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La crisis de octubre de 1978 me convirtió en un convencido del peligro de las armas nucleares y de la necesidad del control de armamento

A última hora de la tarde del 16 de octubre de 1978, 111 cardenales electores de todo el mundo, que se habían reunido el 15 de octubre de 1978 en la basílica de San Pedro, y tras ocho rondas de votación, eligieron papa al arzobispo Karol Wojtyła, de 58 años. Juan Pablo II, como se conocía a Karol Wojtyła, era polaco, y Polonia formaba parte en aquel momento del Pacto de Varsovia, dominado por la Unión Soviética, donde la religión había estado subordinada durante décadas al dogma del Partido Comunista.

En toda Polonia, las multitudes salieron a las calles en una muestra masiva de alegría espontánea. En Cracovia, se tocó la campana Sigismund, que colgaba en el antiguo castillo real de Wawel, algo que solo se hacía en circunstancias extraordinarias.

La gente desfilaba por las calles, exhibiendo banderas nacionales y cantando canciones religiosas e himnos que estaban oficialmente prohibidos. Se encendió una chispa en los corazones del pueblo polaco que dio lugar al movimiento Solidaridad dos años más tarde.

Se dice que Joseph Stalin se burló de la Iglesia católica con su famosa frase: «El Papa, ¿cuántas divisiones tiene el Papa?».

La respuesta a esa pregunta la dieron los propios polacos: millones de personas inundaron las calles en una movilización social masiva no autorizada que sacudió hasta los cimientos al Partido Comunista Polaco, entonces en el poder. Mientras el pueblo polaco bailaba en las calles, la televisión y la radio polacas, controladas por el Estado, permanecieron en silencio, y el Partido Comunista consultó entre sus miembros cuáles podrían ser los siguientes pasos.

Había 40 000 soldados soviéticos estacionados en Polonia, que servían como puño de hierro para reforzar las 300 000 tropas soviéticas en Alemania que liderarían cualquier guerra con la OTAN. Las autoridades soviéticas consideraban a Polonia un componente esencial del Pacto de Varsovia, la base sobre la que se sustentaba su capacidad para enfrentarse con éxito a la OTAN en el campo de batalla.

Los funcionarios soviéticos, encabezados por el jefe del KGB, Yuri Andropov, estaban alerta ante cualquier indicio de que el nuevo Papa polaco formara parte de un complot más amplio respaldado por Estados Unidos para crear inestabilidad en Polonia, lo que requeriría la intervención militar soviética, debilitando la unidad del Pacto de Varsovia y socavando la posición de los soviéticos en Alemania Oriental y otros lugares.

La CIA consideraba a Polonia como un miembro especialmente volátil del Pacto de Varsovia y señalaba en un análisis de 1977 que una «explosión» en Polonia podría derrocar al Gobierno polaco «e incluso obligar a los soviéticos a restablecer el orden», en una repetición de lo ocurrido en Checoslovaquia en la primavera de 1968.

La CIA consideraba a la Iglesia católica polaca como un actor fundamental en cualquier escenario que implicara disturbios sociales en Polonia, y señalaba que el Partido Comunista había estado apoyándose en la Iglesia para ayudar a sofocar el sentimiento antigubernamental entre la población polaca, profundamente religiosa. La elección de Karol Wojtyła como Papa acabaría con el papel que desempeñaba la Iglesia católica polaca en el sustento de la legitimidad del Partido Comunista Polaco.

El cardenal John Joseph Krol (izquierda) con el papa Juan Pablo II tras su elección

Estados Unidos había estado preparando el terreno para tal movimiento, presionando a los líderes católicos de Alemania Occidental para que apoyaran a Wojtyła. Zbigniew Brzezinski, asesor de seguridad nacional del presidente Jimmy Carter, estaba trabajando con el cardenal John Joseph Krol de Filadelfia para alinear a los cardenales estadounidenses detrás de Wojtyła.

La CIA también consiguió que Krol sobornara a cardenales de países más pobres (en su mayoría de Asia y África) con dinero de la CIA para que votaran por el arzobispo polaco.

La KGB de Andropov había estado siguiendo estas actividades, por lo que sus preocupaciones sobre un complot respaldado por Estados Unidos no eran infundadas.

El Partido Comunista Polaco, a partir de finales de 1977, había emprendido una ofensiva diplomática para intentar socavar el apoyo a la controvertida «bomba de neutrones», un arma termonuclear diseñada para matar a las personas mediante radiación en lugar de con la fuerza de una explosión.

Aunque estas ojivas se habían utilizado durante mucho tiempo en misiles antibalísticos en los años cincuenta y sesenta, la administración Carter quería adaptarlas para su uso en sistemas como el misil de corto alcance Lance, donde se utilizarían para neutralizar las divisiones blindadas soviéticas en caso de una invasión de la OTAN por parte del Pacto de Varsovia.

Estas armas resultaban muy atractivas para Alemania Occidental en aquel momento, ya que la mayor parte de los combates en cualquier invasión soviética se librarían en su territorio. Las ojivas «de neutrones» matarían a los soldados soviéticos sin hacer que las tierras alemanas quedaran inhabitables durante siglos.

Pero Alemania Occidental no apoyaría el despliegue de estas armas en su territorio a menos que contara con el respaldo de otras naciones europeas. La diplomacia polaca había logrado socavar el apoyo a la «bomba de neutrones» y, en abril de 1978, el presidente Carter anunció oficialmente que Estados Unidos aplazaría la producción del arma a condición de que la Unión Soviética hiciera lo mismo.

La administración Carter, influenciada por el acérrimo anticomunista Brzezinski, tenía cuentas que saldar con el Partido Comunista Polaco. La elección de Karol Wojtyła como Papa podría ayudar a contrarrestar la influencia de Polonia entre los principales partidos socialdemócratas y socialistas de Europa.

Poco después de asumir la presidencia en enero de 1977, Jimmy Carter se enfrentó al despliegue de misiles soviéticos SS-20 de alcance intermedio a poca distancia de Europa occidental.

Los soviéticos ya habían logrado la paridad estratégica con Estados Unidos en términos de fuerzas nucleares estratégicas y, del mismo modo, habían igualado la postura de corto y medio alcance a nivel teatral mediante el despliegue del misil de combustible sólido SS-12/22 «Scaleboard».

El despliegue de misiles SS-20, cada uno equipado con tres ojivas nucleares, fuera del alcance de cualquier sistema de armas equivalente con base en Europa, creó una «brecha» de capacidad que puso en peligro la estrategia de disuasión de «respuesta flexible» de la OTAN, basada en disuadir o contrarrestar la agresión soviética con una respuesta adecuada y gradual —que iba desde la defensa convencional hasta las armas nucleares tácticas o estratégicas— en cualquier nivel de conflicto.

Lanzamisiles SS-20

En agosto de 1978, el presidente Carter, con el firme respaldo de Brzezinski, aprobó un plan con el que esperaba dar un nuevo impulso a la «respuesta flexible» mediante el despliegue de un contingente de 108 misiles balísticos Pershing II-XR y 464 misiles de crucero lanzados desde tierra en el Reino Unido, Alemania Occidental e Italia. Sin embargo, la cuestión de la capacidad de Polonia para influir en la mentalidad europea cobró gran importancia.

Para poder superar lo que se preveía que sería una importante oposición europea a este plan, era necesario neutralizar a Polonia. Aquí es donde entró en juego la elección de Karol Wojtyła como Papa.

En noviembre de 1977, mi familia se mudó de Ankara (Turquía), donde mi padre, comandante de la Fuerza Aérea de los Estados Unidos, había servido como asesor de la Fuerza Aérea Turca, a la región de Renania-Palatinado, en Alemania Occidental. Mi padre fue destinado a la 17.ª Fuerza Aérea, con sede en la base aérea de Sembach, donde supervisaba el mantenimiento de los aviones en apoyo de la misión de la 17.ª Fuerza Aérea de llevar a cabo misiones aéreas defensivas y ofensivas en Europa Central en apoyo de la OTAN.

En tiempos de crisis, el personal del cuartel general de la 17.ª Fuerza Aérea se trasladaba a búnkeres subterráneos donde podían capear un ataque nuclear soviético y seguir cumpliendo con sus responsabilidades.

En el otoño de 1978, mi familia vivía en una casa alemana que alquilábamos a una familia alemana que la había estado alquilando a estadounidenses desde que el general George Patton la utilizó como cuartel general temporal para su Tercer Ejército en los últimos meses de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. La casa estaba en las afueras de la ciudad alemana de Marnheim. Al otro lado de la autopista había un pequeño pueblo llamado Weirhof, donde se encontraba una pequeña comunidad militar que incluía una capilla, un club de oficiales, cuarteles para oficiales solteros y una clínica médica donde mi madre trabajaba como enfermera.

Weirhof se encontraba a varios kilómetros del Depósito de Armas Especiales del Ejército de los Estados Unidos en Kriegsfeld, conocido oficialmente como NATO Site Number 107, pero al que siempre se referían como «North Point». La mayoría de las familias y oficiales que vivían en Weirhof trabajaban en «North Point», donde su misión era proteger y mantener el inventario del Ejército de los Estados Unidos de proyectiles de artillería nucleares de 155 mm y 8 pulgadas.

En otoño de 1978, ya era muy consciente de la realidad de la vida en Alemania Occidental. La simple existencia cotidiana ponía a uno en contacto con tanques, helicópteros y aviones de combate que atravesaban los campos y las carreteras alrededor de mi casa, y los cielos sobre ella.

La razón de ello era la presencia de dos ejércitos de la Guardia Soviética (el 1.º de Tanques y el 20.º de Armas Combinadas) justo al otro lado de la frontera con Alemania Oriental, a unos 200 kilómetros (o dos horas y media en coche). Mis padres me dijeron que, si había una guerra, no nos evacuarían, sino que permaneceríamos en nuestro lugar. Se esperaba que los soviéticos pudieran llegar en un plazo de dos o tres días después del inicio de los combates.

Pero yo oía otros rumores: que los soviéticos, para evitar que se distribuyeran proyectiles de artillería nuclear a las unidades del ejército estadounidense que serían llamadas a dispararlos en un esfuerzo desesperado por detener el avance de los tanques y vehículos blindados soviéticos, atacarían «North Point» con armas nucleares al principio del conflicto.

Depósito de armas de North Point

Dada la ubicación de la casa que mi familia alquilaba en «North Point», estábamos literalmente en la zona cero de lo que sería la primera salva nuclear de la Tercera Guerra Mundial.

Mi padre, debido a su trabajo, a veces no volvía a casa por la noche. En su lugar, se recluía en uno de los búnkeres subterráneos situados en la base aérea de Sembach. En la mayoría de los casos, estas ocasiones estaban relacionadas con maniobras militares. Pero de vez en cuando, el mundo real intervenía y mi padre desaparecía sin previo aviso. Cuando esto ocurría, simplemente llamaba a mi madre y le decía dos palabras: «Ay, Babilonia».

Ay, Babilonia era el título de un libro de 1959 de Pat Frank que describía la vida apocalíptica posnuclear en un pequeño pueblo de Florida. Mis padres habían leído el libro mientras mi padre asistía a la Universidad de Florida, un período que coincidió con la crisis de los misiles cubanos de octubre de 1962. No hace falta decir que el libro les impactó profundamente a ambos.

«Ay, Babilonia» significaba que el mundo podía llegar a su fin en cualquier momento, que no se trataba de un simulacro, que había que reunir a la familia y rezar por lo mejor.

El 16 de octubre de 1978 era lunes. Mi padre se había ido a trabajar esa mañana como siempre, y mi hermana y yo nos subimos a los autobuses turísticos alemanes alquilados que el Departamento de Defensa utilizaba como autobuses escolares, para nuestro viaje de 40 minutos a Kaiserslautern, sede del instituto americano Kaiserslautern American High School.

Yo jugaba al fútbol americano en el equipo del instituto (como receptor abierto/ala cerrada) y, después de las clases, me quedaba para entrenar y cogía el «autobús tardío» que me llevaba a casa, a Marnheim.

Los «Red Raiders» de Kaiserslautern estaban en medio de lo que acabaría siendo una temporada de campeonato invicta. Veníamos de una victoria decisiva sobre los Stuttgart Panthers, un partido en el que yo había contribuido de manera decisiva al atrapar un pase de 38 yardas en tercera oportunidad, lo que ayudó a mantener lo que resultaría ser la jugada ganadora del partido.

Esa victoria me animó a seguir adelante con mis planes de invitar a Betsy Ensign al baile de bienvenida, que se celebraba literalmente el sábado siguiente. Había dejado claras mis intenciones a todos mis compañeros de clase, para que nadie se adelantara a mis planes, pero aún no había reunido el valor para invitarla directamente. Mi plan era pasar el rato durante el almuerzo en el aula donde la madre de Betsy enseñaba ciencias sociales y esperar a que Betsy apareciera. Iba a sondear a la señora Ensign para saber si tenía alguna posibilidad antes de hacerle la pregunta.

El plan funcionó a las mil maravillas: la madre de Betsy me dijo que Betsy era plenamente consciente de mi intención, que estaba más que enfadada porque tardaba tanto en responder, pero que probablemente diría que sí si reunía el valor para hacerle la pregunta. Betsy apareció, le pedí salir, ella dijo que sí y el mundo era perfecto.

Fui al entrenamiento de fútbol con la energía que solo puede tener un chico que ha invitado a bailar a la chica de sus sueños. Seguía en una nube cuando cogí el último autobús a casa, deseando poder compartir la gran noticia con mi familia.

Pero no fue así.

La elección de Karol Wojtyła como Papa había hecho saltar las alarmas en toda Europa y la OTAN.

Los soviéticos y sus aliados del Pacto de Varsovia se atrincheraron, tratando de averiguar cómo responder. La OTAN, temiendo la posibilidad de que los soviéticos aprovecharan su ventaja en misiles SS-20, elevó su estado de alerta.

Mi padre estaba en el búnker de Sembach.

Y había llamado a mi madre antes, diciéndole las dos palabras que ella no quería oír: «Ay, Babilonia».

Mi madre, mis hermanas y yo pasamos la noche mirando álbumes de fotos familiares, hablando de las aventuras que habíamos compartido como familia y con miedo a irnos a dormir por si no volvíamos a despertarnos. Al final, cerramos los ojos y, por la mañana, salió el sol y tuvimos que prepararnos para ir al colegio.

Mi padre seguía en el búnker.

Recuerdo mirar por la ventana del autobús nuestra casa mientras nos alejábamos, preguntándome si volvería a verla alguna vez, o a mi madre. Mi hermana pequeña, Amy, asistía a la escuela primaria de Sembach, así que me hice la misma pregunta sobre ella. Suzanne, que era un año menor que yo y estaba en su tercer año de secundaria, estaba conmigo en el autobús. No dijimos nada, pero sabía que ella también estaba preocupada.

Betsy y yo nos reunimos durante el almuerzo, ya que ahora éramos oficialmente «pareja». Ella quería la combinación de mi casillero, porque había una tradición de que las novias de los jugadores de fútbol americano decoraran los casilleros el viernes antes del partido.

Ella intuía que algo andaba mal, pero yo no podía expresar claramente cuál era el problema: la familia de Betsy vivía en las viviendas de la base Vogelweh, cerca de la escuela secundaria, muy lejos del depósito de armas «North Point» y del drama que rodeaba ese lugar.

Del mismo modo, el hecho de que mi padre estuviera en el búnker de guerra y se lo hubiera comunicado a mi madre no era algo que se pudiera revelar públicamente. Simplemente le dije que estaba pensando en el partido y le prometí que al día siguiente, cuando habíamos quedado para comer, sería mejor compañía.

Pero en el fondo me preguntaba si habría una segunda comida, una taquilla decorada, un partido de fútbol o un baile de bienvenida.

Mi padre estaba en el búnker.

El autor (fila trasera, entre los números 60 y 50), como miembro del invicto equipo de fútbol americano Kaiserslautern Red Raider de 1979.

El entrenamiento de fútbol era tan intenso como cabría esperar. Hice todo lo posible por mantener la concentración, pero me sorprendió cuando el sol se reflejó en el espejo de un camión que pasaba por la calle Pariser, cegándome temporalmente con un destello de luz brillante.

Lo único que pasó por mi mente fue: «Se acabó».

«Ritter, concéntrese», me gritó el entrenador Joe Klemmer, que también era mi profesor de física.

Hice lo que me dijo, pero ese destello, y lo que podía significar, me sacudió hasta lo más profundo.

Cogí el último autobús a casa, buscando con la mirada el camino de entrada donde debería haber estado aparcado el coche familiar, un Saab 99 Turbo negro.

No estaba allí.

Mi padre seguía en el búnker.

Llegó a casa más tarde esa noche, después de que hubiéramos cenado. Se determinó que la reacción soviética a la coronación del papa Juan Pablo II era puramente política y que la amenaza de cualquier emergencia militar había pasado.

El mundo volvía a estar bien.

Betsy decoró mi taquilla y se aseguró de poner un pastel de chocolate casero para que lo disfrutáramos juntos durante el almuerzo.

Ganamos el partido de fútbol de forma contundente.

Y pude llevar a mi novia del instituto al baile de fin de curso.

El autor (de pie, segundo por la derecha) con otros inspectores estadounidenses fuera de la planta de montaje final de misiles de Votkinsk, diciembre de 1988.

Una década más tarde, en octubre de 1988, trabajaba fuera de la planta de montaje final de misiles de Votkinsk, situada en las estribaciones de los montes Urales, a unos 1.200 km al este de Moscú. En aquel momento era primer teniente del Cuerpo de Marines de los Estados Unidos y trabajaba como inspector asignado a la Agencia de Inspección In Situ, una actividad del Departamento de Defensa creada en febrero de 1988 con el fin de aplicar el Tratado sobre Fuerzas Nucleares de Alcance Intermedio (INF).

La planta de montaje final de misiles de Votkinsk era donde los soviéticos habían fabricado los misiles SS-12/22 y SS-20 que habían estado en el centro de la crisis del «Pope» de octubre de 1978.

Yo formaba parte de un equipo de inspectores estadounidenses estacionados fuera de las puertas de la fábrica para asegurarse de que esos misiles no se volvieran a fabricar nunca más.

Para mí, esta misión era especialmente emotiva.

El destello que presencié en el campo de prácticas a última hora de la tarde del 17 de octubre de 1978 quedó grabado en mi mente.

Ayudar a librar al mundo de estas armas era algo personal.

La gente me pregunta por qué estoy tan involucrado en el control de armas.

No es una pregunta difícil de responder.

Porque hubo un momento en que la vida de un niño se vio trastornada por la amenaza existencial que estas armas representaban para él, su familia y la vida que llevaba.

Porque mi padre tuvo que bajar al búnker.

Y antes de irse, se sintió obligado a decirle a mi madre dos palabras que la llenaron de miedo:

«Ay, Babilonia».

Creía en el control de armas porque ninguna madre debería escuchar esas palabras.

Y ningún niño debería preguntarse si el reflejo aleatorio de la luz en el espejo retrovisor de un camión que pasa es el destello que señala el inicio de una explosión nuclear que acabará con su vida en un instante.

El último tratado de control de armas nucleares que quedaba entre Rusia y Estados Unidos ha expirado.

Mi misión ha fracasado.

He recibido entrenamiento en el Cuerpo de Marines.

No me rendiré.

Pero soy lo suficientemente inteligente como para saber que el legado del control de armas que había mantenido la seguridad mundial durante los últimos 54 años (desde la firma del tratado sobre misiles antibalísticos (ABM) en 1972) se ha echado a perder.

Trabajaré para ayudar a que el control de armas forme parte de nuestra relación estratégica con las demás naciones con armas nucleares del mundo, especialmente Rusia.

Pero esto no sucederá de la noche a la mañana.

Y mi temor es que la próxima generación de niños, que de otro modo se habría librado de las consecuencias de los acontecimientos que llevaron a un padre a llamar a su esposa y pronunciar las palabras «Ay, Babilonia», tenga que vivir experiencias similares a las mías.

Si es que pueden sobrevivir a la experiencia.

(Viajaré a Rusia en marzo para continuar con mis esfuerzos por promover el control de armas y mejorar las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Rusia. Como periodista independiente, dependo totalmente de las amables y generosas donaciones de lectores y simpatizantes para sufragar los gastos relacionados con dicho viaje (transporte, alojamiento, comidas, alquiler de estudio, contratación de intérpretes, producción y edición de vídeos, etc.). Agradezco cualquier apoyo que puedan brindarme).

Publicado originalmente por Scott Ritter.

Traducción:  Geopolítica rugiente

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Since the Cold War, terms like “global order,” “world order,” and “international order” have been used interchangeably in international relations, often without clear definition. This has led to confusion, particularly when global order is conflated with the international system or power structure. For the sake of avoiding ambiguity, this essay attempts to define global order through its core components: institutions, norms, and values.

Global order exists when institutions, norms, and values function within the international system. Their breakdown signals disorder or anarchy. War and peace serve as indicators, with international order conceptualized as a spectrum—ranging from war (disorder) to peace (order), and an indeterminate middle zone.

Since it is difficult to provide a quantitative definition for international order according to degree of changes in peace or war, international order, as I defined it in Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers (2019) is “the state of affairs wherein players in a given international system settle their conflicts through nonviolent approaches according to interstate norms.” This definition applies across systems—regional or global—and serves as the analytical foundation for post-World War II global orders.

While both global order and global system involve norms, they are distinct. The global system encompasses norms, actors, and configurations; global order refers to norms, mainstream values, and institutional power distribution. As prominent Chinese academic Zhou Fangyin observed in a 2021 essay for World Political Studies, “order is not an entity but a kind of soft existence.” History shows that while the global system emerged by the nineteenth century, global order was absent during both world wars in the twentieth century.

Global order is also mistakenly equated with international power structure—defined by polarity (unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar). Power structure reflects capability distribution among major powers and is part of the global system, not the order itself. Ian Bremmer’s framing of global order transitions—from bipolar to unipolar to “G-Zero”—illustrates this conflation.

Polarity cannot predict the functionality of global order, and power transitions, such as those from Britain to the United States, do not necessarily mean order transitions. Regardless of type, international order is marked by stability, predictability, and cooperativeness. A war-ridden system lacks order due to its instability and hostility. Conversely, order prevails when nonviolent conflict resolution and prevention dominate. Despite proxy wars, the Cold War, post-Cold War, and present periods are considered ordered due to their relative systemic stability.

Whenever an international order is present, it may shift in type. While scholars agree on its variability, they differ on categorization. American political scientist John Ikenberry identifies balance of power, hegemony, and law-based orders, while his Indian-born colleague Amitav Acharya suggests hegemony, conciliation, and community. Chinese scholars Sun Xuefeng and Huang Yuxing propose hegemony, balance of power, tribute, and community, and Liu Feng outlines seven types, ranging from empire to multipolar coordination.

Rather than limiting analysis to Cold War or liberal paradigms, I propose categorizing global order by its dominant values, norms, and institutional power distribution. Among these, norms most decisively shape types of international order. The post-Cold War era, defined by democratization and marketization, is best termed the “globalization order.” In contrast, the emerging “counter-globalization order” reflects deglobalizing trends.

Some global orders prove beneficial to a greater number of states than others, and thus gain broader international acceptance. A desirable order is one that is both stable and widely supported. Analogous to social entities—such as prisons (stable but unpopular) versus bazaars (unstable but preferred)—global orders that serve collective interests are favored over those serving a few, even if the latter offer greater stability.

This dynamic underpins the current divergence between Beijing and Washington. Both have advocated a rules-based order, but differ on its characteristic. Washington has long argued that China seeks to reshape the order away from universal values. U.S. officials have emphasized defending and reforming the post-World War II rules-based system to uphold peace and rights.

Having itself benefited from globalization, China has been supportive of its continuation but stood in opposition to Western dominance. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi has criticized the “rules-based order” as hegemonic, favoring instead rules grounded in international law over selective imposition by the West.

The debate on the characteristic of international order is thus not about rules per se, but whose rules will prevail. All social orders are rules-based, but what matters is the specific characteristic of those rules and their acceptance by the majority. This logic applies not only to modern systems but also to ancient ones—e.g., the Western Zhou’s Five Services defined tributary order in East Asia, while Rome’s preoccupation principle shaped colonialism in Africa and Asia.

In the coming decade, major powers will surely contest the type of global order, but not its existence. Nuclear deterrence has prevented direct wars since World War II and will likely continue to do so. The Ukraine war is another illustration of this paradigm: despite early threats, Russia refrained from nuclear escalation. However destabilizing they may seem, proxy conflicts do not dismantle global order, which is one of the reasons this essay focuses on transformations in the types of order rather than their presence or absence.

Some scholars view the Cold War and post-Cold War periods as different phases of a single liberal order. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, much like Ikenberry, traces its architecture to Bretton Woods and post-World War II institutions like the UN, IMF, and WTO. However, this view raises some logical questions: Why distinguish the periods if the order remained unchanged? Why did the “liberal order” emerge only after the Cold War? Why is globalization central to the post-Cold War but absent from Cold War discourse?

Conflating these periods obscures the evolution of global order. For instance, in his 2022 book entitled The Authoritarian Century: China’s Rise and the Demise of the Liberal International Order, Australian scholar Chris Ogden defined the period from 1945 to the present as the order of Pax Americana while arguing that there was “a new world order” after the end of the Cold War because of actual dramatic change in world affairs. In Is The American Century Over? (2015), Joseph Nye even argued that “the ‘American century’ began in 1941” and was “not over” yet, and would likely last until 2041. To understand today’s state of global order, we must compare it with Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

The Soviet collapse in 1991 marked a shift to U.S.-led unipolarity. U.S. President George H. W. Bush envisioned a “new world order” of peace and prosperity. While idealized, the post-Cold War order differed markedly in institutional power distribution, dominant values, and international norms.

During the Cold War, global leadership was split between the United States and the Soviet Union in political and security institutions, as the UN Security Council reflected this balance, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact embodied regional blocs. Despite its economic superiority, the United States could not exert global political leadership. Ideologically, the Cold War was defined by rivalry between capitalism and communism. Proxy wars were reflective of the struggle to install like-minded regimes, but neither ideology was able to achieve global dominance. The tripartite division—on the First World (U.S.-led), Second World (USSR-led), and Third World (non-aligned)—highlighted ideological fragmentation. The Third World, comprising most UN members, embraced diverse ideologies beyond the bipolar contest.

Above all else, sovereignty was the cornerstone of Cold War norms. The 1945 UN Charter enshrined non-intervention, and even its violators justified their actions under the guise of defending sovereignty. Conflicts like those in Korea, Vietnam, or the Arab-Israeli wars were framed as sovereignty struggles, reinforcing its normative primacy.

The post-Cold War era that followed, saw transformation across all dimensions of global order. With the USSR gone, the United States assumed sole leadership in global institutions, advancing liberal values and globalization norms and giving way to a shift that defined this new type of global order.

The U.S. dominated both economic and political institutions. UN Security Council resolutions—whether on Kosovo, Afghanistan, North Korea, or Iran—were often U.S.-led. Wary of confrontation, China frequently abstained, based on which the international media derided the Chinese representatives at the UN and sticking them with the nickname “Ambassador Abstention.”

Globalization norms, boiling down mostly to political democratization and economic marketization, spread quite widely. While Eastern Europe’s democratic transitions exemplified the former, the latter certainly had broader reach: even non-democratic states embraced market reforms. China and India epitomized this trend. China pursued WTO membership after transitioning to a mixed economy, joining in 2001, whereas India, after decades of protectionism, liberalized its economy in 1991.

To grasp the current global order, one must move beyond Cold War and post-Cold War frameworks. Comparisons with a “new Cold War” have circulated since the 1980s, first applied to U.S.-Soviet rivalry, later to that between the U.S. and Russia, and more recently U.S.- China. Yet repeated claims of a “starting point” have failed to hold, once again reaffirming that today’s order is not a Cold War redux. As Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan observed, invoking Cold War analogies is intellectually lazy and misrepresents the nature of U.S.-China competition.

Unlike the Cold War’s ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, today’s most consequential rivalry centers on technological superiority. Ideological challenges now stem from domestic populism rather than external expansion. Competition unfolds across both natural space (geo- and outer space) and cyberspace, with cybertechnology seen as decisive. Some of Russia’s military mishaps in Ukraine highlighted this, prompting Washington’s “small yard, high fence” strategy to restrict China’s tech progress, and Beijing’s “dual circulation” policy to strengthen domestic innovation. China’s goal is national rejuvenation, not global communism, and since 2017 it has pledged not to export its development model.

For its part, Washington too has abandoned Cold War ambitions of ideological expansion. Capitalism is no longer promoted as a global ideology and liberalism itself has been weakened by populism. And even those who prioritized it, focused on preserving liberalism at home, not spreading it abroad. Despite rivalry, both capitals reject framing their competition as a new Cold War.

Proxy wars, once central to Cold War strategy, are marginal in today’s competition. They do not advance technological superiority and drain resources. Hence, the risk of a proxy war over Taiwan is overstated. Beijing emphasizes peaceful reunification, recognizing that national rejuvenation depends on innovation, not territorial expansion. Lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine reinforce this restraint.

Unlike the comprehensive U.S.-Soviet separation, Washington and Beijing maintain economic and social ties. China continues to benefit from American markets, technology, and education, and thus resists full decoupling, while both sides acknowledge the need for coexistence. Both are also keenly aware that severing ties between the world’s two largest economies would bring about gross destabilization of global markets.

The U.S.-China rivalry will not lead to a new Cold War, since the conditions that defined the Cold War—ideological expansion, proxy wars, and comprehensive separation—are absent. Only mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains, making today’s order fundamentally different.

The dividing line of today’s competition lies in the rise of counter-globalization, distinct from anti-globalization (popular protests) and de-globalization (state-led reduction of interdependence). Counter-globalization emerges when major powers mutually adopt de-globalization policies.

Brexit in 2017 marked the first major step towards de-globalization, but its global impact was limited. The decisive shift came with Trump’s 2018 initiation of the trade war against China, involving economies that together comprised nearly 40 percent of global GDP. The COVID-19 pandemic only accelerated the trend, as states curtailed international connections. Thus, the period between 2017 and 2020 represents the transition from post-Cold War globalization to counter-globalization.

The Ukraine war in 2022 deepened this trajectory and the sanctions imposed on Russia disrupted supply chains, prompting the EU to reduce dependence on food, medicine, raw materials, chips, and digital technology. With no major power advancing globalization, the EU acknowledged a changing order. Reflecting this trend, U.S. officials at some point began speaking of “internationalization” rather than “globalization.”

Unlike Cold War’s bipolarity or the unipolarity of the post-Cold War period, power is diffusing in the contemporary world. Australia’s 2023 Defence Review noted the United States is no longer the Indo-Pacific’s unipolar leader. American withdrawals from institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO, and the Paris Agreement further diminished its global leadership. This trend started from Tramp 1.0, was not reversed during the Biden administration and has certainly continued in the second Trump presidency.

Liberal norms are losing ground around the world and sovereignty has regained primacy, especially since the onset of the Ukraine war. Another testament to this fact is that NATO condemned Russia’s violation of sovereignty rather than emphasizing human rights. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), quite central in the post-Cold War era, has been sidelined. Major powers now selectively invoke sovereignty or human rights to justify policies. During the 2023 Israel-Hamas war, Western governments emphasized Israel’s sovereignty, while Beijing and many developing states highlighted Palestinian human rights. This selective application underscores the erosion of liberal norms and the reassertion of sovereignty as a guiding principle.

Economic norms have shifted from post-Cold War marketization to deglobalization, marked by trade protectionism, sanctions, and technological decoupling. Since 2018, major powers have tightened restrictions on trade, investment, and data flows while subsidizing domestic innovation. The United States, once the champion of globalization, abandoned free-market principles with its trade war against other countries including members of NAFTA, refusal to appoint WTO appellate judges, and passage of the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act—both criticized as protectionist. The EU, formerly globalization’s strongest advocate, now emphasizes “de-risking” and economic security, encouraging members to limit openness and prioritize internal resilience.

Global values have also shifted. Liberalism, dominant in the post-Cold War era, is declining under pressure from populism. This trend originates within Western democracies, where resentment against liberal norms has fueled political upheaval. Events like the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol reinforced perceptions of democratic fragility, and have only emboldened non-democratic states to claim greater legitimacy. Populism now shapes politics across both Western and non-Western powers, with roughly 15 percent of the world’s nations governed by populists in 2025. Unlike authoritarianism, which is a practice rather than an ideology, populism presents itself as a global ideological challenger to liberalism. The current clash of values is therefore between populism and liberalism, not capitalism and communism.

Taken together, these differences confirm the current order as distinct from both Cold War and post-Cold War types. Over these three periods, global order has evolved from ideological rivalry to globalization, and now to counter-globalization. Strategies shifted from proxy wars to democratization and marketization, and now to deglobalization. Institutional leadership moved from bipolar balance to U.S. unipolarity, and currently toward decentralization. Norms transitioned from the primacy of sovereignty, to human rights dominance, and now to a balance between the two. Values shifted from the rivalry between capitalism and communism, to liberalism’s dominance, and now to liberalism being challenged by populism.

Characteristics of the Current Global Order

Counter-globalization defines today’s global order, just as ideological rivalry defined the Cold War and globalization its aftermath. Yet other features also distinguish the present era: China’s rise, the digital age, and the spread of populism. Together, they reshape power distribution, strategic competition, and foreign policy priorities.

China’s ascent began with Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978 and became undeniable when its GDP surpassed Japan’s in 2010. Alarmed, the United States launched its “Pivot to Asia,” signaling the shift of the world’s center from Europe to East Asia. While Europe remains important, it no longer anchors global competition and only China has the capacity to systemically challenge U.S. leadership. Recently, Trump described China-U.S. relations as “G2” but he did not define “G2” as confrontation or cooperation between two superpowers.

Although it is still considered a junior superpower by some, China’s growing influence decentralizes U.S. dominance in institutions. By 2022, it contributed 15.25 percent of the UN budget, second only to the United States. China has expanded its role through funding, leadership appointments, and new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which by 2023 involved 150 countries and 30 organizations. On the security front, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization also broadened its membership and partnerships.

This rivalry forces other states into dilemmas of alignment. European leaders like France’s President Emmanuel Macron have warned against being trapped between Washington and Beijing, while many countries, much like during the Cold War, embrace their “Global South” identity to preserve neutrality.

Strategic competition now extends into cyberspace. Cyberattacks have surged, with over 1,100 weekly incidents per organization in late 2022, intensifying disputes over internet sovereignty. Such attacks are seen as both security threats and violations of sovereignty, as illustrated by U.S. allegations of Russian interference in the 2020 elections.

China has long promoted internet sovereignty to legitimize its cyber policies. Initially, both the United States and Europe resisted, favoring a “single internet.” For instance, in 2010, Hillary Clinton championed universal access, yet by 2020, U.S. policy shifted toward protecting its own digital domain. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s “clean network” initiative excluded Chinese firms from American infrastructure, while the Biden administration later banned U.S. companies from engaging with apps like TikTok and WeChat. Today, terms such as “internet sovereignty,” “cyber sovereignty,” and “digital sovereignty” become popular in global debates, reflecting the centrality of cyberspace in strategic competition.

Counter-globalization defines today’s global order, just as ideological rivalry defined the Cold War and globalization did the post-Cold War. Yet other features also distinguish the present era: China’s rise, the digital age, and the spread of populism. Together, they reshape power distribution, strategic competition, and foreign policy priorities.

Xenophobia, Populism, and Economic Security

Populism now prevails in the politics of major powers, accompanied by rising xenophobia and a preference for strongman rule over democratic institutions. Since the 2008 financial crisis, slower growth in democracies compared to China has fueled disillusionment, with many associating a strong leadership with economic progress. Populism blames liberal globalization, deepening xenophobia and enabling leaders to consolidate personal rule. In a 2022 speech as then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet observed that trust in democratic institutions is fading, with more states leaning toward non-Western systems. By 2021, half of 173 countries assessed by International IDEA showed democratic erosion, including 17 in Europe. Today, Trump’s administration is viewed as a semi-authoritarian regime.

Xenophobia manifests in anti-immigration policies and rejection of liberal norms like R2P. In the United States, Title 42 border restrictions persisted under both Trump and Biden, reflecting populist pressures. Likewise, European leaders voicing concerns over immigration at EU summits has become commonplace. In the UN, China’s defense of its policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet was supported by over 90 states, highlighting declining enthusiasm for R2P among developing countries.

Economic security has become a central strategic interest, far more emphasized than during the Cold War or post-Cold War. Washington formally linked economic security to national security in 2018, a stance reinforced by Blinken and Alan Estevez, who cited restrictions on China’s access to advanced technologies. Trump’s administration adopts even stricter policy in this aspect. The U.S. increasingly blurs civilian and military industries, intensifying tensions with Beijing and straining ties with allies.

China’s conflicts over economic security extend beyond Washington. In 2023, Beijing condemned the EU’s economic security strategy. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy identified supply chain vulnerabilities and imposed export restrictions on semiconductor equipment to China. South Korea proposed an “economic security alliance” with the United States to reduce dependence on China, while India passed legislation curbing Chinese investment. These developments underscore how economic security now drives global competition and reshapes alliances while intensifying rivalries.

Beijing’s Concern Regarding the Global Order

China is the only state with comprehensive capability to rival U.S. global influence, and thus seeks to shape the order according to its preferences. Its economic, military, and political power, along with ingrained governance values, will significantly impact the coming order. Compared to Washington, Beijing’s leadership trajectory is more certain, given U.S. electoral cycles.

Beijing’s outlook shifted after the Biden administration restored ties with traditional allies, briefly reversing Trump’s unilateralism. In 2020, the CPC still spoke of a “period of strategic opportunity.” By 2022, however, Beijing’s rhetoric darkened. At the BRICS Summit, it warned of “Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation,” while the CCP’s 20th Congress described “hegemonic, bullying acts” and unprecedented challenges. The 2023 Global Security Initiative Concept Paper echoed this pessimism, citing rising protectionism, persistent conflicts, and governance deficits.

By late 2023, Beijing’s rhetoric had grown more combative, emphasizing sovereignty, self-reliance, and systemic rivalry with the West. In parallel, China’s strategic rapprochement with Russia deepened, while initiatives like the Global Development Initiative expanded Chinese influence across the Global South. The 2024 Two Sessions stressed “struggle” and technological independence, and military signaling intensified. By 2025, the CCP’s messaging adopted a dual track: externally promoting multipolarity and institutional reform through BRICS+ and Global South forums, while domestically framing global competition as a long-term challenge requiring resilience and civilizational confidence.

Beijing rejects Washington’s framing of a rules-based order, insisting that international rules derive from the UN Charter and must be agreed upon by all 193 member states. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated that “there is but one set of rules in the world.” In contrast, Beijing accuses Washington of undermining norms, citing interventions, sanctions, and selective use of international law. Its 2023 document “U.S. Hegemony and Its Perils” condemned American practices such as “color revolutions,” bloc politics, and unilateral sanctions.

To counter what it sees as an unfavorable trajectory, Beijing launched four initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022), Global Civilization Initiative (2023), and Global Governance Initiative (2025). Together, they articulate China’s desire to reshape the order, emphasizing development, sovereignty-based security, and cultural diversity. These initiatives illustrate Beijing’s strong determination to shape a new order and elaborate on the kind of order it desires.

The Global Order Beijing Advocates

Beijing envisions a global order distinct from U.S.-led alliances and Western universalism. It promotes non-alliance partnerships, plural political legitimacy, development-first human rights, and open economic globalization.

China opposes U.S. military alliances such as AUKUS or QUAD in East Asia, as well as NATO’s growing hostility. It condemns these as Cold War mentality and instead promotes “no-alliance, no-confrontation” partnerships, exemplified by its relationship with Russia. Beijing argues this model avoids bloc confrontation and offers a new framework for major-power relations.

Beijing also rejects universal values, insisting there is no single yardstick for democracy or legitimacy. It emphasizes institutional competition as central to global rivalry and promotes diverse modernization paths. China positions its own modernization—economic growth, social change, and technological advancement under non-liberal governance—as an attractive model for developing countries, though applicability beyond Confucian contexts remains debated.

China prioritizes economic development over civil and political rights, arguing that freedom from poverty precedes other freedoms. This view resonates with many developing countries, as reflected in the 2022 UN Sharm El Sheikh Implementation Plan. Beijing criticizes Western human rights discourse as a tool of intervention and consistently invokes the UN Charter’s principle of non-interference, reinforcing sovereignty as a core norm.

Beijing distinguishes economic globalization, which it supports, from political democratization, which it opposes. Having benefited enormously from post-Cold War free marketization, China now advocates for an open economic order to counter Western decoupling and protectionism. China also calls on developing countries to resist “small yards and high fences” and urges reform of international financial institutions to amplify their voice. Premier Li Qiang reaffirmed China’s commitment to opening up, pledging cooperation with the U.S. to uphold trade rules and stabilize supply chains.

Beijing’s Strategy for Shaping the Global Order

Beijing pursues a comprehensive strategy across economic, political, and security domains, with economic influence as its strongest lever. BRI is the centerpiece of this vision, reflecting China’s reliance on trade and finance to expand global influence. By 2022, cumulative BRI engagement reached $962 billion, making China the top trading partner for over 120 countries. Complementing BRI, Beijing created the AIIB and NDB to reform U.S.-dominated financial governance. While these institutions challenge U.S. leadership, they largely replicate existing norms, as consensus-based structures limit the scope for new rules.

Beijing expands its influence through institutions and forums it leads, often excluding U.S. participation. In so doing, China has established regional forums across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe, and the Pacific. BRICS exemplifies this approach, with membership expanding in 2023 to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the UAE. Hosting summits at home—such as the South-South Human Rights Forum and the Central Asia-China Summit—allows Beijing to shape collective positions, emphasizing non-interference and skepticism toward Western-dominated norms.

Outlined in the Global Security Initiative Concept Paper, Beijing’s security agenda includes peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation, mediation, regional security architecture, and nontraditional security cooperation. It proposes five approaches:

Engage in UN and multilateral discussions to forge consensus.

Leverage platforms like the SCO, BRICS, and regional mechanisms for incremental cooperation.

Hold high-level GSI conferences to strengthen dialogue.

Support forums such as the Xiangshan Forum and China-Africa Peace and Security Forum to deepen exchange.

Build platforms for cooperation in counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, biosecurity, and emerging technologies, including training 5,000 professionals from developing countries over five years.

Changes in the Coming Global Order

The next decade will likely bring a more segmented and confrontational global order. While specifics cannot be forecast, general trends suggest consolidation of U.S.-China bipolarity, modest rises by India, and declining influence of other major powers.

By 2035, the United States and China will widen their lead over other states. Both already far surpass Germany, Japan, India, the UK, France, and Russia in GDP and military budgets. Digital superiority will further enhance their dominance. The absolute gap may grow, with U.S. GDP remaining over $10 trillion ahead of China’s, though China’s relative proportion may rise slightly from 66 percent to over 70 percent. Despite higher growth, Beijing faces “triple pressure”—weak demand, supply shocks, and low confidence—limiting its ability to close the gap. The United States will retain greater material resources than China to shape the order.

India may grow faster than Japan, Germany, the UK, France, and Russia, potentially becoming the world’s third-largest economy by 2027. Its demographic advantage and growth trajectory could elevate its status, though it will remain a regional rather than global power by 2035. Hosting the Global South Summit without China underscored its ambition to lead developing nations.

Germany will remain a clear leader of the EU, but will continue to lack global reach. Japan’s GDP will likely fall behind both Germany and India, with poor ties to Beijing limiting its influence. Brexit has already weakened the UK’s position in Europe, while France looks set to remain a junior partner to Germany. Collectively, these powers will have less impact on global order by 2035. For its part, Russia will remain a regional power and junior partner to China. Even if the Ukraine war ends in near future, the impact of unprecedented sanctions will hinder recovery and prevent prospects for normalization with the West. Despite its demonstrated ability to maintain a war economy relatively well, Moscow’s global influence will remain diminished compared to its pre-2022 role.

Strategic Balance in Favor of the U.S.

Although major powers’ de-risk policies are in favor of Washington, this situation is changing in 2025. In the 2010s, many states were prone to hedging their bets, seeking economic benefits from China while relying on the U.S. for security. Since Washington defined “economic security” as a national interest in 2018, however, major economies have reduced interdependence with China and strengthened cooperation with the United States. This trend, reinforced by corporate “China+1” strategies, undermines the previous balance. Trump’s policy on tariff and the Ukraine war is likely to shift the strategic balance between China and the U.S. in favor of China over the next decade.

By 2035, Washington may consolidate its advantage by expanding alliances into economic and technological domains. The U.S.-South Korea alliance was redefined in 2023 to include economic cooperation, while Vietnam elevated ties with Washington to “comprehensive strategic partnership,” and the U.S. and EU launched plans for a Europe-Middle East-India corridor to counter China’s BRI. Still, ongoing U.S. tariffs—especially on steel, aluminum, and Chinese goods—continued to complicate trade diplomacy, including these strategically important relationships, casting some doubt on Washington’s reliability as a long-term economic partner. These frictions subtly undermined the appeal of U.S.-led initiatives, prompting some allies to go back to hedging between economic blocs. Yet, despite all this, Beijing’s troubles may endure, as China adheres to non-alignment, lacks formal allies, and cannot replicate Washington’s “small yard, high fence” strategy in digital competition. However, Trump’s policy to reduce U.S. protection for allies is diminishing this trend.

The Ukraine war has further entrenched Western reliance on the U.S. and resentment toward Beijing, which has avoided criticizing Moscow. Irrespective of when the war ends, China’s close ties with Russia will continue to hinder relations with most European states, pushing them to side with Washington in global disputes.

Additionally, Beijing’s partnerships with developing countries remain uncertain. Russia may be its only substantial partner, though not an ally. Relations with Brazil hinge on Lula’s tenure, while ties with India are constrained by QUAD membership and growing rivalry. India’s economic growth and leadership in the Global South will intensify competition with China for influence among developing nations.

Continued World Peace with Historical Regression

Competition between China and the United States will intensify in the coming decade, likely generating more security conflicts. Global order depends on public goods—security and stability—which are provided by leading powers. Yet both have identified each other as their top strategic threat, reducing prospects for cooperation. Washington views Beijing as intent on reshaping the order to its advantage, while Beijing condemns the United States as the primary disruptor, citing interference in Taiwan, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and maritime disputes. As China’s officials have repeatedly noted, “the world is not peaceful.”

Despite rising tensions, outright war between the two powers remains unlikely. Beyond Taiwan, there are no disputes that could escalate into a direct military clash. Unlike Washington, Beijing shows little inclination to use military power for regime change abroad. Coexistence between the two powers is possible, sustaining relative peace for the next decade.

However, peace will coincide with regression. Globalization is giving way to counter-globalization, and governance rhetoric will lack meaningful action. Technological and economic progress will continue, but the order will become less stable and predictable. Proxy wars will persist, and AI-driven unmanned weapons may reduce military casualties while increasing civilian deaths, encouraging more attacks. Regression will manifest in heightened military conflicts, diplomatic confrontation, economic deglobalization, and technological segmentation.

Historically, global orders have lasted decades: the interwar period just over 20, while the Cold War lasted about 40 years. If this precedent holds, regression may endure at least a decade, possibly two or three. Counter-globalization, still in its early phase, is unlikely to peak until after the next decade. Those expecting it to be short-lived will likely be disappointed.

Political Uncertainty and Conflicts over Economic Security

Populism will become the most influential ideology over the next 10 years, shaping foreign policies across major powers. Currently ascendant but not yet at its peak, populism is likely to spread rapidly, validating itself through foreign policy and resisting any resurgence of liberal global order. Populist leadership prioritizes regime and economic security, increasing uncertainty, undermining liberal norms, and fueling global conflicts.

An increasing number of states will be ruled by populist leaders. In non-Western countries, many incumbents have entrenched constitutional foundations for extended tenure. In the West, populist parties—such as the Trump-led Republican Party in the U.S., Germany’s AfD, Sweden Democrats, France’s National Rally, and Italy’s Northern League—are all gaining traction or have already taken positions of power. By the late 2020s, Western parliaments or governments may be dominated by populists. Judging by its current trajectory, the United States could well shift from a democratic model to a semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian state, with populism replacing liberalism as the dominant ideology, driving foreign policy toward protectionism and anti-humanitarianism.

Populist leaders’ focus on regime security often leads to aggressive, unpredictable foreign policies aimed at bolstering domestic support. Unlike national security, which responds to external threats, regime security is conditioned by volatile domestic politics. This volatility drives erratic foreign policy choices, eroding international norms and increasing global instability. Chaos may become the defining characteristic of the coming order.

The rhetoric of “economic security” will intensify xenophobia. Populist leaders scapegoat foreign powers for domestic failures, stoking resentment at home and abroad. Social media accelerates the spread of xenophobic sentiment, while economic interests resonate emotionally with the populace. Leaders use economic security to justify de-globalization policies—delinking, de-risking, sanctions, and protectionism. The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, adopted by the Biden administration in 2022, exemplifies this shift, abandoning free-market principles in favor of industrial protection. Other major powers are following suit, adopting stricter economic-security policies. This trend will reinforce populist values and accelerate the abandonment of the liberal order during Tramp 2.0.

The historical trajectory of global order since the mid‑twentieth century demonstrates a clear evolution: ideological confrontation during the Cold War, globalization and liberal expansion in the post‑Cold War era, and the current counter‑globalization order marked by fragmentation, populism, and economic security. Each order has been defined by its own dominant values, norms, and institutional distribution of power. The Cold War was driven by ideological expansion and proxy wars; the post‑Cold War by democratization and marketization; and the present order by deglobalization, technological rivalry, and the reassertion of sovereignty.

Looking forward, the consolidation of U.S.-China bipolarity will be the central feature of the coming decade. Washington will retain greater material resources than China and a more extensive alliance system, while Beijing will continue to rely on economic globalization and non‑alignment as its strategic principles. India may rise as the third largest economy, but its role will remain regional. Europe’s major states will see declining influence, and Russia will remain constrained by sanctions and its junior position in the partnership with China. The strategic balance will tilt further toward China and the United States’s domination will decline.

This balance, however, will not produce stability. Populism is poised to become the most influential ideology across major powers, eroding liberal norms and driving unpredictable foreign policies. Economic security will replace free‑market principles as the guiding rationale of statecraft, legitimizing protectionism and intensifying xenophobia. Governance will stagnate, global institutions will weaken, and selective application of norms will deepen mistrust.

The paradox of the coming decade is that relative peace may be maintained, yet regression will define the order. Outright war between the United States and China is unlikely, but proxy conflicts, technological segmentation, and diplomatic confrontation will proliferate. Advances in AI and unmanned systems may reduce military casualties while increasing civilian deaths, further destabilizing the moral fabric of warfare.

If past experience is any guide, this reversal of globalization is likely to persist for well over a decade—potentially even extending across several decades. Rather than a fleeting disruption, it signals a sustained period of decline characterized by volatility, disunity, and the ascendancy of populist norms at the expense of liberal principles.

The current order is neither a repetition of the Cold War nor a continuation of the liberal post‑Cold War order. It is a counter-globalization order—one defined by rivalry without ideology, deglobalization without complete decoupling, and peace without progress.

Original article:  cirsd.org/horizon-article

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Max Weber was the image of a cultured intellectual of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The German sociologist was best known for his essay “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”, an explanation of why Protestant countries outperformed others in that period. When the First World War started, Weber was 50 years old. The German historian Golo Mann, the younger brother of Thomas Mann, included a revealing comment by Weber in his book The History of Germany Since 1789. It shows how easily we get drawn into wars:

At no point did Weber and many other war-cheerleading Germans of the time appear to consider the possibility that the war might not turn out the way they thought it would.

I see Europe in a similar position today. Like Weber, many intellectuals and politicians of our era are gung-ho about going to war with Russia. One of the biggest cheerleaders for Western military intervention is the historian Timothy Snyder, previously at Yale, now at the University of Toronto. He said in 2023: “The Russians have to be defeated, just like the Germans were defeated.”

I am not underplaying the security threat posed by Vladimir Putin. The intrusion of Russian fighter jets into Estonian airspace no doubt constitutes an unacceptable act of aggression. Nato has every right to shoot them down and should signal strongly that this is what will happen next time. But defending your alliance is different from fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, a country that is not part of Nato.

The Cold War was a period of relative stability not only because of balance-of-power politics, but because politicians who experienced the horrors of the Second World War wanted to secure peace. Most of that generation is no longer with us. Like Weber, today’s European elites have missed out on the opportunity to fight a glorious war. The difference is that they would prefer to let others do the fighting for them.

The likelihood of an escalation into a hot war is big enough to be taken seriously. Apart from a general war-hungry disposition, the biggest risk today is that we, like those Germans in 1914, are misjudging the enemy. Putin, too, misjudged the Western response to his invasion of Ukraine, and the resilience of the Ukrainian army. But the Western misjudgements are more persistent.

The biggest of all was that Russia’s economy was weak and would ultimately buckle under Western pressure. This misjudgement has several layers. It started off with a statistical lie — that Russia was really only a small economy. If you measure the size of the Russian economy by its annual output in US dollars, that would have indeed been the case. At the start of the war, the Russian economy was approximately the size of Spain’s if measured in US dollars. But this is not a good way to judge a country’s capacity in times of war. What matters is the spending power of their money — how many tanks their money can buy. The answer is they can buy a lot more tanks than us.

If you measure an economy on the grounds of purchasing power, a completely different picture emerges from that suggested by our complacent statistic. According to the World Bank, the world’s largest economy, by far, is China, provided the measurement is made on the basis of purchasing power parity. (Purchasing power parity accounts for goods being more affordable in some countries than in others.) Number two is the US. Then comes India, and then Russia. Germany, in sixth place, is the biggest of the European countries.

Based on this measure, the 10 countries that form part of an alliance with China and Russia, the so-called Brics, are bigger than the US, Western Europe and Japan together. We live in a truly bi-polar world. The US and China are the leaders of each side. We no longer call the shots, even if we think we do. Over time, the other side will become bigger, because they are growing faster than us.

Since the start of the war, Russia has outgrown all of the G7 economies. The British economist John Maynard Keynes would not have been surprised, because what happened was a classic Keynesian war economy effect. The UK experienced this effect during the Second World War. Putin re-organised Russia into a war economy.

I am emphasising these economic facts because this is what will inform the reality on the ground in Ukraine going forward. It is money that buys weapons. This money for Ukraine has dried up. The US has given €115bn in total bilateral aid to Ukraine so far, which dwarfs Germany’s €21.3bn and €7.56bn from France. Without the US, there is absolutely no way that the Europeans could afford to bankroll the war themselves. For that, they have to borrow money.

Or they could raid the €210bn of frozen Russian assets that sit in Europe. Previously, Germany, France, Belgium and the European Central Bank have opposed an asset raid — for different reasons. Belgium has most of the money on its soil. The money sits in the vaults of Euroclear, a large financial depository based in Brussels. France and Germany might be on the line for any compensation claims should Russia win in commercial courts. The ECB believes that an asset raid is illegal and would irrevocably damage Europe’s reputation as a financial centre. Under normal circumstances, it would be hopping mad for the EU to take such risks, but if they want to continue to support Ukraine, this is the only financial vehicle they have at their disposal. Now that the European Commission has come out with a proposal for unlocking the money, there is now a good chance that it could happen.

And then what? Leaving the complex technical and legal issues aside, the EU will run into a problem very similar to Margaret Thatcher’s caricature of socialism: eventually, they will run out of other people’s money. The misjudgement is that the €200bn will tide us over until Donald Trump leaves office, when he will be succeeded by a Democrat who will happily resume providing the lion’s share of the funding. Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, said recently that the war will end when Russia is economically exhausted. That’s the Western strategy.

But our sanctions have failed to cripple the Russian economy. Remember Einstein’s characterisation of madness as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different outcomes. The EU has so far agreed 18 packages of sanctions against Russia. A 19th is now being prepared.

But Russia has something that Ukraine has not. China is a better ally to Russia than the US is to Ukraine. The Western neocons keep on underestimating the depth of the China-Russia alliance, which is the result of inept US foreign policy over the last ten years. By placing sanctions and tariffs on both countries, the US ended up creating a strategic alliance between them. The US, meanwhile, is much more detached from Ukraine under Trump than under Biden.

The mistaken idea behind Western sanctions is that Russia and China are dependent on Western technology like semiconductor chips. Very much to the surprise of the Biden administration, China managed to build high-performance chips themselves. Last week, China turned the tables by placing a ban on the import of Nvidia chips.

The €200bn in frozen assets that we might unleash in loans to Ukraine can also easily be matched by the other side. China could give a loan to Russia, collateralised on Western assets in China, or on receipts from legal compensation that Russia may be entitled to in the future. It is an ongoing misjudgement to think that the West — the smaller part of our duopolistic world — is going to smoke out the larger one.

Misjudgement of this scale and number is what turns regional wars into world wars. Our army of tweeting, war-hungry Western intellectuals are Max Weber’s successors. They leave me in no doubt that there is substantial support for a glorious war, just as there was over 100 years ago.

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The United Kingdom appears intent on escalating tensions with Russia, positioning itself as a significant adversary. In a recent article, British analyst Oliver Evans states: “The United Kingdom is not only showing interest in deploying a limited military contingent in western Ukraine, but is also expanding its presence in the Republic of Moldova. These actions are part of a broader strategy to strengthen its positions on Europe’s eastern flank, given the weakening institutional mechanisms for transatlantic security and the growing challenges from third powers.”

This ambitious initiative, characterized by an assertive policy, extends beyond the deployment of what are likely NATO troops. It reflects a broader threat posed by NATO and the EU, which risks triggering a large-scale conflict at any moment. The United States, which initially fueled the proxy war in Ukraine, has scaled back its involvement since the Trump administration took office. This shift stems from multiple factors, including the U.S.’s near-financial collapse, which has fueled the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, alongside deep divisions and polarization within the American populace.

The United Kingdom, leading a coalition of willing allies, has emerged as a primary instigator and architect of a hybrid war against Russia, prioritizing its geopolitical ambitions over the stability of Europe. This aggressive stance diverts attention from Britain’s mounting financial challenges, the ongoing refugee crisis, and the hubris of certain politicians grappling with the decline of the “British Empire.”

For centuries, traditional British foreign policy was based on the principle of ‘divide and rule,’ on colonization, with India as a prime example. Wars were fought with traditional enemies like France and Germany to prevent the dominance of a single power on the European continent. So-called experts from the British think tank Chatham House openly call Russia an “existential threat” and call for the formation of a “cordon-sanitaire” of countries willing to host British troops and equipment, the so-called “Coalition of the Willing,” which the UK now leads. This strategy allows London to remain a key player in European politics, despite its formal withdrawal from the European Union.

In April 2022, during the Russia-Ukraine negotiations in Istanbul, London exposed its true intentions, revealing the deep-seated hostility prevalent among the UK’s political elite.

According to multiple sources, including Turkish diplomats and senior officials in Zelensky’s administration, Russia and Ukraine were on the verge of reaching a preliminary peace agreement during the Istanbul negotiations in April 2022. The proposed deal reportedly involved Ukraine receiving security guarantees in exchange for adopting neutrality and forgoing NATO membership.

At this critical juncture, however, then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson rushed to Kiev. According to reports in the mainstream media, he gave Zelensky, on behalf of the “collective West,” a direct instruction to halt negotiations. Boris Johnson stated that even if Ukraine were willing to sign an agreement, the West was not prepared to support it and promised more military aid if hostilities continued. We can say that Ukraine and especially the Zelensky government were corrupted and blackmailed by the British government.

Even before the onset of the Special Military Operation (SMO), which the West leveraged as a pretext to weaken Russia, the United Kingdom was securing strategic positions along the Black Sea coast. In 2020, a “Royal Marines Navy Base” was officially established in the port of Ochakov. Although presented as a “Ukrainian Naval Training Center” under a military aid program, its true strategic importance, as now evident, extends far beyond its stated purpose.

Ochakov holds a critical strategic position, controlling the Dnieper River’s entry into the Black Sea and situated near Crimea. By 2020, the base established there had evolved into an intelligence hub for monitoring the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s activities. Additionally, it functions as a logistics center for arms shipments and a training ground for Ukrainian sabotage units, which have demonstrated their effectiveness in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. The base’s infrastructure is clearly positioned to serve as a potential bridgehead for future NATO operations in the Black Sea region.

Following Russia’s launch of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in 2022, the United Kingdom adopted a more assertive strategy, establishing a continuous military presence from the Baltic to the Black Sea, often described as a “sanitary cordon” to counter Russia. Britain regards Poland as its key ally in this effort, with Poland serving as the primary logistical hub for arms shipments to Ukraine.

The British leadership of the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” is also considering the formation of joint British-Polish military units. Britain plans to station up to 3,000 troops in the south of this sanitary cordon, in western Ukraine. But Ukraine is not the only target of London’s “false plans.” Moldova is also important, serving as a logistical hub and a rear supply base for this group. Romania is assigned the role of operational base in this construction. Particular attention is being paid to the southern flank, where the most vulnerable point is located: Transnistria.

Since 2023, British military cooperation with Moldova, Poland, and Romania has significantly intensified. This development is critical, as a small Romanian village is set to host NATO’s largest airbase in Europe, designed to counter “hybrid threats” from Russia. Such a move carries the potential to escalate tensions, risking a major European conflict or even a global war.

The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Transnistria), an unrecognized state within Moldova established during the Soviet Union’s collapse, with a predominantly Russian-speaking population and a Russian peacekeeping presence, remains a “frozen conflict.” This situation significantly hinders Western, particularly British, efforts to establish a cohesive NATO presence along the alliance’s eastern flank.

Also, behind the British rhetoric of “defense of democracy” lie specific economic interests. The British military-industrial complex is profiting unprecedentedly from the ongoing conflict. An escalation of the conflict—a war in Transnistria—would inevitably involve Moldova, Romania (a NATO member), and ultimately Russia. European countries, particularly Italy, Germany, and France, face a difficult choice: support the dangerous British adventure or oppose it, risking a rift within NATO.

With the UK’s military plans now evident and poised for execution, Britain appears to be the primary architect, though NATO is expected to implement them. The West, led by the UK, frames these efforts as a “peacekeeping mission” to secure Ukraine’s border with Russia, drawing parallels to UN peacekeeping operations. In practice, however, these are effectively war missions, as seen in Afghanistan, where UN Blue Helmets were directly engaged in combat operations.

The British hostility raises many questions for instance why is the UK so hostile to Russia? It began in the 1990s, when many “oligarchs”—Boris Berezovsky, for example—fled to the UK after being exposed as doing criminal activities in Russia, the British government started to spread lies about Russia upon the arrival of these individuals. Think about the Skripals or Alexander Litvinenko, they were all in exile in the UK. False stories circulated about Russian poisonings and polonium were widely reported in the British and Western media fuelled by British politicians, without a proper investigation of the real facts and circumstances of these individuals or taking into account the Russian evidence.

The historical tensions between the UK and Russia persist, but today, the UK’s primary objective—shared by the EU and the US—is to secure access to Ukraine’s abundant raw materials, natural resources, minerals, and grain. Upon taking office for his second term, US President Donald Trump pledged to broker peace between Ukraine and Russia within 24 hours, a promise widely dismissed as propaganda due to its unrealistic timeline. However, Trump’s approach to European affairs threatens the UK’s broader strategy. His plan reportedly involved pressuring Ukrainian President Zelensky to recognize Crimea as Russian territory and accept the Russian control of the Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson regions, legitimized through a democratic referendum in 2022.

Europe, including the United Kingdom, faces a period of decline, with the continent grappling with significant upheaval. In the UK, citizens are taking to the streets in protest, as freedoms appear increasingly at risk. Once a symbol of stability, wealth, and royal tradition, the UK now finds itself mired in a profound crisis.

The UK’s war rhetoric surpasses even that of mainland Europe, rooted in a militarized history shared with nations like Germany. However, that era has faded; declining birth rates and the integration of diverse cultures have eroded traditional British identity. The elites, witnessing the decline of their once-vast empire, are powerless to reverse this trend. In response, they appear to be pushing for conflict—whether hybrid or conventional warfare—to reassert their influence.

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The end of the Cold War in 1989 provided a fantastic opportunity for a major reset in relations between the American people and the people of Russia, China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and other nations that U.S. officials had long designated as official enemies of the United States. For almost 45 years following the end of World War II, U.S. officials had inculcated a mindset of deep fear among the American people — fear that the Russians, Chinese, and other communist nations were coming to get us.

It was all one great big racket designed to justify the conversion of the U.S. government from our founding governmental structure of a limited-government republic to a national-security state, a type of totalitarian-like governmental structure that wields omnipotent powers, such as the power of engaging in state-sponsored assassinations.

Fear-mongering, propaganda, and indoctrination are central to a national-security state governmental structure. The national-security state must convince the citizenry that there are scary enemies coming to get them so that the citizenry will continue to support and embrace the national-security state governmental structure and the ever-increasing power and taxpayer-funded largess that is necessary to sustain it.

The racket worked almost perfectly. Americans fell for it hook, line, and sinker. “The Russians are coming!” people cried. “The Reds are everywhere!”

One big exception was when President Kennedy achieved a personal “breakthrough” after the Cuban Missile Crisis by recognizing that the Cold War and the anti-communist crusade were nothing more than one great big racket. After he vowed to bring the racket to an end in his Peace Speech at American University in June 1963, the U.S. national-security establishment dealt with him in Dallas five months later.

Thus, the Cold War racket continued all the way until 1989, when the Soviet Union suddenly and unexpectedly dismantled itself. The Berlin Wall came crashing down and West Germany and East Germany recombined into one nation. The Warsaw Pact dissolved, Russian troops withdrew to Russia, and Eastern European countries gained their independence.

There was an obvious readiness among Russian officials to do a complete reset with respect to relations with the United States. They made it clear that they desired to establish a world of peaceful and friendly relations. The same held true for China, notwithstanding the fact that it was still headed by a communist regime. The same was true for Cuba.

This was a time of great optimism and hope for the American people and the people of the communist world. Why, for a few years afterward, there were even libertarian conferences being held in both China and Russia.

But the hope and optimism did not characterize the U.S. national-security establishment — i.e., the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA. Remember: They needed big official scary enemies to justify their existence. They knew that many Americans were advocating a post-Cold War “peace dividend,” which would have entailed a severe reduction in military-intelligence spending. There was even the danger that Americans might even begin demanding the restoration of their founding governmental system of a limited-government republic.

The U.S. national-security establishment was not going to let that happen, at least not without a big fight. A deadly invasion of Iraq, followed by 11 years of brutal and deadly economic sanctions against the Iraqi people, produced the “blowback” of the 9/11 retaliatory attacks. The national-security establishment was back to the races, this time replacing communism with terrorism as the new official enemy of the American people.

At the same time, however, they never gave up hope of restoring the Cold War to America. It had proven to be too lucrative a racket to simply let it go. If they could combine their “war on communism” racket with their “war on terrorism” racket, they could virtually guarantee that the national-security state governmental structure would remain a permanent and perpetual part of the U.S. government.

That’s why they used their old Cold War dinosaur NATO to begin moving eastward toward Russia, absorbing former members of the Warsaw Pact in the process. It wasn’t exactly consistent with the peaceful and friendly world that people had in mind at the end of the Cold War.

Moreover, once the U.S. national-security state became mired in forever wars of aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. officials could see that China and Russia were prospering, especially given that they weren’t mired in such wars. They could also see that China and Russia were gaining popularity and influence around the world, while there was ever-growing animosity toward the U.S. and its forever deadly and destructive propensity toward war and aggression.

That’s when the U.S. government decided that it was time to “degrade” both China and Russia and initiate the continuation of the old Cold War racket. A vicious trade war and a brutal system of economic sanctions were launched against China, with the aim of diminishing the economic prosperity of that nation. Moreover, the old Cold War dinosaur NATO was used to provoke Russia into invading Ukraine, which provided U.S. national-security state officials with the opportunity to use Ukraine as a proxy or agent to give Russia its own “Afghanistan,” thereby “degrading” Russia through the loss of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers and ever-increasing war expenditures.

Thus, what began with lots of hope and optimism at the end of Cold War I ended up with Russia and China being restored to the top tier of America’s official enemies as part of Cold War II.

According to a recent article in Politico, however, the U.S. government is now shifting its attention to Latin America, using its decades-old, ongoing, never-ending, perpetual drug war as its excuse. That shift in official enemies is clearly reflected by the new U.S. obsessiveness with Venezuela’s socialist dictator Nicolás Maduro.

The irony is that when Cold War I ended, the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA were so panicky over having lost Russia as their official enemy, they were suggesting that they could help fight the drug war as their new mission. And so here they are — with their new official enemies — drugs and drug lords in Latin America.

Don’t think for a minute, however, that they are giving up on Russia and China as official enemies. They are just hedging their bets by adding more official enemies to keep the American people agitated and afraid. In that way, Americans will continue to look on the U.S. national-security state to keep them “safe” and “secure” from all those scary official enemies.

Original article: fff.org

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Weapons non-proliferation treaties should be renewed to prevent nuclear war!

Some observers in the lead-up to last week’s meeting between President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin in Anchorage Alaska hoped that a dialogue might be established where the broader issue of creating a new European security model that would reduce tensions and make it unlikely that a conflict like Russia-Ukraine would be repeated. Both Trump and Putin came away from the three-hour plus meeting with positive remarks though little of substance, at least in terms of what they were prepared to reveal. Trump did indicate that the idea of a ceasefire had been sidelined in favor of further discussions for a comprehensive peace plan to end the war at the next bilateral talks in Moscow, but it has been suggested by critics that he was speaking only for himself personally. If he has come around to the view that a ceasefire will not work in the current context, he is probably correct.

If there is any hope for a peace deal a sine qua non would be territorial transfers demanded by Russia on the part of Ukraine. Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly rejected any such arrangement. Predictably, Zelensky and a group of supporting “European leaders” including the Netherlands Mark Rutte, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Britain’s Keir Starmer, Germany’s Friedrich Merz and Finnish President Alexander Stubb are arriving at the White House on Monday to make their case for the continuation of the war. The European delegation is headed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who is a near perfect, even enthusiastic, spokesperson for the hawk sentiments prevailing in parts of Europe.

Trump’s actual sentiments continue to be somewhat enigmatic and, as always, poorly articulated. It is widely understood that President Donald Trump is actively seeking to obtain the Nobel Peace Prize, even going so far as to boast falsely that he has already earned it “four or five times.” He has reportedly even called the Norwegian Finance Minister Jens Stoltenberg to ask how the polling regarding his candidacy is going, a grotesque faux pas but characteristic of what comes out of Trump’s head. Trump clearly fails to understand that seeking a peace prize while the United States is simultaneously actively supporting two major avoidable armed conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine while also removing existing restraints on development and deployment of certain weapons that are designed for nuclear war might be viewed by some as contradictory.

Those who are inclined to look to make excuses for Trump’s behavior while in the US presidency might be compelled to argue that Donald Trump doesn’t know any better and is therefore always inclined to act both impulsively and aggressively when in doubt, but the systematic withdrawal from Cold War agreements designed to make nuclear war avoidable during Trump 1 rather suggests that it is now policy de facto to make a catastrophic war easier to engage in to establish and maintain American global military dominance over adversaries like China and Russia. Total US military supremacy maintained by 850 overseas military bases to assert the national will globally is an aspect of the so-called “Wolfowitz Doctrine,” the unofficial name given to the initial version of the Defense Planning Guidance drafted in 1992 under President Bill Clinton for the 1994–1999 fiscal years published by neocons US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and his deputy Scooter Libby. The doctrine still dominates White House strategic thinking, particularly as Trump has surrounded himself with neocons and is taking direction from the Israel Lobby both regarding the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Based on the document, US defense strategy aimed to prevent the emergence of a global rival and asserted US primacy and unilateralism. One of it primary instruments to dominate in Europe was the expansion of NATO into the former Eastern European states that made up the Soviet Union, something that US negotiators had promised not to do during negotiations with Moscow during the Soviet collapse in 1991-2. This expansion has been the principal cause behind the current war between Russia and Ukraine as Moscow views Ukraine under NATO as a grave national security threat.

The corresponding dismantling of post-World War 2 agreements that sought to control limits on nuclear developments as well as the nature and distribution of new weapons and potential unmanned delivery systems have unfortunately dramatically increased the possibility of a devastating nuclear war taking place. The number of nuclear armed countries has grown in spite of Nuclear Non-Proliferation policies, with North Korea, China, Pakistan, India and Israel all now having nuclear arsenals. Israel even has a plan to use the nukes if it is seriously threatened called the “Samson Option.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, located at the Keller Centre of the University of Chicago, monitors the movement of the minute and second hands on the so-called Doomsday Clock. It is now reporting that the second hand is closer to midnight than it has ever been, 89 seconds away, and moving in the “wrong” direction, towards inevitable armed conflict or even natural catastrophe. Reaching Midnight in this context could mean nuclear war, which could plausibly extinguish life on earth.

The United States is the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons against an enemy, which took place against Japan in early August 1945, destroying the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and killing at least 170,000 mostly civilians. My father was at that time an infantry sergeant on a troop ship located offshore of the Japanese mainland, part of a new Army corps, the Eighth Army, which was about to undertake an invasion of Japan’s main island. It promised to be bloody and the word among the troops was that Japan would put up a fierce last stand resistance. The American soldiers were consequently happy to hear that the bombs were used and the war had ended with an immediate Japanese surrender. More recently, however, historians have come around to the view that Japan was about to surrender anyway, which it did six days after the bombings, and it was a bad decision by President Harry Truman to authorize the use of the new and devastating weapon.

After World War 2, the Soviet Union, benefitting from the secrets stolen by the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg spies in the United States, also acquired nuclear secrets and used them to become a nuclear armed military power, joining the US and Britain. The deployment of nukes subsequently became part of the tit-for-tat maneuvering that characterized the Cold War. The crisis came when Russia declared its intention to base nuclear capable missiles in Cuba, 90 miles from the US and therefore capable of hitting targets anywhere in the US, as a deterrent of any possible moves by Washington to again invade Cuba. The move was also in response to US basing of nuclear missiles in NATO countries Italy and Turkey. It seemed that some kind of nuclear exchange was imminent when the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union came to their senses. In 1962 President John F Kennedy and Chairman Nikita Khruschev agreed that playing nuclear risk was just not worth it and the Russians declared that their missiles would not be going to Havana and the US agreed that its Jupiter missiles would also be withdrawn from Turkey.

This led to other agreements to limit the likelihood that nuclear weapons might actually be used in a war. The most important agreement was the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which was signed by President Ronald Reagan and Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 but which the US withdrew from in October 2018 during the first Trump Administration. The INF banned both nuclear and conventional land-based missile systems and missile launchers with ranges of 620–3,420 miles (“intermediate-range”) and 310–620 miles (“shorter-range”), meaning that the mobile missile systems could not be developed for deployment and possible use close to a country’s border where they might be capable of a devastating surprise first strike against the “enemy.”

Prior to the US withdrawal, there were claims from both sides that there had been violations by the other side in terms of what the treaty allowed. When Trump ordered the government to withdraw from the INF treaty, it claimed Russia was in violation through its development of a new highly sophisticated ground-launched cruise missile. Russian officials responded that the missile had a maximum range of only 298 miles, making it legal. Russia replied that there was a possible US violation of the INF treaty through its establishing its own Aegis Ashore missile defense systems that were based in NATO members Romania and Poland, close to the Russian border. The US systems use highly mobile Mk-41 vertical launchers, which can accommodate Tomahawk missiles. The US under Trump would not negotiate with Russia and there was some speculation that the reason Washington had withdrawn from the INF treaty was so it would have a free hand to deploy its intermediate-range missiles near China. Russia responded by proposing that the over the limits INF missiles be banned in Europe only, but Washington never discussed and never accepted the compromise offer.

Russia has responded to what it sees as the continuing US provocations, like the development of the new highly mobile missile launcher named the “Typhon.” The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on August 4^th which declared that: “With our repeated warnings on that matter having gone ignored and the situation developing towards the de facto deployment of US-made intermediate-and shorter-range ground-based missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, the Russian Foreign Ministry has to declare that any conditions for the preservation of a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of similar arms no longer exist, and it is further authorized to state that the Russian Federation does not consider itself bound by relevant self-restrictions approved earlier.” The Ministry decried how the “formation and buildup of destabilizing missile potentials in regions adjacent to Russia, [is] creating a direct, strategic threat to the security of our country… Russia’s leadership [will respond] based on an interdepartmental analysis of the scale of deployment of US and other Western ground-based INF missiles.”

To avoid a war that might become nuclear with devastating consequences should rightly be a major issue up for discussion at the next bilateral meeting in Moscow and whatever develops thereafter. The Trump Administration’s inept moves in the past to increasing US national security by discarding agreements intended to remove or at least mitigate the threat of large scale or even nuclear war should be considered in its broader context beyond Ukraine and Russia to include the Middle East where Israel is “secretly” nuclear armed. The INF Treaty could be viewed in the same fashion as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement to monitor Iran’s nuclear enrichment program to keep it from becoming a path to the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Developments since Trump withdrew from the program in 2019 in his first term in office suggest strongly that the subsequent attacks on Iran by both Israel and the US have if anything increased the likelihood that the next Iranian government will seek to weaponize nuclear capabilities through a hidden program, only this time they will not do so while under IAEA inspection status, they will do it in secret. Hardly a good outcome, but when one is considering developments with both Russia and Iran, it is unfortunately true that what has been broken without regard for the consequences can no longer be easily mended. It would nevertheless be a gift to the human race to attempt to do so and if Donald Trump truly wants his Nobel Peace Prize a good place to start would be by ignoring the Europeans and Zelensky in the lead up to the next bilateral meeting in Moscow. Peace in Eastern Europe to include limits of weapons, possibly to establish a model that could be copied in the Middle East, would be the best “deal” that America’s president could ever make.

Original article:  www.unz.com

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Last week the nuclear rhetoric between the US and Russia made some of us feel like we were transported back to 1962.

Back then, Soviet moves to place nuclear-capable missiles 90 miles off our coast in Cuba led to the greatest crisis of the Cold War. The United States and its president, John F. Kennedy, could not tolerate such weapons placed by a hostile power on its doorstep and the world only knew years later how close we were to nuclear war.

Thankfully both Khrushchev and Kennedy backed down – with the Soviet leader removing the missiles from Cuba and the US president agreeing to remove some missiles from Turkey. Both men realized the folly of playing with “mutually assured destruction,” and this compromise likely paved the way to further US/Soviet dialogue from Nixon to President Reagan and finally to the end of the Cold War.

Fast forward more than 60 years later and we have a US president, Donald Trump, who last week stated that he had “ordered two Nuclear Submarines to be positioned in the appropriate regions,” meaning nearer to Russia.

Had Russia attacked the US or an ally? Threatened to do so? No. The supposed re-positioning of US strategic military assets was in response to a sharp series of posts made by former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev on social media that irritated President Trump.

The war of words started earlier, when neocon US Senator Lindsey Graham’s endless threats against Russia received a response – and a warning – from Medvedev. Graham, who seems to love war more than anything else, posted “To those in Russia who believe that President Trump is not serious about ending the bloodbath between Russia and Ukraine… You will also soon see that Joe Biden is no longer president. Get to the peace table.”

Medvedev responded, “It’s not for you or Trump to dictate when to ‘get at the peace table’. Negotiations will end when all the objectives of our military operation have been achieved. Work on America first, gramps!”

That was enough for Trump to join in to defend his ill-chosen ally Graham and ended with Medvedev alluding to Soviet nuclear doctrine which provided for an automatic nuclear response to any first strike on the USSR by US or NATO weapons.

The message from the Russian politician was clear: back off. It was hardly Khruschev banging his shoe at the UN screaming “we will bury you,” but it was enough for Trump to make a rare public pronouncement about the movement of US nuclear submarines.

Trump is understandably frustrated that his promise to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours has not been fulfilled after six months in office. President Trump doesn’t seem to understand that you cannot arm one side in a war and then demand that the other side – the side that’s winning – stop fighting. That has never happened in history.

What is most tragic is that the war in Ukraine could have likely been ended if not in 24 hours, then surely in six months if Trump simply ended Joe Biden’s policy on Ukraine. It is continued US support for the war that keeps the war going. Even the US mainstream media admits that Ukraine will lose. But Trump seems under the spell of the neocons who can never reverse a failed policy.

Hopefully the return of nuclear rhetoric will awaken some in DC to the danger that the neocons pose to our country. We are no longer in 1962.

Original article:  ronpaulinstitute.org

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All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. ~ Anna Karenina

Yes, Russia may be winning in Ukraine and Iran may have recently given Israel a bloody nose, but Israel not only has Hezbollah surrounded but is now also at the border of Iran, and Russia faces an array of NATO proxy forces along its entire Western and Southern fronts, as well as God knows how many deranged Pussy Riot type traitors within. Even if the Zelensky dictatorship is overthrown, Russia’s armed forces and internal security services will remain bogged down not only in their western and southern oblasts but also in central Asia, if NATO becomes more firmly entrenched in Azerbaijan which is the perfect bridgehead to further attack both Russia and Iran. Long story short, if NATO consolidates and expands its Azeri base, Russia and Iran will both find themselves facing multi-pronged attacks that could undo the two of them.

NATO has advanced from West Germany to the Russian border and, should she manage to cross the moat of the Caspian Sea from Azerbaijan into central Asia, Israel will have the flanks and the shanks of Iran of Russia thoroughly exposed as well.

Although Russia, Armenia and Iran can all plead their cases on the international stage, that is wasted energy. Their NATO enemies still decree that Russia’s crimes, if such they are, are infinitely worse than those of Israel, whose unspeakable barbarities serve NATO’s bigger purpose of global conquest and so are inconsequential to the bigger game. And, as for the Armenians, sure hasn’t NATO member Turkey been slaughtering them for well over a century, and all without blowback?

Although the Bonnie and Clyde marriage of NATO and Israel was enshrined by God in some Bronze age book or other, NATO’s Israeli bridgehead, first posited by Irish mercenary revolutionaries to Napoleon, is a NATO dagger searing through the Arab world. Egypt and Jordan have long ago been brought to heel, Cyprus is being colonised, Hezbollah has to watch its northern back, Syria is now ruled by NATO endorsed cut throats, Iraq is a patch quilt and NATO’s cash and oil rich Gulf dictatorships know the fate that awaits them if democracy ever takes root anywhere within that general region. As regards the double headed snake of NATO member Turkey and Erdogan’s dream of restoring the Ottoman Caliphate from the Balkans all the way to central China, Israel, Turkey and their Azeri buddies need to first topple Tehran to move that project up a notch.

Not only do countries like Syria and Libya prove that NATO will gladly deliver any and all Amaleks into the abattoir but the ass wipe of Rwanda, which is currently devouring the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a country over 100 times its size, is a real time. example of NATO’s voracious piranhas gobbling up countries far bigger than themselves. Anybody who believes that NATO and Israel cannot dismember and slice and dice both Iran and Russia has never read a history book, no doubt partly because they have their sycophantic heads too far up the backsides of whoever is paying them to be deaf, dumb, blind and incorrigibly stupid.

This is not to say that NATO will slice and dice either Iran or Russia but that the possibility, however remote it might now seem to be, is there. And the military, cultural and diplomatic hot shots of both Iran and Russia are duty bound to make the appropriate contingencies to make the probability of their respective countries being turned over all but impossible.

Let’s hopscotch over Iran, to Afghanistan and then to New York where the Quisling governments of Germany, Ireland and Sweden recently presented a 67-point document to the UN General Assembly condemning the Afghan government’s treatment of women which, to be fair, seems to be quite appalling but which must be seen in the context of NATO’s recently suspended extermination campaign there, after which the British and Americans suddenly became interested in women’s rights in Afghanistan and, for good measure, in Iran and Sapphic China as well.

The Afghan front, like those of Iran and China, as well as the Pussy Riot and Femen slappers of Ukraine and Russia, indicates that NATO only champions such causes when they further its cause and not only do the current Syrian pogroms and NATO arming and diplomatically supporting the Khmer Rouge to fight the Vietnamese Army validate that contention but so do other battlefields as diverse as Ukraine, Libya and central America.

Did I forget to mention the Palestinians? Never mind, as they do not matter and anyone, such as Blighty’s Palestine Action thinking of speaking up for them, can expect up to 15 years in prison. Sally Hayden, who came to Syria with me to undermine secular Syria, is currently writing sob sob stories about the Palestinians of the West Bank. Bully for that hypocrite and her paper’s pompous readers but nothing will come of any of that or the Irish Times would not publish her gruel. Sure, the usual Zionists will play ping pong in the paper’s letters page and maybe Sally will get another meaningless award for her sham bravery. But the killing will go on, and the Israelis will continue to rob the land and even the rain water from the locals and nothing of any effect will be done to redress Zionism’s onward march.

The Irish Times and similar NATO outlets will cry crocodile tears for the Palestinians and the lesbians and Uyghur head choppers of China, but then balance that out by showing how the CIA run the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, how Hamas, and not the proven rapists of the IDF, are serial rapists (thanks BBC, jolly good show) and what an utter bastard Putin, the world’s most evil man, is. I mention Putin as I was told all about him by some Irish octogenarians way back in 2013, which left me scratching my head wondering why he was on all their radars for being the current re-incarnation of the club footed anti-Christ. The answer to that can be found in all the NATO radio and afternoon TV shows that chirrup away on such topics and which convince those who must be convinced that Putin is bad, that war criminals like Blair, Bush, Obama, Biden, Trump and Starmer are living angels, whose lives are devoted to making the world a better place, especially for them and their Ukrainian rent boys and that Jeffrey Epstein, Mossad’s own equivalent of a saint, never had any client list of VIPs who systematically gang raped toddlers.

If you are wondering how all of this directly pertains to Iran and Russia, consider the proposed Zangezur corridor which, as this checkerboard map suggests, will hasten the transformation of Armenia into a NATO vassal state and bequeath NATO a further launching pad to undermine both Iran and Russia not only from Armenia but via the Caspian Sea, from Central Asia as well. No doubt, all the new head chopping units Turkey is currently recruiting in Syria will get gainful employment there in this great plan to decouple and dismember both Iran and Russia and have all of us fully complicit in these conquests.

The good news is that the Vatican and other players are convening powwows about all this both in the Vatican itself and in Tokyo but the bad news is all of that is hot air of no practical consequence, as Azerbaijan is trying to rival Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia by being the world’s most Russophobic country and Turkey is there to nudge it along.

Double faced Turkey is where Voltaire’s Candide ends, with some old geezer sitting Buddha-like under a cherry blossom tree famously telling the book’s characters to forget the wider world’s valley of tears and to instead concentrate on cultivating their own gardens. But that is precisely what the Armenians of Kessab and of Nagorno-Karabakh did before the Turks slaughtered them. And it is what the Christians of Taybeh on the Palestinian West Bank were doing until Netanyahu’s storm troopers recently attacked them. And it is what young Iranian poet Pamia Abbasi was doing until the Israelis incinerated her, just like they have incinerated countless other poets, gardeners, hip hop dancers and sundry whatnots over the last many years. And, as regards the ongoing slaughter of the Druze of southern Syria, it is the same story, albeit with a further Machiavellian Zionist twist to it.

This panoramic article began with a quote from Tolstoy and a title that is an amalgamation of two of Tolstoy’s shorter works. Tolstoy, who has much to teach the civilised world, considered God sees the truth, but waits, alongside The Prisoner of the Caucasus, its companion novella, his finest works and the Tehrani reading club I proposed could do worse than put them, and the tales of Dostoyevsky, Hugo and even Steinbeck’s East of Eden, which cover broadly similar terrain, on their reading lists. And, though Anna Karenina, with its famous, familial principle, should also be on the curriculum, so too should more practical subjects, which can allow its Russian, Armenian and Iranian members to turn back NATO’s crimson tide which, since the end of the Cold War, has inched inexorably ever closer to them and theirs.

The Iranians and the Russians must, like America’s Lakota Indians before Wounded Knee, make a choice. They can do their own equivalent of the Ghost Dance, stick their heads in their books, in the sand or even up their own arses as they swallow the lies forever oozing from NATO’s Ambassadors, or they can sharpen their spears, unsheath their tomahawks and resolve to do some serious scalping. Decision time is at hand and the time for Hamlet’s endless prevarications and philosophical musings has passed.

Though Tolstoy, along with Dostoyevsky, was arguably the greatest novelist ever, Tolstoy considered himself not a novelist but a philosopher, the Socrates of his age, if you will. And, though Tolstoy, like Socrates before him, might have been a great fellow to have a yarn about nothing with, both men saw action, Socrates in the Second Peloponnesian War, and Tolstoy, whose father had seen action in 1812, fought in the Caucasus (the inspiration for his Hadji Murat novella) and in Crimea, where he distinguished himself during the 1854/5 siege of Sevastopol, where Russia and the Greek Volunteer Legion squared up to the usual NATO suspects.

Those usual suspects have not gone away and nor have they reformed themselves or fundamentally changed their plans of conquest. Because they will not stop by their own accord or by appealing to their non-existent better senses, the works of Tolstoy, Hugo, Voltaire and Abbasi can linger a while longer on the book shelves and the idle chitter chatter of Socrates and his sort can be consigned to the coffee shops, student dorms and other backwaters having no immediate military significance to Iran and Russia, whose militaries best immediately don their thinking caps to avert the calamity NATO is hell bent on visiting not only upon them but on the hard pressed lesbians of Armenia, Afghanistan and China as well.

Segue nostro Telegram. 

La storia della Svizzera affonda nel Medioevo e in quel tempo turbolento in cui uscendo dal feudalesimo le realtà comunali in tutto il continente hanno posto in crisi la dimensione universalistica del Sacro Romano Impero.

È alla fine del ‘300 che Lucerna, Berna e Zurigo segnano la loro distanza dagli Asburgo e affermano il primato di un’indipendenza che non può storicamente essere messa in discussione, il 9 luglio 1386 a Sempach Leopoldo III d’Austria riunisce la più agguerrita cavalleria tedesca, tuttavia viene annientato dalla fanteria  elvetica, perendo lui stesso nella battaglia. Nel 1393 proprio a Sempach otto Cantoni: Uri, Svitto, Untervaldo, Zurigo, Lucerna, Zugo, Glarona e Berna firmano una Convenzione che dà sostanzialmente vita alla Confederazione Elvetica, ben più concretamente della firma del Patto Federale tra Uri, Svitto e Untervaldo del 1° agosto 1291, data poi assurta a festa nazionale. In merito a questi fatti il grande storico Marc Bloch ricorda come proprio agli albori del XV secolo l’alleanza tra i Cantoni diventi vincolante, scrivendo appunto che dalla ghianda, le diverse leghe eterogenee, sia nata la quercia: la Confederazione Elvetica. Sarà proprio il Quattrocento a vedere l’affermazione delle milizie cantonali non solo a difesa di un esteso territorio che abbraccia le valli e soprattutto le montagne tra il lago di Ginevra e quello di Costanza, ma diventando anche un valido sostegno delle monarchie a loro prossime geograficamente, l’asburgica e la francese, disponendo di una fanteria di oltre ottomila soldati reclutati con la chiamata alle armi di una milizia organizzata, capace di impadronirsi agli albori del ‘500 di quella porzione del Ducato di Milano che oggi corrisponde alla Svizzera Italiana. L’avvento del protestantesimo rischia di compromettere la già difficile convivenza plurilinguistica e di approfondire il solco tra città e campagne, ma proprio la fine della stagione più vivace del mercenariato contribuisce a trovare una composizione tra i differenti cantoni. Sarà la pace di Vestfalia nel 1648 a sancire l’esistenza giuridica della Confederazione e la sua neutralità rispetto ai conflitti europei, innescando la ragionevole convinzione che la neutralità e la pace avrebbero garantito la prosperità. È ancora Vestfalia a inaugurare la stagione dei “buoni uffici”, ovvero di un ruolo di intermediazione diplomatica che, proprio in ragione della sua neutralità, la Svizzera inizia ad assolvere nei confronti del resto del continente. L’arrivo degli ugonotti francesi contribuirà allo sviluppo dei settori bancario, tessile con centomila tessitrici addette alla lavorazione del cotone, edile con maestranze tanto rinomate da seguire architetti famosi, da Trezzini in Russia a Borromini a Roma, a quello celebre dell’orologeria. La Repubblica Elvetica imposta dai francesi nel 1798 e gestita da Napoleone contribuisce alla modernizzazione giuridico – amministrativa, oltre a decretare come lingue nazionali anche il francese e l’italiano, il Congresso di Vienna delimita i confini svizzeri in quelli attuali, sancendone “la neutralità perpetua”, il XIX secolo porta la Costituzione, la cittadinanza elvetica nazionale e non più cantonale, la sindacalizzazione dei lavoratori, la ferrovia e l’energia idroelettrica, tutte innovazioni che contribuiscono ad accrescere la ricchezza, massimamente dei centri urbani, meno delle zone rurali e contadine, la neutralità acquista un rinnovato slancio con la fondazione della Croce Rossa con sede internazionale a Ginevra. Il primo conflitto mondiale rafforza l’idea di una Svizzera mediatrice e neutrale, tanto che la nascente Società delle Nazioni avrà sede a Ginevra, ma soprattutto rafforza il franco svizzero al punto da farne una delle monete di riferimento del mercato mondiale, con un afflusso di capitali verso le banche svizzere che in qualche modo determinerà il destino rossocrociato per tutto il XX secolo. La Seconda Guerra Mondiale al contrario della precedente vede una smaccata prossimità al campo nazifascista, sostanziato da un rilevante rifornimento bellico e logistico a entrambe le nazioni dell’Asse, l’isolamento successivo al 1945, durato fino al deflagrare alla fine di quel decennio della Guerra Fredda, sarà dettato proprio dalla totale diffidenza di Washington per quello che è stato un alleato indiretto dei nazifascisti, ugualmente la volontà di impedire alla Svizzera, al pari di Germania, Italia e Giappone l’ingresso alle Nazioni Unite ne è una diretta conseguenza. Quando agli albori degli anni ‘50 gli Stati Uniti sarebbero ben lieti di accogliere la Svizzera sempre più ferocemente anticomunista al Palazzo di Vetro, saranno i politici elvetici a rifiutare di aderirvi, rimandando il tutto al 2002, ovvero un anno dopo l’ingresso della Repubblica Popolare di Cina nell’Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio, in un tempo in cui il mondo avrà preso a correre in tutt’altre direzioni.

La storia della Svizzera è dunque più complessa di quanto Orson Welles abbia sagacemente quanto impropriamente riassunto nella celebre pellicola “Il terzo uomo”, ovvero un paese tranquillo, buono solo a realizzare orologi a cucù. Terra di mercenari contesi, di una imprevedibilmente riuscita convivenza tra comunità linguistiche e religiose differenti, nella seconda metà del Novecento abile nazione neutrale, certamente a pieno titolo incorporata dentro l’Occidente, ma sufficientemente duttile da interloquire anche con il campo socialista sovietico e la stessa Cina Popolare, che la Svizzera per prima riconosce in Europa, aprendone a Berna nel 1950 la sola ambasciata in quel tempo di tutto il continente, con il divertente pellegrinaggio alla metà degli anni ‘60 dei giovani maoisti europei verso la capitale rossocrociata con l’intento di ricevere pacchi di Libretti Rossi da diffondere fuori e dentro le fabbriche e le università ai loro coetanei arrabbiati e desiderosi di cambiamenti sociali e politici.

Una nazione – la Svizzera – capace durante la Guerra Fredda di costruire una neutralità credibile e riconosciuta, diventando luogo preferenziale per le trattative diplomatiche e di pace di ogni contesa e di ogni conflitto che a vario titolo abbia incendiato il precario equilibrio di quell’epoca, dall’Indocina fino ai primi colloqui tra statunitensi  e sovietici alla metà degli anni ‘80.

Oggi invece la diplomazia internazionale per provare a risolvere i conflitti, dal Medioriente all’Ucraina, preferisce Ankara, Riyad, finanche Roma, come per l’incontro tra Stati Uniti e Iran mediato dagli omaniti a metà aprile 2025, piuttosto che Ginevra o un’altra città elvetica. Il ministro degli Esteri della Repubblica Federativa Russa Sergej Lavrov ha dichiarato con molte ragioni qualche tempo addietro di non ritenere la Confederazione Elvetica uno stato neutrale. È infatti avvenuto che politici mediocri e succubi delle imposizioni di Washington e di Bruxelles abbiano oggi indirizzato la politica svizzera, tanto economica, quanto militare, così come quella culturale, in un quadro di totale subalternità alla NATO e all’Unione Europea. Un disastro in cui hanno concorso gli schieramenti di tutte le parti, certo con qualche resistenza a destra e piuttosto una totale acquiescenza e sudditanza a sinistra, con la sola meritoria eccezione del Partito Comunista guidato da Massimiliano Ay, capace di promuovere un fronte per la neutralità e la pace, di ribadire la necessità di una neutralità integrale, visto che oggi acquistare aerei e altra strumentazione militare dagli Stati Uniti vuol dire mettere in mano al Pentagono il controllo da remoto degli stessi, non si tratta infatti di semplice ferraglia. Massimiliano Ay, tra i promotori dell’Associazione “No UE, No NATO”, ritiene che in un’epoca di passaggio dall’unipolarismo atlantico al multipolarismo promosso da cinesi e russi sia del tutto demenziale vincolare la Svizzera alla porzione declinante di questo scontro, reputando piuttosto necessario per la Svizzera rilanciare la propria neutralità e la conseguente disponibilità al dialogo e al commercio con tutti i contendenti, senza aderire a inopinate e controproducenti sanzioni, come quelle contro la Russia, che in ultima analisi danneggiano solo chi le ha promosse e le promuove.

Tuttavia il sottile e neppure troppo sotterraneo lavoro di subordinazione della Svizzera a Bruxelles e alla NATO è perseguito con battagliera determinazione anche da operazioni all’apparenza semplicemente culturali, ma nella sostanza nefastamente politiche, come le tesi sostenute nel libro di Maurizio Binaghi: “La Svizzera è un paese neutrale (e felice)”. L’autore con uno stile sardonico e canzonatorio ripercorre la storia rossocrociata mettendo in atto un malevolo tentativo per ridicolizzare la neutralità, riducendola a un fenomeno senescente e incartapecorito, una sclerosi da vecchi bacucchi conservatori, a suo dire anche un po’ analfabeti di come vada il mondo. È invece vero tutto il contrario, i fatti storici del tempo passato confermano che la neutralità con i suoi nobili trascorsi sia la migliore garanzia per il futuro della Confederazione Elvetica, perché garantisce autonomia, indipendenza e sovranità. Binaghi invece ritiene non valga la pena rivendicarla, essendo piuttosto l’Unione Europea l’orizzonte umano, culturale, politico, economico a cui aspirare, anche a volte ridicolizzando la storia elvetica e le sue scelte, quasi che la neutralità avesse in sé qualcosa di trogloditicamente rozzo e ancestralmente superato. La falsificazione è massima quando l’euro – atlantismo viene spacciato come la sola forma di cooperazione internazionale, mentre la neutralità corrisponderebbe a una postura isolazionista, quando è vero tutto il contrario, vi è cooperazione se si è neutrali rispetto ai blocchi internazionali, mentre vi è totale isolazionismo se ci si aggrappa a una delle parti in conflitto. Spiace perché essendo stato pubblicato da uno dei più rilevanti editori italiani, sarà questo uno dei pochi libri che gli abitanti della penisola leggeranno sul tema, indotti a farsi, pur seguendo la meritevole ricostruzione della storia della Svizzera dal medioevo ai nostri giorni, un’idea di sostanziale inutilità della neutralità per gli svizzeri, quando al contrario proprio le nazioni europee dovrebbero in questo tempo di transizione ambire a un’indipendenza e a una sovranità che non sia minata dalla ancillarità – parole di Mario Draghi – dell’Unione Europea alla NATO. Un sincero progressista rossocrociato può avere una sola aspirazione: emancipare la Svizzera da qualsiasi sottomissione e subalternità alla NATO e all’Unione Europea. Patriottismo, sovranità, internazionalismo non sono contrapposti, ma concorrono a formare un’identità che si difende solo con la neutralità, libera dai vincoli militari ed economici con un declinante Occidente, aperti al dialogo con il multipolarismo di matrice sino – russa, per altro già abbracciato da un numero crescente di nazioni di tutti i continenti. In definitiva la lettura del libro conferma l’esatto contrario di quanto espresso nel titolo: la Svizzera deve restare un paese neutrale per essere felice, o almeno per provare, come dovrebbero fare pure tutti gli altri stati e popoli europei, a garantirsi un domani capace di futuro, aperto a un benessere che, se non scontato, possa almeno apparire possibile.

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Em vez de apelarem ao bom senso e à contenção, elites há que estão sequiosas por envolver os seus povos na guerra, fazendo vista grossa das consequências irreversíveis que uma aventura dessas terá para a Europa e para a humanidade.

Muito se tem falado do declínio da Europa. A possibilidade de se criar um clima de paz no Velho Continente, que evite acontecimentos dilacerantes como aqueles que o atingiram no século XX, parece estar seriamente comprometida. Para isso, muito tem contribuído a mediocridade das lideranças europeias. Dada a dimensão do tema, limitar-nos-emos a assinalar apenas alguns dos casos mais marcantes.

As guerras intraeuropeias do século XX contribuíram decisivamente para a redução da sua importância geoestratégica. Como resultado da II Guerra Mundial, as potências europeias ficaram, pela primeira vez na história, subordinadas a uma potência não europeia e foram amputadas dos seus impérios coloniais, apesar da resistência de algumas delas aos processos de descolonização. A Europa foi sempre a grande perdedora das guerras ocorridas no seu espaço geográfico, mas nada aprendeu.

O fim da Guerra Fria não só permitiu a afirmação dos EUA como a grande potência global, como proporcionou à Europa, entretanto libertada das grilhetas da Guerra Fria, uma oportunidade histórica única de afirmação internacional, não aproveitada. Houve forças que procuraram seguir esse caminho de libertação, mas não conseguiram prevalecer relativamente aos que defendiam um papel de subordinação estratégica aos EUA.

O soft power norte-americano foi, e continua a ser, um instrumento poderoso e eficaz de socialização das elites políticas europeias, fazendo com que subordinem os interesses nacionais e coletivos da Europa aos dos EUA. Não teve grande futuro político quem, na década de noventa, colocava a autonomia europeia à frente do designado elo transatlântico. As iniciativas, para levar por diante a ambição de tornar a Europa num polo de decisão estratégica, foram devidamente sabotadas por Washington e pelos seus servidores internos colocados em centros de decisão, sobre os quais Washington manteve sempre um droit de regard.

Temos presente, por exemplo, as tentativas de levantar uma Política Externa e de Segurança Comum (PESC) e de se avançar com a construção de uma Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PCSD), cuja evolução foi minada pelos britânicos, ao serviço de interesses não europeus. Não será, pois, de estranhar a oposição do presidente Barack Obama ao BREXIT.

A concretização desse projeto de domínio global tornou-se na política oficial dos EUA. Os geoestrategistas norte-americanos deram contributos decisivos para a sua articulação, sugerindo caminhos às lideranças instaladas nos centros de poder em Washington. As ideias de nação indispensável e do excecionalismo americano, proferidas vezes sem conta pela então secretária de Estado Madeleine Albright, faziam parte da concretização desse projeto.

A doutrina Wolfowitz (1992), concebida para consolidar o estatuto de superpotência dos EUA, tinha como primeiro objetivo impedir o ressurgimento de um novo rival, quer no território da antiga União Soviética, quer noutro local, nomeadamente na Europa. Nada melhor, para fazer isso acontecer, do que “seduzir” as elites europeias. O pensamento que subjaz a esse projeto foi posteriormente consolidado por vários think-tanks e académicos, entre outros por Zbigniew Brzezinski no seu “The Grand Chessboard” (1997).

O plano era e continua a ser o mesmo. O alargamento da NATO é um capítulo desse processo, neste caso orientado contra a Rússia. A inclusão da Geórgia e da Ucrânia na Aliança seria a cereja no topo do bolo. Antevendo a reação de Moscovo e a instabilidade que daí adviria, a França e a Alemanha opuseram-se. Na Cimeira da NATO, em Bucareste (2008), o plano enfrentou alguns obstáculos. Para indicar que não permitiria a colocação de bases militares na sua fronteira, em 2008, a Rússia envolveu-se numa guerra na Geórgia. Mesmo assim, o recado não foi entendido.

Entretanto, os EUA instalaram sistemas de defesa antimíssil na Polónia e na Roménia, no âmbito da Abordagem Europeia Adaptativa por Fases (EPAA), da NATO, para fazer face a potenciais ameaças de mísseis balísticos provenientes… do Irão. Estes destacamentos foram acordados no âmbito do plano de Defesa da NATO contra Mísseis Balísticos (BMD), de 2010, na sequência da revisão dos planos do escudo antimíssil da era Bush pela Administração Obama, em 2009. Na prática, isto significa colocar misseis sensivelmente a 5/7 minutos de Moscovo e de S. Petersburgo, sugerindo de modo desengonçado e pouco convincente de que era para fazer face à ameaça iraniana.

Com base nas premissas enunciadas, não será difícil compreender o que aconteceu na Ucrânia nos últimos 20 anos, nomeadamente o golpe de estado que derrubou um governo democraticamente eleito, como parte do necessário confronto para derrotar e esgotar Moscovo. Por isso, há que prolongar a guerra, até que a Europa esteja em condições de combater a Rússia, não importando o que isso possa custar ao povo ucraniano.

Terá sido este o raciocínio que levou o Diretor do Instituto de Economia e Estratégia Militar Mundial, na Escola Superior de Economia, Dmitri Trenin, a escrever no Kommersant que a guerra na Ucrânia é uma “guerra por procuração do Ocidente contra a Rússia. E este confronto, em si mesmo, faz parte de uma guerra mundial em curso, na qual o Ocidente está a lutar para manter a sua hegemonia mundial. Esta será uma guerra longa e os Estados Unidos, com ou sem Trump, continuarão a ser o nosso [da Rússia] adversário. Para nós, o que está em jogo nesta luta não é o estatuto da Ucrânia, mas a existência da Rússia.”

Se os dirigentes europeus tivessem percebido nestes termos a natureza da presente guerra na Ucrânia, ou seja, na perspetiva de uma confrontação entre potências de primeira grandeza, como na verdade é, como um capítulo da concretização de um projeto global, em vez do argumento pueril e panfletário da luta pela expansão da democracia, estariam hoje numa posição mais confortável e vantajosa. Infelizmente, décadas de socialização impossibilita-os de terem uma cosmovisão que se distancie do servilismo.

Exatamente por isso, em vez de racionalizarem a verdadeira causa da confrontação e de orientarem o seu esforço para a resolução do problema, envolveram-se numa linguagem belicista, agitando histericamente o papão de uma invasão russa aos países da NATO, sem terem qualquer indício credível dessa possibilidade, amplificando a ameaça recorrendo a uma série de porta-vozes presentes diariamente na comunicação social. Segundo eles, a guerra com a Rússia é inevitável.

Talvez fizesse sentido evitá-la, porque serão sempre perdedores e a sua situação estratégica piorará. A haver beneficiários do lado ocidental, hipótese extremamente remota e improvável, os europeus teriam de se contentar com os restos. Apesar desta evidência, as domesticadas elites políticas europeias aderiram, sem qualquer hesitação, ao presente rufar dos tambores.

Não deixa de ser oportuno recordar o que aconteceu na preparação de Maidan, em que a Alemanha de Merkel conspirou ombro a ombro com os EUA, mas, na altura de distribuir os despojos, foi posta de lado e não conseguiu meter no governo nenhum dos seus apaniguados. Não foi além de conseguir nomear Wladimir Klitschko para presidente da Câmara de Kiev.

A linguagem dominante em Bruxelas e nas chancelarias europeias tem pouco a ver com a criação de uma capacidade de dissuasão militar europeia, mas sim com uma vontade desenfreada de criar capacidades militares para uma confrontação militar com a Rússia. Por isso, não será de estranhar o alinhamento da retórica de Bruxelas com o das maiores potências do continente.

O atual comissário europeu para a defesa e espaço e antigo primeiro-ministro lituano Andrius Kubilius sugeriu uma “solução final” para a questão russa, ao apelar à Europa para se armar ativamente com vista a um “futuro confronto” com a Rússia. Algo semelhante disse a atual representante para a política externa da União Europeia (UE) e antiga primeira-ministra da Estónia Kaja Kallas, quando afirmou que a “desintegração da Rússia em pequenas nações não é uma coisa má.” Não deixa de ser extraordinário como a narrativa revanchista dos irrelevantes bálticos – os três juntos conseguem ter metade da população de Portugal – se consegue impor na política externa da UE.

O primeiro-ministro britânico Keir Starmer e o presidente francês Emmanuel Macron “cantam a mesma música”. Macron apelou a um aumento substancial das despesas de defesa da França nos próximos dois anos, citando ameaças iminentes, leia-se Rússia: “Desde 1945, a liberdade nunca esteve tão ameaçada e nunca foi tão grave”.

Para abrilhantar o cenário, o chanceler alemão Friedrich Merz, que disse mais do que uma vez ser o seu grande objetivo tornar a Alemanha a principal potência militar da Europa, a mesma pessoa que afirmou estar Israel a fazer o “trabalho sujo” por nós [Europa], veio declarar que os esforços diplomáticos para terminar a guerra na Ucrânia se encontram esgotados: “Esgotam-se quando um regime criminoso, recorrendo à força militar, põe abertamente em causa o direito à existência de todo um país e procura destruir as liberdades políticas de todo o continente europeu.”

Esta conversa assenta que nem uma luva na ambição alemã, de longa data, de se libertar do espartilho da Guerra Fria, de se rearmar e de se tornar a grande potência militar da Europa. A Alemanha, do ex-funcionário da Black Rock – Merz, caminha assim, com grande entusiasmo, para uma escalada sem precedentes contra a Rússia. A decisão de entregar misseis Taurus à Ucrânia é mais um dos seus capítulos, com resultados perigosos e muito incertos.

Do outro lado do Canal da Mancha acirra-se a histeria militarista contra a Rússia. O ex-chefe do Exército britânico, General Patrick Sanders, em entrevista ao “Independent”, insta o governo a construir abrigos anti bombas devido à acrescida ameaça de Moscovo ao Reino Unido. Para ele, uma guerra com a Rússia dentro de cinco anos é considerada como um “cenário realista”. E acrescenta: “se a Rússia interromper as operações militares na Ucrânia, poderá lançar em poucos meses um ataque limitado contra um membro da NATO, e o Reino Unido será obrigado a responder. Isso pode acontecer até 2030”. Esta tese foi subscrita por outros dirigentes europeus. A opção dos decisores suecos de distribuir à população manuais de sobrevivência, como um preparativo para uma guerra ao virar da esquina, é reveladora da insanidade que atinge largos setores das elites políticas europeias.

Em vez de apelarem ao bom senso e à contenção, estas elites estão sequiosas por envolver os seus povos na guerra, fazendo vista grossa das consequências irreversíveis que uma aventura dessas terá para a Europa e para a humanidade. À retórica adicionam-se os múltiplos indícios de preparação para um conflito. Por exemplo, o porto de Roterdão, o maior da Europa, está a reservar espaço para navios que transportem material militar; as provocações no mar Báltico aos petroleiros com destino a portos russos são cada vez mais frequentes; a ameaça de colocar uma força de países europeus (a coligação de vontades) na Ucrânia.

Muito se poderia acrescentar para apontar o indisfarçável e destemperado desejo de se avançar para uma confrontação. Dispensamo-nos de referir as insólitas declarações sobre o tema, do secretário-geral da NATO Mark Rutte.

Tudo isto sem haver do lado de Moscovo quaisquer preparativos para atacar um país da NATO ou pretender provocar uma guerra em larga escala, artificialmente lucubrada por dirigentes insensatos e desmemoriados. Depois de três anos a combater no Donbass, com as dificuldades conhecidas, sem recorrer à mobilização e sem ter nenhuma anunciada, contando apenas com contratados, é difícil imaginar qual o interesse da Rússia, com uma população de 144 milhões de habitantes, em querer atacar países da NATO, que não dispõem de matérias-primas ou de quaisquer recursos minerais significativos. Alguém terá de o explicar devagar e com seriedade.

Para não falar da capacidade militar para o fazer e da retórica distópica, que nuns dias afirma estar a Rússia falida e que noutros dias vai atacar a NATO. O futuro da Europa não pode ficar nas mãos do revanchismo báltico e alemão, que já estiveram juntos do lado derrotado da história, na II GG. Já agora, convinha relembrar ao longo dos últimos dois séculos quem atacou quem e como terminaram essas guerras. Talvez essa reflexão possa ajudar a compreender melhor o momento que se vive.

Estes apontamentos serão aproveitados para colar o autor à narrativa russa. Aviso os mais distraídos que não se trata disso, mas tão somente de salvaguardar os interesses da Europa, onde vivo, que só perderá com mais uma guerra.

Quem aposta as fichas na derrota e na fragmentação da maior potência nuclear do mundo devia, ao invés, dar entrada num hospício. Infelizmente, é quem está à frente dos nossos destinos.

Publicado originalmente por:  A Estátua de Sal