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Alla guida di un futuro migliore

Un consiglio: non bisogna togliere gli occhi da ciò che sta avvenendo nel Sahel. E, soprattutto, non bisogna ignorare le ragioni profonde e le modalità con cui oggi l’Africa sta risorgendo proprio grazie alla Alleanza degli Stati del Sahel.

Burkina Faso, Mali e Niger costituiscono tre stati contigui, privi di sbocchi al mare, che occupano un’enorme fascia di territorio a cavallo fra il Sahara meridionale e la regione sudano-saheliana. Insieme rappresentano quasi la metà della superficie complessiva dell’Africa occidentale – circa il 45% – e circa il 17% della sua popolazione, pari a oltre 73 milioni di abitanti sommando i tre Paesi (26,2 milioni in Niger, 23,8 milioni in Mali e 23 milioni in Burkina Faso). Questi numeri da soli mostrano il peso demografico e geografico della triade saheliana.

Le società di questi Paesi presentano forti tratti comuni, frutto di secoli di scambi culturali e commerciali e di una vicinanza geografica che ha favorito la condivisione di norme e pratiche sociali, culture ancora in gran parte fondate su valori comunitari, sull’oralità come mezzo privilegiato di trasmissione del sapere, su economie prevalentemente agricole e su strutture sociali fortemente influenzate dalla religione che plasma la vita delle persone in un’apertura verticale all’esistenza.

Come il resto dell’Africa occidentale, anche Niger, Mali e Burkina Faso hanno conosciuto nel Novecento tutte le contraddizioni del dominio coloniale francese, contraddizioni che esplosero in modo evidente durante la Seconda guerra mondiale. Nella narrazione ufficiale europea raramente si ricorda che una parte significativa dei soldati e dei corpi di lavoro impiegati per liberare l’Europa dal nazismo proveniva dalle colonie francesi dell’Africa occidentale, comprese le odierne Burkina Faso, Mali e Niger. Migliaia di africani combatterono e morirono su suolo europeo, e la loro esperienza bellica alimentò una nuova coscienza politica che preparò il terreno alle rivendicazioni di eguaglianza e autodeterminazione.

Le prime organizzazioni anticoloniali

È dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, in un contesto di tentativi di affermazione del socialismo in Africa, che i movimenti anti-coloniali prendono piede e ottengono successi significativi.

Procediamo per tappe storiche. In Niger già nel 1946 nacque il Partito Progressista Nigerino, affiliato al Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, grande coalizione panafricana e anticoloniale guidata da figure come Modibo Keïta in Mali e Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea. L’RDA iniziò chiedendo l’uguaglianza di diritti con i cittadini francesi, ma in pochi anni passò a posizioni di rottura totale con il sistema coloniale.

In Burkina Faso, l’Unione Voltaica si unì all’RDA per costruire un fronte comune di liberazione su scala regionale. Il socialismo in Burkina Faso ha assunto una connotazione particolare durante la presidenza di Thomas Sankara, che trasformò l’allora Alto Volta in Burkina Faso, “Paese degli uomini integri”. La sua visione, ispirata al marxismo-leninismo ma profondamente adattata al contesto africano, puntava a un modello di sviluppo autonomo, fondato sulla giustizia sociale, la partecipazione popolare e l’indipendenza economica dalle potenze coloniali e dalle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali.

Sankara avviò infatti un vasto programma di riforme che includeva la redistribuzione delle terre, la promozione dell’agricoltura di sussistenza e l’alfabetizzazione di massa. Furono costruiti migliaia di scuole, pozzi e centri sanitari nelle aree rurali, con l’obiettivo di ridurre le disuguaglianze tra città e campagne. La sua politica incoraggiava il ruolo delle donne, abolendo pratiche tradizionali oppressive e promuovendone l’integrazione attiva nella vita economica e politica del Paese.

Il socialismo burkinabé si distingueva dal modello sovietico per il suo forte radicamento comunitario e per l’attenzione all’autosufficienza, criticava apertamente il debito estero, considerandolo un meccanismo di sottomissione neocoloniale, e rifiutava l’arricchimento personale dei dirigenti. La leadership di Sankare fu austera e carismatica, poiché cercava di costruire un senso di identità nazionale e solidarietà tra i cittadini in un momento di grande difficoltà per i popoli africani del Sahel.

Nonostante i risultati significativi in termini di sviluppo sociale e infrastrutturale, il progetto socialista del Burkina Faso incontrò resistenze interne ed esterne. La carenza di risorse, l’isolamento internazionale e i contrasti con le élite locali portarono a tensioni crescenti, culminate nel colpo di Stato del 1987 in cui Sankara fu assassinato.

Subito dopo, Blaise Compaoré prese il potere inaugurando un periodo di trent’anni caratterizzato da un progressivo abbandono delle politiche socialiste. Il nuovo regime cercò di normalizzare i rapporti con le potenze occidentali e con le istituzioni finanziarie internazionali, liberalizzando l’economia e riducendo la portata delle riforme popolari di Sankara. Questa transizione generò una crescente disillusione tra i cittadini, poiché le promesse di sviluppo inclusivo e giustizia sociale lasciarono spazio a corruzione, diseguaglianze e instabilità.

Nel 2014 un movimento popolare costrinse Compaoré alle dimissioni, aprendo una fase politica incerta con governi civili deboli e incapaci di rispondere all’aumento dell’insicurezza, aggravata dalla diffusione di gruppi jihadisti nel Sahel. I successivi presidenti, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré e Paul-Henri Damiba, non riuscirono a stabilizzare il Paese né a riprendere il cammino di sviluppo sociale, alimentando il malcontento.

In questo contesto di crisi, il militare Ibrahim Traoré prese il potere con un colpo di Stato nel settembre 2022, riportando in auge il sogno socialista e indipendentista di Sankara, e diventando un faro per tutti i popoli oppressi del mondo.

Il quadro internazionale aveva accelerato questo processo, soprattutto per la presenza politica di Francia e UK. La grave sconfitta francese in Indocina del 1954 e l’intensificarsi della guerra in Algeria che durò fino al 1962 ridussero la capacità di Parigi di mantenere il controllo sulle colonie. Charles de Gaulle tentò di preservare almeno parte dell’impero offrendo un compromesso: nel 1958 indisse un referendum legato alla nuova Costituzione della Quinta Repubblica. Ai territori africani furono proposte due opzioni: votare “sì” per restare nella Comunità franco-africana, mantenendo sotto influenza francese i centri nevralgici del potere, oppure votare “no” per l’indipendenza immediata, rischiando però rottura politica e isolamento economico.

Djibo Bakary – fondatore del partito Sawaba (che significa “libertà” in lingua hausa) e capo del governo dopo le elezioni del 1957 – guidò la campagna per il “no”. Solo la Guinea di Sékou Touré riuscì realmente a respingere l’offerta di De Gaulle, conquistando nel 1958 l’indipendenza immediata come prima colonia francese dell’Africa occidentale.

I leader favorevoli alla rottura furono spesso colpiti da repressione interna, alimentata dalla cooperazione tra funzionari coloniali, capi tradizionali e la nuova élite africana “évoluée” formata nelle scuole francesi e destinata a perpetuare l’ordine esistente. De Gaulle inviò un nuovo governatore, Don Jean Colombani, che mobilitò l’intero apparato amministrativo e di sicurezza per sabotare il referendum e indebolire il Sawaba, contrario anche allo sfruttamento dell’uranio nigerino da parte francese. Il “sì” prevalse ufficialmente grazie a massicce manipolazioni elettorali.

Ciononostante, la vittoria della Guinea nel 1958, dopo l’indipendenza del Ghana britannico nel 1957, costrinse Parigi a cedere progressivamente terreno. Nel 1960 ben 17 Stati africani – 14 dei quali ex colonie francesi – proclamarono l’indipendenza. Si trattò però in larga misura di una “indipendenza con bandiera”: cambiava il simbolo nazionale ma non la struttura economica. L’influenza francese restò intatta grazie a una fitta rete di accordi di “cooperazione” che, attraverso protocolli di assistenza tecnica, intese di difesa e soprattutto il sistema del franco CFA, assicuravano a Parigi un controllo sostanziale. Tali accordi obbligavano gli Stati africani a rimborsare le infrastrutture costruite nel periodo coloniale (spesso con lavoro forzato), concedevano alla Francia diritti di prelazione sulle esportazioni strategiche – in particolare uranio – garantivano alle imprese francesi esenzioni fiscali grazie al principio della non doppia imposizione, imponevano l’uso del franco CFA controllato dal Tesoro francese limitando così la sovranità monetaria e fiscale, e mantenevano basi militari francesi con libero utilizzo delle infrastrutture, incluse comunicazioni e trasmissioni.

Emblematico è il caso del Niger. Un accordo di difesa del 1961 con Costa d’Avorio e Dahomey (oggi Benin) concedeva alla Francia l’uso illimitato di infrastrutture e beni militari e definiva esplicitamente il ruolo delle forze armate francesi come garante degli interessi economici, elencando le materie prime strategiche (idrocarburi, uranio, torio, litio, berillio) e obbligando i Paesi firmatari a informare Parigi su ogni progetto di esportazione e a facilitare lo stoccaggio di tali risorse per le esigenze della difesa francese. In questo modo l’apparato militare diventava un vero e proprio strumento di tutela degli interessi commerciali e geopolitici di Parigi, che non voleva lasciare l’Africa, troppo importante per mantenere il proprio potere finanziario coloniale e gestire la propria ricchezza interna nel continente europeo.

Autonomia e ritorsioni

Il Mali di Modibo Keïta, dopo l’indipendenza del 1960, cercò di imboccare una via autonoma ispirata al socialismo: creazione di imprese statali, nazionalizzazione di settori chiave e soprattutto introduzione nel 1962 di una moneta nazionale fuori dall’area del franco CFA. La reazione francese fu immediata: isolamento diplomatico, restrizioni commerciali e sospensione dell’assistenza tecnica e finanziaria. La crisi economica conseguente aprì la strada al colpo di Stato del 1968 del tenente Moussa Traoré, sostenuto dalla Francia, che riportò il Mali nell’orbita del franco CFA nel 1984.

Negli anni Ottanta e Novanta, con la fine della Guerra fredda, Parigi riformulò la sua politica africana introducendo la “condizionalità politica”: al vertice di La Baule del 1990 François Mitterrand dichiarò che gli aiuti sarebbero stati legati a riforme democratiche come il multipartitismo. In parallelo, FMI e Banca Mondiale imposero i Programmi di Aggiustamento Strutturale (SAP): austerità, tagli al settore pubblico, liberalizzazione del commercio. In Mali questi pacchetti accompagnarono il ritorno al franco CFA nel 1984.

La devalutazione del franco CFA del 1994 rappresentò un secondo shock: ufficialmente serviva a rilanciare le esportazioni e stabilizzare le finanze, ma in realtà provocò rincari, erosione dei salari e proteste diffuse. Questa nuova fase combinava liberalizzazione economica e riforme di governance imposte dall’esterno: una “democratizzazione” di facciata che consolidava il controllo neocoloniale attraverso debito, privatizzazioni e ristrutturazioni statali guidate dai donatori.

A questi strumenti di dominio si aggiunse progressivamente la presenza militare occidentale, in particolare statunitense, quando nell 2002 gli USA lanciarono la Pan-Sahel Initiative, che segnò l’inizio di una presenza militare duratura in Mali, Niger, Ciad e Mauritania, poi estesa al Burkina Faso con la Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership del 2005.

Dal 2011 le operazioni francesi e statunitensi si intensificarono: droni USA, missioni di addestramento guidate da AFRICOM, basi militari a Gao, N’Djamena, Niamey, Ouagadougou, l’Operazione Barkhane della Francia, la forza congiunta del G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Ciad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger). Molte cose sono cambiate. Non è mancato anche il terrorismo religioso, che ha mantenuto la regione in una condizione di precarietà e insicurezza, diventando una piaga difficile da combattere in molte zone.

Proprio in quell’anno, 2011, avvenne anche la programmata distruzione del Libia di Gheddafi, che aprì le porte al traffico incontrollato di armi e alla proliferazione di gruppi jihadisti. Libia che rappresentava un pilastro regionale, ma che una volta bombardata distrusse anche le iniziative di mediazione dell’Unione Africana. L’Occidente prima o dopo dovrà pagare per l’enorme male compiuto alla Libia.

Verso una sempre maggiore indipendenza

Mentre le ingerenze militari erodevano la sovranità, le corporation transnazionali continuavano a estrarre ricchezza dal Sahel a condizioni fortemente inique.

Questa dipendenza economica cronica ha consolidato il sottosviluppo strutturale, limitando la capacità degli Stati di diversificare l’economia e negoziare termini commerciali più favorevoli. Ne è derivata una fragilità permanente che espone a pressioni esterne e alimenta crisi politiche, sociali e di sicurezza, laddove non è possibile, oggi, avere soltanto l’indipendenza politica, ma è necessario possedere anche quella economica.

Dagli anni Novanta, i colpi di Stato e i cambi di regime sono diventati fenomeni ricorrenti, espressione di élite che competono per il potere in contesti istituzionali deboli. Corruzione, servizi pubblici insufficienti e l’esclusione di gruppi marginalizzati hanno minato la legittimità statale e accresciuto la sfiducia della popolazione in molti Paesi africani.

La storia recente di Burkina Faso, Mali e Niger dimostra come l’indipendenza formale ottenuta negli anni Sessanta non abbia significato sovranità effettiva. Dai meccanismi economici del “debito coloniale” e del franco CFA agli accordi di difesa che integravano interessi strategici francesi, fino alle “condizionalità” imposte negli anni Ottanta e Novanta e alle missioni militari occidentali del XXI secolo, le vecchie forme di dominio si sono in molti casi trasformate piuttosto che dissolversi, e i leader attuali, che vogliono veramente cambiare la situazione, si trovano davanti ad una complicata struttura statale che deve essere rinnovata completamente. E, di più, è una struttura occidentale, europea, che deve essere riadattata al mondo africano.

Comprendere questa traiettoria è essenziale per leggere l’attuale fase politica nel Sahel: solo inserendo le crisi contemporanee in questa cornice storica si può cogliere il senso delle rivendicazioni di sovranità e delle scelte radicali compiute da governi e società civili della regione.

L’indipendenza piena ed effettiva, con sovranità e autonomia, è possibile, ma è ancora un processo in atto, non è già completa, ed è soprattutto un procedimento che parte da un consolidamento ideologico di “chi” e “cosa” sono quei popoli. Segue poi la scelta di quali forma politiche adottare, secondo la propria sensibilità e tradizione, anche declinando il socialismo in modi sconosciuti all’esperienza europea. Cacciare ciò che resta dei colonialisti, smantellare ogni loro struttura e rifondare con spirito africano le loro terre, è una missione che richiederà coraggio e sacrificio.

Non si può non concludere con una citazione del Presidente Capitano Ibrahim Traoré: “Insieme e in solidarietà, trionferemo sull’imperialismo e il neocolonialismo per un’Africa libera, dignitosa e sovrana”.

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Leading the way to a better future

A word of advice: keep your eyes on what is happening in the Sahel. And, above all, do not ignore the underlying reasons and the ways in which Africa is now rising again thanks to the Alliance of Sahel States.

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are three contiguous, landlocked states that occupy a huge swath of territory straddling the southern Sahara and the Sudano-Sahelian region. Together, they account for almost half of West Africa’s total area—about 45%—and about 17% of its population, with a combined total of over 73 million inhabitants (26.2 million in Niger, 23.8 million in Mali, and 23 million in Burkina Faso). These figures alone demonstrate the demographic and geographic weight of the Sahelian triad.

The societies of these countries share strong common traits, the result of centuries of cultural and commercial exchanges and geographical proximity that has fostered the sharing of social norms and practices, cultures still largely based on community values, oral tradition as the preferred means of transmitting knowledge, predominantly agricultural economies, and social structures strongly influenced by religion, which shapes people’s lives in a vertical openness to existence.

Like the rest of West Africa, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso experienced all the contradictions of French colonial rule in the 20th century, contradictions that exploded in a dramatic fashion during World War II. The official European narrative rarely mentions that a significant proportion of the soldiers and laborers employed to liberate Europe from Nazism came from the French colonies in West Africa, including present-day Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Thousands of Africans fought and died on European soil, and their war experience fueled a new political consciousness that paved the way for demands for equality and self-determination.

The first anti-colonial organizations

It was after World War II, in a context of attempts to establish socialism in Africa, that anti-colonial movements took hold and achieved significant successes.

Let’s proceed in historical stages. In Niger, the Nigerien Progressive Party was founded in 1946, affiliated with the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, a large pan-African and anti-colonial coalition led by figures such as Modibo Keïta in Mali and Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea. The RDA began by demanding equal rights with French citizens, but within a few years it moved to a position of total break with the colonial system.

In Burkina Faso, the Voltaic Union joined the RDA to build a common front for liberation on a regional scale. Socialism in Burkina Faso took on a particular connotation during the presidency of Thomas Sankara, who transformed the then Upper Volta into Burkina Faso, ‘the land of honest men’. His vision, inspired by Marxism-Leninism but deeply adapted to the African context, aimed at a model of autonomous development based on social justice, popular participation, and economic independence from colonial powers and international financial institutions.

Sankara launched a vast program of reforms that included land redistribution, the promotion of subsistence agriculture, and mass literacy. Thousands of schools, wells, and health centers were built in rural areas with the aim of reducing inequalities between cities and the countryside. His policy encouraged the role of women, abolishing oppressive traditional practices and promoting their active integration into the economic and political life of the country.

Burkinabe socialism differed from the Soviet model in its strong community roots and focus on self-sufficiency. It openly criticized foreign debt, considering it a mechanism of neocolonial subjugation, and rejected the personal enrichment of leaders. Sankare’s leadership was austere and charismatic, as he sought to build a sense of national identity and solidarity among citizens at a time of great difficulty for the African peoples of the Sahel.

Despite significant achievements in terms of social and infrastructural development, Burkina Faso’s socialist project met with internal and external resistance. A lack of resources, international isolation, and conflicts with local elites led to growing tensions, culminating in the 1987 coup d’état in which Sankara was assassinated.

Immediately afterwards, Blaise Compaoré took power, ushering in a thirty-year period characterized by a gradual abandonment of socialist policies. The new regime sought to normalize relations with Western powers and international financial institutions, liberalizing the economy and reducing the scope of Sankara’s popular reforms. This transition generated growing disillusionment among citizens, as promises of inclusive development and social justice gave way to corruption, inequality, and instability.

In 2014, a popular movement forced Compaoré to resign, ushering in a period of political uncertainty with weak civilian governments unable to respond to rising insecurity, exacerbated by the spread of jihadist groups in the Sahel. Subsequent presidents, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré and Paul-Henri Damiba, failed to stabilize the country or resume the path of social development, fueling discontent.

In this context of crisis, the military leader Ibrahim Traoré seized power in a coup d’état in September 2022, reviving Sankara’s socialist and independence dream and becoming a beacon for all oppressed peoples around the world.

The international situation had accelerated this process, especially due to the political presence of France and the UK. France’s heavy defeat in Indochina in 1954 and the intensification of the war in Algeria, which lasted until 1962, reduced Paris’s ability to maintain control over its colonies. Charles de Gaulle attempted to preserve at least part of the empire by offering a compromise: in 1958, he called a referendum on the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic. The African territories were offered two options: vote ‘yes’ to remain in the French-African Community, keeping the centers of power under French influence, or vote ‘no’ for immediate independence, but risking political rupture and economic isolation.

Djibo Bakary—founder of the Sawaba party (which means “freedom” in the Hausa language) and head of government after the 1957 elections—led the “no” campaign. Only Sékou Touré’s Guinea really managed to reject De Gaulle’s offer, gaining immediate independence in 1958 as the first French colony in West Africa.

Leaders in favor of breaking away were often subjected to internal repression, fueled by cooperation between colonial officials, traditional leaders, and the new African “évoluée” elite educated in French schools and destined to perpetuate the existing order. De Gaulle sent a new governor, Don Jean Colombani, who mobilized the entire administrative and security apparatus to sabotage the referendum and weaken the Sawaba, which was also opposed to French exploitation of Nigerien uranium. The “yes” vote officially prevailed thanks to massive electoral manipulation.

Nevertheless, Guinea’s victory in 1958, following the independence of British Ghana in 1957, forced Paris to gradually give ground. In 1960, as many as 17 African states—14 of which were former French colonies—proclaimed independence. However, this was largely a case of “independence with a flag”: the national symbol changed, but not the economic structure. French influence remained intact thanks to a dense network of ‘cooperation’ agreements which, through technical assistance protocols, defense agreements and, above all, the CFA franc system, ensured Paris substantial control. These agreements obliged African states to repay the infrastructure built during the colonial period (often with forced labor), granted France preemptive rights on strategic exports—particularly uranium—guaranteed French companies tax exemptions thanks to the principle of non-double taxation, imposed the use of the CFA franc controlled by the French Treasury, thus limiting monetary and fiscal sovereignty, and maintained French military bases with free use of infrastructure, including communications and transmissions.

The case of Niger is emblematic. A 1961 defense agreement with Côte d’Ivoire and Dahomey (now Benin) granted France unlimited use of military infrastructure and assets and explicitly defined the role of the French armed forces as guarantor of economic interests, listing strategic raw materials (hydrocarbons, uranium, thorium, lithium, beryllium) and obliging the signatory countries to inform Paris of any export projects and to facilitate the storage of these resources for French defense needs. In this way, the military apparatus became a real instrument for protecting the commercial and geopolitical interests of Paris, which did not want to leave Africa, too important to maintain its colonial financial power and manage its internal wealth on the European continent.

Autonomy and retaliation

After independence in 1960, Modibo Keïta’s Mali sought to embark on an autonomous path inspired by socialism: the creation of state-owned enterprises, the nationalization of key sectors, and, above all, the introduction in 1962 of a national currency outside the CFA franc area. The French reaction was immediate: diplomatic isolation, trade restrictions, and suspension of technical and financial assistance. The resulting economic crisis paved the way for the 1968 coup d’état by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, supported by France, which brought Mali back into the CFA franc zone in 1984.

In the 1980s and 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, Paris reformulated its African policy by introducing ‘political conditionality’: at the 1990 La Baule summit, François Mitterrand declared that aid would be linked to democratic reforms such as multipartyism. At the same time, the IMF and the World Bank imposed Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs): austerity, public sector cuts, trade liberalization. In Mali, these packages accompanied the return to the CFA franc in 1984.

The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was a second shock: officially, it was intended to boost exports and stabilize finances, but in reality it led to price increases, wage erosion, and widespread protests. This new phase combined economic liberalization and externally imposed governance reforms: a facade of “democratization” that consolidated neocolonial control through debt, privatization, and donor-led state restructuring.

These instruments of domination were gradually joined by a Western military presence, particularly from the U.S., when in 2002 the U.S. launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which marked the beginning of a lasting military presence in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania, later extended to Burkina Faso with the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership of 2005.

Since 2011, French and U.S. operations have intensified: U.S. drones, training missions led by AFRICOM, military bases in Gao, N’Djamena, Niamey, Ouagadougou, France’s Operation Barkhane, and the G5 Sahel joint force (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger). Much has changed. Religious terrorism has also been present, keeping the region in a state of precariousness and insecurity, becoming a scourge that is difficult to combat in many areas.

It was in that same year, 2011, that the planned destruction of Gaddafi’s Libya took place, opening the door to uncontrolled arms trafficking and the proliferation of jihadist groups. Libya was a regional pillar, but once bombed, it also destroyed the African Union’s mediation efforts. Sooner or later, the West will have to pay for the enormous harm done to Libya.

Towards ever greater independence

While military interference eroded sovereignty, transnational corporations continued to extract wealth from the Sahel under highly unfair conditions.

This chronic economic dependence has consolidated structural underdevelopment, limiting the ability of states to diversify their economies and negotiate more favorable trade terms. The result is permanent fragility that exposes them to external pressures and fuels political, social, and security crises, where it is not possible today to have only political independence, but it is also necessary to have economic independence.

Since the 1990s, coups and regime changes have become recurrent phenomena, reflecting elites competing for power in weak institutional contexts. Corruption, inadequate public services, and the exclusion of marginalized groups have undermined state legitimacy and increased public mistrust in many African countries.

The recent history of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger shows that the formal independence achieved in the 1960s did not mean effective sovereignty. From the economic mechanisms of “colonial debt” and the CFA franc to defense agreements that integrated French strategic interests, to the “conditionalities” imposed in the 1980s and 1990s and the Western military missions of the 21st century, old forms of domination have in many cases been transformed rather than dissolved, and current leaders who genuinely want to change the situation are faced with a complicated state structure that needs to be completely overhauled. What is more, it is a Western, European structure that needs to be readapted to the African world.

Understanding this trajectory is essential to interpreting the current political phase in the Sahel: only by placing contemporary crises in this historical context can we grasp the meaning of the claims to sovereignty and the radical choices made by governments and civil societies in the region.

Full and effective independence, with sovereignty and autonomy, is possible, but it is still a work in progress, it is not yet complete, and above all, it is a process that starts with an ideological consolidation of ‘who’ and ‘what’ these peoples are. This is followed by the choice of which political forms to adopt, according to their own sensibilities and traditions, even declining socialism in ways unknown to European experience. Driving out what remains of the colonialists, dismantling all their structures, and rebuilding their lands with an African spirit is a mission that will require courage and sacrifice.

One cannot fail to conclude with a quote from President Captain Ibrahim Traoré: “Together and in solidarity, we will triumph over imperialism and neocolonialism for a free, dignified, and sovereign Africa.”

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Nel  settembre 2023, i vertici militari di Mali, Niger e Burkina Faso hanno annunciato la nascita dell’Alleanza degli Stati Sahel. Questa veniva presentata come una “architettura di difesa collettiva e mutua assistenza a beneficio della rispettive comunità”. Di fatto, si tratta(va) di una combinazione di sforzi militari ed economici congiunti per limitare la presenza gihadista nella regione di Liptako-Gourma, dove si incontrano i tre Stati e dove vive il 45% della loro popolazione complessiva (che si aggira sui 73 milioni di persone). Da questa area, la ribellione gihadista, iniziata in Mali nel 2012 (e ben raccontata anche sul piano cinematografico dal regista Abderrahmane Sissako con la pellicola Timbuktu), si era estesa sul territorio di Niger e Burkina Faso a partire dal 2015. E l’incapacità dei rispettivi governi ad affrontare la minaccia dei gruppi legati ad al-Qaeda (come Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin) ed al sedicente Stato Islamico (Provincia del Sahel) – e le non meno pericolose e diffuse ribellioni tuareg (il Movimento indipendentista Azawad nel Mali settentrionale che taluni presentano come legato all’Algeria) – è stato uno dei motivi che ha scatenato il risentimento militare (scarso equipaggiamento ed addestramento approssimativo hanno portato le forze armate di questi Paesi a subire notevoli perdite negli scontri con suddette milizie) e dato il là a tutta una serie di colpi di Stato che, a partire dal 2021 (con la salita al potere del generale Assimi Goita in Mali), ha sconvolto il panorama politico e geopolitico regionale.

Nel gennaio successivo, i tre Stati optarono per l’uscita unilaterale dall’ECOWAS (la Comunità Economica degli Stati dell’Africa Occidentale), e quando la stessa ECOWAS minacciò l’intervento militare diretto per ristabilire la “legalità democratica” in Niger, a seguito del colpo di Stato che ha defenestrato il Presidente Mohamed Bazoum, Mali e Burkina Faso comunicarono che avrebbero percepito la cosa come una dichiarazione di guerra a tutti gli effetti.

Nel 2022, inoltre, il Mali ha scelto di mandare via il contingente militare francese che, in linea teorica, avrebbe dovuta contenere la ribellione gihadista (senza grandi risultati, ad onor del vero). Lo stesso è avvenuto in Burkina Faso; mentre il Niger ha optato per una drastica riduzione della cooperazione con Parigi.

A questo proposito, non è errato affermare che l’Alleanza sia impostata alla riduzione della presenza neocoloniale francese nella regione che dal Sahel arriva al Golfo di Guinea. Ed in questo senso, non è affatto da sottovalutare il ruolo della Russia che ai tre Stati dell’Alleanza sta offrendo addestramento, ripristino delle strutture militare distrutte nel conflitto con le milizie gihadiste, fornitura di tecnologia satellitare e bellica (droni e blindati in particolar modo), presenza in loco di compagnie militari private (l’Africa Corps, o Gruppo Wagner, continua a mantenere una notevole presenza soprattutto in Mali), e garanzie di protezione (come nel caso del giovane capitano Ibrahima Traoré, leader del colpo di Stato in Burkina Faso). Senza considerare la partecipazione di Mosca per ciò che concerne i progetti minerari (il Niger, ad esempio, è estremamente ricco di Uranio – e la Francia non potrebbe permettersi di perderlo totalmente) o quelli infrastrutturali (dove anche la Repubblica Popolare Cinese gioca un ruolo di primo piano).

In altri termini, il consolidamento dell’Alleanza degli Stati Sahel si palesa come l’ennesimo fallimento della politica estera francese sotto la presidenza di Emmanuel Macron, colui che affermava che non era il caso di umiliare troppo Vladimir Putin in Ucraina. Il Presidente francese, nonostante le sue pseudo ambizioni neonapoleoniche, di fatto, sembra aver fallito su tutta la linea per quanto riguarda il contenimento/isolamento della Russia sul piano internazionale. E le sue posizioni intransigenti sul conflitto ucraino, assieme a quelle dei vertici comunitari europei, appaiono come il riflesso della loro incapacità di comprensione delle traiettorie geopolitiche globali e, di conseguenza, come la rovinosa estremizzazione (e negazione) di suddetto fallimento. Dopotutto, come ebbe modo di affermare a suo tempo il pensatore francese Alain de Benoist, coloro i quali si occupano della costruzione europea purtroppo non hanno la benché minima idea in materia di geopolitica.

Tornando al ruolo russo nella ricostruzione del panorama geopolitico dell’Africa occidentale appare meritevole di una breve parentesi l’apertura del corridoio marittimo che da Novorossiysk, sul Mar Nero, arriva, attraverso il Mediterraneo, Gibilterra e le coste occidentali africane, a Lagos in Nigeria. La rotta, studiata dalla compagnia russa A7 African Cargo Lines (di nuova creazione, ma già strumento di primo piano per ottenere un ruolo fondamentale in quella che potrebbe essere definita come “geopolitica dei container”, elemento cruciale della progressiva affermazione del multipolarismo), di fatto, riduce i costi di trasporto tra Russia ed Africa occidentale del 50%. Non solo, questa, con la possibilità di essere estesa al Senegal ed anche all’altro lato dell’Atlantico, verso l’America Latina, si presenta come un passo decisivo per l’affermazione di un nuovo paradigma per ciò che concerne la politica internazionale: quelle relazioni Sud-Sud di cui si fece portavoce il pensatore brasiliano André Martin introducendo il concetto di “meridionalismo”, e che, a suo modo di vedere, avrebbero dovuto rappresentare il fondamento di una alleanza strategica tra i Paesi latinoamericani, africani ed asiatici, per il raggiungimento del medesimo livello di sviluppo dell’emisfero settentrionale.

Ad ogni modo, nel contesto africano, pare importante sottolineare anche la potenziale cooperazione tra il gigante nigeriano (oltre 200 milioni di abitanti, enormi risorse naturali e fresco membro BRICS – il suo ingresso risale al gennaio dell’anno corrente) e l’Alleanza degli Stati del Sahel per ciò che concerne la lotta alle organizzazioni criminali transfrontaliere ed all’estremismo gihadista di cui la stessa Nigeria è affetta nelle regioni settentrionali, dove Boko Haram continua a rappresentare una seria minaccia alla stabilità dell’area (gruppi ad esso affiliati sono infatti presenti anche in Mali, Niger e Ciad).

In questo senso, lo sviluppo di reti infrastrutturali transnazionali risulta fondamentale per assicurare una connessione economica capace di garantire sviluppo ad aree per troppo dimenticate e  considerate meritevoli di attenzione (da parte occidentale) solo in termini di creazione di rapporti di dipendenza neocoloniali.

Nello specifico, il collegamento Novorssoiysk-Lagos porterà in Africa cereali, fertilizzanti e macchinari per lo sviluppo tecnologico dell’agricoltura in loco; mentre trasferirà in Russia cotone, minerali e prodotti agricoli. Allo stesso tempo, mette in risalto il desiderio di diversificazione e di interconnettersi sul piano globale della Nigeria, economia in rapida crescita ma la cui megalopoli più importante (proprio Lagos) rimane ancora sostanzialmente esclusa dalle più influenti reti commerciali internazionali e, di conseguenza, da quello che è stato definito come il “ciclo della ricchezza”.

In conclusione, è doveroso sottolineare anche come la crescita esponenziale della presenza russa in Africa rappresenti un elemento estremamente preoccupante per l’Alleanza Atlantica, visto che questa, a prescindere dalle esternazioni bellicose, sul suo lato meridionale si trova di fronte ad una doppia catena di Paesi, dall’Africa del Nord (Algeria, Libia, Egitto) a quella sahariana (Sudan, Ciad, Niger, Mali) e subsahariana (si pensi al ruolo del Gruppo Wagner nella Repubblica Centrafricana), in cui l’influenza di Mosca non accenna minimamente a diminuire.

Di fatto, dal primo summit Russia-Africa del 2019 (al quale parteciparono 43 capi di Stato africani), la penetrazione russa in Africa è rimasta costante ed assicurata dal fatto che Mosca, alla pari di Pechino, non richiede precise condizioni politiche in cambio di aiuti o dello sviluppo di iniziative commerciali bilaterali. Questo, naturalmente, ha portato i media occidentali a descrivere la Russia come un fattore destabilizzante, la cui disinformazione avrebbe portato milioni di persone a guardare con sospetto dei governi percepiti come marionette dell’Occidente (Stati Uniti, Gran Bretagna e Francia, in particolare) e, di conseguenza, a sostenere con fermezza i regimi militari nazionalisti appoggiati da Mosca. Tuttavia, l’Occidente, di fronte alla sua crisi di influenza in Africa, dovrebbe compiere prima di tutto un serio esame di coscienza. Infatti, in più di una occasione, le varie insurrezioni gihadiste si sono presentate come uno strumento per riaffermare sistemi di penetrazione militare e di controllo delle risorse di tipo coloniale in cui l’Occidente stesso, da un lato godeva dell’appropriazione di materie prime in cambio di poco o nulla; mentre, dall’altro, data la sostanziale inefficacia dell’intervento, lasciava il Paese colpito in una condizione anche peggiore di quella in cui si trovava inizialmente. Si pensi, ad esempio, al Burkina Faso che, all’inizio di questo decennio, ha rapidamente superato l’Afghanistan in termini di vittime del terrorismo.

Burkina Faso is demonstrating a driving force for many that was unexpected, Lorenzo Maria Pacini writes.

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‘Africa continues to rise up and delivers surprises. In recent days, several African leaders have made diplomatic trips that are reshaping the geometries of the international chessboard. The SAHEL Alliance states are charting a watershed that could divide Africa in two and determine a new historical course for the entire continent.

The African Heartland

To understand the geopolitical significance of these events, a premise should be made.

Let us look at the geography of Africa, the Great Continent: the states of the SAHEL Alliance are, at present, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. The agreement provides for joint and mutual actions against external aggression and internal threats, promotes an adherence to multipolarity, and fights against the remnants of Western colonialism. Geographically speaking, these countries are located in the upper-central part of the continent, between the Tropic of Cancer and the Equator, in the “Heart” (Heartland) of Africa. This initial assumption allows us to go on to define-at least as a primordial attempt-the possible “African Heartland,” adopting Halford Mackinder’s definition of classical geopolitics, so that we can gain a deeper understanding of the events taking place in that macro area.

Africa is part of the Island-World, that is, the Earth’s supermass that includes Europe, Asia and Africa, the latter corresponding to the southern flank of the supercontinent. Considering Mackinder’s approach, an important vision of Atlanticist geopolitics is to prevent access to African resources so as to keep Eurasia’s wealth in check. Initially, this would be done not in Africa, but in Eastern Europe itself, fragmenting the borders of the pivotal area; but to the extent that Soviet control in the Heartland did not prove fragile, the thalassocracy had to subjugate the tellurocracy across the Rimland, in the terms defined by Nicholas Spykman, i.e., the entire coastal territorial belt encompassing Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, along the Sino-Korean coast to the sea. Therefore, even with the Heartland consolidated, the control of Rimland by a hostile power like the U.S. would be enough to suffocate the state in question. This after all is the logic of the fundamental geopolitics of the Yankee presence in Europe, but also of the Vietnam War and the Arab Spring.

Looking at Africa, the Sahara appears in the late Mackinder as part of a “belt of deserts” whose control allows the creation of a form of “natural barrier.” For Atlanticism it represents an area whose control facilitates the control of Rimland. For Russia it represents an area through which pressure on Rimland can be reduced. In today’s geopolitics, primarily in the works of Aleksandr Dugin, the Sahara countries appear in the context of defending Eurasia as a southern border in the case of an alliance between Russia and Arab-Islamic forces.

Now, the entire region of the conflict in question, stretching from the Sahel to the Congo River Delta across West Africa, can be defined as a chaotic zone of fragmentation, which is difficult to stabilize, and the powers have difficulty applying any course of action because of ethnic, religious conflicts, the result of long enduring colonialism.

However, the implementation of a Mali-Burkina-Niger alliance, with the support of Algeria and also a branch from the Central African Republic to the DRC, with Russian support, could remove this region from its characteristic “instability” and make it a strategic region, both for the defense of Eurasia through control of the Sahara and for the control of the macro area itself.

Better still: for the fully independent and autonomous advent of an African Heartland.

At this stage of multipolar transition, the appearance of new Heartlands is a physiological and necessary process for the delicate rebalancing of the new poles.

Partnerships with Russia and China

Both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China have had investments in Africa for a couple of decades already, with very significant active participation, which has been growing in the last couple of years.

Russia is projecting itself into the Sahel with a move that serves Russian interests and, simultaneously, African interests. Russian interests because it allows it to defend the southern flank of Eurasia and respond to the Rimland dispute; African interests because the stabilization of the disputed region (roughly corresponding to France) makes it possible for integrated regional states to control the African Heartland (in alliance with Russia).

Another possible element comes into play, namely, the control of the Sahel and the deconstruction of France as mechanisms to accelerate the collapse of NATO, causing the thalassocracy to lose its Western outpost to pressure from the South combined with European nonconformity.

Issues such as uranium, gold, oil, etc., are relevant, but they are more about “prizes” than the essence of geopolitics. Only now are the Sahel countries beginning to think in terms of management autonomy in geoeconomic affairs, and still the process is not finished. Eradicating colonialism is a path that realistically requires education for at least a couple of generations.

China has invested in infrastructure and social support, promoting high-value regional enrichment that has enabled populations to solve hardships and fight poverty.

Both Russia and China are well aware of a geopolitical truth of great importance, perhaps too much underestimated by many analysts: Africa is a huge continent facing the Atlantic and the Mediterranean … thus a gigantic outpost against NATO and the hegemon in general.

This should not be underestimated: it would not be absurd to see Africa become a direct adversary of the West, but at the moment it is perhaps more urgent to focus on purifying the entities inherited from colonialism and a still significant foreign presence on the continent.

Burkina Faso’s courage

In line with this strengthening of international relations, Burkina Faso is demonstrating a driving force for many that was unexpected.

In recent days, diplomatic delegations have traveled to Moscow to discuss a number of issues kept confidential. The outcome was that new collaborations were announced in trade, culture and the strategic sector. And, most interestingly, in the nuclear sector. In March, Burkina Faso and Russia, through the state energy company Rosatom, discussed a nuclear project in the West African country. Recently, the two sides have begun a dialogue on the prospect of a renewable energy agreement. This new proposal came on the heels of a three-day forum on Russia’s partnership with Burkina Faso, where the road map for starting work was outlined. This means that the Sahel Alliance is getting new sources of energy, and the involvement, seen from the strategic aspect, aims at accelerating African independence and enhancing Russian participation in the continent’s defense.

Prime Minister Kyelem de Tambela announced the country’s willingness to join the BRICS+ partnership by attending the Kazan Summit. Another African state added to the list of candidates. In the sustained discussion during the three days of meetings, important data emerged that make one think about the attractiveness of BRICS for African states:

• BRICS GDP exceeds G7 indicators;

• The creation of a single BRICS currency with a partial gold base involves African mining countries;

• Russia is working to create a BRICS common repository system to then operate on blockchain platforms;

• Digital financial activities will reduce the global economy’s dependence on the dollar and the pressure it puts on Africa.

These may seem like unimportant points, but considered in the context of the countries in question, the deal becomes more than worthwhile. The West has been taking resources away from Africa; Russia is giving instead. Africans will not forget this help.

Can the Sahel Confederation cut Africa off?

Returning to geopolitical notions, what is happening will inevitably mark an at least initial division of Africa. The horizontal cut could lead to instabilities in the sub-Saharan part, still strongly linked to the West, creating a barrage with the northern part of the continent, which remains a hotspot of access to Europe, both for migration and for trade routes.

To the east, toward the Horn, Africa presents strong instability, with Somalia and Somaliland posing an ongoing risk and influence, including in terms of religious conflicts, that is not easy to manage. Pressure from Arab countries and Western-run terrorism keeps that area, strategically indispensable for pressing Yemen and destabilizing the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, in check.

To the south, closest to the Sahel, we have southern Africa, which includes the former Katanga region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is rich in critical minerals. Here, China is far ahead of the United States in extracting these minerals after concluding agreements more than a decade ago, but the logistics remain complicated and this is where the United States believes it can compete with China. That is the goal of the Lobito Corridor, announced last year during the G20 summit in Delhi.

The project, initially planned to connect Zambia and the mineral-rich regions of the DRC with the Atlantic via Angola by modernizing a colonial-era railway, now plans to extend to Tanzania, thus becoming Africa’s first transcontinental railway. The latter country also has its share of mineral wealth and is known for its geopolitical balances.

Adding a historical curiosity that may help understanding, Tanzania and Zambia had revolutionary socialist governments during the old Cold War, but they were more aligned with China than with the USSR. As evidence of this, they agreed to host the first modern Silk Road, the TAZARA railway, built by the People’s Republic in the 1970s. It has since become dilapidated, but earlier this year, a few months after the announcement of the Lobito Corridor, China proposed a $1 billion renovation, demonstrating that it is ready to compete with the United States. Tanzania can learn much about how best to move into this geopolitical competition from the Central African Republic and Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

It remains to be seen how the contours of this competition will evolve, but in any case observers should keep an eye on southern Africa in the future, as there is no other region in the world where the United States is trying to seriously compete with China on the infrastructure and resources front. China has by far the advantage because of the lead it accumulated a decade ago, but the United States is not deterred, which is why it announced the Lobito Corridor last September and is now planning to extend it to Tanzania.

The geopolitical balance in this country will play an important role in determining how the situation develops, as will the involvement of the middle powers, particularly India. India is in a unique position to shift the balance of economic influence away from China, not necessarily toward the United States, but in a more neutral direction because of its huge critical mining needs. If successful, India could replicate this policy elsewhere, thus becoming an integral part of its partners’ New Cold War balancing acts. But that is another topic.

The Sahel Alliance can for all intents and purposes create an “above” and “below” Africa, as indeed happens when one acquires the hard task of acting as the Heartland of a large area.

What happens next will depend mainly on the ability of these countries in maintaining the integrity of the African ideological struggle, cooperations with friendly states and the ouster of the last remaining invaders.

Congress owes it to the country to retake its war powers from the executive.

By Rand PAUL

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Recently, after over two decades of an unnecessary U.S. military presence in Niger, the U.S. finally withdrew from the West African country. I, for one, never believed we should have been there in the first place and warned our presence was doing more harm than good. Congress never authorized sending troops to Niger. Last year, I was right to demand their withdrawal. Why waste our money and risk our troops’ lives for a hostile country?

In over a decade, civilian lives were lost, U.S. service members were killed, millions of taxpayer dollars were spent, and we have nothing to show for it. So, what exactly did we do in Niger? I repeat: Congress never voted to send troops there. Congress never authorized the use of military force there. Yet, on multiple occasions, U.S. forces in Niger had to engage with hostile groups and, sadly, American lives were lost.

This tragic incident was the largest loss of life for U.S. forces in Africa since the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia. At the time, the New York Times reported, in a piece called “An Endless War,” that two senior senators, a Republican and a Democrat, both of whom are still serving, knew little of the American military presence in Niger.

They were surprised because Congress had abdicated its constitutional war-making power to the executive branch. They were surprised because Congress is content to allow the President to sidestep the Constitution and unilaterally deploy U.S. forces anywhere in the world, at any time, for any reason, by citing a limitless interpretation of the 9/11 AUMF.

Passed in the days following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 AUMF was narrowly tailored to bring to justice those responsible for the attacks. An ever-aggrandizing executive, however, deliberately misinterprets the AUMF as limitless, empowering the President to go to war everywhere, all the time, forever.

Using an AUMF written 23 years ago to justify war today is a perverse abuse of power, yet Congress stands idly by.

Does anyone remember our intervention in Libya? I know many think this is ancient history, but in 2011, the Obama-led offensive helped destroy that country. The American-led coalition toppled the government of Muammar Gaddafi, killed hundreds of civilians, fomented anarchy throughout the country, and opened the floodgates for widespread extremist terror to spread throughout the region. Gaddafi kept Libya’s tribal rivalries in check, but his U.S-sponsored overthrow exacerbated them. Many tribal members turned to Islamists for guns and training to defend themselves against rivals.

In fact, I forced a vote in the Senate in 2011 declaring that President Obama’s decision to intervene militarily in Libya violated the Constitution. Unfortunately, it failed 90-10, and here we are, 13 years later, and not much has changed. During that 2011 floor debate, I stated, “Though I’m new here in the Senate, I am appalled that the Senate has abdicated its responsibility.” Well, I’m now in my third term, and I’m still appalled that Congress refuses to acknowledge its constitutional role on the question of determining when and where the United States goes to war.

Libyans today are unambiguously worse off than before we intervened. In 2010, the UN Human Development Index ranked Libya 53rd in the world. This year, Libya is ranked 92nd. The UN Human Rights Office reports that the execution and torture of civilians in Libya is a regular occurrence. The UN has also identified the existence of “open slave markets” where migrants and refugees transiting Libya are bought and sold as slaves.

The disaster the Obama administration helped unleash in Libya has had lasting consequences for the region. Libyan arms, including heavy weaponry such as anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles, have been traced to criminals and terrorists across the region, including in Niger, Mali, Tunisia, Syria, Algeria, and Gaza.

It is rarely asked if our interminable military interventions create the terrorists we seek to destroy. That’s a question Congress needs to answer. In the 11 years U.S. troops were in Niger, Congress did not once debate the merits of the mission and never authorized the use of military force. As the U.S. was forced out of Niger, Russia was welcomed with open arms, solidifying that our efforts have almost been counterproductive.

After over a decade, lives lost, and hundreds of millions spent, the U.S. didn’t stop the spread of Islamic extremism, didn’t help build or spread democracy in other nations, and has now lost a top ally in the region. At what point will Congress learn that its inaction and reliance on the executive branch is not only a dereliction of its constitutional duty but also worsening global relations?

Last year, Niger’s democratically elected leader was ousted in a coup led by Nigerian military officers. With the potential of U.S. service members being caught in the crosshairs, I forced the Senate to vote on a War Powers Resolution. The resolution directed the President to remove all U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Niger within 30 days of its enactment, something that should have been done as soon as the Biden administration formally declared that a military coup took place.

We owed it to those service members to debate their mission. Not only because it was a new conflict not contemplated by the 9/11 AUMF, but because, if we are asking our young men and women to remain in harm’s way and potentially pay the ultimate sacrifice, Congress should fulfill its duty.

Committing America’s military to fight wars on behalf of the nation is the most consequential and humbling responsibility that Congress is entrusted with. If America’s interest in another country is of such vital importance that we ask our young men and women to fight and potentially pay the ultimate sacrifice to defend it, we at least owe our service members a debate in Congress.

Original article: The American Conservative

Conscience. Action. Revolution. Africa in 2024 is the real protagonist of multipolar change.

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Conscience. Action. Revolution. Africa in 2024 is the real protagonist of multipolar change. The Global South now has an increasingly strong leadership and has no intention of stopping.

The recent constitution of the Confederation ‘Alliance of Sahel States’, officially founded by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso on 6 July in Niamey, marks a watershed in the political and military history of West Africa and the decolonization process that is experiencing a new wave after that of the 20th century.

The challenges of regional security and defense against external pressures, in particular France and the United States of America, are answered in the strategic partnership that is destined to become the central pivot not only of defense, but also of the contemporary African revolution.

The defense pact

It is 16 September 2023: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have announced the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) Defense Pact. Conceived to allow the three countries to work together against threats of internal armed rebellion and external aggression, the pact signed with the document known as the Liptako-Gourma Charter, named after the region where the border between the three countries is located, stipulates that any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one of the signatory countries will be considered an aggression against all the others.

The leader of Mali, Colonel Assimi Goïta, stated during the signing of the document that his aim was to establish a framework of collective defence and mutual assistance. This will be the case. This alliance aims to combine the military and economic efforts of the three countries, with the priority of fighting the terrorism that has devastated the Sahel region in recent years, but also repelling threats from other countries in the region.

Bye bye ECOWAS

On 28 January this year, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso announced their immediate withdrawal from the Communauté Economique des Etas de l’Afrique Occidentale (ECOWAS). The three countries accused the regional bloc of being influenced by foreign powers and of betraying the founding principles of ECOWAS and becoming a threat to its members, referring to the increasing threats of military intervention in Niger.

The decision to withdraw from ECOWAS was in fact a response to the economic sanctions imposed by the organization and the threat of military intervention in Niger after the coup d’état of July 2023, which brought the junta led by Abdourahamane ‘Omar’ Tchiani to power. In this regard, Goïta emphasized that the confederation had failed to support our fight against terrorism and insecurity, while Captain Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s military chief, explicitly accused Western powers of exploiting their countries and using ECOWAS to pursue their own ends in the region.

So we come to 6 and 7 July: the military leaders of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso met in the Niger capital Niamey for the first summit of the Alliance of Sahel States and formed the ‘Alliance of Sahel States’ confederation, strengthening the defense pact and announcing plans for greater economic and political integration. This event cast a shadow over the simultaneous ECOWAS summit held in Abuja, Nigeria, marking an event of great regional and global significance.

General Omar Tchiani of Niger said that the peoples of their countries have turned their backs on ECOWAS because they want to build a sovereign community emancipated from the foreign powers looming over Africa. He also added that AES will create a joint military force to fight jihadist terrorism, defend territories, and guard the development of strategic sectors such as agriculture, water, energy, and transport.

The yoke of the CFA Franc

One of the most important points discussed in recent months, and in particular during the Niamey summit, was the plan to abandon the CFA franc, a currency considered a colonial legacy as it is controlled by France, which in this way maintains a strong economic and financial influence over the entire region.

Although no precise indications have yet been given about the possible decision to abandon the CFA Franc, this is seen by many analysts as an important step towards complete economic independence. Captain Traoré recalled at the summit how the currency is a sign of sovereignty.

The currency, introduced by France in 1945, provided financial stability, but was also seen as a mechanism of economic control by the former colonial power. Conversion to a new currency is therefore seen as a necessity to allow the AES countries to have more control over their economic and monetary policies, and achieve complete independence in this respect.

On the whole, the establishment of the Confederation of Sahel States has raised concerns on the part of the Western powers, which see their influence severely weakened on the African continent. ECOWAS, which had hoped for the eventual return of the three countries, is now faced with a new geopolitical reality, with three important countries in the region having definitively left the Economic Community. The European Union, led by France, and other Western powers, such as the United States, are watching this development carefully. Despite initial difficulties, this new regional bloc is a sign of the determination of the three governments involved to defend their sovereignty and to work together to address common challenges.

The abandonment of the CFA Franc and the creation of a new currency could mark the beginning of a new era of economic independence for the three countries, providing an example for the other peoples of the region as well. The AES has the potential to become a model for regional cooperation in Africa, demonstrating that these countries are finally ready to break free from Western neo-colonialism and join the multipolar world as major players.

Africa is no longer France’s cash cow. A new Heartland is rising.

The days of American domination are over, and the doors in Africa are wide open for alternative help from Russia and China.

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Niger has demanded American troops to leave the country “no later” than 15 September, and the U.S. has agreed. The official statement said the two countries had “reached a disengagement agreement to effect the withdrawal of U.S. forces, which has already begun”.

The U.S. had relied on Niger as its primary military base, but U.S. threats led to the rupture of military ties, according to Niger’s Prime Minister Zeine, who blamed the U.S. for the breakdown in bilateral relations, culminating with the “Yankee Go Home” order.

In April, street demonstrators in Agadez, Niger demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

A crucial military relationship between Washington and Niger, its closest West African ally, dissolved after a visiting U.S. official made threats during last-ditch negotiations over whether American troops based there would be allowed to remain, according to Zeine.

On March 17, Niger broke off military cooperation with the U.S., as military leaders move closer to Russia. A senior U.S. delegation left the country the day before, following an unsuccessful 3-day visit to renew contact with the military leaders that ousted the former president.

The government of Niger decided to “denounce with immediate effect” the agreement relating to U.S. military and civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense inside Niger, which operated a desert drone base built at a cost of U.S.$100 million.

In July 2023, a military coup overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum, who had been close to Washington, and the U.S. had cut aid to Niger in the aftermath. Niger’s military had in the past worked closely with the United States, but are now looking to cooperate with Russia.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken paid a visit to Niger in 2023 in hopes of shoring up Bazoum, a stalwart ally of the U.S., but just four months later, the military deposed Bazoum and put him under house arrest.

The military took a hard line against former colonial power France, forcing the withdrawal of French troops in place for nearly a decade last year.

China has focused on economic engagement in Africa, while funding infrastructure development through its Belt and Road Initiative. China’s investment and aid without attaching conditions such as political and economic reforms have attracted many African leaders who have come to resent what is perceived as Western meddling in internal affairs, where U.S. aid is conditioned on domestic politics.

In March, Niger announced the end of its military agreement with the U.S. Military spokesperson Col. Amadou Abdramane accused the U.S. of raising objections about the allies that Niger had chosen. Abdramane condemned the U.S. for its “condescending attitude” and “threat of reprisals”.

American forces have used two military bases in Niger, and has more than 1,000 troops stationed at the base.

As Niger has distanced itself from the West, it has drawn closer to Russia, and last month, Russian military instructors arrived in Niger as part of a new agreement with its military leaders.

Niger has also quit the French-backed G5 Sahel force, saying it was ineffectual and undermined African sovereignty, and launched their own defense pact called the Alliance of Sahel States.

Era of Global Transformations

The U.S.-China rivalry revolves around global factors. The post-World War II global order is evolving, with the U.S. losing its dominance, while China emerged as a manufacturing powerhouse, extending its influence worldwide.

The Western-led global order is plagued with an ideological crisis driven by unfair distribution of wealth that breeds resentment among the poor.

The Global South, are gaining significant influence and power themselves. In Africa, China’s investments have empowered nations to diversify their economies and enhance their global standing while also reinforcing the nation’s leaders.

The U.S. prioritizes militarism and capital accumulation over values such as human rights and democratic governance, while China emphasizes socio-economic rights but restricts civil liberties to support economic growth and social cohesion. Capitalism became the governing logic of the economy, in both the U.S. and China, which has improved living standards for many but has sustained inequality, polarization, and distrust in institutions.

China has emerged as a significant state actor capable of challenging the dominance of the U.S. and its Western allies in the global landscape. India, Russia, and Brazil, China has emerged as the sole state actor displaying the ambition and capacity to bolster its military prowess, economic influence, and social credibility, while potentially curtailing the U.S.’ sway across the world. China has ascended to become the world’s largest manufacturing hub and foremost exporter of goods, concurrently reinforcing its worldwide military capabilities and presence in international governance organizations.

It positions the U.S.-China rivalry at the intersection of physical geography, social interactions, and global politics, while China’s overtly authoritarian political system has combined with a neoliberal capitalist economy.

The U.S., while publicly advocating for the ideals of human rights and democratic governance on the global stage, has often overlooked these principles when its brute economic interests are at stake. Such is the case in Gaza, where the U.S. supports militarily and politically the genocide of the Palestinian people. This underscores a systemic U.S. hypocrisy that leaves marginalized populations struggling for basic rights and equitable treatment. The people of Africa are all too aware of American double-standards and are rejecting it with a call of “Yankee Go Home” while open to new partners who are fair.

A wave of grassroots mobilizations for national sovereignty has been happening in countries including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Military uprisings have seized power and expelled western military forces from their territories. These groups want control over natural resources and have received support from the population.

Niger, for example, is considered the world’s third-largest uranium producer; however, nearly all uranium in the country has been mined by French companies to this day, perpetuating a neocolonialist exploitation model that has persisted since the country gained independence in the 1960s.

In July 2023, when a military uprising ousted the then president of Niger, harsh sanctions were applied by the U.S., affecting the entire population, especially people in rural areas.

“The path to real peace in West and Central Africa lies in the full sovereignty of the people. Neocolonial interventions must cease,” the Niger Peasant Platform had stated in 2023.

The unfair, inhumane sanctions that have been imposed on Niger has led to a shortage of medications in drugstores, extreme energy shortages, and shortage of food and high food prices, and has limited the movement of entire populations.

Niger’s coup follows others, since 2020, in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan. Niger, like many African states created by European colonialism, has had periods of military rule since its independence in 1960. But since 2011, it has held three democratic elections, and it has generally been on a democratizing path.

From the voice of the people of Niger, we will hear the need for less traditional “development aid” and more economic investment.

Since 2020, Africa has seen more political unrest, violent extremism, and democratic reversals than any other region in the world. A wave of coups has washed across the Sahel and West Africa, leaving authoritarians in power in numerous countries. In addition, the continent has served as a stage for the escalating great-power competition between China, Russia, and the U.S.

U.S. engagement with Africa has long been deprioritized in Washington, with successive administrations devoting scant attention and resources to advancing democracy and resolving conflicts. The Biden administration has maintained this pattern, which reflects the persistent tension between an interests-based and values-based U.S. foreign policy.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres called Africa an “epidemic” of coups. The U.S. and its closest Western allies still lack a coherent and coordinated African strategy.

The citizens of Niger, and elsewhere, have come to perceive democracy as equating with the corruption by elected officials, and have looked to a non-democratic military coup as an option.

The U.S. would need to spend some money in Africa of developing business that will create jobs and economic prosperity. The U.S. has so far been unwilling to help Africans make a better economic life for themselves, and instead focused their heavy-handed military presence on keeping their ally in power, at the expense of the citizenry.

The days of American domination are over, and the doors in Africa are wide open for alternative help from Russia and China.

Nick TURSE

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Vestido con uniforme militar verde y gorra azul de guarnición, el coronel mayor Amadou Abdramane, portavoz de la junta gobernante de Níger, se dirigió a la televisión local el mes pasado para criticar a Estados Unidos y romper la prolongada asociación militar entre ambos países.

El gobierno de Níger, teniendo en cuenta las aspiraciones y los intereses de su pueblo, revoca, con efecto inmediato, el acuerdo relativo al estatuto del personal militar estadounidense y de los empleados civiles del Departamento de Defensa, declaró, insistiendo en que su pacto de seguridad de 12 años de antigüedad violaba la Constitución de Níger.

Otro antiguo portavoz nigerino, Insa Garba Saidou, lo expresó en términos más contundentes:

Las bases y el personal civil estadounidenses no pueden permanecer más tiempo en suelo nigerino.

Los anuncios se produjeron en un momento en que el terrorismo se ha disparado en el Sahel de África Occidental y tras la visita a Níger de una delegación estadounidense de alto nivel, entre ellos la subsecretaria de Estado para Asuntos Africanos, Molly Phee, y el general Michael Langley, jefe del Mando de África de Estados Unidos, o AFRICOM.

El repudio de Níger a su aliado no es más que el último golpe a los vacilantes esfuerzos antiterroristas de Washington en la región. En los últimos años, las antiguas alianzas militares de Estados Unidos con Burkina Faso y Malí también se han visto reducidas tras golpes de Estado perpetrados por oficiales formados en Estados Unidos. Níger era, de hecho, el último gran bastión de la influencia militar estadounidense en el Sahel de África Occidental.

Estos reveses no son más que los últimos de una serie de estancamientos, fiascos o derrotas directas que han llegado a tipificar la Guerra Global de Estados Unidos contra el Terror.

Durante más de 20 años de intervenciones armadas, las misiones militares estadounidenses se han visto repetidamente desbaratadas en África, Oriente Próximo y Asia Meridional, incluyendo un estancamiento en Somalia, una intervención convertida en motor de retroceso en Libia y auténticas implosiones en Afganistán e Irak.

Esta vorágine de derrotas y retiradas de Estados Unidos ha dejado al menos 4,5 millones de muertos, entre ellos unos 940.000 por violencia directa, más de 432.000 de ellos civiles, según el Proyecto sobre los Costes de la Guerra de la Universidad Brown. Hasta 60 millones de personas también han sido desplazadas debido a la violencia avivada por las «guerras eternas» de Estados Unidos.

El presidente Joe Biden ha afirmado tanto que ha puesto fin a esas guerras como que Estados Unidos seguirá combatiéndolas en un futuro previsible -posiblemente para siempre- «para proteger al pueblo y los intereses de Estados Unidos.» El balance ha sido devastador, sobre todo en el Sahel, pero Washington ha ignorado en gran medida los costes soportados por las personas más afectadas por sus fallidos esfuerzos antiterroristas.

Reducir el terrorismo

Unos 1,000 militares y contratistas civiles estadounidenses están desplegados en Níger, la mayoría de ellos cerca de la ciudad de Agadez, en la Base Aérea 201, en el extremo sur del desierto del Sahara. Conocida por los lugareños como «Base Americaine «, ese puesto avanzado ha sido la piedra angular de un archipiélago de bases militares estadounidenses en la región y es la clave de los esfuerzos de proyección de poder militar y vigilancia de Estados Unidos en el norte y el oeste de África. Desde la década de 2010, Estados Unidos ha invertido roughly aproximadamente un cuarto de millón de dólares sólo en ese puesto avanzado.

Washington se ha centrado en Níger y sus vecinos desde los primeros días de la Guerra Global contra el Terrorismo, vertiendo ayuda militar en las naciones de África Occidental a través de docenas de iniciativas de «cooperación en materia de seguridad», entre ellas la Asociación Transahariana contra el Terrorismo, un programa diseñado para «contrarrestar y prevenir el extremismo violento» en la región. La formación y la asistencia a los ejércitos locales ofrecidas a través de esa asociación han costado por sí solas a Estados Unidos más de 1.000 millones de dólares.

Justo antes de su reciente visita a Níger, el general Langley, del AFRICOM, compareció ante el Comité de las Fuerzas Armadas del Senado para reprender a los antiguos socios de Estados Unidos en África Occidental.

Durante los últimos tres años, las fuerzas de defensa nacionales volvieron sus armas contra sus propios gobiernos electos en Burkina Faso, Guinea, Malí y Níger», dijo. «Estas juntas evitan rendir cuentas a los pueblos a los que dicen servir.

Langley no mencionó, sin embargo, que al menos 15 oficiales que se beneficiaron de la cooperación estadounidense en materia de seguridad han participado en 12 golpes de Estado en África Occidental y el Gran Sahel durante la Guerra Global contra el Terror. Entre ellos se encuentran las mismas naciones que él nombró Burkina Faso (2014, 2015 y dos veces en 2022); Guinea (2021); Mali (2012, 2020 y 2021); y Níger (2023).

De hecho, al menos cinco dirigentes  de un golpe de Estado perpetrado en julio en Níger recibieron ayuda estadounidense, según un funcionario estadounidense. Cuando derrocaron al presidente democráticamente elegido de ese país, nombraron a su vez gobernadores a cinco miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad nigerinas formados en Estados Unidos.

Langley continuó lamentando que, aunque los golpistas prometen invariablemente derrotar las amenazas terroristas, no lo hacen y entonces «recurren a socios que carecen de restricciones para tratar con gobiernos golpistas… en particular Rusia«. Pero tampoco expuso la responsabilidad directa de Estados Unidos en la caída libre de la seguridad en el Sahel, a pesar de más de una década de costosos esfuerzos por remediar la situación.

«Vinimos, vimos y murió«, bromeó la entonces secretaria de Estado, Hillary Clinton, después de que una campaña aérea de la OTAN liderada por Estados Unidos ayudara a derrocar al coronel Muamar el Gadafi, dictador libio desde hacía mucho tiempo, en 2011.

El presidente Barack Obama aclamó la intervención como un éxito, incluso cuando Libia empezaba a deslizarse hacia un estado casi fallido. Obama admitiría más tarde que «no planificar el día después» de la derrota de Gadafi fue el «peor error» de su presidencia.

Al caer el líder libio, los combatientes tuareg a su servicio saquearon los alijos de armas de su régimen, regresaron a su Mali natal y empezaron a apoderarse del norte de esa nación.

El enfado de las fuerzas armadas de Malí por la respuesta ineficaz del gobierno desembocó en un golpe militar en 2012 dirigido por Amadou Sanogo, un oficial que aprendió inglés en Texas y recibió formación básica para oficiales de infantería en Georgia, instrucción en inteligencia militar en Arizona y orientación de los marines en Virginia.

Tras derrocar al gobierno democrático de Malí, Sanogo se mostró incapaz de luchar contra los militantes locales, que también se habían beneficiado de las armas procedentes de Libia.

Con Malí sumido en el caos, estos combatientes tuaregs declararon su propio estado independiente, sólo para ser apartados por militantes islamistas fuertemente armados que instituyeron una dura ley islámica, provocando una crisis humanitaria. Una misión conjunta francesa, estadounidense y africana evitó el colapso total de Malí, pero empujó a los islamistas a las fronteras de Burkina Faso y Níger, sembrando el terror y el caos en esos países.

Desde entonces, las naciones del Sahel de África Occidental se han visto asoladas por grupos terroristas que han evolucionado, se han escindido y se han reconstituido. Bajo las negras banderas de la militancia yihadista, hombres en motocicletas armados con fusiles Kalashnikov irrumpen regularmente en las aldeas para imponer el zakat (un impuesto islámico) y aterrorizar y matar a civiles.

Los incesantes ataques de estos grupos armados no sólo han desestabilizado Burkina Faso, Malí y Níger, provocando golpes de Estado e inestabilidad política, sino que se han extendido hacia el sur, a los países del Golfo de Guinea. La violencia, por ejemplo, se ha disparado en Togo (633%) y Benín (718%), según las estadísticas del Pentágono.

Los funcionarios estadounidenses han hecho a menudo la vista gorda ante la carnicería. Cuando se le preguntó por la evolución de la situación en Níger, por ejemplo, el portavoz del Departamento de Estado, Vedant Patel, insistió recientemente en que las asociaciones de seguridad en África Occidental «son mutuamente beneficiosas y están destinadas a lograr lo que consideramos objetivos compartidos de detectar, disuadir y reducir la violencia terrorista».  Su afirmación es una mentira descarada o una fantasía total.

Después de 20 años, está claro que las asociaciones de Estados Unidos con el Sahel no están «reduciendo la violencia terrorista» en absoluto.

Incluso el Pentágono lo admite tácitamente. A pesar de que el número de tropas estadounidenses en Níger ha aumentado más de un 900%  en la última década y de que los comandos estadounidenses entrenan a sus homólogos locales, al tiempo que luchan e incluso mueren allí; a pesar de los cientos de millones de dólares que llegan a Burkina Faso en forma de entrenamiento y equipamiento, como vehículos blindados de transporte de tropas, chalecos antibalas, equipos de comunicaciones, ametralladoras, equipos de visión nocturna y fusiles; y a pesar de la ayuda estadounidense a la seguridad que llega a Malí y de que sus oficiales militares reciben entrenamiento de Estados Unidos, la violencia terrorista en el Sahel no se ha reducido en absoluto.

En 2002 y 2003, según las estadísticas del Departamento de Estado, los terroristas causaron 23 víctimas en toda África. El año pasado, según el Centro Africano de Estudios Estratégicos, una institución de investigación del Pentágono, los atentados de militantes islamistas sólo en el Sahel causaron 11.643 muertos, un aumento de más del 50.000%.

Haz las maletas

En enero de 2021, el presidente Joe Biden entró en la Casa Blanca prometiendo poner fin a las guerras eternas de su país. No tardó en afirmar que había cumplido su promesa. «Hoy estoy aquí por primera vez en 20 años sin que Estados Unidos esté en guerra«, anunció Biden meses después. «Hemos pasado página«.

Sin embargo, a finales del año pasado, en una de sus periódicas misivas al Congreso sobre «poderes de guerra«, en las que detallaba las operaciones militares estadounidenses reconocidas públicamente en todo el mundo, Biden dijo justo lo contrario. De hecho, dejó abierta la posibilidad de que las guerras eternas de Estados Unidos pudieran, de hecho, durar para siempre.

No es posible«, escribió, «conocer en este momento el alcance preciso o la duración de los despliegues de las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos que son o serán necesarios para contrarrestar las amenazas terroristas contra Estados Unidos.

La junta de Níger, entrenada por Estados Unidos, ha dejado claro que quiere que la guerra eterna de Estados Unidos allí termine. Eso significaría presumiblemente el cierre de la Base Aérea 201 y la retirada de unos 1.000 militares y contratistas estadounidenses.

Hasta ahora, sin embargo, Washington no muestra signos de acceder a sus deseos.

Somos conscientes de la declaración del 16 de marzo… en la que se anuncia el fin del acuerdo sobre el estatuto de las fuerzas entre Níger y Estados Unidos», declaró la vicesecretaria de prensa del Pentágono, Sabrina Singh. «Estamos trabajando a través de los canales diplomáticos para pedir aclaraciones… No tengo un calendario de ninguna retirada de fuerzas».

El ejército estadounidense está en Níger a petición del gobierno de Níger», declaró el año pasado la portavoz del AFRICOM, Kelly Cahalan. Ahora que la junta ha dicho a AFRICOM que se marche, el mando tiene poco que decir.

Los recibos de devolución de correo electrónico muestran que las preguntas de TomDispatch sobre los acontecimientos en Níger enviadas a la oficina de prensa de AFRICOM fueron leídas por una serie de miembros del personal, entre ellos Cahalan, Zack Frank, Joshua Frey, Yvonne Levardi, Rebekah Clark Mattes, Christopher Meade, Takisha Miller, Alvin Phillips, Robert Dixon, Lennea Montandon y Courtney Dock, subdirectora de asuntos públicos de AFRICOM, pero ninguno de ellos respondió a ninguna de las preguntas planteadas.

En su lugar, Cahalan remitió a TomDispatch al Departamento de Estado. El Departamento de Estado, a su vez, remitió a TomDispatch a la transcripción de una conferencia de prensa que trataba principalmente de los esfuerzos diplomáticos estadounidenses en Filipinas.

El USAFRICOM tiene que permanecer en África Occidental… para limitar la propagación del terrorismo por la región y más allá», dijo el general Langley al Comité de Servicios Armados del Senado en marzo. 

Pero la junta de Níger insiste en que AFRICOM tiene que irse y que los fracasos de Estados Unidos en «limitar la propagación del terrorismo» en Níger y más allá son una razón clave de ello.

Esta cooperación en materia de seguridad no estuvo a la altura de las expectativas de los nigerinos: todas las masacres cometidas por los yihadistas se llevaron a cabo mientras los estadounidenses estaban aquí,  declaró un analista de seguridad nigerino que ha trabajado con funcionarios estadounidenses, hablando bajo condición de anonimato.

Las guerras eternas de Estados Unidos, incluida la batalla por el Sahel, se han prolongado durante las presidencias de George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump y Joe Biden, con el fracaso como argumento definitorio y los resultados catastróficos como norma.

Desde la derrota por el Estado Islámico del ejército iraquí entrenado por Estados Unidos en 2014 hasta la victoria de los talibanes en Afganistán en 2021, desde el eterno estancamiento en Somalia hasta la desestabilización de Libia en 2011, que sumió al Sahel en el caos y ahora amenaza a los Estados ribereños del Golfo de Guinea, la Guerra Global contra el Terror ha sido responsable de la muerte, las heridas o el desplazamiento de decenas de millones de personas.

La carnicería, el estancamiento y el fracaso parecen haber tenido un efecto notablemente escaso en el deseo de Washington de seguir financiando y librando esas guerras, pero los hechos sobre el terreno, como el triunfo de los talibanes en Afganistán, han forzado a veces la mano de Washington.

La junta de Níger está siguiendo otro de esos caminos, intentando poner fin a una guerra estadounidense para siempre en un pequeño rincón del mundo, haciendo lo que Biden prometió pero no consiguió.

Aun así, la pregunta sigue en pie: ¿Invertirá el gobierno de Biden un rumbo que Estados Unidos lleva siguiendo desde principios de la década de 2000?  ¿Accederá a fijar una fecha para la retirada? ¿Empacará por fin Washington su desastrosa guerra y se irá a casa?

Fuente original: Consortium News
Traducción consortiumnews.com

By Nick TURSE

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Not long ago, President Joe Biden vowed that the U.S. would “counter democratic backsliding by imposing costs for coups” in Africa. But three weeks after a military mutiny in Africa involving U.S.-trained officers, the Pentagon refuses to call the takeover in Niger a coup d’état.

After a Nigerien junta, which calls itself the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Fatherland, seized power on July 26 and detained the democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, France and the European Union immediately called it a coup. But weeks later, in public statements and responses to The Intercept, Pentagon officials have repeatedly stopped short of using that word.

“Not calling a coup a coup not only undermines our credibility but harms our long-term interests in these states.”

“Not calling a coup a coup not only undermines our credibility but harms our long-term interests in these states,” said Elizabeth Shackelford, a senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and lead author on a forthcoming report on U.S. military aid in Africa. “We have legal prohibitions on providing security assistance to juntas for a reason. It’s not in our long-term national interest to do so.”

U.S. coup legislation, specifically Section 7008 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, specifies that any country whose “duly elected head of government is deposed by a military coup d’état or decree” will be automatically prohibited from receiving a broad package of congressionally appropriated foreign assistance. The Pentagon’s reluctance to call a coup a coup may be aimed at preserving the ability to continue providing security assistance to military-ruled Niger.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh was pressed earlier this week about why the United States has not called the takeover a coup. “It certainly looks like an attempted coup here,” she said. “We have assets and interests in the region, and our main priority is protecting those interests and protecting those of our allies. So a designation like what you’re suggesting certainly changes what we’d be able to do in the region and how we’d be able to partner with Nigerien military.”

While calling a three-week-old coup no more than an attempt, Singh was clear about why the U.S. might be reticent to sever relations with the junta. “Niger is a partner and we don’t want to see that partnership go,” she said. “We’ve invested, you know, hundreds of millions of dollars into bases there, trained with the military there.”

Since 2012, U.S. taxpayers have spent more than $500 million on that partnership, making it one of the largest security assistance programs in sub-Saharan Africa. Niger hosts one of the largest and most expensive drone bases run by the U.S. military. Built in the northern city of Agadez at a price tag of more than $110 million and maintained to the tune of $20 to $30 million each year, Air Base 201 is a surveillance hub and the linchpin of an archipelago of U.S. outposts in West Africa. It is home to Space Force personnel, a Joint Special Operations Air Detachment, and a fleet of drones, including armed MQ-9 Reapers.

In the month prior to the coup, the drone outpost was the site of a meeting between Brig. Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, the U.S.-trained chief of Nigerien Special Forces and Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, head of U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Within weeks, Barmou helped topple Bazoum and, according to a U.S. government official, conveyed a threat to Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland to execute the deposed president if neighboring countries attempted a military intervention.

When asked if Singh was equivocating to avoid calling Bazoum’s overthrow a coup, a Pentagon spokesperson passed the buck to the State Department. “The DoD does not make the determination whether the situation in Niger is a coup,” Maj. Pete Nguyen told The Intercept. “The State Department will make the determination as to whether the situation in Niger is a coup.”

Sarah Harrison, who served four years as an associate general counsel in the Pentagon’s Office of General Counsel, including providing guidance on U.S. activities in Africa, says that there is a popular misunderstanding that failing to call a military takeover a “coup” means that the U.S. government does not have to restrict access. “The Biden administration handwringing over saying ‘coup’ is absurd. The law requires no formal designation and is in force regardless of what officials choose to label events,” says Harrison.

Elias Yousif, a research analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program, sees the Pentagon equivocations as a “political gesture” of dubious use. “By calling it an ‘attempted coup,’ it implicitly suggests that there is going to be a reversal of it and denies the facts on the ground that the president is under strict house arrest and the military junta is running the show,” he told The Intercept. “There has been a coup in Niger. This is the reality.”

Earlier this month, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the “U.S. government is pausing certain foreign assistance programs benefiting the government of Niger.” But the State Department did not respond to The Intercept’s questions about exactly which programs have been paused and if security aid continues to flow to the junta. Just prior to Blinken’s declaration, a State Department spokesperson told The Intercept that there had “been no determination on security assistance at this time.”

U.S. coup restrictions were first imposed in 1984 when the Reagan White House and Congress battled over military assistance to El Salvador. The next year, Congress passed a law that applied the coup restriction to all other countries. Similar restrictions have been included in every State Department annual appropriations bill since. The U.S. has, however, often employed loopholes, workarounds, and exceptionally strict or selective readings of the law to keep military aid flowing when heads of state are deposed, including in Egypt in 2013, Burkina Faso in 2014, and Chad in 2021. Even when aid has been restricted following coups, alternate funding channels have kept U.S. tax dollars trickling into the coffers of juntas. According to State Department responses to questions from The Intercept, security assistance also continues to fund juntas in Mali, which had coups in 2020 and 2021, Guinea (2021), and Burkina Faso (two in 2022).

“We have laws in place to ensure we don’t help prop up those who undermine democracy,” says Shackelford, who formerly served as a foreign service officer in multiple posts in Africa. “When we find ways around enforcing those laws whenever it’s inconvenient, we undermine our own influence and the stability those laws are meant to promote.”

Indeed, Biden has decried Russia’s creation of a “propaganda ecosystem” that “creates and spreads false narratives to strategically advance the Kremlin’s policy goals.” He added, “There is truth and there are lies. And each of us has a duty and responsibility, as citizens, as Americans, and especially as leaders — leaders who have pledged to honor our Constitution and protect our nation — to defend the truth and to defeat the lies.”

When Is a Coup Not a Coup? When the U.S. Says So. (theintercept.com)