missions led by AFRICOM, military bases in Gao, N’Djamena, Niamey, Ouagadougou, France’s Operation Barkhane, and the G5 Sahel joint force (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger). Much has changed. Religious terrorism has also been present, keeping the region in a state of precariousness and insecurity, becoming a scourge that is difficult to combat in many areas.

It was in that same year, 2011, that the planned destruction of Gaddafi’s Libya took place, opening the door to uncontrolled arms trafficking and the proliferation of jihadist groups. Libya was a regional pillar, but once bombed, it also destroyed the African Union’s mediation efforts. Sooner or later, the West will have to pay for the enormous harm done to Libya.

Towards ever greater independence

While military interference eroded sovereignty, transnational corporations continued to extract wealth from the Sahel under highly unfair conditions.

This chronic economic dependence has consolidated structural underdevelopment, limiting the ability of states to diversify their economies and negotiate more favorable trade terms. The result is permanent fragility that exposes them to external pressures and fuels political, social, and security crises, where it is not possible today to have only political independence, but it is also necessary to have economic independence.

Since the 1990s, coups and regime changes have become recurrent phenomena, reflecting elites competing for power in weak institutional contexts. Corruption, inadequate public services, and the exclusion of marginalized groups have undermined state legitimacy and increased public mistrust in many African countries.

The recent history of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger shows that the formal independence achieved in the 1960s did not mean effective sovereignty. From the economic mechanisms of “colonial debt” and the CFA franc to defense agreements that integrated French strategic interests, to the “conditionalities” imposed in the 1980s and 1990s and the Western military missions of the 21st century, old forms of domination have in many cases been transformed rather than dissolved, and current leaders who genuinely want to change the situation are faced with a complicated state structure that needs to be completely overhauled. What is more, it is a Western, European structure that needs to be readapted to the African world.

Understanding this trajectory is essential to interpreting the current political phase in the Sahel: only by placing contemporary crises in this historical context can we grasp the meaning of the claims to sovereignty and the radical choices made by governments and civil societies in the region.

Full and effective independence, with sovereignty and autonomy, is possible, but it is still a work in progress, it is not yet complete, and above all, it is a process that starts with an ideological consolidation of ‘who’ and ‘what’ these peoples are. This is followed by the choice of which political forms to adopt, according to their own sensibilities and traditions, even declining socialism in ways unknown to European experience. Driving out what remains of the colonialists, dismantling all their structures, and rebuilding their lands with an African spirit is a mission that will require courage and sacrifice.

One cannot fail to conclude with a quote from President Captain Ibrahim Traoré: “Together and in solidarity, we will triumph over imperialism and neocolonialism for a free, dignified, and sovereign Africa.”

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Nel  settembre 2023, i vertici militari di Mali, Niger e Burkina Faso hanno annunciato la nascita dell’Alleanza degli Stati Sahel. Questa veniva presentata come una “architettura di difesa collettiva e mutua assistenza a beneficio della rispettive comunità”. Di fatto, si tratta(va) di una combinazione di sforzi militari ed economici congiunti per limitare la presenza gihadista nella regione di Liptako-Gourma, dove si incontrano i tre Stati e dove vive il 45% della loro popolazione complessiva (che si aggira sui 73 milioni di persone). Da questa area, la ribellione gihadista, iniziata in Mali nel 2012 (e ben raccontata anche sul piano cinematografico dal regista Abderrahmane Sissako con la pellicola Timbuktu), si era estesa sul territorio di Niger e Burkina Faso a partire dal 2015. E l’incapacità dei rispettivi governi ad affrontare la minaccia dei gruppi legati ad al-Qaeda (come Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin) ed al sedicente Stato Islamico (Provincia del Sahel) – e le non meno pericolose e diffuse ribellioni tuareg (il Movimento indipendentista Azawad nel Mali settentrionale che taluni presentano come legato all’Algeria) – è stato uno dei motivi che ha scatenato il risentimento militare (scarso equipaggiamento ed addestramento approssimativo hanno portato le forze armate di questi Paesi a subire notevoli perdite negli scontri con suddette milizie) e dato il là a tutta una serie di colpi di Stato che, a partire dal 2021 (con la salita al potere del generale Assimi Goita in Mali), ha sconvolto il panorama politico e geopolitico regionale.

Nel gennaio successivo, i tre Stati optarono per l’uscita unilaterale dall’ECOWAS (la Comunità Economica degli Stati dell’Africa Occidentale), e quando la stessa ECOWAS minacciò l’intervento militare diretto per ristabilire la “legalità democratica” in Niger, a seguito del colpo di Stato che ha defenestrato il Presidente Mohamed Bazoum, Mali e Burkina Faso comunicarono che avrebbero percepito la cosa come una dichiarazione di guerra a tutti gli effetti.

Nel 2022, inoltre, il Mali ha scelto di mandare via il contingente militare francese che, in linea teorica, avrebbe dovuta contenere la ribellione gihadista (senza grandi risultati, ad onor del vero). Lo stesso è avvenuto in Burkina Faso; mentre il Niger ha optato per una drastica riduzione della cooperazione con Parigi.

A questo proposito, non è errato affermare che l’Alleanza sia impostata alla riduzione della presenza neocoloniale francese nella regione che dal Sahel arriva al Golfo di Guinea. Ed in questo senso, non è affatto da sottovalutare il ruolo della Russia che ai tre Stati dell’Alleanza sta offrendo addestramento, ripristino delle strutture militare distrutte nel conflitto con le milizie gihadiste, fornitura di tecnologia satellitare e bellica (droni e blindati in particolar modo), presenza in loco di compagnie militari private (l’Africa Corps, o Gruppo Wagner, continua a mantenere una notevole presenza soprattutto in Mali), e garanzie di protezione (come nel caso del giovane capitano Ibrahima Traoré, leader del colpo di Stato in Burkina Faso). Senza considerare la partecipazione di Mosca per ciò che concerne i progetti minerari (il Niger, ad esempio, è estremamente ricco di Uranio – e la Francia non potrebbe permettersi di perderlo totalmente) o quelli infrastrutturali (dove anche la Repubblica Popolare Cinese gioca un ruolo di primo piano).

In altri termini, il consolidamento dell’Alleanza degli Stati Sahel si palesa come l’ennesimo fallimento della politica estera francese sotto la presidenza di Emmanuel Macron, colui che affermava che non era il caso di umiliare troppo Vladimir Putin in Ucraina. Il Presidente francese, nonostante le sue pseudo ambizioni neonapoleoniche, di fatto, sembra aver fallito su tutta la linea per quanto riguarda il contenimento/isolamento della Russia sul piano internazionale. E le sue posizioni intransigenti sul conflitto ucraino, assieme a quelle dei vertici comunitari europei, appaiono come il riflesso della loro incapacità di comprensione delle traiettorie geopolitiche globali e, di conseguenza, come la rovinosa estremizzazione (e negazione) di suddetto fallimento. Dopotutto, come ebbe modo di affermare a suo tempo il pensatore francese Alain de Benoist, coloro i quali si occupano della costruzione europea purtroppo non hanno la benché minima idea in materia di geopolitica.

Tornando al ruolo russo nella ricostruzione del panorama geopolitico dell’Africa occidentale appare meritevole di una breve parentesi l’apertura del corridoio marittimo che da Novorossiysk, sul Mar Nero, arriva, attraverso il Mediterraneo, Gibilterra e le coste occidentali africane, a Lagos in Nigeria. La rotta, studiata dalla compagnia russa A7 African Cargo Lines (di nuova creazione, ma già strumento di primo piano per ottenere un ruolo fondamentale in quella che potrebbe essere definita come “geopolitica dei container”, elemento cruciale della progressiva affermazione del multipolarismo), di fatto, riduce i costi di trasporto tra Russia ed Africa occidentale del 50%. Non solo, questa, con la possibilità di essere estesa al Senegal ed anche all’altro lato dell’Atlantico, verso l’America Latina, si presenta come un passo decisivo per l’affermazione di un nuovo paradigma per ciò che concerne la politica internazionale: quelle relazioni Sud-Sud di cui si fece portavoce il pensatore brasiliano André Martin introducendo il concetto di “meridionalismo”, e che, a suo modo di vedere, avrebbero dovuto rappresentare il fondamento di una alleanza strategica tra i Paesi latinoamericani, africani ed asiatici, per il raggiungimento del medesimo livello di sviluppo dell’emisfero settentrionale.

Ad ogni modo, nel contesto africano, pare importante sottolineare anche la potenziale cooperazione tra il gigante nigeriano (oltre 200 milioni di abitanti, enormi risorse naturali e fresco membro BRICS – il suo ingresso risale al gennaio dell’anno corrente) e l’Alleanza degli Stati del Sahel per ciò che concerne la lotta alle organizzazioni criminali transfrontaliere ed all’estremismo gihadista di cui la stessa Nigeria è affetta nelle regioni settentrionali, dove Boko Haram continua a rappresentare una seria minaccia alla stabilità dell’area (gruppi ad esso affiliati sono infatti presenti anche in Mali, Niger e Ciad).

In questo senso, lo sviluppo di reti infrastrutturali transnazionali risulta fondamentale per assicurare una connessione economica capace di garantire sviluppo ad aree per troppo dimenticate e  considerate meritevoli di attenzione (da parte occidentale) solo in termini di creazione di rapporti di dipendenza neocoloniali.

Nello specifico, il collegamento Novorssoiysk-Lagos porterà in Africa cereali, fertilizzanti e macchinari per lo sviluppo tecnologico dell’agricoltura in loco; mentre trasferirà in Russia cotone, minerali e prodotti agricoli. Allo stesso tempo, mette in risalto il desiderio di diversificazione e di interconnettersi sul piano globale della Nigeria, economia in rapida crescita ma la cui megalopoli più importante (proprio Lagos) rimane ancora sostanzialmente esclusa dalle più influenti reti commerciali internazionali e, di conseguenza, da quello che è stato definito come il “ciclo della ricchezza”.

In conclusione, è doveroso sottolineare anche come la crescita esponenziale della presenza russa in Africa rappresenti un elemento estremamente preoccupante per l’Alleanza Atlantica, visto che questa, a prescindere dalle esternazioni bellicose, sul suo lato meridionale si trova di fronte ad una doppia catena di Paesi, dall’Africa del Nord (Algeria, Libia, Egitto) a quella sahariana (Sudan, Ciad, Niger, Mali) e subsahariana (si pensi al ruolo del Gruppo Wagner nella Repubblica Centrafricana), in cui l’influenza di Mosca non accenna minimamente a diminuire.

Di fatto, dal primo summit Russia-Africa del 2019 (al quale parteciparono 43 capi di Stato africani), la penetrazione russa in Africa è rimasta costante ed assicurata dal fatto che Mosca, alla pari di Pechino, non richiede precise condizioni politiche in cambio di aiuti o dello sviluppo di iniziative commerciali bilaterali. Questo, naturalmente, ha portato i media occidentali a descrivere la Russia come un fattore destabilizzante, la cui disinformazione avrebbe portato milioni di persone a guardare con sospetto dei governi percepiti come marionette dell’Occidente (Stati Uniti, Gran Bretagna e Francia, in particolare) e, di conseguenza, a sostenere con fermezza i regimi militari nazionalisti appoggiati da Mosca. Tuttavia, l’Occidente, di fronte alla sua crisi di influenza in Africa, dovrebbe compiere prima di tutto un serio esame di coscienza. Infatti, in più di una occasione, le varie insurrezioni gihadiste si sono presentate come uno strumento per riaffermare sistemi di penetrazione militare e di controllo delle risorse di tipo coloniale in cui l’Occidente stesso, da un lato godeva dell’appropriazione di materie prime in cambio di poco o nulla; mentre, dall’altro, data la sostanziale inefficacia dell’intervento, lasciava il Paese colpito in una condizione anche peggiore di quella in cui si trovava inizialmente. Si pensi, ad esempio, al Burkina Faso che, all’inizio di questo decennio, ha rapidamente superato l’Afghanistan in termini di vittime del terrorismo.

Burkina Faso is demonstrating a driving force for many that was unexpected, Lorenzo Maria Pacini writes.

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‘Africa continues to rise up and delivers surprises. In recent days, several African leaders have made diplomatic trips that are reshaping the geometries of the international chessboard. The SAHEL Alliance states are charting a watershed that could divide Africa in two and determine a new historical course for the entire continent.

The African Heartland

To understand the geopolitical significance of these events, a premise should be made.

Let us look at the geography of Africa, the Great Continent: the states of the SAHEL Alliance are, at present, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. The agreement provides for joint and mutual actions against external aggression and internal threats, promotes an adherence to multipolarity, and fights against the remnants of Western colonialism. Geographically speaking, these countries are located in the upper-central part of the continent, between the Tropic of Cancer and the Equator, in the “Heart” (Heartland) of Africa. This initial assumption allows us to go on to define-at least as a primordial attempt-the possible “African Heartland,” adopting Halford Mackinder’s definition of classical geopolitics, so that we can gain a deeper understanding of the events taking place in that macro area.

Africa is part of the Island-World, that is, the Earth’s supermass that includes Europe, Asia and Africa, the latter corresponding to the southern flank of the supercontinent. Considering Mackinder’s approach, an important vision of Atlanticist geopolitics is to prevent access to African resources so as to keep Eurasia’s wealth in check. Initially, this would be done not in Africa, but in Eastern Europe itself, fragmenting the borders of the pivotal area; but to the extent that Soviet control in the Heartland did not prove fragile, the thalassocracy had to subjugate the tellurocracy across the Rimland, in the terms defined by Nicholas Spykman, i.e., the entire coastal territorial belt encompassing Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, along the Sino-Korean coast to the sea. Therefore, even with the Heartland consolidated, the control of Rimland by a hostile power like the U.S. would be enough to suffocate the state in question. This after all is the logic of the fundamental geopolitics of the Yankee presence in Europe, but also of the Vietnam War and the Arab Spring.

Looking at Africa, the Sahara appears in the late Mackinder as part of a “belt of deserts” whose control allows the creation of a form of “natural barrier.” For Atlanticism it represents an area whose control facilitates the control of Rimland. For Russia it represents an area through which pressure on Rimland can be reduced. In today’s geopolitics, primarily in the works of Aleksandr Dugin, the Sahara countries appear in the context of defending Eurasia as a southern border in the case of an alliance between Russia and Arab-Islamic forces.

Now, the entire region of the conflict in question, stretching from the Sahel to the Congo River Delta across West Africa, can be defined as a chaotic zone of fragmentation, which is difficult to stabilize, and the powers have difficulty applying any course of action because of ethnic, religious conflicts, the result of long enduring colonialism.

However, the implementation of a Mali-Burkina-Niger alliance, with the support of Algeria and also a branch from the Central African Republic to the DRC, with Russian support, could remove this region from its characteristic “instability” and make it a strategic region, both for the defense of Eurasia through control of the Sahara and for the control of the macro area itself.

Better still: for the fully independent and autonomous advent of an African Heartland.

At this stage of multipolar transition, the appearance of new Heartlands is a physiological and necessary process for the delicate rebalancing of the new poles.

Partnerships with Russia and China

Both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China have had investments in Africa for a couple of decades already, with very significant active participation, which has been growing in the last couple of years.

Russia is projecting itself into the Sahel with a move that serves Russian interests and, simultaneously, African interests. Russian interests because it allows it to defend the southern flank of Eurasia and respond to the Rimland dispute; African interests because the stabilization of the disputed region (roughly corresponding to France) makes it possible for integrated regional states to control the African Heartland (in alliance with Russia).

Another possible element comes into play, namely, the control of the Sahel and the deconstruction of France as mechanisms to accelerate the collapse of NATO, causing the thalassocracy to lose its Western outpost to pressure from the South combined with European nonconformity.

Issues such as uranium, gold, oil, etc., are relevant, but they are more about “prizes” than the essence of geopolitics. Only now are the Sahel countries beginning to think in terms of management autonomy in geoeconomic affairs, and still the process is not finished. Eradicating colonialism is a path that realistically requires education for at least a couple of generations.

China has invested in infrastructure and social support, promoting high-value regional enrichment that has enabled populations to solve hardships and fight poverty.

Both Russia and China are well aware of a geopolitical truth of great importance, perhaps too much underestimated by many analysts: Africa is a huge continent facing the Atlantic and the Mediterranean … thus a gigantic outpost against NATO and the hegemon in general.

This should not be underestimated: it would not be absurd to see Africa become a direct adversary of the West, but at the moment it is perhaps more urgent to focus on purifying the entities inherited from colonialism and a still significant foreign presence on the continent.

Burkina Faso’s courage

In line with this strengthening of international relations, Burkina Faso is demonstrating a driving force for many that was unexpected.

In recent days, diplomatic delegations have traveled to Moscow to discuss a number of issues kept confidential. The outcome was that new collaborations were announced in trade, culture and the strategic sector. And, most interestingly, in the nuclear sector. In March, Burkina Faso and Russia, through the state energy company Rosatom, discussed a nuclear project in the West African country. Recently, the two sides have begun a dialogue on the prospect of a renewable energy agreement. This new proposal came on the heels of a three-day forum on Russia’s partnership with Burkina Faso, where the road map for starting work was outlined. This means that the Sahel Alliance is getting new sources of energy, and the involvement, seen from the strategic aspect, aims at accelerating African independence and enhancing Russian participation in the continent’s defense.

Prime Minister Kyelem de Tambela announced the country’s willingness to join the BRICS+ partnership by attending the Kazan Summit. Another African state added to the list of candidates. In the sustained discussion during the three days of meetings, important data emerged that make one think about the attractiveness of BRICS for African states:

• BRICS GDP exceeds G7 indicators;

• The creation of a single BRICS currency with a partial gold base involves African mining countries;

• Russia is working to create a BRICS common repository system to then operate on blockchain platforms;

• Digital financial activities will reduce the global economy’s dependence on the dollar and the pressure it puts on Africa.

These may seem like unimportant points, but considered in the context of the countries in question, the deal becomes more than worthwhile. The West has been taking resources away from Africa; Russia is giving instead. Africans will not forget this help.

Can the Sahel Confederation cut Africa off?

Returning to geopolitical notions, what is happening will inevitably mark an at least initial division of Africa. The horizontal cut could lead to instabilities in the sub-Saharan part, still strongly linked to the West, creating a barrage with the northern part of the continent, which remains a hotspot of access to Europe, both for migration and for trade routes.

To the east, toward the Horn, Africa presents strong instability, with Somalia and Somaliland posing an ongoing risk and influence, including in terms of religious conflicts, that is not easy to manage. Pressure from Arab countries and Western-run terrorism keeps that area, strategically indispensable for pressing Yemen and destabilizing the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, in check.

To the south, closest to the Sahel, we have southern Africa, which includes the former Katanga region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is rich in critical minerals. Here, China is far ahead of the United States in extracting these minerals after concluding agreements more than a decade ago, but the logistics remain complicated and this is where the United States believes it can compete with China. That is the goal of the Lobito Corridor, announced last year during the G20 summit in Delhi.

The project, initially planned to connect Zambia and the mineral-rich regions of the DRC with the Atlantic via Angola by modernizing a colonial-era railway, now plans to extend to Tanzania, thus becoming Africa’s first transcontinental railway. The latter country also has its share of mineral wealth and is known for its geopolitical balances.

Adding a historical curiosity that may help understanding, Tanzania and Zambia had revolutionary socialist governments during the old Cold War, but they were more aligned with China than with the USSR. As evidence of this, they agreed to host the first modern Silk Road, the TAZARA railway, built by the People’s Republic in the 1970s. It has since become dilapidated, but earlier this year, a few months after the announcement of the Lobito Corridor, China proposed a $1 billion renovation, demonstrating that it is ready to compete with the United States. Tanzania can learn much about how best to move into this geopolitical competition from the Central African Republic and Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

It remains to be seen how the contours of this competition will evolve, but in any case observers should keep an eye on southern Africa in the future, as there is no other region in the world where the United States is trying to seriously compete with China on the infrastructure and resources front. China has by far the advantage because of the lead it accumulated a decade ago, but the United States is not deterred, which is why it announced the Lobito Corridor last September and is now planning to extend it to Tanzania.

The geopolitical balance in this country will play an important role in determining how the situation develops, as will the involvement of the middle powers, particularly India. India is in a unique position to shift the balance of economic influence away from China, not necessarily toward the United States, but in a more neutral direction because of its huge critical mining needs. If successful, India could replicate this policy elsewhere, thus becoming an integral part of its partners’ New Cold War balancing acts. But that is another topic.

The Sahel Alliance can for all intents and purposes create an “above” and “below” Africa, as indeed happens when one acquires the hard task of acting as the Heartland of a large area.

What happens next will depend mainly on the ability of these countries in maintaining the integrity of the African ideological struggle, cooperations with friendly states and the ouster of the last remaining invaders.

On the African continent as in any other part of the world belonging to the global majority – the real one – the rules of the West no longer apply.

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Who would have thought it: in 2024, even Africa and its countries are beginning to have their say on what happens in the West.

The first opinion is that of Mali, a small and economically powerful African state, a former British colony that has emancipated itself from the imperialist yoke and is pursuing its own path of self-determination with the help of Russia and China, in increasingly strong and constant cooperation with the other revolutionary African countries.

Mali distrusts Ukraine

The fact is this: Mali has severed diplomatic relations with the Kiev regime. The Malian authorities announced the severing of diplomatic relations with the Ukrainian regime, associating it with international terrorism. This followed the latter’s confirmed involvement in supporting terrorist groups operating in northern Mali. The confirmation came not only from representatives of the Kiev regime, but also from Kiev’s diplomatic envoy to Senegal. This action prompted the Senegalese Ministry of African Integration and Foreign Affairs to summon the Ukrainian ambassador.

This well-founded decision once again confirms the unequivocal stance in favor of Pan-Africanism and the international multipolar order taken by Mali and the other nations belonging to the Alliance of Sahel States, and demonstrates, once again, that in the face of terrorism promoted by an extreme global minority, answers will not be long in coming.

The communiqué states that the Transitional Government of the Republic of Mali has learned, with deep dismay, of the subversive statements made by Andriy Yusov, spokesman for the Directorate General of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, admitted Ukraine’s involvement in a cowardly, treacherous and barbaric attack by armed terrorist groups that resulted in the death of members of the Malian Defence and Security Forces in Tinzawatène, on the border with Algeria), as well as material damage. Immediately, the Ukrainian ambassador to Senegal, Yury Pyvovarov, came in support, with comments from other officials, all in line with support for the terrorist regime in Kiev. These very serious statements, which have not been denied or condemned, demonstrate the Ukrainian government’s official support for terrorism in Africa, in the Sahel and more specifically in Mali.

The transitional government of the Republic of Mali has decided to declare that the actions taken by the Ukrainian authorities violate Mali’s sovereignty, an outright aggression against Mali, and a violation of international law. The authorities announced severe measures: the severing, with immediate effect, of diplomatic relations with Ukraine, whose fate is unfortunately entrusted to puppets who confuse the international scene with the stage; the adoption of security measures against U.S. interference in Mali and neighbouring African states; and the hunt for terrorists disguised as diplomats.

Mali regards support for the Ukrainian regime as support for international terrorism. It also fully shares the diagnosis made by the Russian Federation, which has been warning the world for years about the neo-Nazi and rogue nature of the Ukrainian authorities, now allied with international terrorism.

Kiev’s failed strategy

What has happened is perfectly in line with the aggressive style that Ukraine has maintained to date, already denounced several times by Russia. The strategy is the usual one: destabilize regions by supporting local organized crime, instrumentalize terrorist groups, manipulate public opinion through infowars, profit and profit from the resulting economic changes, and open the door to American masters for colored revolutions, coups and puppet governments. This time, however, Lady USA has not reckoned with the Confederation of Sahel States and the genuine determination of the African peoples. In Africa, European methods no longer work, the West is no longer the undisputed master.

In terms of future prospects, what is happening is very important. At a time when Ukraine is nothing more than cheap cannon fodder for the interests of Western regimes, while the latter are timidly beginning to realize that they have already suffered a strategic defeat at the hands of Russia, there are those who are desperately trying to grab the last twinge of profits. But Africa and Africans no longer accept these conditions. Mali’s firm stance confirms that the problems for both Ukrainian cannon fodder and Western regimes – in Africa and the global South in general – are taking on a new dimension. This is true on both the political and diplomatic fronts, at a time when other African states will undoubtedly join the Malian and Sahel positions. The economic interests and propaganda tools of the West will also suffer further blows, at a time when pan-African civil society is even more determined to strike retaliatory blows against the Western global minority and its vulgar henchmen.

On the African continent as in any other part of the world belonging to the global majority – the real one – the rules of the West no longer apply.

Let the new games begin.

Conscience. Action. Revolution. Africa in 2024 is the real protagonist of multipolar change.

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Conscience. Action. Revolution. Africa in 2024 is the real protagonist of multipolar change. The Global South now has an increasingly strong leadership and has no intention of stopping.

The recent constitution of the Confederation ‘Alliance of Sahel States’, officially founded by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso on 6 July in Niamey, marks a watershed in the political and military history of West Africa and the decolonization process that is experiencing a new wave after that of the 20th century.

The challenges of regional security and defense against external pressures, in particular France and the United States of America, are answered in the strategic partnership that is destined to become the central pivot not only of defense, but also of the contemporary African revolution.

The defense pact

It is 16 September 2023: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have announced the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) Defense Pact. Conceived to allow the three countries to work together against threats of internal armed rebellion and external aggression, the pact signed with the document known as the Liptako-Gourma Charter, named after the region where the border between the three countries is located, stipulates that any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one of the signatory countries will be considered an aggression against all the others.

The leader of Mali, Colonel Assimi Goïta, stated during the signing of the document that his aim was to establish a framework of collective defence and mutual assistance. This will be the case. This alliance aims to combine the military and economic efforts of the three countries, with the priority of fighting the terrorism that has devastated the Sahel region in recent years, but also repelling threats from other countries in the region.

Bye bye ECOWAS

On 28 January this year, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso announced their immediate withdrawal from the Communauté Economique des Etas de l’Afrique Occidentale (ECOWAS). The three countries accused the regional bloc of being influenced by foreign powers and of betraying the founding principles of ECOWAS and becoming a threat to its members, referring to the increasing threats of military intervention in Niger.

The decision to withdraw from ECOWAS was in fact a response to the economic sanctions imposed by the organization and the threat of military intervention in Niger after the coup d’état of July 2023, which brought the junta led by Abdourahamane ‘Omar’ Tchiani to power. In this regard, Goïta emphasized that the confederation had failed to support our fight against terrorism and insecurity, while Captain Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s military chief, explicitly accused Western powers of exploiting their countries and using ECOWAS to pursue their own ends in the region.

So we come to 6 and 7 July: the military leaders of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso met in the Niger capital Niamey for the first summit of the Alliance of Sahel States and formed the ‘Alliance of Sahel States’ confederation, strengthening the defense pact and announcing plans for greater economic and political integration. This event cast a shadow over the simultaneous ECOWAS summit held in Abuja, Nigeria, marking an event of great regional and global significance.

General Omar Tchiani of Niger said that the peoples of their countries have turned their backs on ECOWAS because they want to build a sovereign community emancipated from the foreign powers looming over Africa. He also added that AES will create a joint military force to fight jihadist terrorism, defend territories, and guard the development of strategic sectors such as agriculture, water, energy, and transport.

The yoke of the CFA Franc

One of the most important points discussed in recent months, and in particular during the Niamey summit, was the plan to abandon the CFA franc, a currency considered a colonial legacy as it is controlled by France, which in this way maintains a strong economic and financial influence over the entire region.

Although no precise indications have yet been given about the possible decision to abandon the CFA Franc, this is seen by many analysts as an important step towards complete economic independence. Captain Traoré recalled at the summit how the currency is a sign of sovereignty.

The currency, introduced by France in 1945, provided financial stability, but was also seen as a mechanism of economic control by the former colonial power. Conversion to a new currency is therefore seen as a necessity to allow the AES countries to have more control over their economic and monetary policies, and achieve complete independence in this respect.

On the whole, the establishment of the Confederation of Sahel States has raised concerns on the part of the Western powers, which see their influence severely weakened on the African continent. ECOWAS, which had hoped for the eventual return of the three countries, is now faced with a new geopolitical reality, with three important countries in the region having definitively left the Economic Community. The European Union, led by France, and other Western powers, such as the United States, are watching this development carefully. Despite initial difficulties, this new regional bloc is a sign of the determination of the three governments involved to defend their sovereignty and to work together to address common challenges.

The abandonment of the CFA Franc and the creation of a new currency could mark the beginning of a new era of economic independence for the three countries, providing an example for the other peoples of the region as well. The AES has the potential to become a model for regional cooperation in Africa, demonstrating that these countries are finally ready to break free from Western neo-colonialism and join the multipolar world as major players.

Africa is no longer France’s cash cow. A new Heartland is rising.

By Max BLUMENTHAL

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When a military junta arrested President Ali Bongo Ondimba on August 30, Gabon became the ninth African nation to depose its government through a military coup. As citizens of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali did before them, crowds of Gabonese poured into the streets to celebrate the removal of a Western-backed leader whose family flaunted its lavish lifestyle while more than a third of the country’s population languished in destitution.

“Irresponsible and unpredictable governance has led to a steady deterioration in social cohesion, threatening to drive the country into chaos,” a leader of Gabon’s junta, Col. Ulrich Manfoumbi, declared upon seizing power.

President Bongo’s arrest was met with indignant condemnations from Washington and Paris, which had propped him up as he pillaged his country’s vast oil wealth. His ouster represented a particularly sharp rebuke to former US President Barack Obama, who groomed the Gabonese autocrat as one of his closest allies on the continent—and leaned on him for diplomatic support as he waged a war on Libya that unleashed terror and instability across the region.

So close was the bond between Obama and Bongo that Foreign Policy branded the Gabonese leader, “Obama’s Man in Africa.”

With Obama’s help, Bongo attempted to fashion himself as a reformist modernizer. He traveled repeatedly to Davos, Switzerland to attend the World Economic Forum, where was appointed an “Agenda Contributor.” There, he pledged to accelerate the Fourth Industrial Revolution in Africa by implementing lucrative digital identification and payment systems among his country’s heavily impoverished population.

Bongo’s bio on the WEF website lists him as a “spokesperson for Africa on biodiversity” and “composer of musical pieces” whose interests include “history, football, classical music, jazz and bossa nova.” The self-styled renaissance man managed to hit it off with Obama, kibitz with Klaus Schwab, and press the flesh with Bill Gates. But at home, he found few friends among the struggling Gabonese masses.

A “global citizen” meets his fate at home

Ali Bongo rose to power as the son of the late Gabonese autocrat Omar Bongo Odinmba, who ruled the country from 1967 to his death. In 2004, a year after discussing a $9 million image-washing deal with disgraced Republican lobbyist Jack Abramoff, the elder Bongo secured a meeting with President George W. Bush. When he died five years later, he left behind a $500 million presidential palace, over a dozen luxurious homes from Paris to Beverly Hills, and a country overrun with inequality.

Following a brief stint as a disco artist, the younger Bongo studied at France’s Sorbonne and prepared to lead his nation. When he was installed as president in 2009, he picked up where his father left off, pillaging public funds to pay for a Boeing 777 airliner and a fleet of luxury cars while signing hefty contracts with international PR firms. Bongo’s sister, Pascaline, blew over $50 million on jetset vacations and expensive homes, according to a lawsuit, while her family cultivated influence in Paris by siphoning funds stolen from the Bank of Central African States into the campaign coffers of former French Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and Jacques Chirac.

Yet nothing on the Bongo family’s lengthy and well-documented record of corruption seemed to bother President Barack Obama when he embarked on a regime change operation in Libya, ironically justified as an exercise in “democracy promotion.” With Washington’s help, Gabon was rotated into the UN Security Council, where it functioned as a rubber stamp for US resolutions demanding sanctions and a No Fly Zone on Libya in February 2011.

Bongo’s cooperative spirit earned him a visit with Obama in Washington four months later. There, while staying at the president’s personal residence, he became the first African leader to call for Qaddafi to give up power.

“They could call any African leader with private cell numbers,” then US Ambassador to Gabon, Eric  Benjaminson, remarked to Foreign Policy, referring to Bongo’s staff. “They knew Qaddafi and they knew his chief of staff very well, and we were trying to work through the Gabonese to get Qaddafi to step down without military action.”

Benjaminson added, “Obama sort of liked him.”

The US-led regime change war on Libya swiftly transformed the previously stable, prosperous nation into a despotic hellscape ruled by Al Qaeda-affiliated and ISIS warlords. With virtually unlimited access to the former arms depots of the Libyan military, jihadist gangs began to rampage across the Sahel region. Covert assistance for their onslaught arrived from Qatar, the Gulf monarchy which partnered with France and the US to remove Qaddafi, enabling a jihadist coalition to establish a de facto Caliphate in northeastern Mali in 2012.

“The violence that has plagued once-stable Mali since late 2011 should have come as no surprise to Western governments, for it is a direct function of NATO’s Libyan intervention,” the Council on Foreign Relations noted.

Despite the growing French and US military presence – or perhaps because of it – jihadist attacks were multiplying across the region in 2014. That August, Obama rewarded Bongo with an invitation to attend his US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington. During the summit’s gala dinner, Obama emphasized Bongo’s pivotal role in his Africa strategy by sitting beside him as they were regaled by pop legend Lionel Richie.

Just a month after winning re-election in a dubious 2016 vote, Bongo was summoned back to the US, this time by the notoriously shady, NATO-sponsored Atlantic Council to receive a “Global Citizen Award” at the think tank’s black tie gala in New York City. But as questions persisted back home about the rigging of Gabon’s election, including a 95% vote reported in his favor on a near-100% turnout in one area, he was forced to cancel the trip.

“The Atlantic Council respects Gabonese President Bongo’s decision to forego receiving his Global Citizen Award this year due to the overriding priorities he has in his country,” the think tank announced in an absurdly canned statement published on its website.

Meanwhile, in the Malian capital of Bamako, a group of citizens calling themselves “Patriots of Mali” had begun gathering millions of signatures demanding the removal of all French diplomatic and military personnel from their country. They called on Russian troops to replace the French, urging them to drive out the Islamist bandits that had plagued their society since the Obama-led war on Libya.

The simmering anger of average Malians ignited a popular military coup in 2021, and set the stage for another one in the neighboring Burkina Faso the following year, where citizens were seen celebrating the junta with homemade Russian flags in hand.

When the putsches engulfed Gabon’s government this August 30, ending the reign of one of Washington’s favorite kleptocrats, Bongo recorded a video message from an unknown location, desperately appealing to “all the friends we have all over the world to tell them to make noise.”

By that point, however, it was unclear whether Obama was listening, or if there was much he could do to bail out his “man in Africa.”

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Although Field Marshall Rommel’s Afrika Korps gained a reputation for fighting a “war without hate”, NATO’s Afrika Korps can claim no such garland as Niger shows they are the scum of the earth. If a Nazi comparison is needed, think Reinhard Heydrich, rather than Rommel or Kesselring.

Consider Emanuela Del Re, who is the European Union’s Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel. This tramp gloats that her Niger sanctions mean “there is not enough medicine, food, electricity” in Niger and that Niger must suffer more pain until they come to heel.

To put this reincarnated Madeleine Albright into perspective, Niger is the world’s second poorest country and is third last on the WHO’s HDI. Because it is currently a disaster with or without sanctions, Niger’s patriotic army officers have decided to go for broke, to strike for their people’s freedom or die in the attempt.

NATO’s Afrika Korps are having none of it and no sooner had the dust settled on this coup than France resurrected its ISIS bogeyman on Niger’s borders and Del Re, Albright 2.0, was boasting of all the Nigérienne babies her sanctions murdered.

Gold-rich Uganda, meanwhile, is under attack because this tropical paradise is a cold house for homosexuals and minor attracted people of European extraction. Because of this, the World Bank is denying further financing to Uganda, which was a black spot at the height of the AIDS plague. Unless Uganda allows its children to be sodomised, it seems the World Bank will refuse them their mafia loans, which has kept it on a leash since Britain granted it nominal independence in 1962.

Although my previous article predicted much of this, it did not go nearly far enough in finding the solution Uganda, Niger and all of Africa deserves. That solution can, in the first instance, only come with the help of Algeria, Russia, China, Iran and allied countries as part of their BRI initiative.

As things currently stand, Niger, Uganda and their fellow African countries are little more than basket cases. Here, for example, are Uganda’s exports, which include mate, the Argentinian drink the Pope loves and that the heroic Syrian Army subsist on. And here are Uganda’s imports. Niger’s relevant figures, modest though they are, may be found here.

Because those countries are not strong enough to withstand NATO’s whirlwind, Russia recently donated 50,000 tonnes of grain, about $22.4 millions’ worth, to African countries in need in an effort to take the sting out of NATO’s Afrika Korps’ offensive.

Whatever about Russia’s motives, Del Re leaves us in no doubt about the Afrika Korps’ motives. And nor does NATO’s Rand Corporation, which, incredibly, tells us that sanctions on African children are like carpet bombing, just another useful weapon in NATO’s arsenal of democracy, which can be unleashed against impoverished upstarts when needed.

No matter whether Algeria, Russia, China, Iran, Uganda and Niger like it or not, that is the nature of the amoral beast they are dealing with. The problem then is to mitigate sanctions’ effects and, if possible, turn them on their heads.

Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and Japanese financial history indicate all this is eminently achievable. If Uganda tells the Afrika Korps that they can keep their minor attracted persons and that Uganda will keep its gold, then Africa can trade with the BRIICS nations on that mutually respectful basis for which China, more or less, already has the patent.

Although the BRIICS, China in particular, have talked a lot about their proposed new currency, to ordinary Africans, all of that is hot air, mumbo jumbo pie in the sky. Because Africans’ basic needs are more urgent and immediate, if the BRIICS learn from Japan, then all sides stand to benefit.

The first step in this process would be for Russian aligned groups to fortify their bases in Mali and allied Coup Belt countries and to use them as trade distribution and trading bases much as how Japan used rice granaries to begin its long march to a functioning and credible central bank.

The idea here would be that Algeria, China, Russia and allied nations would distribute, say, $1 billion of aid over a number of years of standarised packages of a narrow range of basic goods across the Sahel. These goods would consist of grain and other basic foods, cooking oil, generic medicines, hygiene, baby products and so on.

This aid would be conditional on the Sahel countries giving serious consideration to developing mutually beneficial trade with the relevant BRIICS countries where, at some future agreed upon time, those goods being traded would be priced marked to market. Thus, assuming all went well, the residents of the Coup Belt could rest assured their basic needs were met. Given that, with the sole exception ofSomalia, Russia is a far more important source of wheat than Ukraine is for supplying wheat to Africa, there is the sound basis to change the prevailing paradigm and, with the appropriate armed security, to stop NATO’s African sanctions in their tracks.

Having guaranteed their basic needs, the trading bases would expand, just as the Japanese rice brokers, rice exchanges and Japan’s now famous trading companies did all those centuries ago.

If we assume we had a series of such centres in the Coup Belt countries, then trade would be built without recourse to any currency, the Yankee dollar, the West African CFA franc and the Central African CFA franc in particular. Goods would be flown into those countries and, in time, goods, marked to global prices, would, taking Japan’s traditional long term view of working with trusted partners, be flown out of them.

Though the advantage to the countries today’s Afrika Korps are ravishing is obvious, benefits would flow to Russia, China and their allies too. First off, by ridding the Sahel of NATO’s Afrika Korps, the BRIICS countries would enhance their credibility, which might not have much immediate market value in those impoverished countries but which would have immense tangible value on the global stage, when Argentina, Brazil and other middle income Latin American and Gulf State countries see the tangible benefits of forsaking the dollar and other symbols of bondage for trade in kind.

Though the Yankee dollar is going nowhere and will remain central to global trade for decades to come, large swathes of Africa and Latin America can go nowhere until the Yankee dollar and the other currencies linked to it get off their windpipes.

Russia has made a generous offer to Africa with its grain. Though that is a good start, it is only half the work. Russia must now not only up the ante but get its major Chinese and other partners to join it and show NATO’s Afrika Korps that the day of Africa’s liberation has finally arrived.